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"B. - The situation is that of him who is helpless, cannot act, 
in the event cannot paint, since he is obliged to paint. 
The act is of him who, helpless, unable to act, acts, in the 
event paints, since he is obliged to paint. 
D. - Why is he obliged to paint? 
B. -I don't know. 
D. - Why is he helpless to paint, 
B. - Because there is nothing to paint and nothing to paint with. " 
(Beckett, 'Th-ree Dialogues with Georget 
Duthuitl, No III, "Bram Van Velde. " 19490) 
"Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called 
upon to consider questions, 'which it cannot decline, as 
they are presented by its own natdre, but which it can- 
not answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. * 
(Kant, Preface to the First Edition 
of the 
' 
Critique of Pure Reason, 
1781. ) 
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction 0 
The thesis 
"The easiest thing of all is to pass judgement 
on what has a solid substantial content; it is 
more difficult to graspit-apd-most of all dif- 
ficult to do both together and produce the 
systematic exposition of it*. - 
(Hegel. ) 
t 
Since at least 1960 there has been a considerable amount of 
critical attention paid to Beckett. Besides articles, reviews, 
chapters and paragraphs, by 1979 more, than sixty books had been 0 
published devoted exclusively to him. A lot of this critical worK- 
has been of the highest standard and certainly it is hard to imagine 
how a serious appreciation of Beckett could survive without it. But 
it is my opinion that at the heart of his writing there is an inescapable 
mass of involvement with the fundamental issues of existence that has 
yet to be dealt with adequately. In this thesis I intend to attack 
this central core of Beckett's work by associating it with the discipline 
which, by definition, operates in the same area - philosophy. This will 
provide a new "reading" of Beckett and at the same time show how far 
philosophical analogy can illuminate a writer. 
Beckett's own Philosophical asides and hints are something like 
red herrings. Descartes and his followers appear, for example, for 
the purposes of joke and parody. When one has learnedly pointed out 
what they are doing in Murphy and Watt or what Democritus is doing in 
Malone Dies one has merely done dully-for the worse-educated what 
.. 11 ., 
Beckett has already done-well-for the better-educated, which is to 
point out that certain real, painful, issues are not much helped by a 
Rati'analist-Idealist dialogue or whatever. But if Beckett laughs at 
and, plays with the answers of*traditIonal-philosophy-it can unly be 
because he is concerned with the same questions. In spite of all 
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protestations to the contrary, Beckett is working the same ground 
as the philosophers. 
I thinK that we must recognize the red herrings for what they 
are and try to give a philosophical interpretation of BecKett without 
their dubious assistance. This is not entirely possible, of course, 
and it would be unproductive deliberately to exclude, say, Zeno just 
because he is mentioned by Beckett. But my main aim is to tryýto 
lighten the Beckettian gloom with those philosophical lamps that seem 
to work best. This has led me to choose Hegel, Heidegger and Sartre. 
These three by no means exhaust the possible range of useful 
philosophical analogues for Beckett. No philosopher, anyway, is 
sui generis, and I think that every single major western philosopher 
has some light to shed both on every other philosopher and on Beckett. 
But Hegel, Heidegger and Sartre are closely related to one another and 
offer almost the full range of concepts that apply substantially to ', 
Beckett. All three take in, develop and sometimes reject the major 
work of their predecessors; all. iassume, forInstance, theidecisiveness 
of Descartes' work and Kant's. This puts them into a position rather 
like Beckett's own - he, too, has worked through philosophy up to the 
Eighteenth-Century. --He does not-refer-ta'apy philosopher later than 
Berkeley. It is almost as if we can suggest two parallel developments 
the development of philosophy since 1800 on the one hand and the 
development of Beckett's mind since he gave up reading philosophers 
an the other. 
0 
Other 
-modern philosophers. according 'to -this . parallel. ý -might 'also 
have, clainr.. -to be Included here. A--parallel between BecKett -and -the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty ý would be valuable and that between 
Language Philosophy, and BecKett has been suggested- by several rriticst 
for-example-in'the,, proposal by Jacqueline Hoefer-that'Watt, mayDwe 
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something to Wittgenstein (in her essay in Esslin, 11. This could 
be the subject of a thesis by itself, but it is not broached here. 
My inclination is not to miss so instructive a parallel as the 
Tractatus offers, but a thorough and detailed examination of a few 
philosophers, and therefore the exclusion of everyone else, is Just 
what no Beckett critic has yet undertaken and just what I am attempting. 
Above all, the three philosophers chosen display some striKingly 
Beckettian insights. Notably, they try to escape from the impasse 
into which Oescartes, took philosophy and Beckett took Murphy. 
Descartes' cogito, however, is at least, an admission that philosophy 
starts with me. Its results in the following century were, signifi- 
cantly, the Idealism of Berkeley, Hume, Kant and Hegel. To paint 
with, a very broad brush for a momentj we can say that if Greek (and 
Medieval) philosophy presents a picture of the external universe and 
is concerned, typically, with the cosmos, with man in society and with 
logical categories. Descartes decisively reverses this concern. Since 
the Seventeenth Century it has not been possible to ignore the subjective. 
and philosophy has not again tried to discuss the world without discussing 
the perceivers of it. It is no coincidence that philosophy is no longer, 
the "Queen of the Sciences", that philosophers are no longer scientists. 
Indeed, thereis a sense in which philosophy has been excluded from all 
objective disciplines, its'provinces have been annexed by cosmology, 
biology, anthropology, sociology and psychology, the sciences of the 
universe. -life, man, -man in society and-man's mind. This is a coin 
tý, 5t has a reverse side however; when-we turn-it aver we find that 
philosophy is more important, that 'ever. 'No -longer dealing with any 
specific area-cf-knowledge and-unableýto-escape-, the. demands of the 
cogito, it-has become the -moderator-of the languages of knowledge. and 
, the study-of thescientificallyIndefinable aspectsý-af the world - 
being and self., 
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However close the parallels are we must remember that Beckett 
has disclaimed any philosophical achievement. He said to Tom Driver 
"I am not a philosopher. One can only speak of what is in front of 
him, and that is simply a mess. " (Driver, 1,231 Recent critics, 
however, although none has attempted a systematic comparison, have 
found philosophy useful when dealing with Beckett. A glance at 
Hesla's bibliography in The Shape of'Chaos will make the point (Hesla, 
1,245). Or we can quote Pierre Melese an the influence of the 
Existentialists: "Parler d1influences serait, peut-letre, exag6re; 
d'impregnation semblerait plus justifiLn Wlese, 1.1201 Mary 
O'Hara, in a thesis presented in 1974, is able to say, "So close is 
Heidegger's thinking to Beckett's that the latter's work could almost 
be, seen as a literary exploration of Heideggerian mataphysics. " 
(O'Hara, 1,143) 1 hope to demonstrate how this "impregnation" and 
"exploratýon" worKs in detail (chapters 2.3, and 4) and then attempt 
some sort of synthesis that will provide a new reading of Becketý 
(chapter 51. Before embarking on this I shall give an account of the 
extent to which Beckett criticism has come to grips with philosophy. 
*** 
Beckett's CrItics. 
I have so far mentioned five critics (Hoefer. Driver, Hesla. 
Melese, O'Hara). To what extent, does philosophy really appear in 
their work and the work of others an Beckett? In fact, surprisingly 
I; tittle. ThereAs nearly alway5, in any work-on Beckett, amention of 
Descartes. Geulincx-or Zeno. -but not much more. 
The first book published about Beckett seems to have been 
Niklaus Gessnar's Die Unzulinglichkeit der Sprache published. in 1957 
in 'Zurich. Its subtitle (Eine. Untersuchung Ober'Formzerfall und 
BeziehUngslosigkeit bei-Samuel Beckett) indicates clearly enough 
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that it is concerned with structural, aesthetic questions and not 
with philosophy much beyond a bow to Rationalism and a nod to 
Existentialism. Since then this has been the pattern. To give 
some representative examples: 
Hugh Kenner's Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study (1961) is a 
good general study, an indispensable trail-blazer really, but it 
does not employ philosophical tools or methods beyond a tracing 
of Beckett's sources. That is perhaps a little unfair to a book 
which contains the delightful essay an the "Cartesian Centaur", but 
the basic point holds, I think, that there is no attempt here to take 
the philosophical analysis beyond Beckett's own lines of demarcation. 
Frederick'Hoffman's Samuel Beckett, 
__The-Language'of 
Self (1962) 
traces the literary, not the philosophical, ancestry of Beckett's 
quest for the Self. We learn a lot about Dostoevsky, Goncharov, 
Gogol, Dan'te, Kafka, Joyce and so on. Descartes, admittedly, appears, 
and there are bows to Sartre and Bergson. No real analysis of 
philosophical thinking about the Self is attempted. 
Ruby Cohn's book, Samuel Becketti The'Comic Gamut (1962) is 
excellent but, as its title implies, not really interested in 
developing philosophica'l themes. 
John Fletcher's The*Novels'of'Samuel'Bockett (19641 gives a 
critical account'of each of the novels and indicates the-presence 
In therp of Descartes, his followers, Leibniz and Spinoza. Sartre is 
mentioned twice. 
W. Y. 7indall"s monograph Samuel"Beckett (1964) covers much the 
same ground. Includes the plays. and does it. in forty-five pages. 
Ronald'Hayman's short book on'the plays (Samuel'SecKett, 1968) like 
Alec Reid's ditto [All"That"I'CanManage, More Than I Could, 1968) 
deals with the, presentation and : Lmpact of the plays, their style and 
structure, rather than their-*meaning". 
B. 
N. A. Scott's Samuel'Beckett (1965) has a brief final chapter 
that points out that "oddly enough" Beckett ban be read profitably 
in the light of Heidegger's'What is_Metaphysics? These concluding 
pages of his essay are pregnant with possibilities. 
PatricK Murray's The Tragic Comedian: A Study*of Samuel BecKett 
(1970) is a "second generation" study of Beckett that relies quite 
heavily on Cohn, Esslin, Fletcher and Kenner and does not attempt 
any original philosophical exploration. 
Francis Doherty's Samuel Beckett (1971) is also stuck in the 
now-familiar groove. It has far more about Geulincx than about 
Sartre and the chapter entitled, promisingly, "Mind and reality" 
is subtitled "Murphy and Watt" and is in fact the first chapter of 
the book. No attempt is made to provide a philosophical framework 
for the later fiction. The same applies to Brian Finney's monograph 
on Beckett's'short texts CSince How It'Is, 1972) and, perhaps 
surprisingly, to Kenner's'Reader's Guide to Samuel'Seckett (1973) which 
has plenty about Eliot and Joyce but little enough time for the 
Seventeenth Century philosophers and none for the moderns. This may 
be a function of the book's status as a Guide. 
A. Alvarez's book'Beckett 1: 19731ýhas a-striking conclusion (in 
the original edition) yoking together*Breath and a passage from 
Kierkegaard. The success of this comparison could perhaps have 
stimulated Alvarez-to further flights, but it did not. 
Ruby'Cohn's more recent -study. -the'elegant'Sack'to Beckett (19731 
50YS a "lot of Interesting, things'about all the work-to date, -none of 
strictly philosophical. -'Her most recent, excur--Aan into -this -field 
has-been to edit a vol'ume'Df EssaYs [Samuel*Becke tt, 1975)'many of them 
sparkling pieces -that throw l1gýt -into -the Beckettian murk, none of 
them interested, to-give-an account cf-it-in philosophical terms. 
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Another volume of essays thatiappeared in 1975, Beckett the 
1 Shape Changer , edited by Katharine Worth, is of interest in that 
it deliberately eschews a philosophical approach to Beckett. The 
editor, in her introduction, explains that one of the things that 
her contributors have in common is "a feeling... that philosophical 
interpretation has loomed rather too large in Beckett criticism up 
to now" and she observes that "Philosophy is, after all, only one 
of the things that keep Beckett's people going, one of their dubious 
consolations... " (Worth, 1,15) With this observation Katharine 
Worth reveals that what she and her contributors mean by "philoso- 
phical interpretation" is the picking up and explaining of the fragments 
of philosophy scattered through his work by Beckett. If this is what 
she means I think she is quite right to move on to pastures new. For 
example: John Fletcher in his second book on Beckett (Samuel Beckett's 
Art, 1967) has a definitive chapter on ". Beckett and the Philosophers" 
which "considers... the philosophers who have influenced him in 
chronological order. from the Presocratics to Leibniz and Hume". 
(Fletcher, 1.122) In every case Fletcher takes his cue -from something 
in Beckett's own text; this is a job that had to be done and Katharine 
Worth is quite right-to-maintain that, Fletcher having., done it and 
done it well, there Is no, need for us to keep on doing It. 
However, as I pointed out at the start of this section, philoso- 
phical-interpret-atibn. is not really a matter of spotting references in 
Beckettlsýworks to individual, philosophers. ItIs revealing that 
Fýqýcherls list, finishes at Hume. -Surely ItAs fair to enquire whether 
later, and perhaps more relevant,, philosophers have any. light to shed 
an Beckett. 'The, point Is-that we are talking, about two quite distinct 
operations;. there As the elucidation of learned, jokes about Hippasas 
the'Akousmatic -and there. 1s, the attempt-to use, philosophy to explain 
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largely by analogy, what Beckett means. I have listed a number of 
books that sometimes undertake the former operation and almost never 
the latter. To this list may be added the great bulk of articles 
about aspects of Beckett. The question now is whether there are any 
critics who have attempted philosophical interpretation in the second 
of our senses, that is, who have tried to do what this thesis tries to 
do. 
Some of the more conventional books about Beckett have tantalizing 
philosophical moments such as Alvarez's use of KierKegaard. Eugene 
Webb, in Samuel'Seckett, 'A Study of His Novels (1970) has one excellent 
paragraph which associates Beckett with Existentialism. (Webb, 1,181 
But is it not enough. A sentence like the following. from the paragraph 
in question, cries out for expansion: "The comfort Moran and Gaber take 
in the fact that, since'they are members of a vast organization, their 
troubles are shared sounds like what Hefdegger, in Sein und'Zeit, would 
have called-a flight into das'Man. " But that is where Heidegger is 
left. 
Ruby Cohn, in her article "Philosophical Fragments in the Works 
of Samuel Beckett" (in Criticism, Winter, 1964) goes again over-the 
ground covered'by Fletcher-and-adds three-pages an Logical Positivism 
and Existentialism. which get ýus a bit further and show clearly how 
valuable-these philosophies can be-In interpreting Beckett. 
- 'The Logical Positivist side was developed, in relation to Watt, 
by Jabqueline HoeferIn the special''Beckett'Issue of'Perspective 
Qkutumn, 1359). 'Her article is. again, promisingý but 'not fulfilling; 
thereds. a sense that she Is skating., =und'her, philosophers-rather 
than going'through'them-to: Beckett. The, -Existentialist-side-, was 
developed, by Milton Rickels, ý, (in'triticism, ", Spring, -19623. in. an-,,, article 
entitled-, wExistential'Themes in'BeckettIIs*Unnamable!. 'This-is the- 
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most promising work we have so far mentioned. It takes a late, 
difficult work from the Beckett canon and scans it for Existentialist 
elements in a way that is quite different from digging Descartes, or 
even Wittgenstein, out of Watt. But it is a brief article and alludes 
to philosophers rather than examining them in any detail. 
Besides all the above, it is necessary to take into account the 
worK done on BecKett to elucidate the religious elements in his novels, 
plays and poems. There are plenty of asides an this subject in most 
studies and, ever since the Christian interpretation of Godot was first 
put forward in 1957, there have been essays on BecKett's religious 
imagery (for instance Hersh Zeifman's'essay discussed in the final 
chapter, below). ' Most significant among these religious views is 
Richard Coe's article ! God and Samuel BecKett" (Meanjin Quarterly, 
March, 1965) which I shall also consider in the final chapter of 
this thesis. This is an appropriate place at which to mention Richard 
Coe's booK Samuel BecKett (19641 which, although it is short, must be 
put beside Michael Robinson's much longer The Long Sonata of the Dead 
(1969). These two books show authors prepared to bring their philoso- 
phical reading to be'ar on Beckett. Neither fights'shy of making 
enlightening'associations-between Beckett-and philosophers-or between 
Beckett and religious thinkers. Robinson, in particular, shows the 
right sort of ape-n-mindedness, going to the extent of adding an extra 
section to his bibliography to -list works which he has "found useful" 
while writing on Beckett. 'These'indlude: Camus, Descartes-and 
followers, Marjorie Greenels'book an Heidegger, two of Heidegger's own 
works, 'Iris Tlurdochs'book on 'Sartre. ' L*Etre et 'le Neant, Pascal's 
Pense'es. St. Augustine, Schopenhau'ar, Unamuno and Wittgenstein. ' Robinson 
does not carry through an-analysis based on, any, one D-f these or an any 
one of their concepts but he ieveals their interpretative value'better 
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than anyone so far mentioned. Coe's study is particularly good on 
Sartre and appears here in the Sartre section of Chapter Five, below. 
There have, of course, been a number of general studies in the 
field of "Literature as Philosophy" which have touched on Beckett or 
have adopted a method something like my own. Most of these have 
concentrated on Sartre and other French authors of romans ýa clef. 
E. W. Knight's excellent Literature Considered'as Philosophy (19621 
takes great trouble to set out the relevant phenomenological and 
existentialist concepts before embarking on a study of Gide, Camus, 
Sartre, Malraux, Saint-Exupery and others. Some of his methods are 
applicable to the slightly different task of seeing as philosophy 
-the literature of an anti-philosophical writer. -Works which undertake 
examinations of Beckett in this field include Enrico Garzilli's 
Circles Without*Center 2 (1972) which, has little of value for the 
student of Beckett, John Cruickshank. ' s The Novelist as Philosopher 
(1962) which has an essay on Beckett by Martin Esslin, and Charles 
Glicksberg's Modern Literature and the Death of God (1966)o 
Esslin's essay comes close to my-purpose. It discusses the 
philosophical elements In Beckett and moves to a conclusion in which 
his relationship to Sartre is briefly but pregnantly, summarized. The 
Unnamable is taken as "the culminating point of a progressive exploration 
of the self; it reveals, in the end, that very centre of nothingness, 
that state of pure potentiality by which Sartre defines Being-for-itselfw 
-i. e. le Ndant. (Crut_c_ýsharjk, 1.142) -, Esslin, says thatýBeckett_is probably 
n. 5t, consciously-influenced, by. Sartre, and that thus it-is all, the more 
'remarkable that be has put-this, aspect of existentialist philosophy 
(Nothingness). 
-Intr) the *=ncretum* of a, work-of 'art. "It Is as though, 
by, some nTysterious nsmosis., the-currents of-abstractýthought and creative 
vision in our time fiadinter-penetrated each-other% truicXshan'K, 1,143) 
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This thesis analyses that proposition. 
Glicksberg's book considers a variety of writers, but Beckett 
is central among them. This is not surprising when we consider 
that the contention of the first chapter is that, since the "death 
of God", the modern writer has been able to "discover no unitary, 
enduring self". (Glicksberg, 1.17) This connexion between God 
and the self is emphasised very thoroughly: "Relinquishment of 
faith in the absolute called for a transvaluation of values in the 
psychology of the self". libid. 18) "What is modern man to do when 
he is confronted by the vision of Nothingness? He has no self that he 
can call his own. " Cibid. 29) This leads GlicKsberg into a discussion 
of BecKett in terms of modern theology. It is interesting to see here 
I 
how-theological considerations cannot be separated from philosophical 
ones in this conte xt. It is Heidegger's view of death, for instance, 
that makes possible Tillich's new Christian vision. Both have 0 
something to add to'our understanding of Beckett. 
Besides the work mentioned so far, there have been, of course, 
scares of articles on the subject of Beckett. Most, I have said, are 
Irrelevant to our line of enquiryj some I have mentioned. There are 
soffe others which am, partially-relevant butý-none that even get as 
far as Robinson or Glicksberg in applying philosophy to Beckett. It 
is perhaps in the nature of this subject that, at one extreme, brief 
allusions to philosophers are of use to a critic discussing BecKett, 
and. at the other, extended discussion of concepts can be very 
illuminating. 'The article-length piece is not really well-adapted 
to deal with. these cDmplexities. 
In giving a : selection of -Beckett criticism I have -stuck to 
English and American*r-ritics. They are by-far the most numerous 
and they-represent areasonable sample. There is sOme-French work, 
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however, which needs to be mentioned, notably Olga Bernal's 
Langage et'fiction dans le roman*de Sambel Beckett (1969). Her 
opening points to the basic problem of both Language Philosophy and 
Existentialism, namely, language. For Being to be, we'must fall 
silentj*BecKett's worK is "une aeuvre qui cherche une autre 
lumi'e"re que celle du Verbe, la lumiere de 11indit. " *(Bernal, 1,15) 
This critic, who quotes Heidegger and Sartre quite freely, is clearly 
at home among her philosophers and she puts the ideas she applies to 
Beckett-into their philosophico-historical perspective. Kant is 
sited between Descartes and Hegel in a summary that gives a certain 
amounf- of the background to both Existentialist and Beckettian 
thought. 
I 
Besides Bernal I should mention Ludovic Janvier's book Pour 
Samuel Beckett (1966) as illuminating and Jean Onimus' Beckett (1968) 
as suggestive. Cnimus' book is in the series Les Ecrivains devant Dieu 
and as such goes some way in suggesting Existentialist theological 
parallels. He stresses, without fully exploring it, the intimate 
relationship between Beckett and Heidegger. Interestingly he ponders 
the possibility of Beckett's having read Was ist-Metaphysik? on its 
appearance in French in-1937 and, concludes: 'wBeckett... avait peut e 
alors de'ja lu Sein und Zeit. En tout 'cas les thImes principaux de 
Heidegg6r recoupent souvent ceux de Beckett. " 
This leaves me with three works for which I must accatmt. I have 
been moving from'the-less-rale'vant critics to ýhe more-relevant; these 
itlwee, are the most-relevant. "They are*David Hesla in his-st I udy of 
Beckett,. The*Shapezf Chaos, ifiesia, . 11., Edith Kern in the'Beckett 
section t3f'her'Existential Thought and'Fictional'7echnique; [Kern, *I) 
and H-J. SchulzýinThis Hell of*Stories: a Hegelian aPproar-h*to"the novels 
of'Samuel'Beckett. (Schuiz., I) 
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I shall give an account of the Schulz bock at the beginning 
of Chapter Two, the Hegel chapter, below and meanwhile I shall deal 
with Kern and Hesla in that order. 
Edith Kern presents us with three essays on the fictional 
technique of Kierkegaard, Sartre and Beckett respectively. The 
object is to relate their thinking to this technique. In the case 
of Kierkegaard and Sartre this works quite well, but the Beckett 
section presents Kern with difficulties in that Beckett himself 
has offered no wthought". Existentialist or otherwise, which can be 
related to his fiction. As a consequence of this, Beckett is related, 
nominally, to the "thoughtw of the Existentialists. What this amounts 
to is an interesting essay on Beckett studded herenand there with gems 
of comparison. 
Some of these comparisons are with non-Existentialist thinkers 
(Wittgenstein, Mauthner), many of them with Sartre's fiction, a few 
with Goethe, Cerjantes, Beckett's own Proust. A handful are actually 
with Existentialist philosophy. Heidegger's concept of Geworfenheit 
appears once, his Dasein twice, and "Being-in-the-world* is once alluded 
to. Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego figures and there are one or 
two pointsfrom Being and Nothingness such,, cat a comparison between the 
Unnamable's view of Others and the Sartrean *Look". A small number 
of Kierkegaardian points appears, and there are some references to 
Nietzsche. 
Altogether the essay is quite a success, but for anyone expecting 
aL. 1philcsophical reading of Beckett It can only act as an aperitif. 
Da%ýid Hesla. provides-a more substantial offering. The first sentence 
of the Preface to The, Shape of Chaos. runs. *This book Is an inter- 
pretation of the art of Samuel Beckett mainly from the perspective 
offered by the history-of ideas. 0 [Hesla, 1, v) Hesla'eschews the 
task of relating Beckett to. a literary traditions instead, moving 
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with enviable freedom among them, he employs a mass of thinkers, 
from the Presocratics to Sartre, to illuminate Beckett where they 
can. He deals with Beckett's work chronologically up to How It Is. 
The result is, in my opinion, the most satisfactory book to have 
appeared an this subject so far. My evaluation of'it having 
already appeared elsewhere 
31 
shall limit myself here to considering 
these areas of Hesla's book that might be said to impinge on this 
thesis. 
Hegel appears in several places, at first on account of his 
W 
centrality in the western'philasophical tradition as an Essentialist. 
Then twice in extensive epigraphs to chapters. Finally there are two 
sections that discuss Hegel in soma detail. 
The first of these (pp. 193-205) deals with the famous Master 
and Slave thesis in the Phenomenology of Mind and relates it to 
Godot and Endgame, pointing out that the Marxist view of Godot is not 
enough and that Marx's reduction of Hegel's thesis, when applied to 
Beckett, is a reduced interpretation of him too. Hesla follows 
Hegel through Stoicism and Scepticism to the Unhappy Consciousness. 
The inherent contradictoriness of Scepticism is compared to the 
, let's contradict each-othet" of Vladimir and Estragon and the 
Unhappy Consciousness (ndas ungluckliche Bewusstsein') is retrans- 
lated as "unlucky" consciousness which enables Hesla to propose that 
it is the origin of Lucky's name. Certainly a case is made for Lucky's 
being stuck In the free-floating stage of Scepticism - he Is not yet 
%61ucky". In this 'discussion of the dialectical triad arising 
from the Master-and-Slave phenomenon a lot of weight is given to 
clear explication of Hegel and rather less weight to Beckett. The 
interpretations offered seem sound but rather marginal. This first 
Hegelian section continues (pp. 199-205) by pointing out that all 
wexistentialisto thinkers parallel Hegel in their Ofear and contempt* 
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for the *Other". Hesla, instances Kierkegaard's view of the 
universal, Nietzsche's view of the herd and Heidegger's approach 
to *das Man". Hegel's "dreadful discovery" was that the Other is 
not "cut there", or not only "out there". in the world. The Other 
is also "in here's in me. (p. 200) Even man's Self is dialectical - 
it oscillates between 'I" and "Me* - all man's introspection is not 
just consciousness, it is consciousness "of". So NI" is always 
conscious wof Me*. This splitting of the S&lf is clearly of great 
significance to Beckett. Hesla-quotes a most apt passage from Jung 
to show how this split Self, in Beckett, parallels the psychologist's 
term schizophrenia. He compares this philosophical and psychological 
material with the whole range of Beckett's work, from Murphy to How 
It Is. points out that Hegel took Descartes' solution (at lea3t I am 
me) as the statement of a new problem, and concludes 
Consciousness alienates me from myself, sets 
me at the mercy of the Other, negates every 
statement of my being, and isolates me from 
every other consciousness, 
That is how it is. (p. 205) 
Hesla's second discussion of Hegel (pp. 208-213) extends these 
considerations to the Absolute. The dialectic of Being-Nothing- 
Becoming is considered, and the possibilities of God and knowledge 
about God. A comparison is made between Hegel, Kierkegaard and 
Sartre an this subject and neat resume' offered of their different es 
answers to the question of whether man's poor bifurcated Self will 
ever be able to come to rest in-itself. No rention of Beckett Is 
rýatfe in all this, but he is treated separately-in the pages that 
follow (pp. 213-2301 that Is. In the concluding pages of this work. 
This Beckett-orientated conclusion opens with "And what of 
Samuel Beckett? Is not all*this talk of Fursichsein and Ansichsein, 
of pour-sci and en-soi, of finite and infinite- is it not all far 
is. 
above his head. " (p. 213-4) And to justify his substantial philoso- 
phical commentary Hesla employs a metaphor. *I have bought and 
sold in drachmas, marks. francs, and Kroner because I am convinced 
that these are convertible into the currency of BecKett's economyn 
(p. 214) This seems to me to sum the matter up very well - Beckett 
is not a philosopher in the normal meaning of the term, some sort 
of "conversion* must take place between philosophical concepts and 
Beckett's themes, ideas and images. But it is not a question of 
trying to translate chalk into cheese; both sides of the conversion 
belong to the'same kind. 
Hesla then denies an important and widely-held assumption. He 
quotes Beckett's remark about the "shapeo of a sentence - "It is 
the shape that matters* - and goes on, "By now it should be perfectly. 
clear that the shape of Beckett's art is the shape of dialectic. " 
(p. 2151 This attacks the assumption that form and content are 
separable entities. In Beckett, as perhaps is all serious literature, 
0 
form and content merge, a point that Beckett himself makes in his 
4 
essay on Joyce So we cannot say that we are not interested in 
Beckett's *shapes* when we are drawing philosophical parallels; it 
may be. as Hesla suggests. that the shape is the key to the meaning. 
So this last chapter of Hesla's book is entitled "Dialectic and 
Absolute Absence"; the only way towards a statement of Absence is 
a dialectical one, there is only one way of shaping thought if it 
is to reach truth. 
Hesla demonstrates how this can work in apractical example. 
He offers an excellent piece of comparative criticism in which Hegel is 
employed to illuminate Beckett in the manner I propose to adopt in 
this thesis. Hesla sees that Beckett's trilogy may be patterned 
according to Hegel's dialectic - Thesis, Antithesis. Synthesis. It 
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can be read "as the moments in the dialectic of a single "transcen- 
dental" self" (p. 219) Malloy is the thesis and Moran the antithesis, 
for Molloy is character and Moran is author. The synthesis is Malone. 
Malone, in his turn, is a thesis in his wcharacterial* being, and his 
own antithesis is his "authorial" being. "Finally, MAlone himself is 
negated by the Unnamable, who comprehends in himself all the preceding 
moments of the dialectic. " (p. 219) In addition the three books of the 
trilogy can be seen as Master, Slave and Unhappy ConsciousneS5 respect- 
ively. Once this is established, Hesla can take Hegel further: 
Hegel did not intend the Phenomenology to 
be the description of some numinous. non- 
real "Spirito. He intended it as an 
accurate account of the development of 
-freedom and self-consciousness through its 
several concrete stages in the history of 
Western man. 
If we take the same perspective an the 
trilogy, beholdl What vistas an inter- 
pretation are opened to usl For Molloy is 
now revealed not only as a fictional 
character and as standing in dialectical 
opposition to Moran in the primordial state 
of self-consciousness. but as the Spirit in 
its manifestation as the Greek world... 
(and so on. ) (p. 220) 
So we can say that Hesla uses Hegel first as a proponent of certain 
sorts of Ideas that have been important in the intellectual tradition 
of which Beckett forms part and second as a direct comparison with 
Beckett, a coaparison that is at first illuniinating but that can 
degenerate, as the example quoted above, shows. into the merely 
interesting. the amusing, and even far-fetched. 
What of Heidegger as a tool in Hesla's hands? There is an 
assuffption-underlying The Shape, of Chaos that Haidegger is closer to 
Beckett, than Hegel. which I -think is fair enough, but it remains a 
-fact that-he &PPa"Wfi*razner less often'than*Hegel- Apart from, twO 
passing references. -Heidegger supplies two epigraphs to chapters-and 
0 
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is discussed in two p3paces, though not at such length as Hegel. 
The first of these (pp. 126-128) points out that Heidegger's answer 
0 
to the question "Who? " ("Who is Dasein? " Answer - "an existence") 
is appropriate as an answer to the Unnamable's "Who now? " (p. 126) 
We also have a brief explanation of "Others" and I'das Man" in 
Heidegger and an association of these with the Unnamable's slavery 
to "them" - "I have no language but theirs" and so on. 
The second of Hesla's Heideggerian discussions is more extensive 
and it opens with a point about the comparison that is being made which 
could serve as a description of this thesis. HeslaiAls offering an. 
interpretation of a scene in Godot. 
I am not imputing a knowledge of Heidegger 
to Beckett (though I would not deny it either), 
and am not supposing that Beckett's works are 
puzzles or allegories explicable only by 
reference to Sein und Zeit. I am, rather, trying 
to get at the "meaning" of the scene, and am using 
Heidegger as one of several possible ways of doing 
so. (p. 140) 
Hesla uses Heidegger to probe the meaning of the scene in Godot where, 
the blinded Pozzo having fallen over, the tramps talK about whether 
they should help him up or not, and about what they are doing there. 
He brings in Dasein,. guilt, inauthentic existence, "das Man", the *they- 
Self", conscience and Dasein's wown-most-patentiality-for-Being-its-Self". 
(p. 144) The application of these concepts is convincing. Used 
cautiously they throw-a light an the scene that is otherwise unavailable. 
They indicate the desirability of a thorough consideration of all of the 
concepts of Being and Time as possible illumination for Beckett. 
Sartre appears in Hesla more extensively than, either Hegel or 
lisidegger. There is a large number af passing references to his work, 
an epigraph-to a chapter, and'his development of Hegelian ideas figures 
In the discussions of llegel mentioned above. There is one section of 
The Shape rif 'Chaos. however. that is devoted to a detailed analysis of 
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Sartrels. Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness (pp. 184- 
192). This is preceded (pp. 169-183) by a consideration of Husserl's 
phenomenology, particularly as it relates to the Ego. The result is 
most of a chapter (chapter VI, "Reduction. Reflection, Negation: Some 
Versions of Consciousness*) in which some of the most important modern 
thinking an consciousness is summarized and applied to Beckett. Hesla 
does his job well and quite thoroughly - so much so that I propose to 
leave a consideration of his technique and the points he raises to the 
last two chapters of this thesis. Hesla's use of Hegel and Heidegger 
seems to be like an arrow, pointing towards the sort of philosophical 
interpretation. of Beckett that I attempt in the relevant chapters, below. 
But. the Sartre section comes a little closer to actually carrying out 
the interpretation and must therefore be incorporated into my chapter 
on Sartre. I mention my final chapter Mhe Wellhead*) because it was 
my intention, even before Hesla published. The Shape of Chaos, to use 
Husserl and Sartre an the transcendence of the Ego to help with the 
discussion that wil 1. it is hoped, lead to a new philosophical reading 
of Beckett. This is still my intention but it is not possible to dismiss 
Hesla an Sartre here, his reading being similar to my own. 
Thus. with the possible. exception of Hesla. and of Schulz whom we 
shall look at in the next chapter, none of Beckett's critics has really 
broughtphilosophy to bear an him in any detail or for any extended 
analysis. In what follows philosophy is brought as close to Beckett as 
I believe Is possible without twisting things. In the -final chapter 
we'shall be able to see whether it is worthwhile to criticize literature 
in'this way. * 
20. 
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CHAPTER TWO Hegel's Phenomenology And The Unnamable 
H-J. Schulz: This Hell of Stories 
The only critic to undertake a substantial Hegelian study of 
Beckett is Hans-Joachim Schulz. His short work is entitled This Hell 
of Stories: A Hegelian approach to the novels of Samuel Beckett. It 
opens with an explanation of its purpose, which is to draw an 
illuminating parallel between Beckett's way of writing and Hegel's way 
of thinking. Schulz pursues a theme that, I shall recur to again and 
again: 
Why do the Beckett artist-bums want silence, 
why do they not achieve it, why do they not 
die? To show the importance of these-questions 
to the Beckett novels, to show that they enter 
us (sic) into a dialogue with Hegel which will 
expose their timeless nature, this is'the purpose 
of the following chapters. 
(Schulz, 1,30) 
This German critic has seen that anything like an, explanation of 
Beckett's unwillingness to fall silent, and of similar paradoxes, is 
going to require philosophical aid. 
After explaining his intentions and saying something about the 
novels he will deal with, Schulz offers an excellent chapter on Beckett - 
and Descartes. In this he employs the method used in the present thesis: 
specific works of Descartes are combed for*Beckettian moments. This leads 
into a consideration of a few "stubborn paradoxes7. such as the Proustian 
problem of the past, which appear in both Beckett and Hegel. There is 
. something slightly unsatisfactory about 
this section: Schulz gets into 
a position in which he can claim that any side of an argument-is Hegelian 
(this is a Hegelian position of course]. ForInstance, concerning the 
past, he says that BecKett's narrators discard their past lives because. 
being unable to understand duration., they are unable to understand'histOrY 
as process and,, growth. This is compared with Hegel's view of-the 
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"ordinary mind" which conceives conflicting philosophical systews 
as being right or wrong and which therefore discards one side of 
the argument. But, in the first place, that is not what the 
BecKettian narrator does and, in the second place, Schulz would 
presumably claim as "Hegelian" a narrator who did just the opposite 
and fully understood process and growth. (Schulz, 1,43-44) 
The Hegelian element in this booK, in spite of its title, only 
really comes into its own in the fourth chapter ("The Dialectic 
Battleground") and in the first half of the fifth chapter ("Dying 
and Killing"). - Thereafter broader aesthetic and mystical considerations 
predominate and, although there are plenty of good things about BecKett 
inýthe later chapters, they need not detain us while we are concentrating 
on Hegel. 
The fourth and fifth chapters, then, make a case for Beckett and 
Hegel. They do so fairly convincingly. The following pages owe 
something to Schulz's discussion, but it should be noted that he does 
not attempt any systematic account of Hegel nor does he work through 
any-given Hegel text. Instead he puts Beckett and Hegel side by side 
under the umbrellas of a few different concepts. The result is that 
he moves-freely about in the works of both writers In. a way, that casts 
some doubt on his proceedings. I do not mean that his parallels are 
false, *although-some of them are rather weak and far-fetched, but 
that it-seems doubtful that he has always managed'to put his finger 
exactly-on-the-right places, in Hegel and Beckett. Where one-is 
Cmparing two abscure, and hardly self-consistent writers it-is perhaps 
best, to deal with -at%least -Dne of them systematically. 
I shall, not ý=fer ýto -Schulz again In what follows. We -shall 
have enough ta. do in keeping Hegel and'Beckett in play without always 
having to-consider an-alternative umpire. ' 
* 
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The Dialectic. 
My choice of Hegel as a starting-point is-not based on merely 
chronological or arbitrary considerations. Hegel's insistence on 
the inclusiveness of his work and its participation in the universal 
movement of philosophy means that there is an economy in first 
approaching Beckett through him. 
1 
Although it cannot be true that 
Hegel includes and surpasses all his predecessors it is certainly 
hard to find a major philosophical issue untouched in his work. If 
Beckettian situations have philosophical analogues there is every 
chance that they will be found in Hegel. But this is less important 
as a reason for starting with Hegel than the simple fact of the strong 
parallels to be found between-some of Hegel's ideas and some of 
Beckett's. These parallels, are-reinforced in several cases by a 
similarity of expression and, it must be admitted, a similar obscurity. 
The insight that makes Hegel's-philosophy possible is 
identical with the motive force that makes Beckett's work continue 
and not simply grind to a despairing halt. This motivation is the 
dialectic. 
Hegel developed the dialectic in an attempt to overcome Hume Is 
problem af. causation. 'Because X.. Js always fnllowed by Y are there 
any good-logical grounds for assuming that X is the cause of Y? 
Can Y be 16gitimately deduced from X? For example, whenever I put 
my finger into a -flame I feel pain, but can the pain be said to: be 
by the flame? The. difficulty Is that the pain does'not seem 
-to-. be-logically"lpresentm in the, flame. 'It-may be objected that-if 
we take another,, example-,, different-. results follow. Water when cooled 
to a -cartain:, point becomevice, 'for example. and 'the Ace does seem 
toýbe "present- in the water. But, in fact-these exanples are 
inadequate if, they permit'this sort of niaterialist: ccrifusion. A 
chemical or physical explanation of why Y follows X leaves our logical 
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problems untouched; - given water and a low temperature we expect ice, 
but, if asked why, we ultimately fall back on an explanation that lacks 
formal necessity - we have to say that we expect ice simply because we 
have always found it in these conditions. 
To combat this problem Hegel adopted the dialectical method, 
the outstanding characteristic of which is that it will only proceed 
in, so far as consequences are contained in causes. Dialectic moves 
in threes, in triads that approximate to thesis, antithesis and synthesis. 
If the dialectic WorKs the antithesis is contained in the thesis and 
the synthesis in them both. 
Thus, for example, Hegel avoids the concept "God" because he sees 
that an act of faith is, indeed, required, to deduce the world from it. 
There is no, logical necessity for "God" to give rise to "world". When 
he posits the concept "being", however, he finds that it contains its 
opposite, "nothing". and that these two contain their synthesis, 
"becoming". How being can contain nothing is explained thus: the 
being of an object is what is "left"*after we have subtracted all its 
qualities and properties such as its size, shape, colour. age and so onj 
but what are we in fact left. with when we have done this subtraction? 
Nothing. So-nothing-is alreadyln, being. "There is no need tn deduce 
one from the other. Thus, at least in the realm of abstract thought, 
we, have'an alternative to the traditional way of handling causation. 
The dialectic is the motive forcebehind Hegel. It is not merely 
,a method, 
it is a self-propelling-account of the universe, Indeed, it 
is, the'-Iogical-structure-of, the, universe. As Stace puts it, 
This antire-, -process of-categories.: Ls a compulsory 
process -forced onwards by the compelling necessity 
of reason. By-, rational necessity-the thesis gives 
rise to Its opposite and so to a contradiction. 
Reason cannot-rest in what is self-contradictory, 
and Is therefore forced onwards to the synthesis. 
And-zo throughout. 'This process cannot stop. * It 
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must go an until a category is reached which 
'aoes not give rise to any contradiction. 
(Stace, 1,93) 
This could serve as a pretty accurate description of Beckett's 
endless attempts to "get it all said". 
The inexorable march of reason, as described by Stace, is the 
basis of man's inability to fall silent, although silence would so 
obviously be an immense relief to Beckett's narrators. As the 
Unnamable says, "You must go on. " Beckett, too, employs the 
dialectic or, better, the dialectical nature of the mind and the 
world is what confronts him and his narrators. They proceed, as 
he does, by "affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered" (T. 293) 
just as Hegel's logic works-'by cancelling its previous moments as it 
moves from thesis to antithesis and thence to synthesis. It is 
doubtful whether Beckett ever reaches a synthesisi this-will be our 
problem in Chapter Five. 
Hegel's world-picture, then, is triple. It rests on such triads 
as "Being-nothing-becoming. " The world is adequately described for 
him under three main heads, Logic. Nature and Spirit, the three 
divisions of the Encyclopedia.. The things of "Nature" include physical 
objects and the laws that govern thems-ttie--things of "Spirit" include 
all mental and psychical phenomena and are clearly to be distinguished 
from Nature in that my conception of, say, a-table is a different sort 
of thing from the table itself. "The category "Logic" presents more 
difficulty: Hegel. here at-his most Platonic, wants to, be: able to 
atcbunt -, for such ýphenomena as Appearance. Cause. Relation, Reason, and 
so on. Of these'heýsays, that'they have, beinglyou, can't very well 
admit the world without admitting-relation. -sayl-but no 'existence". 
Logical abstractions such as these are, clearly'not-physical objects. 
-They are not mental things either. "Whenl. stop feeling angry, my anger 
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is simply not there, but Hegel cannot suppose that Relation is 
"not there" when isolated from human perception. So we have three 
categories of being, Nature, Spirit and Logic, of which one, Logic, 
presents some difficulties, notably as to "where" its components 
are to be found. 
Beckett is also aware of a triplicity in the world. In the 
section of'The Unnamable where the narrator is "confusing himself 
with Worm" and where the prose becomes disjointed, leaping from topic 
to topic and switching pronouns at will, we find him asking, "I 
wonder if I couldn't sneak out by the fundament, one morning, with 
the French breakfast. " He answers his own query with "No, I can't 
move, not yet. " This creates a rich-and tormenting Beckettian 
confusion while repelling the understanding. Obviously the 
here is ambiguously placed and must be read as both a physical "I" 
that, for. example, "can't move" and a-mental one that can be isolated 
from its body. Perhaps it is a foetus, waiting to, make the first 
movements of life; we have, after all, just been treated to the gnomic 
sentence "Worm will I ever get born? " The sentence that follows makes 
it clear that Beckett too is tormented by the confusion: "One minute 
In a skull and the next--in. a belly, strange, and the next nowhers, in 
particular. " Brain, belly and bowels. But not just that. 
To-repeat, the whole passage runs: 'I wonder-if I couldn't sneaK 
out by the fundament, one morning., with the French breakfast. No, .1 
can4t move, not yet. One minute in a skull and*the nextin a belly, 
Sýrange, and the'next nowhere in-particular. ""AT. 355) 
This sort of,, passage As cmnventionally , -, and correctly., iread 
as -a puzzle about the Self. Is the Self t mental i3r physical? " PeMaps 
the Hegelian parallel, can take, us further-than this-however. -It-Is-not 
j us t- a ýmatter Df, where '! I" , am. it -is, a -matter -af where 'and what, -the. world 
Is. But to start with the Self: 'The digestiveýeleffent andýthe worm-f0etus 
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element must be taken largely as metaphors. Their strength may 
lie in their heavy physicality but their sense must be elsewherej 
there are strong indications that this passage, and many like it, 
should be read as abstract speculation. The narrator considers 
moving, tries to move perhaps, realizes that he can't move and 
resorts to generalization instead. He says in effect, "It's funny 
how I locate my Self first in my skull, then in my belly and then 
nowhere" thus abstracting from his earlier pondering about the 
chance of sneaking out by the fundament. Here we have the Hegelian 
triad. In the skull are psychic things, the things of the Spiritj 
but is the Self there? The belly is the archetypal physical entity; 
is the Self there? And "nowhere in particular" is the best we can 
do-to imagine where the Self might be. 
-, But we said we could go beyond this with Hegel's help. So we 
move from the subjective to the objective, and see Beckett's 
speculations about the Self as being potentially about the world. 
When the Unnamable moves from thinKipg about his own chances of 
escape to thinking in more general terms he is thinking about the 
world too. All reality is one minute in a skull, then in a belly, 
thenýnowhere: all reality is mental'(Spirit) physical (Nature) or 
abstract (Nowhere in particulars Logic). 
A-little later the Unnamable is again talking about "they" who 
seem to control him and he says wThey want me to have a pain In the 
neck, irrefragable proof of animation, while listening to talk of 
ttTe'heavens. 'They wantýme'to have'a-mind where It Is known once and 
for-, all that I. '. have a, pain in the neck. thatýflies aredevouring me 
and that'the heavens can do-nothing to"help. "'IT. 356) '"They*-seem 
to-propose'the'triad, the'three levels of being: physical, the pain 
in the neck, - mental, '. the, mind ýthat knows It has -a: pain- -in 'the, neck, 
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and our abstract plane (the heavens). Examples like this could be 
Multiplied. 
The interpretation of Beckett which emerges from this sort 
of analogy-drawing with Hegel has repercussions for other inter- 
pretations and it certainly amplifies them. The view, for instance, 
that the reference to "the heavens" in the above passage is simply a 
bitter pointing to the irony of the non-existence of the heavens is 
Perhaps not enough - we can go beyond this with Hegel's help. BecKett 
is being ironical, of course, but the irony is made more than just 
another antitheistical jibe by our Hegelian approach. The dialectic 
has the effect of cutting us off from the cosy personal relationship 
with God in which He is presented as the antidote for despair. 
Hegel's God is Absolute Reality, that is He is the structure of the 
world. In other words God does ordain "how it is" but is unavailable 
for later modifications. "Talk of the heavens" is useless blather. % 
There is not much'"help" to be found in a Nowhere land of logical 
abstractions. 
The above remarKs have already brought SecKett more closely in 
touch with Hegel than has yet been done by any of his critics except 
POssibly Schulz. But all that has been said has been very general 
and the examples taken at random. The burden of this thesis is that 
SYstematic, detailed comparison will produce, interesting results. 
Obviously it-is not necessary to relate all-of Hegel to. all of-Beckett. 
-rhat proceeding would be unbearably lengthy and not really very much 
'Mare use than a-vore selective approach. 'Consequently I have chosen 
to 
. use one novel of Beckatt's. the Dne most -in - need of 7111urrdnation 
-In my opinion. and to compare -it with one work of Hegel's ---the 
ind. 
The Phenomenology expounds Hegells, main-theses quite-freely and 
at 
-length; lt is not, so compressed as the mnly other candidate among 
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Hegel's work for our task, the Encycloped: 
2 
English translation quite readily. It is 
These seem to me to be sufficient reasons 
method I adopt could, however, be applied 
mature work and to most of Hegel's purely 
*** 
La. It is available in an 
Hegel's most famous work. 
for selecting it. The 
to almost any of Beckett's 
philosophical writings. 
Depth. 
In the Preface to the Phenomenology Hegel observes that during 
the centuries of Faith "consciousness" possessed "the assurance ..... of 
being reconciled with ultimate reality and with its all-pervading 
presence. within as well as without. * (PM. 72) Man ("Self-conscious 
mind") has moved out of this security but has not been content with a 
simple self-sufficiency which merely provides "husks" for him to feed 
on. "Self-consciousness" now desires from philosophy not so much io 
bring it to a Knowledge of what it is, as to obtain once again through 
philosophy "the restoration of that sense of solidity and substant- 
iality of existence it has lost. " CPM. 72) Hegel is talking about a 
situation obtaining in 1807 but it is a situation in which not much is 
'to be hoped. In his own day Hegel had to point out that *in expecting 
philosophy to provide "edification" (which he glossed as a synthesis 
along the lines of some such misty concept as "the beautiful, the holy, 
the eternal... '" (PM. 72) man was asking the impossible of it. Hegel's 
-rigour and insistence on-clarity proposed to offer instead a picture 
the truth, howpver unsatisfying. 'In spite of his antagonism 
towards Romantic longings for synthesis he describes such longings 
in terms of pity: since thedecay of faith'man's mind has become 
"rooted in the earthly". and-"his-spirit shows such poverty of nature 
that it seems to long -for the mere pitiful feeling of'the divine 
in the abstract, and to get refreshment from that, like a wanderer 
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in the desert craving for the merest mouthful of water. " (PM. 73) 
The pity betokens Hegel's foresight, that all his systems, worlds 
and words will not fill the void that has been left in man. Here 
we come up against one of the central, and most painful, paradoxes 
in Beckett. - In Hegel's terms, post-religious man is seeking an 
infinite; he erects substitute religions which "pretend to occupy. 
the very centre and the deepest depths". Now, instead of proceeding, 
as we might expect, to a demolition of these pretensions on the grounds 
that there is a "centre" and there are "depths", though, alas, not 
where his contemporaries think they are, Hegel opens the way for a 
philosophy that will redefine "depths" altogether. He says: "But 
just as there is-a breadth which is emptiness, there is a depth which 
is empty too: as we may have an extension of substance which overflows 
into finite multiplicity without the power of keeping the manifold 
together, in the same way we may have an insubstantipl-intensity which, 
keeping itself in as mere force without actual expression, is no 
better than superficiality. " (P. 74) 
The philosophy to which this opens the door is Existentialism. 
Not only does it foreshadow Sartre's theory of totalities ("there is 
-no 
2ove, apart frmmýthe deeds of love") 
3 but It seems to open the WaY 
for-the Essence/Existence 1-distinction inthat "the depths" are 
'essences'that come-second to the "existence" of-the things said 
to. possess them. To refer, again to Sartre's, example of1ove, perhaps 
there simply is "no such thing as the "deep" 'essence "Love"j them are 
tply, the-actions of love. TheAmportant point here, is"that-having 
'expelled Romantic emotion -and religion from '"the ., 
depths", Hegel does 
'not"abolish-them - be, merely, says that there is "a-depth which, is empty' 
-and*that It-Is '"no better, than-superficiality". This emptiness. is being, 
_Presence, '-theýuseless but-dnescapable aspect of all-things. 
, We shall,, get, back to Beckett by way of Robbe-Grillet. - -In-Four 
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Eignifications" should give place to "presence". "Significations" 
are meanings, essences, depths, and, in the Hegelian-Sartrean 
tradition, they are suspect depths. No amount of "meaning" can 
replace presence - the reality of the world is its presence. 
Adjectives in literature, for example, erode "presence" by 
injecting meaning into it. Adjectives, and art in general, partake 
of 
"la destitution des vieux mythes de "profandeur". 
On sait que toute la littgrature romanesque 
reposait sur eux, sur eux seuls. Le r3le de 
119crivain consistait traditionellement b 
creuser dans la Nature, a l1approfandir, pour 
atteindre des couches de plus en plus intimes 
et finir par mettre au jour que1que bribe d'un 
sdcret troublant. Descendu dans Vabllme des 
passions humaines, il envoyait au monde tranquille 
en apparence {celui de la surfacel. des messages 
de victoire decrivant les mystbres qulil avait 
touchds du doigt. Et le vertige sacrLS qui 
envahissait alors le lecteur, loin dlengendrer 
l1angoisse ou la nausee, le rassurait au contraire 
quant a son pouvoir de domination sur le monde. 
Il y avait des gouffres, certes, mais grace a de 
vaillants spdlgologues on pourrait en sonder le 
fond. " 
(Robbe-Grillet, 1,22) 
Thus much for the valiant explorers who bring up fragments 
from the depths of the psyche. Clearly Robbe-Grillet is mocKing 
such a view of the nature ofliterature-or -of psychology. For 
him the "profcndeurf' of the psyche is an inapt metaphori what he 
has to say later an the subject of "surface" against "depth" makes 
it clear that he ýechoes Hegel's dislike of the pseudo-priority 
given to-the latter. 
One nf the -essays InTnurýUn Nouveau "Roman Is entitled "Samuel 
BecXett, au la presence sur la sclne" (Robbe-Grillst. 1,95). In It 
Robbe-Grillet explains-Beckett's move f=m-fiction to the tbeatre by 
saying that If we cannotsay much that-is--. -nieaningful-aboutýman. -at 
least in the theatre; we can 'know, that he is, there- "La-condition de 
1'Ohomm -, dit Heidagger, C'East-d'ýtre l'a..... ýLe, personnage de theatre 
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est en scene ctest sa premiere qualitg: il est lb". (Robbe- 
Grillet. 1,95) A more interesting, a mare real "depth', then, 
is the "depth" of presence, existence, being-there. 
We are now in a position to gloss Hegel's paradox in two ways; 
"there is a depth which is empty" applies to the hollowness of 
the Romantic and Naturalist claims of "traditional" writers, as 
described by Robbe-Grillet. It also applies to the real, if 
, 
incomprehensible, claim of the Existentialists that existence has 
an absolute priority, that a thing's existence is its reality and 
that this "profoundest" (i. e. most important) aspect of an object 
is, precisely, an emptiness. We shall have more to say about 
this when we confront Sartre; for the moment the title of his 
magnum opus can stand for itself - Being and Nothingness 
If we try to interpret the metaphors of "depth" in Beckett 
in a traditional, religious or Freudian light we find the results 
curiously unsatisfying. In How It is we find a perfect illustration 
Of the point. The creatures crawling about in the mud are "down 
4 
here" and the voices, the scribes, the old life, is "up there". 
We feel it to be almost insulting, a trivialization, -to suggest 
that "down here"Is the libido, a dark hell af unconscious desires. 
And if we develop this and suggest that *down here" is literally 
some sort of hell. this too seems inadequate ih that Beckett, for 
all his characters' deaths and pseudo-ýdleaths, impresses, us as the 
writer who par excellence speaks -of the mess that is "here and 
how it is is the-question. So where, are we-to go-for 
soma help in our, understanding of this metaphor? (That It Is a 
metaphor can hardly be in doubt. Surely-nobody could suggest 
-that the subject of Howlt, lsls a scientific description of 
survival in mud any more"than they -could suggest-that zi 
Christian 
should attempt to., get'to heaven with the aid of a Saturn-5 rocKet. ) 
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The answer may be that we should go for help to philosophy. Seen 
in the light of Hegel, seen as a writer with the same concerns as 
Sartre and Robbe-Grillet, BecKett at once appears serious in a way 
that he does not when we apply "depth" psychologically. A looK 
at How It is in terms of the "depth that is empty" gives that novel 
a, perspective in which we can understand it. 'We find the same 
thing throughout BecKett's mature worK; certainly it applies to 
the Unnamable. He, too, is "down here" somewherej he can talK 
of "them" as being "up there in their world" (T. 300) and ask. 
Why did I have myself represented in the midst of 
men, the light of day? It seems to me it was 
none of my doing. We won't go into that now. 
I can see them still, my delegates. The things 
they have told mel About men, the light of day. ' 
I-refused to believe them. But some of it has 
stuck. But when, through what channels, di. d-I 
communicate with these gentlemen? Did they 
intrude an me here? No, no one has ever 
intruded on me here. Elsewhere then. But I 
have never been elsewhere. 
CT. 299) 
It is insufficient, and the reader knows that it is insufficient, 
to be lured into admiration and acquiescence by the hypnotic 
brilliance of the monologue of which this is a tiny part, by its 
irony and mad ratiocination. If we are content with a Cartesian 
view of Beckett in the face of this we remain what Descartes 
remained - rationalists in a world where reason is not the whole 
story and where, Indeed, it may confuse as much as belp. What is 
needed is a proper acceptance of the fact that the Unnamable here 
mipans what heds saying. that he is trying to express something. 
It-is, of course, something Inexpressible as Beckett well knbws. 
but philosophy has been, struggling'to express the inexpressible 
since the'Presocratics. 
Thus it Is, easy for the reader. even if he does not cast 
aside a sentence such as. -"No. no one has ever intruded ion me here" 
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as unimportant, to swallow it as yet another ambiguous dithyramb 
or yet another utterance to be contemplated in mystic awe. These 
levels are quite legitimate but, surely, inadequate. Let us try 
to do better. 
"No one has ever intruded on me here" is obviously part of 
an extended metaphor of place. The Unnamable has communicated 
with others, even if only with his own "delegates", but he cannot 
imagine how because he has the conviction that he is finally 
isolated, and has always been so. For what can this be a metaphor? 
Surely it is a literary perception of the anguished isolation that 
is permanently revealed by philosophical investigations into the 
nature of consciousness and the self. Hegel has set the scene - 
"there is a depth which is empty" ;- there is nothing in the 
Unnamable's "me". nothing has ever got through into that emptiness. 
Robbe-Grillet proposes that the time has come for a turning away 
from the "traditional" depths of passion to a contemplation of 
being-thereness as more important, but BecKett finds that it is 
preC15ely this empty concept of "presence" that opens a void into 
which comprehension disappears - for if it is irreducibly true 
that Malone's pencil "is, there"-it -is also 
Irreducibly true that 
Malone "is there" and how have the twain ever met in so entirely 
discrete a world? And what sort of a "being-thereness" 
have Malone 
and the Unnamable got? A subject's "being-there" 
is different 
in kind from the penci'l's and just as emPtY- And, itis quite 
. 11 'ýnescapablej -"I, have never been elsewhere*- If his 
"delegates'" 
are his senses how have they communicated with the emptiness 
that 
is himself? 
*** 
35. 
Subjectivity (The Preface) 
Insisting on the importance of a scientific philosophy, Hegel 
observes that the religious man shrouds his consciousness in 
"sheer emotion" and sleeps. The painfulness of consciousness is 
a demon with which Beckett will wrestle long and hard. Hegel 
lays down the foundations for a language in which to discuss 
consciousness (in Baillie's translation the three main divisions 
of the Phenomenology are "A. Consciousness. B. Self-consciousness. 
C. Free Concrete Mind". ) Already in the Preface he justifies 
this stress on consciousness, the sulfject; I offer-glosses from 
the early pages of. The Unnamable: 
The living substance, further, is that being 
which is truly subject, or, which is the same 
thing, is truly realized and actual Cwirklich), 
solely in'the process of-positing itself ("I. say 
I" says the Unnamable), or in mediating with its 
own self its transitions from one state or position 
to the opposite ("I seem to speak, it is not I. 
about me, it is not me"). As subject it is pure 
and simple'negativity ("Impassive, still and mute. 
Malone revolves, a stranger forever to my 
infirmities, one who is not as I can never nof 
be"), and just on that account a process of 
splitting up-what is simple and undifferentiated, 
a process of duplicating and setting factors in 
opposition ("Malone is there"). ... True reality 
is merely this process of reinstating self- 
identity. ... 1t. is the. proceS5 of Its own 
becoming, the circle which presupposes its end 
as its purpose, and has its, end for, its beginning 
("And indeed I greatly fear, since my speech can 
only be of me and here, that'l am once more 
engaged in putting an end to both. Which would 
not matter, ýfar from it, but-for the obligation, 
once rid of them, to begin again, to start again 
from nowhere, from no one and-from nothing-and 
win to = again, 'toýmeýhereýagain,, by fresh ways 
to be sure. or-by-the ancient-ways. unrecognisable 
at each freshfaring"). 
(PM. 80-al. T . 293-304. ) 
This 'section -, of the Preface -to -the Phenomenology, comes -under 
the-subtitle "The Absolute as Subject*. 'We shall'bave Tnore'to 
say about this. Beckett works out, the-. subjectivitY of his 
characters to, the pointwhere it-too appearsýto be described--as 
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absolute: 
What I say, what I may say, on this 
subject. The subject of me and my abode, 
has already been said since, having, 
always been here, I am here still. 
(T. 304. My italics. ) 
The confusion as to what is him and what is not him that the 
Unnamable feels echoes Hegel's paradox that "substance is 
essentially subject". With this we are introduced to an idealism 
and to a sort of Deism - "the Absolute as Spirit"-w-hibb. are not 
more realistic or comprehensible than the Unnamable's wandering 
speculations. 
This marriage of substance and subject is "the truth". The 
Absolute is the combination of substance (the "an-sich", the 
objects of con5CiOU5ness) and subject (the "fýr-sich", 'consciousness 
itself). Now, although Hegel leaves the door open for God 
(despite his disliKe of that "meaningless" word) as Absolute 
Subject, what he is concerned with in the Phenomenology is man's 
mind - human self-consciousnessl of this he admits that 
"consciousness" for itself "is a state quite outside of science". 
CPM. 88). This hint is important - it allows of an, indefinable 
area at'the heart', of-the ýself: that will'be useful for Sartre and 
Beckett. Subjectivity. then, is uniquely human - the attribute 
of developed human minds: 
While the bmbryo is certainly,, in, it-self, 
implicitly a human being, it is not so explicitly, 
it is not by itself a 'human being (T'ur sich); 
manIs explicitlyýman only in the form of 
'developed and cultivated reason,, which has made 
itself to be what it is implicitly. 
(PM. 83) 
The'German wordsin-brackets'ln the-above lead me to prefer 
*for'itself" to "by Itself" earlier 'in the sentence. We, -then 
have a conformity between, Hegel and Sartre an the distinction 
between-things [including-embryos). which are "an-sich", "en-sol", 
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"in themselves", and human minds, which are "fur-sich", "pour-soi", 
"for themselve5". What a double-headed monster this is for 
Beckett's heroes. Not only are they human, with the thousand 
natural shocks that flesh is heir to, but they are "human for 
themselves", "fur-sich"; conscious, that is, of beingi of being 
themselves; of being human. 
Hegel, however, does not pursue his analysis of the subjective 
with Sartre's vigour. He certainly insists in several places 
that subjectivity is "being-for-itself" and is "pure negativity", 
concepts to be much clarified and dev@loped by Sartre; but his 
self is not quite the "empty" entity that this might lead us to 
suppose. For example, Purpose is "the unmoved whichis self- 
movingi as. '-buch it is subject". This leads Hegel into his 
idealist thesis in which he claims that the actual has an identity 
with our mental pictures of itj but "what is actual and concrete 
is the same as its inner principle or notion simply b6lbause the 
immediate qua purpose contains within it the self or pure actuality. 
The-realized purpose, or concrete actuality. is movement and 
development unfolded but this very unrest is the self". CPM. 83) 
It Is worth considering here this, "aside" of Hegel's, to the effect 
that purpose is "in" the self, or vice-versa. Malone, for 
instance, in proposing to tell his stories, is really after the 
0 pure actuality in himself% The offensiveness of this suggestion 
th-at 'purpose, contains the self" and that "pure actualityw'is in 
-the self. which is also-pure negativity* gives us some insight 
"into Malonels. problem. He spins out his words and stories in 
an attempt to, zreate an existence. - after all. 'if the actual is 
the same as. 1ts'"notion" then let us try, to get the notion right 
as a-way of, getting-the actual: right. He Is In search of 
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meaning - of himself - and our reading of Hegel would seem 
to suggest that Malone's "executed purpose" (in this case his 
scribbling) is "the actual as existent" or, better, is an "unrest" 
which, precisely, "is the self". "Unrest" describes the condition 
of Beckett's "narrators" very well. But there is something 
inadequate in the assertion that Malone's self is constituted by 
his babblings. It would not help Malone to know hiMelf. or 
Beckett to understand Malone, if the theory were adopted that the 
very pain of his unfulfilled quest for the self was his self. 
At least, it would be the last'and worst joke. 
*** 
Consciousness The Introduction 
Altogether, Hegel establishes a vocabulary with which to 
discuss the self. That it is impontant follows naturallY from 
his view of the centrality of the self and that it has been 
influential will appear from our discussion of later philosophers. 
I 
What the Hegelian analysis also produces however, is a kind of 
-spotlight on a new and peculiarly ruthless little corner of despair. 
Equipped with this new vocabulary, fluent in the intensely abstract 
and confusing language of consciousness, what are we going to say? 
Some clarification of what Is sayable is made in the Introduction 
that follows the Preface to the Phenomenology and we want to know 
, zidw what Hegel has Tnade possible. 
In theIntroduction we come acrass 'this ominous tag, 
"consciousness ... suffers'this violence at its own hands; it 
destroys Itsown limited satisfaction",. -CPM. 138) What is this 
consciousness. -then'? Things. ve have-seen. -exist "an sich'". per 
-se... 
in themselves; this-is'their 'Truth". They, give themselves 
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to me, however, in another form of being - "being-for-my- 
consciousness". This is my knowledge of an object. But what, 
then, is the "Truth" of knowledge? The table's "Truth" is its 
existence "an-sich"; what is the "Truth" of my knowledge of the 
table? 'Hegel answers that "consciousness furnishes its own 
criterion in itself", this criterion being our immediate apprehension, 
"inside" consciousness, of what is true, (PM. 140). Knowledge 
has "being-for-my-consciousness" and the "being-an-sich" of the 
object'simultaneously in consciousness. "For consciousness is, 
on the one hand, consciousness of the object, on the other. 
consciousness of itself. " CPM. 1413. In other words; I am 
conscious of the table and conscious of being conscious of the 
table. - Three things are thus in; play, - the table, my consciousness 
of it and my consciousness of that consciousness. The table is 
self-substantiating, it is "True" in its existence "an-sich"i 
my consciousness also furnishes its own "Truth" in that it 
observes itself as well as observing the object and automatically 
irons out any discrepancy between them. Here Hegel makes another 
of his disturbing asides - this "ironing out" process changes 
the object per se. ' 7If, this-. is-not, Mr, Wattlls"problem. 'I don't 
Know what is. 
Co'nsciousness, 'thus, has two objects - the object per se and 
-the-existence*for consciousness lof thatý, obJect. We have so far 
spoken ofthislatter asthough-it were, -nmrely, -reflective 
ctYnsciousness'(consciousness, conscious. mf., Itselfl, but-Itý, ': is-in 
-fact,; Dur'oexperlence*--ofýthe, nbject. -. To-make this., clear: --when 
. 1'am conscious of a table -1 ran also, -ber-ome ronscious "'that -*I,, am 
, conscious - of"the -table s -: I cannot - simply -, become zonscious ýthat I 
amzonscious. T, cannot ý, say -, that. 1 am conscious that -1 ý know., I 
must, say, that: Iýam-tonscious, that, I know X. INaturally"there are 
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objections to this rather dogmatic elucidation of Hegel. ) Our 
"knowledge" of an object per se is our consciousness of it, our 
"experience" of it is our consciousness of our Knowledge of it. 
The mind is not content to rest here however, it wishes to "press 
forward" to its true form of existence. What does this involve? 
It involves the abolition of the discrepancy between the object 
man-sich" and our knowledge of it. We are sickeningly aware of 
the distinction between the two objects of our consciousness, viz. 
the object and our knowledge of it. And we feel that our mind's 
true form of existence is one in which it "will reach a position 
where appearance becomes identified with essence" CPM 145). This 
"essence", presumably. is the object's existence "an-sich".. -and 
this "appearance" is how it appears to my consciousness. In 
other words, Hegel is proposing a terminus ad quem for consciousness, 
a point towards which the mind tends. At this point a marriage 
will taKe place between the essential existence-per-se of objects 
and our consciousness of them. But. this implies that here our 
, consciousness, of objects will come 
to share their "an-sich" "Truth". 
In other words. when consciousness effects the, marriage between 
-, objects and 
our. knowledge-, of, them,, by-embracing'both, iý, is , 
grasping its own essence and will *connote the nature of absol6te 
knowledgeltself" CPM. 145). 
- This, is, the--thesis of-Hegel's Introduction to the Phenomenology 
EPM. 131-145). What it amounts-to for our understanding-Df Beckett 
. 
ýý&. how destructive'it, is'af the old stable. Ego, and'how'f-reely-it 
moves lnto, *absolute.. myst: Lral and religious'language. ltls. not 
trivial-ta., add that-it also demonstrates-, the maddening-complexity 
. and-Inclusiveness required--for, any,. sericus 
discussion of-the 
-fundamental Assuesýof subjectivity. This-complexity1tsel-F 
throws cansiderable. doubt on the value of'theresults achieved 
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and - here perhaps one can obtain an insight into that peculiarly 
BecKettian torment of having "to speaK of things of which I 
cannot speak" (T. 294). Hegel, having posed the question of 
the nature of the mind, is forced on by his insatiable thirst 
for truth up an ever-more-tortuous. path towards an unobtainable 
"atomic" paradise -a paradise, that is, where all the 
I 
possibilities have been explored, all the exceptions given. 
The connexion between this unapproachable peace and Wittgenstein's 
"atomic language" will be obvious; the connexion between both 
these and Beckett's need to "get it all said" is also evident. 
A comparison between. Hegel's Preface and Introduction and 
parts of The Unnamable an these stylistic grounds would be 
'revealing. We are concerned here, however, not to establish a 
stylistic analogy but to find out whether Beckett and Hegel are 
'talking abdut the same subject, if that pun is allowed. The 
Unnamable says: ....... all sounds, there's only one, continuous, 
day and night, what is it, it's steps coming and going, it's 
voices speaking for-a moment, It's bodies groping their way. 'It's 
the air, it's things, -its, the air among, the things, that's 
enough .. '. '-(T. '390/. I). The lack of conventional, punctuation-Is 
deceptive, the monotony can hypnotise. But if we remain alert 
we can feel the weight of a sort of epistemological fury here. 
We-could paraphrase'this passage: "Our heads are always-full of 
sound - there is-, no rest and silence In the mind, but what ', is 
, 1-t-that-so constantly Impinges on, our r-ionsciousness? "It is the 
events af-life,, reduced. as-a philosopher-always reduces-them, to 
their simplest -- , all-, human action is steps. 'voices.,, bodies 
perhaps that's, not-enough., perhaps-we are not alliowing, for, the 
Invisible. -, the air, ____wel1#'the-air. and, all It-contairis, air-filled 
with things. things surrounded by air*. 'This is'the'Unnamable 
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battling on with his "pensum". Like Hegel, he is simply trying 
to say something, some simple something about the simplest fact 
himself, his existence. He goes on: 
that's enough, that I seek, like it, no, not 
like it, like me, in my own way, what am I saying, 
after my fashion, that I seek, what do I seek now, 
what it is, it must be that, it can only be that, 
what it is, what it can be, what what can be, what 
I seek, no, what I hear, now it comes back to me, 
all back to me, they say I seek what it is I hear, 
I hear them, now it comes back to me, what it can 
possibly be, and where it can possibly come from, 
since all is silent here, and the walls thick, and 
how I manage, without feeling an ear on me, or a 
head, or a body, or a soul, how I manage, to do 
what; how I manage, it's not clear, dear dear, you 
say it's not clear, something is wanting to make 
it clear, I'll seek, what is wanting, to make 
everything clear, I'm always seeking something... " 
(T. 391) 
The opening phrases of this quotation-refer to the sound 
mentioned in the passage quoted immediately above (the sound is 
an externýl object, an object of perception) and state that the 
reciter "seeks" the sound. Does he do this in the same way as 
the sound does ("like it")? That is, do I comport myself towards 
objects as they comport themselves towards me? No. I comport 
myself'like me" ("f*Ur-michul. So. do we agree that I comport 
myself Iike me as'I seek the external object., the sound? No. I 
seek "what it is", I seek what the sound is(it's essence, in Hegel's 
terM5,, but it's existence in the terms of Sartre). "It can only 
be that; that it . 'is*. 
That what is? The sound, "what I hear". 
But how can the Unnamable "possibly" discover what anything is? 
tie-is'not aware of having an ear, a head, a body. a soul. Now 
this. of course Is precisely how perception works. We bear-sounds 
without hearing our ears. We receive the sense-data in our heads 
without "feeling (Beckett's word) -our brains. We'experience 
physical and mental phenomena without being aware that-it is our 
body, that is doing so. And where, in any of this. is the soul 
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to be found? 
This is precisely the "mess" on which Hegel has turned the 
spotlight of his analysis. We are aware of sounds. And we are 
aware that we are aware of sounds. The "Truth" of the sound is 
its existence "an-sich". The "Truth" of my awareness of it lies 
in my awareness of that awareness. Any mind aspires to a marriage 
between these truths in order to arrive at "absolute knowledge 
itself". If Hegel's analysis is inaccurate it deserves to become 
I 
the chief torment of the intellectual damned. If it is accurate, 
if, that is, it reflects a real situation in our commerce with the 
world, it has really only made matters worse. We are "always 
seeking something", we cannot stopi but "-all is silent here" and 
there is no way out of the echoing prison of subjectivity -I 
am me, perceiving sounds. How do I know? Because I am aware 
that I am perceiving sounds as well as being aware of-the sounds. 
And how do I know that? Hegel, after all, has made matters worse; 
quite literally it becomes "folly to be wise". the Unnamable goes 
mad under the"burden. of the incomprehensibility of consciousness as 
set out by Hegel. 
** 
Names 
Since-we shall be considering the relationship between Beckett's 
world and words such as "God" and "Being*we cannot leave the 
preliminary-sections of the Phenomenology without considering the 
Important discussion of statements. about God in the Preface. 
As so often. Hegel approaches a central-point obliquely. 
He introduces his discussion of statements about God by saying that 
he merely, -needs'wexamplesw. lof statements of any sort*to *explain 
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what has been said". But this coyness should not put us off; 
example or not, the discussion of the proposition "God is Being" 
is of great importance. Of this proposition we are told that 
"The 'predicate is "being": it has substantive significance, and 
thus absorbs the meaning of the subject within it" CPM-121). 
This amounts to the accusation that this proposition is "identical", 
"trivial": Hegel speaks of the "unaccustomed restraint" that is 
imposed on thought by such directionless propositions and of the 
I 
mind being rebuffed and "thrown back on the subject" CPM. 121) by 
such "triviality". Already we are finding how difficult it is 
to talk or to be silent on such subjects. 
A little later in the, Preface we meet God again, in a way 
even rmre significant for our purpose. Hegel, oblique as usual, 
suggests that we should avoid proper names in philosophyj he means 
that we should not employ the word "God". Instead we should speak 
of an immediate "Concept" such as "being". "the One" and so on. 
This of course follows from the earlier discussion of "identical" 
propositions. %ames" are not, do not have, "Concepts". (This 
is a premonition of Wittgenstein's theoretical "atomic" language 
which would consist of nothing but purely Individual '"names* which 
alone denote reality. ) What are names, then? Hegel says, 
"Apart from the sensuously apprehended or ideally presented self, 
It Is in the main the mere name qua name which denotes the subject 
pure and simple. -the empty unit without any conceptual character. " 
tRM-. 1243 Two points emerge from this. First, there is a "self" 
which ýdenotes what 4s purýely-subject-and. -. second.,. pure subject is 
mempty' andIsrepresented by a 'name". Now. the first of these 
points refers to, the-notion that when we Oapprehandw, an object 
"sensuously"lli. e. withaur senses) or when we find it. -*presented* 
to us "Ideally" Ii. e. imaginatively) we arL, confronted with'the 
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"self" or "subject" of the object; the second Ooint is that this 
subject is "empty". "without any conceptual character" and can be 
denoted by a name. 
The fir5t point appears to be a paradox: in perception we 
are confronted with the object as subject. Hegel seems to mean 
here that the objects of our perception give themselves to'us in 
their uniqueness - when I looK at one table in a row of identical 
tables I am in no doubt as to which table I am looking at, it is 
"that" table. The second point is that if I employ a proper name 
(i. e. a name that 
name "Plato" only 
in a proposition, 
perception of the 
"subject",, ý the un 
represents the table's uniqueness just as the 
refers to one individual) to refer to the table 
this name has the same qualities as my 
table, namely that it refers to the "self", the 
iqueness of the table. 
The connexion of this with Wittgenstein has alreddy been 
noted. It connects also with Existentialism in that the existence 
(if not the "Being") of an object is all that can be meant by 
Hegel's point about its "sensuously apprehended ... Self". As 
this is an "empty unit without any conceptual character", it is 
without "essences", it 'is all that is left whenýessences have been 
"subtracted" from an object, it is therefore the "nothing* of 
"being". which we. di5cussed under "Dialectic", above. Thus we 
have adopted-the curious position that an object's "name" is its 
existence. Now. it Is precisely about the name "God" that Hegel 
49. ýtalking and we can develop an-even more "trivial" proposition 
.11 
than *God is Being* by positing that the name "God" is Lod's 
existence. 'That is-to say that the emptyname '"Gad" is nothing 
morethan what is left, when. all the essences and attributes-of God 
have been subtracted - -i. e- his existence. 
This discussion is Televant to BecKett, even If we applyit 
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to other propositions than those about God. It obviously revolves 
about a linguistic-point concerning meaningful and meaningless 
propositions that is a general concern of Beckett's, but that it 
is about God is particularly suitable. On the linguistic level 
we are in the well-Known world of Mr Watt. Much has been made 
of the ringing periods of Mr Watt's speculations on pots (nit 
resembled a pot, it was almost a pot, but it was not a pot of which 
one could say, Pat, pot, and be comforted". W. 78) but he continues 
with an equally interesting thesis: 
It was in vain that it answered, with- 
unexceptionable adequacy, all the purposes, 
and performed all the offices, of a pot, it 
was not a pot. And it was just this hair- 
breadth departure from the nature of a true 
pot that so excruciated Watt. For if the 
approximation had been less close, -then 
Watt would have been less anguished. For 
then he would not have said, This is a pot, 
and yet not a pot, no, but then he would 
have said, This'is something of which I do* 
not know the name. And Watt preferred on 
the whole having to do with things of which 
he did not know the name ... to having to 
do with things of which the known name, the 
proven name, was not the name, any more, 
for him. 
(W. 78) 
A Hegelian interpretation of this passage helps to clarify Watt's 
predicament. "Natural philosophizing" (Kaufmann's translation), 
by which Hegel means common sense and intuition, "treats us to a 
rhetorical melange of commonplace truths" CPM. 1261 and it is just 
this common-sense philosophy. about which Hegel is so scathing, 
that leaves Watt dissatisfied. The mcommonplace truths* of the 
pot, 'its '"purposes* and Omffices"ý-are 'Un-vain". they do not fulfil 
the questing-mind. the mind that asks *What? " Kaufmann, glasses 
this section of the Preface thus. 'The task of philosophy Is .. to 
-supplant notions with Concepts" . -. and thisis just what Watt 
-tries to do. He has-the-=mmon-sense notion of a: pot. and he has 
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the name "pot" but he does not have that one thing that satisfies 
human reason - in Hegel's usage the Concept of the pot. No 
wonder he cannot say the name "Pat" and "be comforted". If this 
name didn't apply to the object it would of course be easier, but 
Beckett makes it quite clear that Watt is talking about something 
to which he cannot avoid giving the name "Pot". Let us remind 
ourselves of the point quoted earlier; "It is in the main the 
mere name qua name which denotes the subject pure and simple, the 
empty unit without any conceptual character" CPM. 124). Watt is 
wrestling with this inadequacy in the nature of names. Here we 
can see that our discussion of the Existentialist interpretation 
of Hegel's thesis was not merely an aside. The "essences" of 
the pot [its "purposes" and "offices") are not in question; nor 
is the accuracy of its name "Pot"i what "excruciates" Watt is the 
pot's individual existence, for which. a proper name would have to. 
be found. The Platonic "nature of a true pot". the ground of the 
pot's "Being" perhaps, is not quite the same as this pot's 
individual existence. But Watt only has one name for all pots - 
"Pot" which denotes their general existence ("Being" perhaps) but 
does not, denote the-Andividual existence of-this-pot. This is 
why "the known name, the proven name, was not the name, any more, 
f or him". 
As we-h-ave seen, however. Hegel is really concerned with 
propositions about'God. We shall have more to say about God and 
. pL-r-haps It is sufficient here to accept provisionally the critical 
commonplace that Tir KnottIs God and note that Watt indulges-in 
this piece of rhetoric: "But what conception have I of'Mr Knott? 
None". (W. 118) Mr Knott's name. then. a proper name af-course, 
the name'that '"designates-the pure subject"is'wvoid mf 'Concept'".. 
Perhaps it is for this reason that at the climax of his aeuvre 
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Beckett abandons names and describes his most devastated "hero" 
as "the Unnamable". 
*** 
Sense - Certainty.. 
Ironically, perhaps, the Phenomenology is not a systematic 
worK of philosophy. Kaufmann!! s discussion of how it was composed 
and how odd its structure is should make us cautious about 
approaching all its sections with the same expectations (cf. Kaufmann, 
1,108-175). It does-. contain, however, the germs of manyof the 
ideas'elaborated by later philosophers, and by Beckett, and it 
is with these that I shall be concerned. The lengthy. sections 
on morality, culture, world religions and so-on have much less 
light, to throw on Beckett than the sections on consciousness, "the 
Self and the Absolute. 
Section A. the first of the three main sections of Baillie's 
translation, is entitled "Consciousness". It begins with a 
chapter-called "Sense-Certainty, " that is with the simplest 
situation, that of consciousness confronted with an object: this 
# is the situation beyondwhich we'have felt nervous, to move since 
the Cartesian cogito; certainly it is the first situation of the 
Unnamable. 
The knowledge, which is at the start or 
immediately our object, can be nothing else 
than just that which is immediate-knowledge, 
knowledge of the immediate. -of what'is. 
We'have. in dealing with 'it. -to proceed, too. 
In an-immediate way., to accept what is given, 
not altering anything in it as It is 
presented before us. and keeping mere 
-apprvhension free from conceptual comprehension (PM. 149) 
which is at least -no clearer than: 
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And things, what is the correct attitude to 
adopt towards things? And, to begin with, 
are they necessary? What a question. But 
I have few illusions, things are to be 
expected. The best is not to decide anything, 
in this connexion, in advance. If a thing 
turns up, for some reason or another, taKe 
it into consideration. 
(T. 294) 
This is where Beckett must be seen as genuinely philosophical. He 
begins this novel at precisely the point at which modern philosophy 
starts. The first three sentences are "Where now? Who now? 
When now? " and these have their equivalents in Hegel who proposes 
two "universal" forms of the "this" - "Now" and "Here". "Now" 
and "Here" are forms which do not alter according to the actual 
When or Where they apply to. "This" is therefore universal, but 
it depends on another "universal* - *I", "pure Ego*. These 
three universals (Now, Here and Ego) are established by posing the 
questions. Where? When? Who? Where now? Who now? When now? For it 
is always now. So the Unnarbable's Consciousness, like Hegel's 
starts with "what is"; here, now, with me. 
"How proceed? " is the question the Unnamable asks next, "By 
affirTnations and negations invalidated as offered, or sooner or 
later, '* IT. 293) And indeed this seems-to be the valid way in 
Hegel's view: 
'The truth for consciousness of a "This" of 
sense is said to be universal experience. 
Every consciousness of, itself cancels again, 
as soon as made, such a. truth as e. g. the 
Here is a tree, arthe Now is noon. and 
expresses the very opposite: the Here is 
not a tree but a house. 
CPM. 1581 
As'-Moran -says. by way of bringing Molloy to ýa close, '*Then I went 
bark into -the bouse and wrote. It Is midnight. The rain is 
beatir)g, on the windows. It was not, midnight. It. was not 
raining. '* [T. 176) 
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Hegel and Beckett, so far, are parallel; immediate knowledge 
is followed by immediate negation. The negation, of course, depends 
on a previous affirmation. "Here is a tree. " The paradox of the 
negation stems from the affirmation. It is in trying to "say" 
the tree that we go wrong. 
Those who ... speak of the "existence" of external 
objects, which can be more precisely characterized 
as actual, absolutely particular, wholly personal, 
individual things, each of them not like anything 
or anyone else (say that) this is the existence 
which ... has absolute certainty and truth. They 
"mean" this bit of paper I am writing on ... but 
they do not say what they "mean". If they really 
wanted to say this bit of paper which they "mean", 
and they wanted to say so, that is impossible, 
because the This of sense, which is "meant", 
cannot be reached by language, which belongs to 
consciousness, i. e. to what is inherently universal. 
In the very attempt to say it, it would, therefore, 
crumble in their hands; those-who'have begun to 
describe it would not be able to finish doing so: 
they would have to hand it over to others, who 
would themselves in the last resort have to confess 
to speaking about a thing that has no being. 
CPM. 159-160) 
This is exactly what happens to the Unnamable. All that he says 
I 
"crumbles in his hands", he cannot finish "describing". he admits at 
last that he is talking about nothing. 
What we have learned from Hegel on Immediate knowledge is that 
objects, simply contemplated, do not yield us up their here-and- 
nowness; on the contrary, they are evanescent and elude us as we 
grasp at them. We have-now learnt that one cannot say an object; 
there. is a difference. in kind between words.. and objects that. makes 
-this foreverimpossible. 'Hegel goes so far"as 
to suggest Beckett's 
nwn solution (the employment of *vice-existers*') when he talks of 
'*handing It over to-Dthers"-who, -eventually, will learn that they 
are talking'about-nothing. 'Mr Watt'learns this lesson of the 
Inherent falseness af all prmpositions-, 'He made, the distressing 
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discovery that of himself too he could no longer affirm anything 
that did not seem as false as if he had affirmed it of a stone" 
(W. 79). What is so illuminating about these parallels is the 
fact that Hegel's version establishes the point (in this case the 
point that one cannot grasp the Here and Now, cannot say the This) 
as philosophically necessary. No longer can we think, "Yes, 
poor old Malone seems to have lost his grip an reality; I have 
felt that way myself sometimes, but after all there is a graspable 
reality which other people -. philosophers for instance, or 
myself when I am feeling up to it - can discuss, clarify and 
explain". We now have to consider the possibility that when 
Beckett produces his paradoxes, seemingly self-contradictory asides 
and so on, he is not merely attempting to find objective correlatives 
for the psychological state of his characters. He is telling the 
philosophical truth. He, is not dealing with madmen and their 
warped views of reality; he is dealing with reality itself, exactly 
as conceived by the sane, prosaic reason of a "normal" academic 
philosopher. 
One is faced with a choice, after, all. One can do one of two 
things when confronted. --for, example. with this from'The-End., 
"Strictly speaking I wasn't there. 
I've never been anywhere* (NK. 61). 
Strictly speaking I believe 
One can either let one's mind 
skate over it. relishing. it as a paradox, 'a crazy aside, a meaningless 
pair iof sentences interesting. only In that-they'are a grammatical 
.I 'jo-Ke (because'they-sound all right and existas -legitimate 
sentences)j or one can decide that they are serious. that-they 
have a meaning. *Strictly speaking I believe I've never been 
anywhere" says f3eckett*s narrator, and Hegel's philcsophicalýrigour 
happens to lead him tomake similar statements when he, ' too. 'Is 
speaKing 'strictly% This should encourage, us to choose lour 
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second possibility and try to read Beckett as meaningful. Even 
without Hegel, - Beckett's tormented battle with expression seems 
to deserve serious consideration. "Strictly speaking". - Why 
"strictly" if there is not a "strict" fundamental. true, non-everyday 
way of speaking?, And if týere is such a way of speaking, who 
speaks in it? In this case, it so happens, Hegel for whom, 
strictly, the Self is nowhere. 
Perceotion- 
* * * 
The second chapter of "Consciousness" is "Perception", 
alternatively titled "Things and their deceptiveness", which 
promises some light on the Unnamable, and others. It is Malone 
in fact who has most to say about "things"; but first, Hegel. 
Perception "has negation, distinction, multiplicity in its 
very nature" CPM. 163). Hegel is trying to establish the point 
at which perception moves from sense to intellect, for example the 
point-at which my sensory apprehension of an object becomes an 
intellectual understanding of what I am looking at. "Negation" 
comes at, the very beginning of, this process, ýas-wesaw In-the 
last section. 
The This ... is established as not-This, or 
as superseded, and yet not noth-in-g (simpliciter), 
but a determinate nothing, ýa nothing with a 
certain content. viz. the This. The sense- 
element-i-s -in this way ltself, still. present. 
(PM. '163) 
Which is to say, among other things. thatwhen we consider a state 
of awareness just slightly higher, than immediate, sense-certainty. 
when we consider "Perception'",, there at once enters a destructive 
agent. Before even considering self-consciousness we have 
arrived at a '"can tra dicta ry'* point 'in -the 'nature -of 'the world - 
, the This establishedas not This. The reason -far this contradiction 
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would appear to be that "This" should refer to the immediate 
existence of a thing but can in fact only refer to the properties 
of the thing apprehended by the senses; thus, to take Hegel's 
example of salt, if I enquire of myself what I mean by "This" 
salt I can only reply that I mean this white, powdered, sharp- 
tasting entity; but these things are not, of course, "This" 
salt; the whiteness is different from the "thisness". So "This" 
brings a "not-This" with it, a situation which it is hard to 
conceive but without which the deceptiveness of things in Beckett's 
world is hard to understand. 
The properties of the salt that give themselves to our 
-perception are quite distinct from one another (PM. 164-165). Its 
whiteness does not at all affect its sharp taste for example. 
But they all share the same Here-and-Now and Hegel hits on a 
happy way of expressing this relationship by saying that the 
"also" required in a description of an object (the salt is white 
and also"tastes sharp) can be promoted to an "Also" which is "the 
pure universal itself ... the "Thinghood" keeping them together" 
(PM. 165). But we do not perceive universal "whiteness". or "sharp- 
-tastingness". we perceive this whiteness and also this sharp'taste. 
The salt is "One"i we exclude from our perception all other things, 
all the properties which the salt does not have. -Thus there is 
an inherent contradiction between the fact that I identify the 
salt by perceiving its properties and the fact that these properties 
, ffre universals. Hegel-deals with-this contradiction quite 
specifically CPM. 167-2581 and develups it further. 'Properties 
may be universals. he says. "but the particular-quality Is a 
property only when attached to a'one", and determinate : only by 
relation to others* IPM-168). It is this-step that-takes us 
from sense-impressions to consciousness. The contradictions 
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breed a higher consciousness which is concerned with itself and 
not with the sense-object. To express it crudely, when we 
start to think about our perception of an object we actually 
think about ourselves, our perception, and we cease to think 
about the object. Hegel detcribeh what happens in this process 
in language that echoes the Trilogyj 
I am thrown back on the beginning, and once 
more dragged into the same circuit, that 
supersedes itself in every moment ... 
Consciousness, then, has to go over this 
cycle again 
(PM. 168) 
Life in the Beckett world tends to be-cyclical CMoran recapitulates 
Molloy's decomposition, Malone comes back again and again to his 
point of departure, the Unnamable sees Malone pass before him "at 
doubtless regular intervals"). But here we are dealing with a 
very short-term cycle, the cycle of sense-certainty-perception- 
consciousness. This feels rather like. the churning and whirling 
of the Unnamable'5 "mind" but the points of connexion that I think 
worth establishing are (a) the compulsory aspect of Hegel's and 
Beckett's descriptions of the thinking process and (b) the 
Incomprehensibility of some parts of the Trilogy, especially The 
Unnamable in any other light than this. I need hardly quote 
passages to establish the compulsory nature of the "pensum" under- 
gone by Beckett's "heroes". the "you must go on" in the last line 
of The Unnamable ran stand for them all. Point of connexion (a) 
, is. between*this 'compulsion and the compulsion expressed in the 
careful choice, of words in the Passage from Hegel quoted above - 
", dragged" and "Con. sciousness .... has to". The thinking mind must 
-go on. 
it cannot stop. Point (b) Is really the thesis I am 
propounding - viz. that Beckett is not really comprehensible 
without some philosophical illumination. Again the point to be 
stressed is that the hypnotic music of E3eckett's prose is only a 
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part of the journey - there is further to go. Thus: Hegel 
proposes a sleight-of-mind whereby consciousness, when engaged in 
perception, is found, as explained above, to have "gone back into 
itself" CPM. 1681. Only such a philosophical proposal can make 
sense of the following. 
Perhaps its the door, perhaps I'm at the door, 
that would surprise me, perhaps its I, perhaps 
somewhere or other it was I, I can depart, all 
this time I've journeyed without knowing it, 
it's I now at the door, what door, what's a 
door doing here, 
(T. 418) 
The tension in this passage between perceiver and perceived is quite 
clear. From the dialectic of the door (object) and the "I" (subject) 
arises what the Unnamable cannot-help having -- -experience. He 
narrates his experience of "going over" the cycle of sense- 
impressions, perceptions and consciousness. 
.*** 
The Unity of Objects. 
So -far, under "Perception", we have looked at properties. the 
'! Also" (existence? ) that connects them, their distinction, their 
union, 'their contradictory-universality. 'The difficulties Hegel 
has encountered-have really arisen as he has tried to move from 
simple sense-certainty (the sort of-"consciousness" we share with 
animals, I would hazard), to a "perception" which includes a measure 
of-understanding. "Thislatter, as we have-seen, Is a mixed blessing 
-ýo"tay'the'least. 
'In, considering-, understanding. we-can-. start from properties 
-again: "The'ent-irs-, diversity of these aspects"r-ames-not,. -from the 
thing but-from, uss and we. find them falling apart .. -. 
from one 
another,, because*the lorgans-they affect are quite,, idistihct, inter se, 
the eye Is--entirely distinct'from the'torIgue and-so on. " (PM. 170) 
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Thus it is we, ourselves. some selfe"behind" our organs of 
perception, who constitute the unity of an object, "We preserve 
and maintain the self-sameness and truth of the thing, its being 
a "one". " (PM. 170) Consciousness thus makes an object "one" at 
the same time as distinguishing its properties, and "Consciousness 
is at the same time aware that it reflects itself also into itself, 
and that, in perceiving, the opposite moment to the "also" crops 
up. This moment, however, is the unity of the thing with itself, 
a unity which excludes distinction from itself. it is consequently 
this, unity which consciousness has to take upon itself" (PM. 171). 
O 
Which is as much as to say that an object's real esse is its 
percipi. This burden that consciousness carries is the burden of 
the existence of the world - only man perceives, so all that is 
perceived is man's. Beckett's Berkeleyan background is well known 
and instantly available in Film, the plot of which involves Buster 
Keaton in ridding his environment of all perceivets to-be 
confronted at iast by himself. 
To formulate Hegel's position here we can say: Perception and 
understanding create the unity of objects Ca unity'Jeopardized by 
perceptionis inevitable fragmenting of objects'into-properties. ) 
However, among these objects must be numbered the empirical self 
-the personality and properties of'the individual; -*consciousness 
reflects itself also into itself". Thus consciousness creates 
the, unity-of the human being himself. - In-Proust'Beckett makes an 
, 
6blique-'approach'towards'this conception-whewhe attributes to Proust 
the, ldea-. -thatýthe world-is'a-projection,. of the 
individual's 
consciausne5s". -CPTD. 19) 'This-world-, -projected by-con5ciousness 
does not-have, an---innate unity -' It depends an vo-luntarv, memory 
-for its unity: -"The; creation mf 'the, -world did not "takEi place once 
and, forý, all'time. -but-"takes'place every day*. '[PTO. -19) 'It is 
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Habit that insists an this daily re-creation of the world, the 
Habit that is bred of (and breeds) familiarity. We must notice 
carefully what Beckett says of this: "Habit then is the generic 
term for the countless treaties concluded between the countless 
subjects that constitute the individual and their countless 
correlative objects. " (PTO-19) I would lay a stress an the 
"countless subjects" of Proustian man which relate to the "countless 
objects" of the world. Here we-have an empirical self confronting 
the phenomena of existence on an ad hoc basis; the Habit which 
holds these selves together is the ersatz Self, it imitates and 
performs the function of the Self. Habit, supported by voluntary 
memory, assures us each morning that-we are still the same person 
that we were yesterday, "It insists on that most necessary, whole- 
some and monotonoU5 plagiarism - the plagiarism of oneself. " (PTO. 33) 
Only by self-plagiarism can we be assured of continued identity. 
To sum up: perception creates the unity of objects, but 
perception also perceives itself; thus it creates the unity of 
itself. This unity-is described in Proust, as the worK of-a 
particular organ of perception, the voluntary memory. 
*** 
Conscio'Usness. The "inner world" 
The third-section of "consciousness" is entitled "Force and 
understanding - -the world'of appearanceýand the-supersensible 
v&rld. "' liere -Hegel, makes his first approach to -a --mystical/ 
existential-view'nf, the,. wor. 1d, andýcomes yet closer-to Beckett 
. country. 
'In 'perception" he, has discussed objects first, as 
groups of properties and then as unities. He-now points out 
further, that we apprehend objects as universals. 'but also in-their 
, singleness. An-other words that-when: Z. look att a table I know it 
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belongs to a universal category "Table" but also that it is "this" 
single, unique, table. This leads Hegel into a discussion of the 
"true being" of things, the "inner world" of the object. He 
establishes the lines of force of his picture of perception by 
proposing four areas between which perception takes place: there 
is consciousness (I. ) which perceives the object (2) and creates 
its unity, (Hegel insists here that these two are', in a sense, only 
one "moment"i we can talk as though there are two objects, "my 
consciousness" and "the table" but what we are concerned with is 
one unified entity, viz. "my consciousness of the table"). 
Beyond (1) and (2) there are: (3) the "inner world" of the 
p- arceived object and (4) a -further consciousness to correspond to 
this. We can expect that this duality, ''(3) and (4), will"also be 
subject to the rule that in consciousness of an object there are 
not two objects but only one unified entity - in this'case "my 
consciousness of the inner world" of the objectý- 
The inner world is so far for consciousness a 
bare and simple beyond, because consciousness 
does not as yet find itself in it. It is 
empty, for it is merely the nothingness of 
appearance, andýpositively the naked universal. 
This type of inwardness suits those who say 
that'the, inner being of'things cannot be known 
(Hegel here refers to Goethe)j but the reason 
for the position would have to be taken in 
some other sense. Certainlythere is no 
knowledge toýbe had of-th15 inner world, as 
we'havelt-herej not. however. nwing, to reason 
being too shortsighted, or limited, or whatever 
you care to call it. ... but an account simply 
of the nature of the case, because`inýthe-void_ 
'there-is nothing known, or, putting it from the 
point of, view of the-other' 7side. ýbecause-its 
very characteristic lies 'in being beyond 
consciousness. 
{PM. 191-292) 
'It-is time taxelate this to The Unnamable. but first I think 
we should stress 'that when Hegel says 'that 'the -'*Inner world" Is 
'Imerely'the nothingnessof appearance* he is not contradicting 
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himselfj he means what he says. He goes on to explain this point 
by telling us that the incomprehensible "inner world", called "the 
holy of holies, the inner sanctuary", must be "filled" with. something 
and that we try to fill it with "dreamings, appearances, produced by 
consciousness itself. " This, however, is unnecessary; the "inner 
world" of an object is not a sanctuary nor need consciousness implant 
anything in it - it is something that arises naturally out of our 
perception and it is filled with "appearance qua appearance". Hegel 
says he realiZe5 that an "inner world" is usually taKen to be the 
opposite of "appearance" (i. e. "inner-world" = "reality") but he points 
out that "Understanding" (which is the sort of consciousness that 
relates to the inner., world, the No. 4 that relates to the No. 3 in our 
description of lines of force above) is related to "inner world" only 
through the "mediation"'of the "play of forces" of sense-certaintY 
and perception (i. e. of No. 1 and No. 21. (PM. 193). In short, the 
"inner world" of an object appears at first as "the implicit, inherent 
being, universal and still without a filling" and then, in truth, as 
appearance qua appearance. CPM. 1931 
Assuming here,. as elsewhere, that BecKett's descriptions may be 
taken, metephorically. an assumption justified by the, fact that If we 
only take them literally we are bound to dismiss them as impossible, 
we find-that the Unnamable! s surroundings read--remarkably like Hegel's 
paradoxical theorising. The Unnamable is motionless, staring straight 
ahead into the grey. air. "close-to me it-is. grey, dimly, *transparent, 
arýd. beyond that-charmed circle deepens, and spreads its-fine Impenetrable 
veils% (T. 302) The "charmed circle" seems. to be-the immediate area 
of'Perception in. which the narrator perceives"Objects, and beyond, which 
the light of certainty,. such as-it is. -cannot penetrate. "There Isno 
night so deep",, however. '"that it may not be-pierced in'the end., with 
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the help of no other light than that. of the blackened sky, or of the 
earth itself". (T. 302) The unexpected conclusion of this sentence 
parallels Hegel's paradox about appearance - both preclude-the 
possibility of some light being thrown on "reality" from'outside, 
both propose man's perception, consciousness, understanding as a closed 
system within which all possible explanations are, or can be, given; 
both exclude divine or supernatural help from the process of 
understanding the world. The Unnamable now suggests that the grey 
he perceives may in fact be "the enclosure wall, as compact as lead" 
(T. 302), a suggestion-. that he accepts (there being no possibility 
of going beyond for explanations). At least he proposes that, if it 
were possible, he, could throw a "Javelin" into the grey to tell "whether 
that which hems me round, and blots out my world, is the old void, 
or a plenum". (T. 302) This is exactly how Hegel proceeds - observing 
that the"'inner world" of objects. is a void and then showing how it 
is a "plenum" in fact, a space entirely filled, filled by "appearance". 
Quite how satisfying Hegel's process is may be questioned. After all, 
has one advanced much beyond "void" when one has-rejected. it and come 
up triumphantly with a "plenum" called *appearance quaýappearance"? 
Beckett, as-so-aften, -expresses'in strong-, metaphorical'tems-the 
dissatisfaction we feel with this sort of philosophical "solution" - 
not the'dissatisfaction-created by disagreement-but'the agony created 
by-agreement. 
-less'painful than-the Ir. -this -situation where the solution is'no 
'problem and the, -, correct solution-no'more, help'-than a--false-one, the 
Unnamable, -is doomed-,, to hisbabble. Hegel calls his "inner-world" 
the-'"superiensible". -It 
is-beyond the reach-of-sense-perception, 
it Is 'the changeless'kingdom, af laws. the, immediate"ectype-and-, copy 
ýof the world af-, perception*.. -(PM. 203) The "inner-world",, for,,, under- 
-standing,. 
is-the'"appearance, qua apDearance" of these laws; ýbut, when 
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we try to explain this we run up against a tautology. If we perceive 
lightning we "explain" it by referring to the changeless laws of 
electricity - the lightning is the "appearance" of, an example of, 
electricity; its "inner world", its "true being", is just this 
appearance itself. But this is an explanation which explains nothing - 
the laws of electricity are identical to the laws of lightning, they 
are the laws of lightning. It is liKe trying to explain the growth 
of a puppy by saying that all puppies grow. Consequently, to say 
that the inner world of an object of perception is its appearancelq 
and specifically its appearance qua the appearance of a changeless 
law, then, to say that this changeless law exists in its appearances, 
such as the appearance of the object, is as much as to say nothing 
at all. To quote Hegel, "It is explanation that not only explains. 
nothing, but is so plain-that, while it maKes as-if it would say 
something different from what is already said, it really says nothing 
at all, but merely repeats the same thing over again. " (PM. 201) 
This puts the Unnamable's babble into perspective. We started 
by calling the "inner world"-a void; then "filled" it with the formula 
"appearance*qua-app'earance"; now we learn'that it is inexplicable and 
ýthat all --ratibnal discuss ion --of, ýit-"s ays nothing ýat all% ". In ýthe 
-section which starts'"All these Murphys, Molloys-and Malones do not 
fool-me*, the Unnamable goes'through a similar process. (T. 305), 
Having-dismissed the superficiallperceived objects)-he claims "only 
-I and. -this black, -void haveever been%ATA06) Is he certain? He 
asi-ts"'And the sounds? 0 -but -replies '"No, -all iB -silentw. Then'"And 
, the lights... mustýthey too. 90 nut? " and answers "Yes. out with them, 
there-Is*noIight-here'0-* Zo, the-, world ofýsense-certainty and 
perception has indeed7been'transcended. ', What Is"left? '"Nothing-then 
but-me, -ofýwhich'-I-'know-nothing,, except-that 1-'have neýter uttered, and 
this black : of which .1 know nothing -either. except that -it is black, and 
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empty". (T. 3061 Thus far the "inner world" is void. He will try to 
"speak of it, of its appearance". He then makes a move that is 
incomprehensible without something like our Hegelian reading. He 
returns to "Basil and his gang" (why, if he has not been "fooled" 
by the Murphys and MolloYs? ) and dismisses them with "Inexistent,, 
invented to explain I forget what", just as if they had been made to 
fill the void like Hegel's "changeless laws" - explaining nothing. 
"Ah yesi all lies, God and man, nature and the light of day, the 
heart's outpourings and the means of understanding, all invented... " 
(T. 306). 
Of course, Hegel does not leave us here. He proposes an "inverted" 
world to replace the tautological world he-has -dismissed. The 
"first 
super-sensible world" was the world of changeless laws conceived in 
Platonic terms. ýNow a "second supersensible world" emerges which 
admits change as an inherent-part of itS reality. So much is change 
part of 'this "inverted" world that, indeed, everything within it is 
in a permanent state of tension with its opposite. Hegel expresses 
this in an almost mystical passage in which all that is in "the first 
supersensible world" is contradicted in the seconds black becomes white. 
But-the-meaning-"of, this,, efferges as-Hegel moves-on-to a-discussion of 
opposites In a true dialectical process. The point is that black is 
"the 'inherent nature of white" (PM. 208). The marriage of opposites 
is'ubscurelyýbut-emphatically established-here-a necessary thesis 
, in view ofý'*-he-ýway*the., dialectic,, works. 
al 
1* 40 
Consciousness. -, The'"! Supersensible"-worlds. 
We -are,. now -. approaching -the end *of the -first Tnain section -of 'the 
ýo4 
Phenomenolazy. 'Cansciousness'ý.. ', Hegel --is moving -, upwar-ds. -from the 
63. 
lowest form of awareness to the highest. His aim is to give an 
adequate account of man's comprehension of the world. This account 
starts from the premiss that understanding is first a matter of 
universalization. 
4 The tendency to universalize produces the "first 
supersensible world". But when we want to explain the world this 
first level is not enough. We may start to understand, say, white 
things because we associate them with one another and learn in the 
end to posit the universal "whiteness", but we cannot explain this 
without resorting to the "second supersensible world", the world in 
which whiteness is defined by its opposite, blacKness, and'vice versa. 
Once this stage is reached man has, without noticing it as it were, 
moved from consciousness to self-consciousness, -(PM. 210) and therein 
lies the burden of this whole dialectical process. "Explanation" 
requires, produces, self-consciousness. 
There is so much satisfactio6 in explanation, 
because consciousness being there, if we may 
use such an expression, in direct communion 
with itself, enjoys itself only. No doubt it 
there seems to be occupied with something else, 
but in point of fact it is busied all the while 
merely with itself. CPM. 210) 
Is this true of Beckett? That is, is "explanation" a path, towards 
self-consciousness for-the vice-existers? We, might. remember here 
that Hegel's "spiritual biography of modern individual man" (Mure, 
1,641 is not really chronological on any large scale. 'More important 
than the, possible "real-time" chronologies (man's development from, the 
anim6l, forAnstance, or the growth of. perception in the childlAs 
I th a-logical', time, or logical-space-within, which his, categoriesýare 
, related to one another. 
7his ., same distinction, could profitably -be 
made An the case of Becketts At -As a: neglected, point, but, if the : Biuple 
-rule :: 
is observed 'that .. we cannot take the 'tr4logy. for . 'instance., 'Jiterally 
(except mn -, one-of : many 
levels3 . 1t,, becomes probable : thýBt Uts non-Aiteral 
meanings do, not necessarily Inhabit "real" 'time and space. In which -case 
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the apparent development from, say, Malloy to The'Unnamable can 
parallel the development, also only apparent, that we find in Hegel. 
The dialectical process may take time but its significance lies in 
its-logical, not in its chronological, order. 
This distinction leaves us freer to move about within Beckett 
in our search for explanations. Although I am attempting to establish 
the mutually-enlightening relationship between the Phenomenology and 
The*Unnamable it would be needlessly inhibiting to pretend that 
because self-consciousness does not really loom very large in the 
first main section of Hegel's work we must restrict out discussion 
of self-consciousness in Beckett to the'l ; ater sections of his novel. 
The Unnamable is acutely self-conscious from the first questions. 
But he discovers the satisfactions of explanation as Hegel discovers 
them, and with them the long joys Of self-consciousness. 
In a sense all Beckett's work is an attempt at*explanation of 
the inexplicable. It appears often that explanation is a substitute 
for a real confrontation with the issue of existence. The Unnamable 
tries to explain why he stopped believing Mahood at a certain pointj 
"I'll explain whyw, he says, "that will permit me to think of something 
else and In-the first place-of how to get backýto me". (T. 324) 
Explanation enables the mind to start moving "back" towards the Self, 
while in a sense the explanation is irrelevant because *in point 'Of 
fact", as we know very well, the Unnamable is *busied all the while 
merely with himself". 'There is a strong underlying assumption, 
e'doecially In'Malone Dies, -that explanation1s a duty owed to'"them", 
orýtosomeone, a"pensum" intimately connected with discussian, cf, 
or. attempts on. the-Self. Malone.. after a -few preliminaries. -s"tarts 
on the-elegant tale of the ImpossibleSaposcats, breaking off with 
the reflection. -higtily'remini5cent of Hegel. 'I wonder if-I am, not 
talking yet again about myself",. He asks"himself. *Shall I-be 
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incapable, to the end, of lying on any other subject? " (T. 189) 
So, "explanation". for Hegel and for Beckett, is a dawning of 
self-consciousness. And we saw that for Hegel explanation is only 
possible once the mind has risen to an appreciation of the "seccnd 
supersensible world", the world in which white is defined by black 
to the extent that he can claim that black is "the inherent nature 
of white". The evident self-contradiction of this sort of juggling 
with opposites is again familiar to us from Beckettj to give only one 
of many examples, in'Endgame Hamm narrates a story which is punctuated 
at close intervals by "It was an extra-ordinarily bitter day", "It 
was a glorious bright day", - "It was a howling wild day" and so on. 
Struggling to include as much as, possible of the world in his 
explanation, before moving on to the section directly concerned with 
Self-consciousness, Hegel raises his eyes, as it were, from the 
details of the mind's perception, understanding and explanation of 
objects and lets into the picture "infinitude" and the mind's perception 
of itself. Life is every distinction and every unity (and perception 
is concerned with these. ) "Explanation" brought self-consciousness out 
of mere perception and this new, self-conscious view of life, must 
include-an "apprehension of Infinitude" that is, -of,, the Infinite-number 
of distinctions Inherent in-objects. This is tantamount to an 
"apprehension" of the ineffability of the objective world. Hegel puts 
it thus: "In that-this notion of infinitude is its object, it (conscious- 
ness as self-consciousness) is thus a zonsciousness-cf-the-distinction 
6, s-one which at the same time-is at ance cancelled. " CPM. '211) 'This-i's 
obscure, admittedly,, but -it seems to me to Involve the (Beckettian) 
ungraspability of the world. There 'is -implied an infinite distance 
between perceiver-and perceived brought out by the simultaneous sel-f- 
perception of the perceiver. For example. I-perceive-the whiteness of 
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an objecti I "explain" it by resorting not merely to the "first 
supersensible world", the world in which the white object participates 
in the Platonic Form of Whiteness, but also to the "second supersensible 
world", the world in which I understand white by knowing black. In this 
world there is already an infinitude of self-reflections between white 
and black and the situation is exacerbated by the introduction of the 
self-reflections of self-consciousness. In mere consciousness I "am" 
the perceived object; in self-consciousness I am both the perceived 
object and aware of myself as perceiver. But being aware of myself 
as perceiver means that I am also aware of myself as a perceived object 
in which case I am aware of myself as aware of myself as a perceived 
object. This is the "infinite regress" of self-consciousness objected 
to by Sartre, as we shall see. 
To substantiate this as being Hegel's meaning it is only necessary 
to quote the passage immediately following the sentence cited above. - 
0 Consciousness is for iiself and an its own account, 
it is a distinguishing of what is undistinguished, 
it is Sel-F-consciousness. I distinguish myself from 
myselfj and therein I am immediately aware that this 
factor distinguished from me is not distinguished. 
I, the self-same being, thrust myself away from 
myself; but this which is distinguished, which is set 
up as unlike me, isimmediately on its being distinguished 
-no distinction forýme. Consciousness of an other. cf an 
object in general, is indeed -itself necessarily self- 
consciousness, reflectedness into self, consciousness 
of self. in -its otherness. (M211) 
Beneath the complexity of this concluding section-of "Consciousness" 
lies an immediately recognizable account of what happens between man 
arýd his world. In the final page of this, section . -Hegel ties up the 
threads of his argument and crowns the mountain-he hasbuilt-with a 
disarming trick of the dia-lectic-whereby the. terms Of the, Procers-so- 
far are dismissed. He is clearing the ground -before moving an to 
Self-consciousness, and his summary of the position reached, at this 
point, besides Its remarkable coherence, and clarity. also reads like 
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an exact description of what The Unnamable is about. Hegel's thesis, 
in the discussion that follows, is summarized in the scheme of perception 
involving poles numbered I to 4, as an page 58 above. 
Raised above perception, consciousness reveals 
itself united and bound up with the supersensible 
world through the mediating agency of the realm 
of appearance, through which it gazes into this 
background that lies behind appearance. The two 
extremes, the one that of the pure inner region. 
the other that of the inner being gazing into this 
pure inner region, are now merged togetheri and as 
they have disappeared qua extremes, the middle term, 
the mediating agency, qua something other than these 
extremes, has also vanished. This curtain [of 
appearance3, therefore, hanging before the inner 
world is withdrawn, and we have here the inner-being 
[the ego] gazing into the inner realm - the vision 
of the undistinguished selfsame reality, which repels 
itself from itself, affirms itself as a divided and 
distinguished Inner reality, but as one for which at 
the same time the two factors have immediately no 
distinction; what we have here is Self-consciouness. 
(PM. 212. The sq*uare brackets are Baillie's. ) 
To clarify this passage we can rely an Mure's glass on it: "The 
curtain hides only a void until the understanding penetrates and finds - 
only itself. " (Mure, 1,73) This sense of looking through appearance 
to see oneself is prevalent in BecKett one of whose greatest achievements 
is his ability to objectify the horrific and sterile self-communion 
that constitutes all consciousness of all objects. (I perceive the 
table becau5e I am conscious of perceiving the tablej there is no exit 
from this closed and self-depending system. ) As so often Beckett 
reveals the painfulness of the philosophic intuition. 
Do they consider me so plastered with their rubbish 
that, l, can never. nxtrirate-myself, never make a 
gesture but their cast must come to life? But within, 
motionless, 'I can: live. and utter. me. for no ears but 
my awn. They loaded me down with their trappings and 
stoned me, through the carnival. I'll sham dead now, 
whom they couldn't bring to life. and my monster'5 
carapace. will rat off me".. CT. 327) 
This-is cne, anguished, rry among. many in'Seckett that parallels 
Hegel'Is, theory of, conscinusness as the constituent of a union with 
a world, not the world of *trappings" and appearances. but that of a 
aý, &I III 
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an exact description of what The Unnamable is about. Hegel's thesis, 
in the discussion that follows, is summarized In the scheme of perception 
Involving poles numbered 1 to 4, as an page 58 above. 
Raised above perception, consciousness reveals 
itself united and bound up with the supersensible 
world through the mediating agency of the realm 
of appearance, through which it gazes into this 
background that lies behind appearance. The two 
extremes, the one that of the pure inner region, 
the other that of the inner being gazing into this 
pure inner region, are now merged togetheri and as 
they have disappeared qua extremes, the middle term, 
the mediating agency, qua something other than these 
extremes, has also van-ished. This curtain [of 
appearance), therefore, hanging before the inner 
world Is withdrawn, and we have here the inner being 
[the ego] gazing into the inner realm - the vision 
of the undistinguished selfsame reality, which repels 
itself from itself, affirms itself as a divided and 
distinguished Inner reality, but as one for which at 
the same time the two factors have immediately no 
distinction; what we have here is Self-consciouness. 
(PM. 212. The sq*uare brackets are Saillie's. ) 
To clarify this passage we can rely an Mure's glass an it: "The 
curtain hides only a void until the understanding penetrates and finds - 
only itself. 0 (Mure, 1,731 This sense of looking through appearance 
to see oneself is prevalent in Beckett one of whose greatest achievements 
is his ability to objectify the horrific and sterile self-communian 
that constitutes all consciousness of all objects. (I perceive the 
table because r am conscious of perceiving the tables there is no exit 
from this closed and self-depending system. ) As so often Beckett 
reveals the painfulness of the philosophic intuition. 
Do they consider me so plastered with their rubbish 
that I can never 3xtricate myself, never make a 
gesture but their cast must come to life? But within. 
motionless. I can live, and utter M,, for no ears but 
my own. They loaded me down with their trappings and 
stoned me through the carnival. I'll 5ham dead now, 
whom they couldn't bring to life, and my monster's 
carapace will mt off me*. (T. 3273 
This is cne anguished cry among many in Beckett that parallels 
Hegel's theory of consciousness as the constituent of a union with 
a world, not the world of *trappings' and appearances, but that of a 
"Withinw. As Hegel puts it, in a passage reminiscent of Beckett's 
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style, "It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain, which is 
to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we 
ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby 
see, as that there may be something behind there which can be 
seen. " (PM. 212-31 
**"* 
Self-consciousness. 
In "Consciousness" Hegel has established that there is a unity 
between consciousnesat'ýand its objects. This indissoluble marriage 
appears to torment Beckett in various guises, among them the 
Unnamable's "It's of me-now I'must speaK, even if I have to do it with 
their language". (T-326) where the silence of "me" 'is only attainable 
through an involvement in the trappings of the worldi that is, where 
consciousness is doomed to an qbjective babble. 
The unity between consciousness and its objects gives rise to 
self-consciousness which, compared with "sense-certainty" and "perception" 
is a. 1return out, of othernessw. (PM. 219) This is the-first point-made 
in section B of the Phenomenology, "Self-Consciousness". It appears 
that there are two possibilities, or that there must be two, *moments". 
There is self-conscious apprehension of the otherness of objects 
(referred to as *negative" andAnvolving-the thought *I am not Xw) 
and-there is, pure self-awareness ("I am'I"). This latter. is-described 
as'Oonly =tiunless-tautology. Ego is Ego". JPM. 219) This'is remarkably 
-similar to the Unnamable's"but within. motionless. I can live, and 
utter-me. for-no'ears but, my'own"quoted -above. 
Of course. -no Beckettian 
character -does --. remain 'within" -or "'utter -me* because of the 'opposite 
urge, the des - ire, for life. 'As Mure expresses Hegel. wDesire-is the 
Subject#s. urF ,e 
to -live through IiI: Ling 'the -empty ''"I - I" with an element 
69. 
of the sensible world" (Mure, 1,741 which is exactly why the "vice- 
existers" are needed. And indeed both of the "moments" of experience 
described by Hegel seem to be equivalent to BecKett's often-stated 
dichotomy. In the present example, the "objective" world of Hegel 
is the "rubbish", the "trappings", the "carnival" of BecKett. I 
would suggest that the crude mind-body split celebrated in Murphy 
relates, as chapter 6 of that novel maKes explicitly clear, to the 
relative simplicity of Cartesian dualism while the voices, words 
and rubbish surrounding the Unnamable's elusive Self relate, as we 
might weM expect, to a more sophisticated epistemology and metaphysic. 
In other words if*Murphy is Cartesian, The Unnamable is Hegelian. 
Hegel elaborates further-on this--relationship between self- 
consciousness and the world. Self-conciousness becomes *convinced 
of the nothingness of the other", and by "negating" the "other" 
thus, it "acquires the certainty of its own self". (PM. 225) This does 
not have the despair in it that Beckett's version has, but in a sense 
that is the foundation of Beckett's uniqueness - he offers a creative, 
emotional reaction to a precise, philosophical reality, in place of the 
commoner, and easier, reaction to the-generalized conditions of "life". 
Beckett's'wversion* nf-this, -negation of the other and affirmation of 
Self by Self-consciousness is present more or less passim in the trilogy 
as one of the "profounder" modes of narration adopted when the games 
no longer serve. The "moment of truth" early in The Unnamable 
illustrates this, "Ah yes, all -lies. God-and man, nature and*the'light 
bf-iday, the heart"s outpourings, and the,, means of understanding. -all 
-invented, basely, 'by me alone. with the help of-no one. since'there 
is no one, -to ýput off 'the'hour when 'I must -speak of me. " IT. "306) 
And the -references to the negativity. indeed the"non-existence. of the 
objective world appear on nearly-everypage: either it-Is suddenly 
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made apparent that all the objective details of the monologue are 
fictions of the Unnamable's ("That's a good continuation" CT. 398) 
"But let us close this parenthesis and, with a light heart, open 
the next" (T. 357) etc. ) or the objects mentioned are simply and 
violently denied, ("Mahood, he was called Mahood, I don't see him 
any more, I don't know how he lived any more, he isn't there any more, 
he was never there, in his jar, I never saw him... " (T. 399). ) 
We can follow this parallel between the novelist and the 
philosopher right up to the conclusion of this passage on negation 
and self-affirmation. Hegel crowns his argument with the following 
sentences: 
sesself-consciousness is-thus only assured 
of itself through sublating this other, which 
is presented to self-consciousness as an 
independent life... Convinced of the nothing- 
ness of this other, it definitely affirms this 
nothingness to be for itself the truth of this 
other, negates the independept object, and thereby 
acquires the certainty of its own self. " (PM. 225) 
Except for the last clause, this quotation is a philosophical 
equivalent of "Nothing then but me, of which I know nothing, except , 
that I have never uttered, and this black, of which I 'know nothing 
either, except that it is-black, and empty. " (T. 306) 
The last clause of the Hegel quotation marks one radicalýdifference 
between the two writers that is everywhere apparent. In Beckett 
there is no certainty. But one might do well to ask whether "certainty" 
is reallythe inevitable outcome of Hegel's dialectic. 
* 
Master, and Slave. 
Having considered the relationship of self-consciousness to the 
unselfconsciious world of zbjects, 'Hegel-naturally: moves an-tothe 
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relationship between different self-consciousnesses. "Self-consciousness 
attains its satisfaction only in another self-conscioUsness" CPM. 2263. 
This is leading in to the famous discussion of master and slave 
("Lordship and Bondage" in Baillie's translation) of which much has 
been made. For our purpose the two features of this discussion that 
throw light an Beckett are, first, the necessity of the master-slave 
relationship for continued self-consciousness ("Servitude is not 
only a phase of human history, it is in principle a condition of the 
development and maintenance of the consciousness of self as a fact of 
experience"-- Saillie's note, PM. 2281 and, second, the violence 
inherent in the master-slave "struggle" and its necessity. 
The first of these. points is based an the fact that self-consciousness 
needs another self-consciousness to achieve "satisfaction" - in simple 
terms, a man totally isolated from other men since birth would never 
appreciate . his self-consciousness' on the level of a pure abstraction, 
he Would not be conscious of being self-conscious. Two self-conscious- 
nesses, then, brought into contact, realize their own self-consciousness 
and immediately assert it by acting so as to show that they are not 
mere objects and "the relation of both self-consCiOU5nesses is in this 
way so constiiuted that'-they prove'themselves and each other through 
0a 
life-and-death struggle. " (PM. 232) The winner of this struggle is 
master, *the loser slave. The winner shows that he'is not a mere object 
and both parties can assent to his full self-consciousness: "the master 
is the consciousness that exists'for itself*. (Here, incidentally, we 
4-1h-d Hegel's usage, -"fOr: sich". coming close to Sartrels. usage"pour- 
soi'w. But the'important, thing -for us here, is'that'Sartra attributes 
-"pour-soi, w existence ex-hypothesi to all human'beings and not merely 
to "masters".. 'There Is much of the Hegelian version in'Beckbtt., as 
we shall see. ) So the master establishes and -nourishes his -, sel-f- 
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consciousness at the expense of the slave. But the slave reaches 
the same point by another route; through "labour" and working to effect 
what the master desires the slave enters into a creative relationship 
with the objects an which he works and through "this activity giving 
shape and form" he attains "the direct apprehension of his indepen- 
dent being as its self". (PM. 238) Thus servitude is necessary to 
the maintenance of consciousness, which is our first point, and the 
condition of servitude is that of violent struggle, which is our second 
point. How do these relate to Beckett? 
The answer to this will involve an assessment in Hegelian terms 
of the significance of the couples and "pseudo-couples" in Beckett. 
If there is. one thing in, his work that is almost as important as the 
agony of--being alone it is the agony of being with another. Murphy 
and Mr Endon, the pairs of servants in Mr Knott's household, Mr Knott 
himself-and Watt, Mercier and Camier. Didi and Gogo, Pozzo and Lucky, 
Nagg and Nell, Hamm and Clov, Winnie and Willie, A and 6, Moran Senior 
and Moran Junior, and then, passing lightly but not insignificantly over 
the-second two parts of the trilogy, the endless pairs of, How It Is; 
this is. only a list of the more important examples. Not all of these, 
of course.,. are master-and-slave couples;, Indeed, only Pozzo-Lucky 
and Hamm-Clov -fall 
into that category exactly. 
Certainly the mutual dependence of Hegellsmaster and slave is 
faithfully reproduced in these two pairs. Pozzo, having treated Lucky 
liKe the'lowest sort of slave (and. be, refers, to him as a slave by 
'. ýmplicatian in Act One, "As if I were short of slaves! 'T reveals that 
, It was, Lucky. who, taught him ", all these beautiful things" (*I can't 
bear, it... any. longer... the way he-goes an. " IWFG. 34) -In the second 
act of'Waiting for Godot Pozza's dependence an his slave. is even-more 
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marKed as they come ifi together with LucKy leading Pozzo because 
the latter has gone blind. 
a 
Hamm and Clov are equally mutually dependent, although here, too, 
the initial impression given is that Hamm is master and Clov slave. 
But Hamm is blind and needs his slave for all sorts of tasKs. On the 
other hand only Hamm Knows the combination of the larder locK. In the 
case of both these pairs it seems that consciousness, self-consciousness, 
is one of the products of their union, as in Hegel. They literally 
Keep each other conscious in that they Keep each other alive, and they 
develop self-consciousness by reassuring themselves0that the other-is 
paying attention. At least the masters (Pozzo and Hamm) are prepared 
*to go to-great lengths-to achieve any sort of an audience; Nagg. Nell, 
Didi, Gogo will do very well, but obviously Lucky and Clov are the 
usual recipients of their masters' voices. This leads us on to the 
other couples mentioned - and indeed to any of Beckett's people. Didi 
and Gogo need one another as witne5*58S of the Hegelian sort ("So there 
you are again"; "Am I? ") as do Mercier and Camier who, when they are 
reunited, begin once again to look at-one another "with something of the 
old. look" andCamier says "I all but gave myself up. " (MC. 114) Even 
Mr-Knottýneeds a, witness-to hisnot needing. 'The consciousness of self 
is in some degree dependent an other self-consciousnesEpsinthese examplesi 
the most extreme version-of this, of course, is the BerKeleyan esse est 
percipi which'. -: Ls the thesis of Becketts'Film. 
The necessary involvement of violence in these -relationships. is 
ýýbde-quite clear'by Beckett. Pozzo whips Lucky who kicks Estragon. The 
-assaults-xange from', the-trivial (the'tramps cannot bear to embrace, an 
. account of the stink-, Df,. garlicl-through the comically violent (the 
stoning of Watt by, Lady McCann) to theýgratesquely-cruel'Cthe-means of 
. -communication adopted ; 
in-*How 
-It "Is). In both Hegel ana Beckatt ýthe 
violence appears gratuitous. but in both cases the reason for it is the 
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same. Hegel puts it that master and slave "must enter into this 
struggle, for they'must bring their certainty of themselves, the 
certainty of being for themselves, to: the level of objective truth". 
(PM. 232), BecKett is naturally not as explicit as this, but even in 
the obscurity of How It Is where we find Pim and Bcrý communicating 
by violent nauseating means the result is that the narrator can say 
of their meeting and first exchange "me too great benefit too I have 
that impression great benefit especially at first hard to say why less 
anonymous somehow or other less obscure". (H. 66) Later, throwing 
confusion as ever on the issue of whether there really are many 
consciousneS5es in the world or only the one, the narrator puts in: 
"With someone else, ta Keep-me company I2. would, have been a different 
man more universal. "-(H. 74) 
Thus far we' have been'covering fairly well-trodden ground. It will 
be noticed that Malone Dies and The Unnamable were omitted from the 
list of worKs given above in., which BecK6tt employs the device of the 
couple. 'In these two worKs, though not exclusively there, BecKett 
develops a more sophisticated, versian of thetwo consciousnesses. We 
do 'not really find couples but we do become aware of a tension between 
an 110 and*a-"Youn'that-repl-aces,, Ithe tension'between couples. 'The'"I" 
is characteristically the narratorl the "You" is characteristically a 
*Them" ýan "'other", '*voices" 'or, in'How It -Is. '"scribes". As 'I say, 'this 
-is not confined-to the secand: two parts of the'. trilogy. It appears at 
least'as ear-ly: as'Watt'in'the, complex-relationship between Wattand"Sam. 
this can be --extended Perhaps 'to 'include -the rislationships between Watt 
and -, Beck-ett. '-Sam -and, Beckett, -Watt, _. and Knott. ýKnott -and 
Sam and Knott 
and-Zeckett. ', I do,, not-prMpose-a'.. lengthy analysis of'these'"moments" 
'In "the, novel -ýwhich zre, "besides, -not alti3gether in the noveli , suffice 
-it-to-observe'that, these: relatic3nships are-ýobviously-, different-ln kind 
from, say. that, 'between"Didi. and Gogo, -and yet mutually-dependent 
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conscibusness. is clearly an issue with all of them. For example, is 
Sam creating Watt? If so, who is creating Sam? Beckett? But Sam 
is Beckett, isn't he? And who is creating whom between Watt and Knott? 
And so on. 
Now this second type of "couple" relationship in Beckett has not 
been analysed in Hegelian terms as the Hamm-Clov and Didi-Gogo type 
has been. But it seems crucial that the transparently fictional couples 
set up in the trilogy (Narrator and Narrated) be considered in these 
terms. The clue dropped by Beckett in naming his sub-narrator in Watt 
"Sam" cannot be ignored. The most important twosomp in Beckett's oeuvre 
is Beckett and the blank pagel as an objective correlative of this there 
is Malone and his stories or the Unnamable and his babble. Early in his 
monologue Malone, describing his "present state", says "all my senses 
are trained full on me, me, " (T. 186) which sets up the position of 
Beckett poised over his paper, waiting. Of course, in spite of, or 
because of, this concentration an himself, he does not penetrate 
through to himself; mind and body, ego and. experience, remain apartl 
"It is there I die, unbeknown to my stupid flesh. " (T. 1871 Meanwhile 
Malone/Beckett yet again resorts to the establishing of a fictional 
couple, 'hiffself and his, creature, In this case'Saposcat. '. Before 
plunging into the Saposcat story he concludes his account of his 
*present state" with *Somewhere in this turmoil'thought struggles on, 
it too wide of the mark. It too seeks me. as it always has, where I 
am, not to be-found. It too, cannot be quiet. On others let it wreak 
its-dying rage, and leave me in peace. " CT. 1873 All that'Beckett can 
do Is tellstoriesýabout Malone: all'that-Malone can do is tell stordes 
about Saposcat. 7hey, cannot, talk of themselvet so-they talk: of others; 
but. In -, the end. we -find -we can talk about'them'by -talking about their 
creations. This is, exactly the mirror situation betwedn self -consciousnes5es 
that Hegel describes. 
76. 
In The Unnamable this process is tidied up. The "Malone" 
stage is jettisoned. The self, Beckett's self, babbles on in search 
of itself, casting aside "All these Murphys. Molloys and Malones" 
(T. 305) and maKing the relationship between himself and his "vice- 
existers" quite explicit: 
It is now I shall speak of me, for the first 
time. I thought I was right in enlisting these 
sufferers of my pains. I was wrong. They never 
suffered my pains, their pains are nothing, 
compared to mine, a mere-tittle of mine, the 
tittle I thought I could put from me, in order 
to witness it. (T. 305) 
The created "other" is there for the "one" to witness it and 
it is now being rejected as a waste of time, as an impediment preventing 
the Unnamable from speaking of himself. Here, we might think, Beckett 
has risen above Hegel's formula whereby self-consciousnesses-are 
mutually-determining; now we are going to get some direct action. 
But no, there ard two further road-blocks, one contingent and one 
necessary. The contingent impediment is the appearance of Basil, Mahood 
and Worm. The central section of The*Unnamable does not in fact talk 
directly about "me" so much as about these three. The nece5sary 
impediment to talking about "me" is of course the simple fact that 
i 
the'"I" who Inhabits the pages i3f'the novel is not^Beckett. 'Even'fiere 
there is a dialectic to be perceived, this time between author and 
character. In other words the process of'self-consciousness in Beckett 
is necessarily dual, as Hegel says. 
*** 
'Stoicism, Scepticism, Unhappy'tonsr-ii3usness. 'Conclusion. 
We have now rear-hed'the end of the section of'the"Phenomenclogy 
Tmst useful for the elucidation of-Beckett. Section B, "self- 
consciousness", continues with a discussion of Stoicism, " Scepticism 
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and the "Unhappy Consciousness". Stoicism is seen in somewhat 
Beckettian terms in that it is found to confine itself to the realm 
of thought where consciousness is "free" (rather in the way the 
Unnamable is "free") whether in prison or on the throne. "Thought 
is free. 7 Unfortunately this is precisely the source of Beckett's 
anguish - although no attack can penetrate the citadel of my thought, 
I cannot get in there either; alternatively I cannot get out. Murphy 
and the Stoics have "body tight" minds. 
Scepticism finds itself to be the only reality in the flux of 
uncertain life. The sceptic can take nothing as certain but behaves as 
though, at least, he exists. In fact this is almost identical to the 
Stoical position: Scepticism "is aware of being this stoical ataraxia 
of self-thinking thought, the unalterable and genuine certainty of 
itself" (PM. 2481 which leads us beyond Beckett. However, Hegel develops 
a point here that will, in the end, enable us to make a final confront- 
ation between him and Beckett in Chapter 5 below. He relates the stoical 
consciousness to the Master and Slave discussion, as his example of 
prison and throne should make reasonable. In scepticism Hegel proposes 
that the Master-consciousness and the Slave-consciousness are contracted 
into one. This produces, the "unglnckliches Bewusstseinw, the "Unhappy 
Consciousness" which is "the Alienated Soul which is conscious of self 
as a divided nature, a doubled and merely contradictory being" (PM. 251) 
that thirsts for unity. This thirst for unity is regarded as a thirst 
for unity with the 'unchangeable"., with "immutability". CPM. 252-253) 
*unchangeable" Is at, first defined as Othe alien, external Being". 
glossed as '*God as judge* by Baillie. 'The second "'moment" of the 
unchangeable is Christ (who is a, "particular* like conscious man and 
not only universal). "The third "mament" is the self-discovery of 
consciousness in, spirit Meist"] through which consciousness "becomes 
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aware" within itself that its particularity has been reconciled with 
the universal". (PM. 253) 
Clearly we are in no position to push Beckett, protesting, through 
these sudden Christian hoops. It will perhaps become slightly less 
ludicrous to suggest doing so when we have looked at some other 
philosophers. Then we may be, iable to consider this section of the 
Phenomenology again, and develop a BecKettian commentary an it and an 
the two concluding sections of Hegel's worK, "VII Religion" and "VIII 
Absolute Knowledge". 
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Notes to Chapter Two 
1. Cf. Stace, 1,1 and Mure, 2. viii and 58. 
2. Besides the Saillie translation I have used for this thesis 
(cf. Bibliography) there is now available an excellent transla- 
tion by A. V. Miller (Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, O. U. P. 
1977) which includes a paragraph-by-paragraph "analysis" of the 
text by J. N. Findlay. 
3. Cf. Kaufmann, 1.379. 
4. This is Hegel's Platonic inheritance. Cf., for instance, the 
Pamenides. 
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CHAPTER THREE. Heidegger's Being and Time and Beckett 
Is it true that Beckett's work "could almost be seen as a liter- 
ary exploration of Heideggerian metaphysics"? 
1 What sort of a thing 
would "exploration" be here? Is it formally possible for Beckett to 
be doing what this quotation suggests? 
. 
"Exploration", I suppose, here means testing, that is. explora- 
tion in the sense in which we might use that word of operations in a 
Chemistry laboratory. Beckett is seen as putting Heidegger to the 
test: he builds people and worlds according to a Heideggerian prescrip- 
tion and it is for us to judge whether they make sense and, therefore, 
whether Heidegger's views are accurate. 
Is it possible for a novelist and playwright to "build people" 
like this? Can a literary world ever be a serious realizing of a 
philosophical thesis? The objection to this would seem to lie in our 
discomfort at the idea of creative genius writing according to a 
blueprint - we feel it must cramp his style. But writing according 
to a plan is somethingthat-many of the greatest writers, Shakespeare 
and Milton for example. have done consistently. Among all Shakespeare's 
plays there is only one with an original plot, which should'help to 
show that the existence of a blueprint is not necessarily a limitation 
on genius. But then, this is not really our problem - it is extremely 
unlikely that Beckett has ever written a single line with Heidegger 
in mind, with one notable exception. as we shall see. 
What then is Heideggerian about Beckett? This Chapter will be 
devoted to an exploration of a series of Heidegger's concepts and an 
attempt to link them with similar points in Beckett. For the moment 
the important thing is to see if Beckett and Heidegger survive in 'the 
same world. I would claim -that they do, and that they are 'linked by 
a common ontology. Beckett, and the earlier Heidegger. are-suspicious 
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of metaphysics but their interest in ontology seems to be identical, 
or, rather, like the obverse and reverse of the same coin. This 
is made obvious when we refer to our notable exception to the rule 
that Beckett does not seem to have Heidegger in mind. Molloy. 
discussing the subjects he has studied, comes out with a phrase that 
is pure Heidegger: "my Knowledge of men was scant and the meaning of 
being beyond me" (T . 39).. The expression "the meaning of being" is 
Heidegger's own propertyj it is not an expression that is used in 
English, where we would use "the meaning of existence", or of "life", 
instead. But it has its own resonance for any reader of Heideggerý 
Being and Time has a short Foreword that haunts the rest of the worK 
with its profundity and directness. It opens with a quotation from 
Plato to the effect that, in the Sophist, ' he has become perplexed 
by the expression "being" and Heidegger continues: 
Do we in our time have an answer 
to-the question of what we really mean' 
by the word "being"? Not at all. So 
it is fitting that we should raise anew 
the question of the meaning of Being,. 
(BT. 19. Heidegger's emphasis) 
The words employed in the German for "meaning" and "Being" ("Sinn" 
and "Sein") are only susceptible of this translation into English, 
in this context. "Sinn" could be translated as "sense", but not 
naturally here. (It is as well to make the point again that I am 
not trying to see Heidegger as a direct and conscious influence on 
Beckett. 'although he may well be that,,, but as a philosophical explorer 
of the same territory). 
-""In the French version of, Molloy the passage quoted above appears 
thus: 
Mais je n1ai jamais eu a ce propos 
que des idees fort confuses, connaissant 
mal les hommes et ne sachant pas 
tr*e's bien ce que cela veut dire. etre. 
(Molloy. Paris: Eds. de Minuit, 1951. p. 58). 
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This means that BecKett, in turning the above into English, deliberately 
chose to compress and strengthen the philosophical connotations of his 
sentence. What is more, we have here a reflection of Heidegger's linking 
together of man (Dasein) and Being (Sein). Molloy moves straight from 
the idea that he is ignorant of man to the idea that he is ignorant of 
Being, which is a negative version of Heidegger's proposal that he must 
interrogate Oassin to reach Sein. 
Being and Time appeared in Husserl's Jahrbuch fUr Ph9nomenologie 
und ph9nomenalogische Forschung in-1927 with the subtitle "First Half". 
This "first half" is in fact only the first two parts of the first half 
of, the treatise: the third part of the first half and the whole of the 
second half have never appeared. The second half was to worK on time 
and ontology through the media of Kant, Descartes and Aristotle. The 
third part of the first half, to be entitled "time and Being", is a 
more obviously serious lack. 
4 The two parts of the worK that did appear deal respectively with 
the Being of a special sort of entity, "Dasein", (roughly "man") and with 
Temporality. So, in a sense, even without the section an "time and Being" 
we do have a treatise an "Being and Time". But the being in question is 
never "Being in general" except by implication. For the most part - 
Heidegger sticKs closely. to his programme and deals with the Being of 
Dasein. In other words, just as BecKett avoids metaphysics Heidegger 
never gets to them. 
2 They are both "stuck", for reasons that may 
not in the-end be so different. "merely" with people and worlds. 
It Is inevitable thatthis will be opbstrued with the assistance of 
a spatial metaphor. The reader will-now 5ee, Heidegger and Beckett - 
as, earthbound while, above them, and, below, them the heights-and depths 
of Being go unplumbed. It is worth remembering however that all 
metaphysical, and Dntological language-Is metaphc)rical and,, to that extent. 
"not true".. We try to push this fact away from us by, employing words 
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such as "ultimacy" and "primordiality" but these are every bit as 
0 
metaphorical as conceptions of "God up there" or "profundity" of "the 
*abyss". To talK of the "ultimacy" of a question cannot literally mean 
that it is the last question beyond which there can be no others; af ter 
any answer man can ask "why? " When Heidegger talks of the "primordiality" 
of Being he cannot literally mean that Being is the first number in a 
series. 
Returning to our original point we now find that we must rephrase 
the question thus: Is it true that BecKett tests by literary exempli- 
fication the philosophical theses Heid ger proposes about people and 
worlds? Answering this will-involve selecting Heidegg*er's main theses 
and seeing if they appear in Beckett. In one way I have already started 
this process by adopting, without a by-your-leave, the expression "people 
and worlds". This does not appear in Heidegger but is influenced by 
his definition of "world" as something only available to each of us 
personally: it is intended to delimit the non-metaphysical area of 
analysis. 
Now. we have said that all metaphysical and ontological language 
is necessarily metaphorical, but as we start to consider the language 
Heidegger uses just in this matter of "People and worlds" we find that 
it too is stiff with metaphor. One of our comparisons, for instance, 
is going to be between Beckettian man and Heidegger's concept of 
". Geworfenheit*. "Thrownness". There is no question but that this 
is a metaphor: Heidegger does not intend us to conceive of man as 
"t. hrown" into Being literally. And indeed when the actor in Act Without 
Words, is literally flung onto-the stage we automatically grope-for the 
meaning of that flinging-in just the same way as we try to seize the 
philosopher's concept. In other words, what we may -find is that the 
philosopher does not necessarily only deal in 1iteral truth and, the 
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novelist only in wposticO truth. They overlap. 
This proposal (that philosophy can work, must at times work, 
by literary means) would not seem at all strange to Heidegger. Increasingly 
he has turned to poetry to assist him in his uncovering of Being. From 
the Verse fragments of the Presocratics he has moved to the enigmatic 
beauty of HoUlderlin's poetry without any sense of a discontinuity In his 
Work, Indeed he has constantly Put philosophy and poetry into the 
84mO Category as the supreme mental achievements. We should 
thus be encouraged in our attemPt to associate Heidegger's Philosophy 
with BOckett's desperate POStrye 
3 
000 
Oasein. "Being-There*- 
Throughout Being and Time Haidegger uses the word Bassin to 
denominate 
entities that *are there", as the etymology of Bassin 
indicates. For our purposes it is sufficient to equate this term with 
0 man". but Heidegger's decision*to use it instead of 'man" reveals his 
first category: man wis therew in a way that other things are not. 
, 
Rsing and Time raises the question of the meaning of 
Being* (ST. 1) 
and It does so by maKing *an entity-the inquirer -transparent 
in his 
Own Being* (BT. 27). 'This entity which each of us is himself and which 
Includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of 
its Being, we shall 
denote by the tam "Dassinow (ST. 271. 
SO the analysis of Dassin'twhich I shall treat 
henceforth. as an 
Fýngllsh word) will lead to any-possible answers about the meaning Of Being 
In ZRneral. And Bassin Is man, but man with a special emphasis. man 
as the entity that *is thersO. Not only that, man is also the entity 
that %Cmport3 itS81fo towards the question of Being: Bassin is the 
qua 6tioner as well as the questioned - Bassin 
is the entity for which 
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Being is an "issue" and *understanding of Being is itself a definite 
characteristic of Dasein's Being" (ST. 32). 
Thus in fact three categories emerge from Heidegger's opening 
remarks: Being, Being-There (Dasein) and the ounderstanding" with 
which Dassin already comports itself towards Being. The "understanding, 
is here apparent as an *inquiry*. 
Does this have anything to do with Beckett? For Robbe-Grillet it 
Is a way Into Beckett's theatre, His *Samuel Beckett ou la presence 
sur la sAne" quoted above in Chapter 1, opens 
La condition de Ithomme, dit Haidegger. clest 
d'fitre 1B. Probablement ast-ce le theatre 
plus qua tout autre mode de representation 
du reel, qui reproduit le plus naturellement 
catte situation. Le personage du theatre 
est en scane, clest sa premi'dire qualite: 
% 
il ast la. (Robba-Grillet, 1,95). 
This quality of the theatre, Robbe-Grillet argues. is particularly 
Important for Beckett. Characters in Ibsen or Shaw ware there". of 
course, but they are principally vehicles - they are going somewhere, 
doing something - only later can we think "he's there". But Didi and 
GOgo in Godot are not going anywhere and not doing anything, they are 
Just *there* with a vengeance. And this quality, far from removing the 
tramps fmn our comprehension# In fact digs deeper than the purposeful 
qualities of traditional characters and brings us closer to human reality. 
Robbe-Crillet, talking of going to a Beckett play& presumably having read 
the novels, says son allait anfin vair I'homme ds Beckett, an allait 
vOIr JoHommew (ibid. 95). Watching the tramps we are watching Beckettian 
nIdn -and seeing Man t)ecauso we are having stressed 
for us his quality 
Of Esing-There. We are watching Dasein. 
This might well appear to be a sPOcial case that can 
be mde only 
for BsCkatt's theatre. 13ut the characters of the novels share this kind 
'Of Contingent Saing-Theraness, this "prSsancel. For one thing the 
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narrators. in the Trilogy and How It Is at least. keep a bizarre hold 
an the present Eand the common etymology Of Opresento and wpresencal 
Is no accident). so that although the Unnamable is reluctant to open 
his wordy-gurdy with the word "10 (- OPresent: ") as Molloy and Malone 
did before him, he does start with three questions about the present. 
*Where now? Who now? When now? w The usual emphasis here is on the 
interrogative half of these phrases, but the repeated Onow" is also 
revealing. 
M0110Y is Others* in his mother's bed. Malone is in more or 
1833 the same position and the Unnamable is positioned or stationed 
or deposited in a similar stasis somewhere where he can observe. It 
is interesting that In his early description of his place he says 
*Mdlone is there* instead of the more natural "Malone is here" (T. 294). 
Out that is marginal compared to the point that underlies Beckettos 
cýolcG Of position for his narrators. In bad one Is most nearly *Just 
there% It-is the position in which'one's purposes and meanings are 
miniMized. Ejejacqua in More Pricks Than Kicks moves a lot. even makes 
a Sort of fetish of his journayings Ccf. MPTK, 39-40) although he Is 
'bagged in indolence* like Murphy. In spite of which Murphy also gets 
about,. and Watt is, quits a mover. -, But Beckett is clearly very concerned 
to Got PP-OP18 to stay still. He blinds and maims 
them, puts them in 
sand, Jars, wheelchairs, dustbins and mud. 
Progressively his characters, 
talking or silent. grind to a halt. Putting 
his narrators in bed or 
3141ilar, is clearly, a stop in the right direction. 
And is all this not 
ar'L. 'ýýten'Pt to get rid of the spurious sense of 
purpose engendered 
by 'notion? To -got -the Njust-therenessw of a character 
an -to PaPer or 
the 
-Stagg? 
Besides 5aing-Thare Haidegger's first tru-se categories 
include 
541W and *Inquiry'& the latter being a way 
in which Dassin comports 
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itself towards the former. 
& 
It Is rather vague to claim that Beckett is concerned with Being. 
In the case of both Heidegger and Beckett this ultimate concern is 
left to emerge by itself from an analysis of man and his world. In 
Heldegger. however, Being Is the stated, specific goal whereas Beckett 
Of course has none. Since this is the ultimate concern, on the other 
hand, perhaps we should leave it to the last chapter. Which leaves Inquiry. 
It may have been noticed that in what was said above Inquiry had 
two sorts of status. It had the ontological status of man's Seing-towards-Beingý 
and it also had the ontical status of Heidegger's own proposal in Rein&- 
and Time. viz. that he will inquire Into Being via the Being of Dasein. ;; Lz 
Both these meanings of Inquiry apply to Beckett. He certainly gives 
his characters the ontological characteristic of inquiring. Indeed it 
is 1"hat they do best and most often. That their Inquiry is directed 
towards their own Being is also clear, and it is reasonable to suppose 
that anything they learn about their own Being implies something-about 
Being in general- There Is an element of the compulsory (as well as 
the compulsive) In the Inquiries of the people In the novels. I would 
Propose that this is an ontological compulsion not a moral or Psycholog- 
Ical one. "You must go on, says the Unnamable. almost at his last 
24SP- and the raging question "Why? * seems not to be adequately answered 
by the Proposal of a moral Imperative, a God who tells us to go on, 
nor by the proposal that we are compelled to go on by some neurosis. 
on thOOther hand an ontological answer seems a lot more satisfactory. 
In:; tliry is the way of Being of Dassin. Inescapably we are 
that sort 
.. I.. 
Of entity that wle-thamO and one of our first and inevitable modes of 
being there is to have already an-understanding of being there. and hence 
of a(3ins. 
On the ontical level too f3ackett parallels 
Widegger. It is-often 
Useful to . 
"gxj3loratjon,. 
4 
1013 Uckett, s ceuvrs as a oquest* or an 
8B. 
Heidegger analyses Dasein as the first step along the "trail of 
Being". Beckett pushes and pushes his people into tighter and tighter 
corners in. his search for a self that will be more than a self: 
clearly he does not just want to "find himself" in the romantic cliche' - 
he wants to find "the Self", that is, something that will render "the 
mess" intelligible, somethi. ng really quite like Being, as we shall see. 
*** 
Phenomenology 
It is worth maKing the point that Heidegger employs a phenomenological 
method throughout Being and Time. This means that he is using the 
method of Husserl. to whom the booK is dedicated, which involves an 
attempt to do precisely the opposite of building a system. Husserl's 
slogan was "Zum Sache selbst"(ýTo the things themselves") and this is 
phenomenology's aim, to uncover. disclose and make clear phenomena 
in their Being. The intention is to uncover the obvious and to disclose 
things in their transparency. This in itself brings Heidegger closer 
to a literary cast of thought, particularly to the aims and methods of 
the Nouveau Roman. It also means-that'he limits his horizons, 
eschews metaphysics and is involved in elucidating things *as they are" 
rather that in placing them in Positions within schemes. *Ultimate" 
questions ars In a sense bypassed, therels no, attempt in Heidegger to 
construct-a mchainm of priorities that will lead uP to an absoluta,. as 
I in . 'puato or Heg8l- This -is really "the way in which Phenomenological 
Existentialist, philosophy differs radically -from "traditional*, philosophy. 
-E3ecKett, of-course. -Issues strong caveats against traditional 
metaphysical speculatýlon. If his work is taken as aý-whole we can-see 
that, the heavily ironic treatment of philosophy in the, early novels gives 
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way to a desperation in the later worK that seems rather beyond 
being helped by metaphysics or even logic. The point is that both 
BecKett and Heidegger perceive the futility of even asKing many of 
the "traditional" philosophical questions. The following paraphrase 
of one of Heidegger's points in Vom Wesen der, Wahrheit. made by Arne 
Naess, could apply equally well to the novelist or the philosopher: 
Man misunderstands himself when he seeks .- the light, seeks "the meaning of his existence", 
or "a goal" which will be illuminated for 
him. Beyond the light-giving function which 
man, as Dasein, himself is, there is no. further 
source of illumination. (Naes@, l, 239). 
*** 
Existenz. "Existence". Faktizit9t. "Facticityll. 
Heidegger offers us, then, a phenomenological analysis of man 
ds Dasein, fhat entity which already inquires into, and has some 
understanding of, the meaning of Being. 
Dassin exists. It is unfortunate that in English'we sometimes 
use "exists" to mean "merely exists" as in the expression "He's not 
living, he's merely existing" which could be used. for instance, of 
someone withsevere brain-damage which has wiped out all zonscious 
activity. In Existentialist terminology "to exist" means precisely 
the opposite, as we shall see. 
Heidegger bases his special usage of Existenz an the etymology 
of the word. Just as he breaKs down the common Berman word Dasein 
ihto-its component parts to emphasize the special sort of Being that 
mas has. so he breaks Existenz down into the, component parts of its 
Latin-root. Ex-sistere means "to stand out from". Thus the firs't' 
feature of Dasein's existence is that it "stands out" 'from something. 
from what? 'The answer will appear more precisely when we have 
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examined the concept of the "world" in the next section, but for the 
present we can say that man "stands out" in such a way that*he is set 
over against his world not simply in the subject - object relation 
that has dominated philosophy at least since Descartes but also in a 
dynamic relationship that takes into account his past and his future. 
Dasein's past is facticity and his future is possibility. Other 
sorts of entity, stones and animals for instance, have no understanding 
of the factical situation in which they find themselves and have no 
possibilities genuinely open before them. As we shall see, this means 
that they do not have temporality. A stone does not have an authentic 
past. But this is anticipating later points. Oasein, then, alone 
"exists". Dassin alone "comports" itself towards its possibilities 
and has some sort of understanding of them. Until Dassin has chosen 
among them it cannot be said to have any "essence", but it always 
already has-an existence, whence the important thesis, taken up in 
Sartre as a sort of war-cry, that "Existence precedes essence". It 
is perhaps imperfectly understood that this thesis appears in toto 
in Heidegger, as for example when he refers to "the priority of 
"existentiarover wessentia". " (BT. 68). 
Thus Dassin's existence consists in his choosing of his own 
possibilities, his choosing of his own essence. "Man maKes himself" 
in other words. So much for the "futural" aspect of Dasein's "standing 
jout", what of'the past aspect which we have characterized as facticity? 
, 
It is not.. perhaps, -strictly accurate to define facticity as the-past 
tjn-; that welargely-experience It as a limiting j: )f: our f-readom, to maKe 
. choices about 
the future. Facticity, is-*the way things are", (How It Is? ). 
It is all that cribs. cabins and confines us but. liKe all such 
limitations,, it is also the conditian of the possible. 'It -is a, fact 
that man rannot simply extend'his -arms and fly; and -It Is, a --fact -, that 'I 
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cannot afford to hire a helicopter; which means that my possibilities 
of getting to the top of a building are limited to the stairs or the lift. 
In a sense this example shows how facticity is in the future -I must 
choose between the stairs or the lift by which I shall go up to the 
top of the building because I shall not be able to go up another way. 
But it is easier to thinK of this as, belonging to the past: the building 
and all the conditions of getting to the top of it are already "in positior 
before I maKe any choices. My situation is always already factical. 
For Heidegger, on the trail of Being, Man's Being is the first 
target, and he finds in his analysis of Existenz that all man's "ways of 
Being" are possibilities perceived in the welter of factic: Lty. He 
calls man's "ways of Being" "existentials". Dasein's Being is "existence", 
which is- "potentiality-for-Being" or "Being-possible" (ST. 183). Dasein 
projects itself upon or into its possibilities - this is its existence. 
Man's free choices, of course, are not only limited by facticity 
cannot choose to be born a Russian if I am born English) they are also 
limited by themselves. Man can only choose one possibility at a time and 
this excludes the other possibilitiesl I cannot go up to the top of the 
building in the lift and by the stairs at the same time. Using the lift 
removes the possibility of the stairs as surely as the shape of my arms 
removes the possibility of flying up unaided. Of course, I can use the 
stairs "next time". but by Nnext time" the world may so have altered that 
I can fly up unaided or can hire a helicopter. 
So. man "is there", he already has some sort of understanding of 
Bqing, his own way-of-Being is *existence* which involves an inevitable 
ap preciation of -facticity and a self-directioning towards his own 
possibilities. 
Beckett's characters may be said generally to"Oexisto in the 
Heideggerian way. There is. in nearly every work of his., an extreme 
illustr, ation of facticity coupled with an exploration of the wild and 
-fantastic, attem-Pts-man can resort to inýorder to project himself into 
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possibilities. The factical situation is usually illustrated by 
physical limitation - amputation, paralysis, blindness. On this level 
Beckett is a pessimist if it is Optimism to minimize facticity and- 
maximise possibility in one's account of man. Facticity also appears 
as the master-servant relationship (Hamm-Clov, Pozzo-Lucky) in which 
both parties are heavily dependent. Projection into possibilities is 
largely verbal (of course, the actual projection always is a mental 
process and, as such, verbal) and takes the form of the story-telling 
and fantasizing that makes up so much of the novels and a good part of 
the plays. The narrators of the novels are obvious examples, but Hamm 
is the most revealing character in this context. He cannot "exist" in 
his physical environment except mentally and so invents an endless 
"story", which, although obviously drawn from his past, 'in fact operates. 
existentially in that he has constantly to choose how and where to take 
it within the factical limitations of his own memory. Hamm's choices 
are pointed up by Beckett quite clearly on the many occasions when he 
stops to comment on his story-telling or to, imprave a phrase. For 
example in the following passage he does both'of these things: 
Hamm: ....... (Narrative tons. ) Come on now, come 
on. -present your Petition and 
let me resume 
my labours. (Pause. Normal tone. ) 
There's English for you. Ah well ... (Narrative tone. ) It was then he'took 
the plunge. It's my little one, he said. 
'Tsstss. -a little one, that's bad. My, little 
boy, he said, as if the sex mattered (E. 36). 
Even more striking is the way Hamm disregards his own earlier 
, remarks. 
For instance he asserts that, the day in question during the 
siary-was a hot day. a coldýday, a windy day and a dry day. This sort 
-of choice, like the -choice of -the words 'themselves. 'is the freedom 
that faces the creative writer. It Is, the pseudo-choosing of a fantasy 
world and. although it parallels the choices of "real" life. It is not 
really governed by facticity. Thus Beckett, and Hamm, are "really" 
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Plunged in a highly factical world - but when they tell stories they 
have a kind of mad freedom which automatically means that the stories 
are simply not *about* the wreal world" although they are so desperately 
meant to be. The same applies in most of the novels. 
My chief example of facticity and existence in BecKett, however, 
apart from this generdl one, is taken from his first, unpublished, 
unperformed, untranslated play, Eleutheria. written in 1947.1 shall 
not recount the plot of this Play (which can be found in Fletcher and 
Spurling's book The Plays of Samuel Beckett). It is enough simply to 
say that its hero, Victor, is a renegade from society who is trying to 
drop out of the everyday concerns of his family, friends and fiancee, 
The Most-impartant character in the play besides Victor is a glazier 
who voices Beckett's wisdom, presumably. This "Vitrier" tells Victor to 
*define himself": OVous de'finir ..... prenez un Pau de contour, pour 
I'amour de Dieu* (p. 62 of the typescript) and he explains, -*Vous n1ates 
tOut-simplement rien, man pauvre ami*. But this request that Victor 
should choose an essence and not simply hover In suspended freedom over 
his Possibilities is precisely what he is trying to avoid. He replies, 
"Il est peut-etre temps qua quelqulun soit tout simplement rien". 
Eleutheria is a play about the tension between individual Existenz 
and the two things which place this in jeopardyj first, facticitY tin 
the shape of Victor's friends and family) and second. choice 
itself only 
by choosing not to choose can one remain free. This tension 
Is also 
aPParent in More Pricks Than Kicks and Murphy. 
I. 
-0 00 
In-der-Welt-sain. "Being-in-the-world". 
Dassin Nis there* already. It has some understanding 
of Its Being 
which reveals to it that it -Olexistssl in a 
factical way. In 5eckettian 
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terms we can translate this summary of our position so far thus: Beckett's 
characters "are there", statically and solidly present, with some 
understanding of themselves and an inescapable feeling of Being which 
manifests itself in the almost overwhelming facticity of the situation; 
but it is only "almost" overwhelming - they continue to "exist", to 
"stand out from" everything else much though they would like to sink 
down into the unconsciousness. of objects. We can think of Didi and 
Gago, just "there" somewhere, certainly understanding enough to Keep 
them miserable, somehow aware of Being, but hopelessly enmeshed in the 
toils of facticity represented above all by the curtailment of their 
freedom occasioned by having to wait for Godot. They "exist" constantly, 
projecting themselves into questions about the future, considering the 
possibilities. 
The question now arises,. if man is "there", where is he? Where is 
"there"? Heidegger's answer is that man is "in-the-world". But he 
uses this in a specialized sense; he does not simply mean that mýn is 
in an objective universe in the same way as a chair is in a room. The 
chair does not "exist". it is simply "present-at-hand" ("Vorhanden"). 
As such_it is present-at-hand inside another present-at-hand entity, viz. 
the room. Dasein, however, exists and can truly be said to be in its 
world CBT. 78-80). To maKe this distinction clear Heidegger uses the 
example of the chair and-the wall. He analyses the statement "The chair 
"touches" the wall" as follows: 
Taken strictly, "touching" is never what we are 
talking about', in Such cases, not because accurate 
re-examination will always eventually establish 
that there is a space between the chair and, the 
wall. but. because. -4an principle the chair can 
never, touch the wall. even if the space between 
them should be equal to zero. If the chair 
could tour-h the wall, this would presuppose that 
the wall is the sort of thing "for", which a 
chair would be encounterable (BT-81). 
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Dasein, however, can "encountern walls and chairs, can "touch" things. 
Dasein can really "ben in the. world. - "Being-in" is "the formal 
existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the- 
world as its essential state" (BT. 80). 
The table, the chair and the wall, however they are disposed, 
are "worldless", whereas Dasein isalways in-the-world. Here Heidegger 
is detbrmined not to be mistaKen: he insists that "Being-in" Cand 
"the world") is not something that is added to Oasein, not "a "property" 
which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and without which 
it could be just as well as it could with it" (BT. 84). Oasein is 
already "in-the-world". the ontological definition of Dasein's Being 
must include this "Being-in" as an essential state. 
Are BecKett's characters "in-the-world" in this sense? Do they 
particularly manifest "Being-in" as an essential state of their Being? 
Certainly Hamm specifically describes his own limited environment 
as ýIthe world". He orders Clov to wheel him round the room/stage of 
Endgame with the phrase "Right round the world! " (E. 23). There is a 
strong feeling that Hamm is only because he "is in" this world of 
his. "Outside of here it's death! " he proclaims towards the end of 
the play (E. 45). 
And if we taKe, for-instance, Malone's room as being more than 
literally intended we can read his description of his "present state" 
as applying to his "world" too: "This room seems to be mine. I can find 
no other explanation to my being left in it" (T. 183). In fact this is 
thqý worst possible explanation of Malone' s being in the *room"; how 
an earth would he be able to Possess a room unless 'this room -is his own 
in an inalienable way, that is. unless-it is his world? We. shall have 
more examples to give-of "Being-in-the-world" in BecKett when we 
discuss Gewarfenheit. 'below. 
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Oasein is already in-the-world. And it is involved in the world 
(its world) in a manner so intimate that subject-object dualism is 
rendered irrelevant. Heidegger here provides an answer to Murphy's 
Cartesian schizophrenia: 
When Dasein directs itself towards something 
and grasps it, it does not somehow first get 
out of an inner sphere in which it has been 
proximally encapsulated, but its 
primary kind of Being is such that it is 
always "outside" alongside entities which 
it encounters and which belong to a world 
already discovered CBT. 89). 
Curiously it is in Murphy itself that we find BecKett adopting this 
at-least-partial solution to the dualism of the "inner" and the "outer". 
When we firstmeet Celia's grandfather, Mr. Kelly, he is mending the 
tail of his kits and imagining what it will be like to fly it. "Already 
he was in position. straining his eyes for the speck that was he, 
digging in his heels against the immense pull skyward" (M. 23). Here the 
kite is Mr Kelly in a manner that is unintelligible except along the 
lines of our Heideggerian epistemology. Mr. Kelly "grasps" the kite 
"outside", up there "alongside" it, not from some "inner" sanctum'. 
' 
This is clearly not SecKett's last word on this subject and we shall have 
to look more closely at the whole question of dualism in the two writers 
In a separate section. 
For our present purposes we must develop Heidegger's alternative 
to dualism, "Being-in-the-world", to illuminate further the concept of 
"the world". 10 
Things which are not Dasein are not all merely "present-at-hand". 
Ih., f act Dasain Is primary way of encountering entities is in -their 
*readiness-to-hand" C'Zuhandenheit"). We do not meet a chair tor,, a kite) 
as something "Just lying about". we meet it first, as an article of 
-equipment* C*Zeug")which is ready-to-hand. We see a chair as something 
to sit on before we see it as a *brute" object. In other words O'cancern" 
Is clDser to us, than more bare perception (ST. 95). Dasein's way of Being 
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towards entities encountered within-the-world is "praxis", that is, 
*concernful dealing. Even the things of "nature" are not exempt from 
this; the tree is "equipment" for making chairs; the mountain is an 
obstacle, a likely source of a stream, a place of refugei the South 
wind "means" rain. 
All this "equipment" is inextricably interrelated and the world 
is the totality of this "equipment". Thus "Being-in-the-world" amounts 
to absorption in the totality of equipment CBT. 105). This becomes 
clearer when we consider that all equipment refers back to Dasein. 
The South wind "means" rain, which "means" the growth of crops, which 
'Imeans" food, which is for Dasein to eat. Thus my world extends out 
as far as these "chains" of reference go (BT. 116). 
Does Beckett make the distinction between "Vorhanden" and "Zuhanden", 
between objects-which are present-at-hand and those which are ready-to- 
hand? Perhaps we have here a distinction that will make some sense 
of that eveýt, "of great formal brilliance and indeterminable purport", 
the visit of the Galls to Mr. Knott's house in Watt. Perhaps it will 
also shed light an Watt's inability to say; of a pat, "pot, pot" and 
be comforted. The Galls come to tune the piano and their visit disturbs 
Watt. He describes his disturbance thus, 
.... the scene in the-music-room, --with the 
two Galls, ceased very soon to signify for 
Watt a piano tuned, an obscure family and 
professional relation, an exchange of 
judgements more or less intelligible, -and 
so on. if indeed it had ever signified such 
things, and became a mere example of light 
commenting bodies, and stillness motion, and 
silence sound, and comment comment (W. 69-70). 
In other-words Watt's world has broken down. It -is precisely the 
, JRZuhanden*. 'equipmental interrelationships that, constitute Dasein's 
world, that fall away -from Watt"m memory of the incident. -leaving only 
his appreciation of the merely "Vorhanden" aspects of'the Incident. 
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"Meanings" such as judgements and family relations break down until 
Watt can only perceive his memory of the incident as an abstract 
design, the meaninglessness, the absurdity, of the merely present-at- 
hand. 
The merely present-at-hand is incapable of being, or having, a 
world. As Beckett indicates in the Three Dialogues with Georges 
Outhuit: 
All have turned wisely tail, before the 
ultimate penury. bacK to the mere misery 
where destitute virtuous mothers may 
steal bread for their starving brats. 
There is more than a difference of degree 
between being short, short of the world, 
short of self, and being without these 
esteemed commodities (PTO. 122). 
The "ultimate penury" is the gazing at the empty and absurd 
object perceived as "Just lying there", It is the nausea experienced 
by Sartre's Roquentin as he gazes at the famous root of the maronnier, 
it 'is just "there". meaningless and worldless. 
The episode in Watt where the hero finds himself unconvinced by 
using the word "pot" to refer to a pot (W. 78) may also be based an the 
ready-to-hand/present-at-hand distinction. When an object slips over 
.p 
from being one to being the other it becomes uncanny and disturbing. 
Heidegger "talks, about *The helpless way in which we'stand before" a 
piece of broken equipment - the breaking robs the thing-of its readiness- 
to-hand and thrusts it. before our very eyes, into the merely present- 
at-hand. This is what seems to be happening to Watt's pot, "It was in 
vain that it answered, with unexceptionable ad'aquacy, all the purposes, 
and performed all the offices. Of a Pot. -it was hot a pot- (W. 78). Watt's 
pot, 'in other words. -is acting or masquerading as a ready-to-hand pot, 
but-1t is not, that. it -is some other thing, some merely present-at-hand 
mbject to which, the name'"pot"Awhich implies its ready-to-hand function) 
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cannot be given. Heidegger returns to this phenomenon later when 
discussing understanding. "When we merely stare at something", he, 
says, "our just-tiaving-it-bef ore us lies before us as a failure to 
, 
understand it any more"(BT. 190). And he comes very close to 
describing the effect on Watt of tioth the Galls and the pot when he 
starts drawing his conclusions about understanding and meaning. 
"Only Dasein can be meaningful". we learn, "all entities whose Kind of 
Being is of a character ottier than Dasein's must be conceived as 
unmeaning .... And only that which is unmeaning can be absurd. The 
present-at-hand. as Dasein encounters it, can, as it were, assault 
Dassin's Being" (BT. 193. Heidegger's italics). Watt's pot is absurd, 
and the Galls' visit "assaults" his Being. 
In this connexion it is interesting to consider SecKett in the 
light of the following gloss on Heidegger made by I. M. BochensKi: 
On the one hand human existence is thrown down 
into the world and is attuned to and utterly subject 
to the beings in it; in this way the world 
transcends human existence. On the other hand, 
human existence is really the "formative" agent 
of the worldi it transcends the world (Bochenski, 
1.171). 
This ambiguity of man's Being-in-the-warld is clearlyýthat of 
the narrators of the trllogyýto go no further. It explains why they 
appear sometimes to be wutterly subject" to their worlds (down-and-out, 
disabled, immobilized, impatent), but at other times to be the *formative 
agents" creating their worlds, as for instance in the-case of Moran's 
half of Molloy which Is'his own *report" and who is to -say how fictitious? 
'There Is a strong ýidentification made in-'BecKett betweewthe 
narrator and his space latter Is quite clearly -, his Heideggerian 
-"world% Malone. ý ýf or -, exampl e. - -thinks ý, that 'his body is,. the world 
and that--he has swollen, to fill the universe, (T. 235) he has, 
ar rather, his, world -and -universe" have zontracted, tD the limits ýo-f his 
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body, or at least of his "room". 
Miss Carriage in Murphy whose personality is extended, via a lead, to 
her Dachshund, he is extended to his possessions: "I say my pats, 
as I say my bed, my window, as I say me" (T. 253). This cuts both 
ways of course, reflecting the ambiguity mentioned in BochensKi's 
gloss. -Either Malone's world of objects is himself and he is their 
"formative agent" or he is an object not really in possession of 
himself and thus "utterly subject" to his factical environment. 
Similarly he points out that, liKe 
The "space" which Malone, in particular, occupies is Heideggerian 
space in that it is persvalized. Science measures space objectively 
as the separation of things merely present-at-hand but Dasein primarily 
occupies space in terms of the connexions of the ready-to-hand. , 
Heidegger gives a striking illustration of what this means when he says 
that my glasses are "environmentally more remote" than the picture I 
look at through them (BT. 141). The picture is "closer" to me in my 
world than the glasses, which I do not notice as I looK through them. 
.1 construct my 
world out of the ready-to-hand and thus learn about 
space, I do not "first" Know about space and then set up my world within 
it CBT. 136 ff). "Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in 
space" CBT-146). 
i 
Heidegger returns to this point towards the end of Being and Time 
when discussing Dasein's temporality. He observes that space is not 
an unfortunate adJunct of the linking of body and mind. As we have seen, 
the whole burden of his thesis about Being-in-the-world Is that this 
Cartesian dualism is meaningless. 'Dasain, because -it is'ý'*spiritual* 
(that is, conscious and possessed of an Understanding of', Its'Being) can 
be"Ispatialw -in a way 
that a Thing, cannot. JUSt as a stone has no 
time, no history, no "real* past. so It'haS no spare either. 'The 
scientific view only aPPliP-s 'to'the present, -: at-hand. - 'the world and 
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its Things, since they-, are always my world and my Things (Malone) 
are ready-to-hand. Hence "The world is not present-at-hand in space" 
CBT. 419-421). 
*** 
Realit9t. "Reality". Dualism. 
So Dasein exists in its own world and encounters that world first 
as "ready-to-hand". The concept of Being-in-the-world Cthe "essential 
state of Being" of Dasein) does away with dualism, as we have seen. 
Being-in-the-world is something that Dasein always is already, it is 
its Being. This is an idea that Heidegger inherited from Husserl for 
whom consciousness is a 'noetico-noematic" correlation. That is to 
say that the *noema" (the object perceived) is part of the nature of 
the "noesis" (the perception). The nonmental object is as much a 
condition of consciousness as the mental subject. Thus for Husserl and 
Heidegger consciousness is no longer interior and self-sufficient 
(cf. Gurwitsch, 1.48 ff). This is the burden of our argument, above, 
in-re, Mr. Kelly's Kite. 
Heidegger claims-that'the apparent insolubility of the problem of 
dbalism is based on a misleading "fragesteljLnr (posing of the question). 
If we "put together" a-present-at-hand Subject and a present-at-hand 
Object and then ask how they can be bound together in consciousness 
we naturally prevent any possible answer. "Not only do we lack the 
"cement"; even -the "'schema" -in -accordance'with which this 'Joining- 
tog*ether, is, to be accomplished. "has been'split asunder..... What is 
decisive for ontology Is to prevent the -Splitting of 'the phenomenon* 
CBT. *170). Not surprisingly a substantial section of'Being and Time 
Is devoted -to a 'between" Existentialist and Cartesian ontology 
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(sections 19,20 and 21). 
The question now is whether Heidegger has not, in closing the 
door on dualism, opened it on the even more pernicious realm of 
If Dassin's world is always its "own" world, if subjectivism. 
"world" is somethi. ng that is always "mine", what price a common 
world in which we all exist? No amount of analysis of merely present- 
at-hand objects "within-the-world" will afford us a way out of this 
dilemma: 
Neither, the ontical depiction of entities 
within-the-world nor th 
,a 
ontological 
Interpretation of their Being is such as 
to reach the phenomenon of the "world". 
In both of these ways of access to 
"Objective Being%. the "world" has already 
been "presupposed" (BT. 92). 
A scientific analysis of objects within-the-world will not allow us to 
understand "worldhood". Science liKes to proceed from the ce'rtainty 
of the inert present-at-hand to the ready-to-hand "uses" to which it can 
be put. But Heidegger insists that Oasein does the opposite of this, 
"r eadiness", for him, is not merely a sort of "subjective colouring" 
added to presence. On the contrary. readiness precedes presence. Does 
this mean that we can have no objective standards and that "the world" 
, J5 mine 
to do as I like with? 
Heidegger is Well aware of this difficulty and he goes out of 
his way to explain himself by adopting the traditional ontological 
category "Reality" and discussing it in the light of his own ontology. 
In doing so he is able both to re-assert his rejection of subject-object 
dualism and to refute charges of subjectivism. This discussion Czection 
43`6ý Being and__Time) can be Put alongside Beckett's 
. 
treatmentof-the 
same problem. In the case of BacKett we shall have to looK at, Murph , 
especially the famous Chapter 6 of that novel and the Mr. Endon episode, 
and then at any later developments -in this area. 
, 
In traditicnal ontolcgy, according, to Heidegger. "Being" is always 
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Conceived in tems of the present-at-hand. The Present-at-hand thus 
gains the name "Reality" because it is, indeed, made UP of res, Things. 
What, above all, characterizes Things is their substantiality, so the 
Real is the substantial, and Being is treated as though substantiality 
were its basic characteristic. To overcome this Heidegger enters 
into three arguments. 
First, can the "Real" world, the "external world", suPposedly 
ft outside" our consciousness be "proved"? This is the classic 
Cartesian question and it is the point beyond which Murphy does not 
try to get when he pictures his mind, as described in Chapter 6. 
In so far as Reality has the character 
of something independent and "in itself", the 
question of the meaning of "Reality" becomes 
linked with that of whether the Real can 
be Independent "of consciousness" or whether 
there can be a transcendence of consciousness 
into the Nsphereff of the Real (BT. 246). 
Thus Murphy felt himself split in two, a body 
and a mind. They had intercourse apparently, 
otherwi; e he could not have known that they 
had anything in corhmon. But he felt his 
mind to be bodytight and did not understand 
through what channel the intercourse was 
effected nor how the two experiences came to 
overlap (M. 77). 
For Murphy even his body is part of Reality and he has no notion how 
-it Is connected with his consciousness. He even proposes the 
Cartesian solution of some supreme third party, beyond body and mind, 
Who holds them together. 
Kant has a solution that purports to bind together body and mind, 
Reality 
and consciousness. He observes that Time. as consciousness of change. 
me" and that for me to be conscious of change there must be 
something Ocutside me* that Is permanent. The trouble with this 
argument, in Heidegger's view, is that It merely yoKes together 
two present-at-hand entities (consciousness and the Real) in the same 
way as Descarteso argument, and that this Is not enough. * 'The Being- 
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present-at-hand-together of the physical and the Psychical is 
completely different ontically and ontologically from the phenomenon 
of Being-in-the -world" CBT. 248). This is precisely where Murphy, 
(not Murphy's creator) has gone wrong. "There was the mental fact 
and the physical fact, equally real if not equally pleasant" (M-76). 
Murphy cannot see how the twain can meet any more than Heidegger can 
see how Kant can maKe them meet. This is exactly the point brought 
up in our discussion of Being-in-the-world,. Merely present-at-hand 
entities. such as a chair and a wall, cannot "touch", cannot "meet", 
cannot "encounter" or be encountered by each other. Unless we grWit 
Dasein a kind of Being (Being-in-the-world) that is different from the 
Being of the present-at-hand we -inevitably end up in Murphy's obviously 
false position. ' 
Let me repeat that this is not the Position of Murphy's creator. 
BecKett is looKing for a way out of dualism, too, and our position 
is now this: both Heidegger and RecKett establish. the inadequacy 
of the premisses from which Descartes, Kant and traditional ontology 
start; Heidegger offers an alternative; does BecKett? Heidegger's 
alternative is that: 
The Real is essentially accessible only as 
entities within-the-world. All access to 
such entities is founded ontologically upon 
the basic state of Oasein. Being-in-the- 
world..... Being already in a world - 
as Being alongside entities within-the-world 
EST.. 246). 
5eckett Is at IjBast aware of a Possible -alternative to dualism 
in. -, -jUs essay --on 
Proust. He'PcintB 'cut 'that the Proustian moment of 
vision, when'the Involuntary-memory, and. the perception Of'the present 
r. ome together, and -thereby 'bring, us Into 'contact-with, our lost selves, 
overcomes -dualism. 
The memory is -Ideal ýand imaginative while the 
-present situation that stirs It, upý_js. Real and empirical, The double- 
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act involved in this moment of truth is "at once an evocation and a 
direct perception, real without being merely actual, ideal without 
I 
being merely abstract, the ideal real" (PTO. 75). "The ideal real" 
has certainly beaten dualism. But this has not got very much to do with 
Heidegger's solution. Heidegger dismisses dualism as a false question 
in a way that is a lot more radical than this example from Proust. 
Does BecKett get beyond it? 
Readers of the trilogy must notice that the dualism motif, so 
strong in Murphy, has almost entirely disappeared in Malloy. I ndeed. 
it is not at all prominent even in Watt. The impression given is that 
other, more urgent considerations have intervened and taKe up the 
narrators' energy. True, in Watt there is the debated question of the 
significance of the compounds fenced-off. in the asylum where Watt meets 
Sam. If we taKe. these compounds to be symbolic of the limitations of 
perception then they show us BecKett still aware of the "outer" and 
the "inner" (the "big-world" and the "little world" of Murphy) but 
i 
accepting a paS5age from one to the other. Watt and Sam can get through 
the holes in their respective fences in a way that seems to marK an 
advance over Murphy's total inability to I communicate with Mr. 
Endon 
(=*Within*). But by the time of the trilogy such problems have been 
superseded by considerations Of a more fundamental-ýýsort. For instance 
who is "narrating" whom? Who determines how much, communication'there 
can be between people? Is the entire business a fiction of Moran's? 
of Malone's? of BecKett's? Certainly the last of course. There is a 
sor: t of hankering after the old Murphyesque obsession 'In places after 
MurP -but it appears less pain-fully or just differently. 'In Godot 
Estragon asks Vladimir. "We always -find something, eh Didi, to give us 
the impression we exist? * CWFG. 69) which is something of a JoKe compared 
to the more violent and serious -, issues In the iplay. It 4s only too 
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painfully obvious that the tramps exist: they suffer, therefore they are. 
In Play the spotlight commands each head to speak of its own experiences, 
isolated from the others, but this is not an ontological isolation so 
much as a psychologicaland emotional one. In How It Is there is the 
"public" world of the meetings with the other figures that crawl through 
the mud and the "private" world of memories about life "up there" in 
the light. This is perhaps the definition of how dualism appears in 
later BecKett. The Real appears as a painful if ambiguous Here and 
Now. The Ideal appears as memory and fantasy. But we can never be sure 
which bits of the Real are not in fact memories or fantasies more or 
less thoroughly disguised. As a result, in How It Is and The Unnarhable, 
the Real and the Ideal merge as they do in the Proust essay, outer and 
inner are one and BecKett has achieved, ipso facto, the integration 
and homogeneity of Heidegger's Being-in-the-world. 
The question of whether the "external" world can be proved is the 
first of three headings under which Heidegger chooses to attack the 
errors of traditional ontology. The other headings are "Reality as an 
ontological problem" and "Reality and Care". The second of these we 
cannot fruitfully discuss until we have met the concept of "Care* in the 
next section (below). The first Wiscussed in ST. pp. 252-255, i. e. 
also in the section nominally about wCare'ý) sets about trying to use the 
illegitimately-employed concept of Reality properly. Heidegger borrows 
Di'Ithey's idea of Reality as fundamentally being "resistance" but 
establishes that "The experiencing of resistance - that is, the discovery 
of what -is -resistant to one"s endeavours - is possible ontologically 
onfý'bY reason 'of the disclosedness Of the world* EST-253). Here 
Heidegger Is using '"disclosedness" In a SPecd-al sense -ttlat ties In,. with 
all *his -other usages. Dassin -Is the entity 'that '"discloses" 'the world 
by existing (i. e. 4Standing-out" from it) and, -by "behaving* 'towards, -It 
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and understanding it to some extent. The condition for standing-out, 
disclosing and so on ia obviously that the world "already" exists. 
So resistance can only be experienced because Oasein is already "there", 
disclosing the world and "endeavouring" to do things in it. So 
Reality is not a primordial entity that needs to be proved "first". 
In so far as it can be, it is. 
This second phase of Heidegger's attacK on traditional ontology 
has its parallel in Beckett. In the trilogy, in How It Is-, and in 
many of the texts, there are constant references to a past life, to an 
area, a world already "given", with an accompanying impression that the 
narrator and his creations are churning about memories of this given 
past life. It is all they have in their minds, all they can pass the 
time with, it is irredeemable. "Ye. sterday is not a milestone that has 
been passed, but a daystone on the beaten track of the years, and 
irremediably part of us. within us, heavy and dangerous" (PTD. 13). 
None of the characters appears at anything liKe a beginning; 'thby are 
already "en situation". The likes of Malone can say, "The search for 
myself is ended. I am buried in the world" (T. 199). 
This leaves us with one unresolved question. We asKed earlier 
I 
whether Heidegger, having avoided dualism, does not fall into subjectivism. 
The answer to'this will have'to appear in the course of our analysis of 
Heidegger's concept of Being-with-others. Meanwhile we must put his 
concept of "Care"In its place. 
* .** 
Sorge. "Care". 
Early -in Being and "Time Heidegger explains that the Kind of Being 
that Dasein has when we mnsider It as'Being-In-the-warlid -is "concern" 
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("Besorgen"). Our way of Being-in is to have "concern", which 
is thus a definitive term for all our activities with the world 
conceived as the ready-to-hand. For example, "Producing something, 
attending to something and looKing after it, maKing use of something" 
and so on (BT-83). And the Being of Being-in-the-world is "concern" 
because "the Being of Dasein itself is .... care" ("Sorge") CBT. 83-84). 
This "has nothing to do with "tribulation", "melancholy" or the 
"cares of life ..... These - liKe their opposites, "gaiety" and "freedom 
from care" - are ontically possible only because Oasein, when understood 
ontologically, is cars" (BT. 84). 
Thus, Dasein is "in-the-world" in a concernful way because it is 
i 
itself care. Heidegger devotes an entire chapter (BooK 1. Chapter 6) 
to the elucidation of this concept.. In this chapter he works round 
. and with 
the idea of care in a way that takes in the concept of Angst 
and has reference to several other ideas which we have not yet dealt 
with. For our present purpose it is enough simply to point out how 
care itself gets defined. Heidegger recapitulates the points that we 
have so far covered. Thus, Dasein "exists" and understands its existence; 
understanding is "self-projective Being towards its. ownmost potentiality 
forzeing" (BT. 23S). This means, as we saw in our discussion of 
"Existenz" above, that Dasein is "ahead-of -itself" or, more fully, "ahead- 
of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world"- This does not mean that Dasein 
is busy out there "welding together" the objects that are present-at-hand 
into a world. No, Dassin's"ahead-of-itself-in-Being-already-in...., is 
primordially a whole" (BT. 236). In other words Dasein. -Its existen- 
tiality and its facticity are equally primordial. Naturally this 
totality that Dasein is Includes its 'Cancer-a" with the world and Its 
"Being-a long side" and using of 'the ready-to-hand. Heidegger considers 
, that this descrIption of Dasein's 'Being 4z In fact what the word "care" 
mean s- 
209. 
This may not be immediately perspicuous. The fault here may be 
Partly Heidegger's. He allows the term "care* to 
. 
be used in a way that 
at times seems to rely on his own special definitions and at times seems 
to require simply conventional colloquial interpretation. This being 
the case I think an attempt at clarification is in order. 
Care is what men have but tables do not. If you burn your table, 
or chop it up, or sing to its it cannot "care". Burning, chopping up 
or singing to a man (an entity with-the character of Dasein) must result 
In Some reactions even if it is the negative one "I don't care" this 
is clearly ontologically different from the table's "not caring". 
In a sense Heidegger is looking for the most fundamental difference 
between Dasein and Reality and he is using Socratic-Aristotelian methods. 
albeit disguised. Care is the *basic" difference between men and other 
things. Because man cares he is in a world. That is to say, the table 
is worldless, meaningless until we see it as part of our world. Tables 
do not have worlds of their owni it is because of us that they are 
revealed-as tables. Because man cares he exists. That is to say,. I 
can project myself into my possibilities. Tables have no possibilities, 
no future, no existence. And because man cares there is facticity. 
That is to say, my world and my existence inevitably already include 
the factical, and the factical only 15 factical because I can care about 
it. Care, In other words, is the basic condition for there being such 
a thing as Dasein existing in a factical world. 
Much later in Being-and Time we learn that "the care-structure, includes 
tber phenomenon Df Selfhoodo (ST-370). But we can leave this point 
. q.. 
to our discussion of the Self, below, and turn mw to consider whe6er 
*Beckett employs anything like *care" In'his work. 
In one way. of course, Beckett must be working within 
the framework 
something 'like cars. If Heidegger's analysis is cOrrsct- and -it 
is 
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very hard to quarrel with a definition of man as the "caring" entity, 
I 
then all literature, in so far as it is concerned with Dasein, is 
concerned with "care", and BecKett is no exception to this. So our 
inquiry boils down to this, we must ask whether Beckett takes any 
special trouble to emphasise aspects of existence that reveal "care", 
perhaps in view of the fact that such a concept is so fundamental as 
to be easily overlooked. 
One of BecKett's most succint, and often-quoted, dicta an the 
difficult art of writing appears in the Three Oialogues With Georges 
Outhuit. When asKed what alternative he offers to the "plane of the 
feasible" that he has rejected, BecKett replies that he prefers 
The expression that there is nothing to 
express, nothing with which to express, 
nothing from which to express, no - 
power to exprdss, no desire to express, 
together with the obligation to 
express (PTD-103). 
Perhaps the most opaque of th6 clauses iý -this quotation is the last. 
Why is there an obligation to express? And why does Be cKett Keep 
returning to this point throughout his later worK? To give only two 
examples, there is Malloy's 
Not to want to say. not to know what 
you want to say, not tobe able, to say 
what you thinkyou want to say, and 
never to stop saying.... (T-28). 
where it Is clear that Malloy is somehow driven on to "say"; and the 
many occasions In The Unnamable, especially in its closing pages, when 
the narrator insists '"You must go on" - And it is not merely a question 
, vf 
JBecKett and his characters making -light statements about being 
obliged to go on talking. 
The whole motive force behind the "whey of 
words" Is clearly some sort 'Of Z-OmPulsion. 'Malone must go an telling his 
- -stories, saying something. until -the end, even the zreatures In the mud 
of fjow It. 2s, build up the impression that they -must go -on "quoting" - "I 
ill. 
say it as I hear it" CH. passim). And BecKett himself is in the grip 
of the same ineluctable command, he must "go on" too. 
I would propose that this obligation, which seems at once quite 
normal and quite arbitrary, is an expression of Heideggerian "care". 
We feel that we understand BecKett's inability to fall silent, perhaps 
because the state of unconsciousness (= wordlessness) is inconceivable 
to us, but if asKed to explain why there is an "obligation to express" 
we cannot do so adequately. This ambiguity reflects exactly the 
ambiguity Of something which is a really basic assumption, something 
liKe "care" in fact. 
The obligation to "say" is the obligation to be involved with, to 
"produce, attend to, make use of" and so an (see above p. 29 ). The 
narra'tors in SecKett would dearly love to do "nothing", as we shall see, 
but they must go on "churning". This actually is the state of Dasein, 
of "Being-there*. Being-there already means being involved with. Dasein 
is care. Not prescriptively, of course; that is where we maKe our 
mistaKe when we try to "explain" the "obligation to express". It is 
not a prescriptive law "handed down", it is a descriptive law, liKe 
gravity. Man is obliged to express by being man. 
it could be objected to the above that an BecKett's side we have 
an obligation to produce words 
(or paintings in the original statement) 
while the ontological obligation to "care" [", Dasein Is care") is 
specifically a matter of actions. This objection, however, misses the 
point-in that It refers to the results of the "obligation" and does not 
sqf. ficiently emphasise the obligation -itself. Heidegger's point is 
that it Is man's -condition to care, whatever he cares about; Beckettian 
man has "the same condition but it appears as an obligation to express, 
whatever he expresses. Expression. Iike cooking. Is only possible because 
, Dassin 
Iso ", already". the -sort mf entity that cares. 
*** 
112. 
Selbstsein. "Being-one's-self". 
We shall deal with the Self as such in'a separate section, 
below. Meanwhile it is necessary to outline briefly Heidegger's 
preliminary definition of what it is to "be-one's-self". Dasein 
exists understandingly in a factical world that is primarily ready-to- 
hand, rather than just objectively "real$$, and his way of being in 
that world is care. To this Heidegger must add some account of who 
Dasein is. 
As so often, the answer is contained in the question. Dasein 
is that sort of entity of whom we can asK the question "who? ". Of 
other things we must asK the question "what? ". And the answer to 
"who? " is always "I myself". Oasein is characterized by "Jemeinigkeit". 
"in-each-case-mineness". Dasein is always 'me" and the question "who? " 
can only be answered by a "me" or on behalf of a "me". It is thus a 
"subject" or a "self" (BT-150). 
But Heidegger is a lot warier than Descartes about seizing on 
this apparently indisputable starting-point. Dasein is indeed "I". but 
the "I". the self, is not an object present-at-hand within the world 
which can be analyzed and described'in the same way as a table. "In 
clarifying Being-in-the-world we have Shown 'that a bare subject without 
a world never nis" proximally, nor is it ever given' (ST. 152). The Self 
is already In the world and if we conceive of it as isolated from the 
world it must *be understood only: in the sense of a non-committal formal 
ind. icator" (5T. 152). The'Self Just is-not, anyý"givenl thing. 'like another 
arm or leg say, there Is'no *nature' -for the'Self to possess, . no '"essence* 
except, nf caurse. Dasein's -essence which is ", existence* .. 
Zo the , Self --Is 
existential. '"Dasein is Its Self only 'in -. existing* CBT. 152). 
The burden af this is that theSelf exists Wasein Is already "I" 
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and already exists) and that means it exists in a world. But the world 
contaim "Others". I have quoted the passage in which Heid. egger points 
out that the "bare subject" is never "given" without a world. His 
very next sentence runs "And so in the end an isolated "I" without 
Others is just as far from being proximately given" (EiT. 152). The "Others" 
are already "there with us" in the world. This important point (a 
crucial part of. all existentialist philosophy, especially that of Buber 
and Sartre) will be discussed in-the next section. For the moment we 
should see if this preliminary stage, that of Being-onels-self, appears 
in Beckett. 
In general Beckett's work reveals the unsatisfactoriness of 
beginning with the Cartesian "Ego" as the fixed point of speculation. 
The word "I" must appear a record number of times in his oeuvre, but 
there is a feeling of insane repetition about it, of hollowness and 
unimportance. As in Heidegger, man can say "I", and indeed in all 
situations he is obliged to be in his own world, the world'that must 
be "mine", but this is only a formal, contentless sort of condition- 
for-existence. As KierKegaard says, "One Keeps on saying "Ich-Ich" 
until one becomes..... Iudicrous" (KierKegaard. 1.136). 
. In,,. 
Eleutheria Victor explains himself thus: "O'abord J'Stais 
prisonnier des autres. Alors Je Ies -ai- quitt6. puis petais 
prisonnier de moi. Cletait pire. Alors Je me suis quittell (P. 115 
of typescript). These marvellOusly-balanced sentences, if they are 
not just rhetoric. show us a character realizing that he is already 
in the world with Others and -putting. his. escape from them -on exactly 
th'e'l5ame level as'his escape frmm himself. Being -wit h-Others and 
Being-one "s -Self are equiprimrdial conditimns, of Dasein"s -existence. 
Above all. the. Self In Beckett. as we shall see, -is zpp_r_ifically 
more than just, a matter Df this -saying ,,. 
Ilch-lc_hn., Unless we adopt 
Heidegger's view of the *I* a5 a Iner-8 'fcrmal Indicator, we are -hard: put 
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to it to explain the constant appearances, especially in the trilogy, I 
of sentences in the first person describing waiting or seeking the Self. 
Molloy, for instance, says 
And as for myself, that 
unfailing pastime, I must 
say it was far now from my 
thoughts. But there were moments 
when it did not seem so far 
from me, when I seemed to be 
drawing towards it.... etc. (T. 163). 
In other words "I" is inadequate, in both Heidegger and Beckett, 
as a term for the Self, merely indicating in both cases that we are 
dealing with a "who? " not a "what? ", that is with Dasein for whom 
the world is always "mine". 
*** 
Mitsein and Mitdasein. "Bei. ng-with" and "Being -t here-with ". 
By these two terms Oeidegger expresses the two aspects of Dasein's 
0 
E3eing-with-Others. On the one hand I am always already in a world "with" 
others, my Being-in-the-world is a Being-with. and on the other hand Others 
are "there" with me in the world. 
My world is primarily-composed of the ready-to-hand. The ready- 
to-hand . 1s. equipment C"Zeug") and equipment, by definition, is referential, 
it is always equipment "for" something. And the thing to which a 
piece of equipment refers always refers to something else in turn. Thus 
a wchain" is automatically built up from anything ready-to-hand, a 
chain of references that always leads bacX to the entity for which 
*Z? UL" is ready-to-hand. 'Dasein. Thus, -the hammer is for fixing -the 
roof, the roof is for excluding the rain -and the 'rain is excluded 
because Dasein prefers to be dry. 'In this way other Daseins are 
revealed to us, we -see the equipment in our world being used by others, 
we follow back chains of ref erence to -their originators - men like 
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ourselves. And of course our own world is full of others, "The 
world is always the one that I share with Others" 
Even when I am alone I still have "Being-with" as an ontological 
characteristic. I am aware of being alone only because I have that 
sort of'being +or which an Other can be missing. 
Dasein has been defined aSn care" ("Lorge"). The sort of care 
I have for the ready-to-hand has been called "concern" ("Besorgen"), 
and now we encounter another sort of care, the care I have for other 
Daseins, for which Heidegger employs the term "solicitude", ("fUrsorge"). 
As with all Heidegger's terms the "solicitude" carries no ethical 
weight. Even when I ignore a fellow Dasein I am displaying "solicitude", 
but in a "deficient made" CBT. 158). The point is that only Dasain 
can "ignore", and Dasein can only do this because it is Dasein Is 
ontological character to be able to be solicitous. 
Being with Others belongs to the Being 
of Dasein, which is an issue for Dasein 
in its very Being. Thus as Being-with, 
Oasein "is" essentially for the saKe of 
Others. This must be understood as an 
existential statement as to its essence. 
Even if the particular factical Oasein 
does not turn to Others, and supposes 
that it has no need of them or 
manages to get along without them. 
it is in the way of Being-with (BT. 160). 
I think we have here an ontological thesis than can help us 
to understand BecKett. There Is a sort of painful, inescapable bond 
between the Self and the Other, between Oasein and Dasein. throughout 
Beckett's work. 'The tramps in Godot say 'that they don', t need each 
other but they are, bound together, Just- as'Much as Lucky and Pozzo 
or Ham and Clov. And what is Heideggerian about this binding is 
, that it 'is ýontological. something to -do with_the tramps I Being, and 
not social Dr -psychological. or at -least not fundamentally social ., or 
psychologir-al. Their -inability -to separate is deeper -in their natures 
lie. 
than a simple need for company or love, they sound when they talK as 
though they are a single person "talKing to himself". LucKy's increasingly 
close conne)dbn with Pozzo exists in spite of the latter's avowed 
intention of selling him. And Clov states simply to Hamm, when asKed 
why he doesn't leave, "I can't leave you". 
Selecting almost at random from the Texts for Nothing we find a 
mountain of similar evidence. -Here is some of the opening of the 
fourth Text. 
It's the same old stranger as ever, 
for whom alone accusative I exist, 
in the pit of my inexistence, of 
his, of ours ...... 
I'm not in his head, nowhere in his 
old body, and yet I'm there, for him 
I'm there, with him, hence all the 
confusion ...... 
He wants me there, with a form and 
a world, liKe him, in spite of him, me 
who am everything, liKe him who is nothing. 
And when he feels me void of existence 
itý of his he would have me void, and 
vice versa, mad, mad, he's mad ..... 
He thinKs words fail him, he thinKs 
because words fail him he's on his way 
to my speechlessness ..... (NK-87). 
Here we have a tearing tension between the nominative and the accusative, 
a fierce struggle that can be taken as being between the author and his 
character. No doubt this is a fair interpretation, but it does not 
completely satisfy; we feel that the "I" has a less nebulous existence 
than--that, of a fictional character. 'that this is less trivial than the 
sort of joke between-author-and character indulged in by Fielding or 
Thackeray. More significantly we have here two Daseins, 'the Self and 
the,. Other, -labouring for clarity In'the-mind of the Self. I exist for 
-the Mther, "he ., -exists I or me, "ý"in -the, pit of my, inexistence" Asee, above, 
on,, Being-rnnels-Self 'land --below t, on "'the Self tout court). "All the 
confusion* -arises -because he and -I 'are'lnseparable. 'If 'he needs me he 
needs me with. a -*! world"'( here -used -in ýa -sense very like'lieideggerl s). 
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Sometimes I am "everything" and, he is "nothing", as in the quoted passage, 
and sometimes vice versa. Which reads very liKe a gloss on Heidegger's 
analysis of "Just standing around". This is the minimum made of 
existence, the least Oasein-liKe state that Dassin can be in, barring 
death as we shall, see, but it. is still quite diff (Brent from the 
Being of something merely present-at-hand. 
Even if we see the Other 
"Just standing around", he is 
never apprehended as a 
human-Thing present-at-hand, 
but his "standing-around" is 
an existential mode of Being - 
an unconcerned, uncircumspective 
10 tarrying alongside everything 
and nothing'(BT-156). 
When HacKett and the others see Watt standing by the tram stop he is 
almost liKe a roll of tarpaulin or a carpet. But not quite. ' Even 
Watt, stationary in the gloaming, just "Standing around", is Dasein and 
has to be dealt with as such. 
Throughout the majority of the fiction the characters are alone. 
But alone precisely in the Heideggerian way-of being alone, alone because 
their Being is a Being-with-Others. Molloy is always trying to avoid 
or escape from people CliKe Buster Keaton in Film). He says he could 
haveýfollowed wA or C" and 5poken-to them, and he wanted to, but he 
didn't. he stayed in, his "observation -postx. "But 'instead of observing 
I had the weakness to-return in spirit to ýthe ýother, the man with 
the stick. -Then the murmurs began, again" CT. 133. Molloy wants to stop, 
to cease to -exist, - to go silent. But he Is An the world and Being-in-ths- 
world is a Being -with-o thers -and others mean -"murmurs" as we see. He 
th an tries'. tD - avoid'being, aacosted when he goes Anto his town, and -all 
he - wants ", is---f or, -the - police -ta 'leave 'him, alone. but -they don ' t. And he 
tries to -escape'-from'Lousse's house and eventually succeeds. and so he 
goes-on. But -besides -the'PhYsical %presence, of . -Others, ýe carries within 
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him the imperative of that first Other, his mother. And Moran, who 
follows him, is not only acbompanied by his son for most of his 
journey (and has constant sKirmishes, with physical Others) but carries 
within him his images of his quarry, Molloy, and Gaber's instructions, 
and Youdi's authority. Thus these narrators of BecKett's become 
"puppets" indeed. 
Malone, as his name implies, is alone, but not alone in the 
ontological sense, his Being is clearly not that of the isolated 
present-at-hand. He is very clearly in a world and his whole Being 
appears as Care both in the positive sense that he is "concernful" about 
his "possessions" (ready-to-hand. while he can still reach them at 
least) and "solicitous" about the Others who actually are his stories. 
If the reader confuses Malone with his fictions he is to be forgiven, 
Beckett intends it, "Dasein "is" essentially for the sake of Others". 
The Unnamable is even more explicit. "Why did I have myself 
represented in the midst of men? " he asks. "It seems to me it was 
ýone 
of my doing" (T-299). Indeed, it was not. Heispeculates on how he knows 
what he Knows and illogically decides that, although he has never had 
any contact with anyone, "they" gave him "lbctures". "They ..... gave 
me the low-down an God..... But what they were most determined for -me to 
-fellow-creatures" (T. 300). Which is Beckett's way af swallow was my 
expressing the inescapabilitY of Being-with-Others. 
It will not have escaped the attentive reader that-this-reading 
of E3eckett implies an explanation of -the author-character nexus that 
Is. sq important in ýhis -work. Fictional 'characters are the ýauthor, -, and 
yet they'are -not him. 'Beckett 
himself -would have,, to,, speaK. of Worm -in 
the accusative because, . although -Oasein! s, world Is l, other, 
Daseins, 
. -jother 
Daseins are just that - Other. 'Thi's ambiguity, -, whichappears, in. Buber 
for -whom '01 -- ThOU' -or '71-, 
itm are -preferable -: to `-Tm -and ýyet do, not 
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annihilate "I", is the ambiguity. of the Self which we have only started 
to explore. 
Two points from BecKett in conclusion. First there is the motif 
in the fiction of the escape to the isolation of a beach, a cave or a 
hut. All the characters, mobile and immobile, escape to such places 
at one time or another. They are never able to stay there and they 
get lured back into the world of Others every time. The impossibility 
of isolation is only stressed by the obvious irony of an expression 
such as, "It is easy for a man, a proper man, to live in a cave, far 
from everybody" CNK. 55). 
Second there is the Puzzling matter of the compounds in the lunatic 
asylum in the third part of Watt. These, the gardens of Watt's and 
Sam's houses, are bounded by fences which do not meet. That is to say 
Watt's compound has a fence and Sam's has one parallel to itj there 
is a gap of a few yards between the fences. This can be taKen as an 
epistemological symbol - Sam and Watt, like, any two people are 
incommunicado. But then there is the fact that some unknown agency has 
burst a hole through both fences at the same point, so Sam and Watt 
can meet and communicate. This is a development from the solipsism of 
Murphy and from the lack of communication in Mr. Knott's house. It 
symbolizes BecKett's giving up of solipsism as a possibility. He does 
not again seriously try to contend that Man's Being-is ontologically 
monadic. 
For Beckett Being is inescapable (suicide is pointless and 
uosijccessful. c. f. Malloy. Godot, etc). 'In parallel with Haidegger 
Beckett -learns -that Others are 1nescapable; 'Heidegger says 'that Dasein's 
. jally 'Per Being -is 
Being-with, Beckett expresses the same thing, passim, 'as 
in Film where 'the Other is carried `Nithin% like a character 'in an 
author. But Being, for Beckett., -Is -also that -traditionzaly inescapable 
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situation, Hell. This can be illustrated from several places, but 
a brief consideration of the title and contents of The Lost Ones should 
be enough. All of which adds up to a familiar conclusion - that hell 
is other people. 
*** 
Geworfenheit. "Thrownness". Entwurf. "Projection". 
I 
Before following Heidegger's developing series of concepts any 
further it is worth noting the close parallel to be drawn between a 
theme in Beckett and Heidegger's concept of Geworfenheit. 
Dasein "is there". But it does not choose the time or place of 
its arrival. Whatever man doei or thinks or f eels it is obvious that, 
first, he is already there. This gives rise to a metaphor that 
describes man as "thrown" (nZeworfen") into Being (BT. 174); Man always 
has a "mqod", or a "state of mind", a basic component of which is this 
feeling of having been thrown into the "there". The "there", of course, 
is facticity, and we have seen that facticity-is the negative aspect 
of possibility. Dasein's Being is its Being-possible and the "fundamental 
existentiale" that is the Being of this potentiality is understanding. 
From my "state of mindo I look backwards, as it were, at my thrownness into 
facticity; from understanding I look forwards into my Possibility. 
Understanding has the structure of "Entwurf, ", projection, which is 
Keeping-open of possibilities. "Understanding Is the existential 
Being of Dassin's own potential ity-f or-Being - andAt As so 'in such a way 
that this Being discloses in itself -what its Being is capable of" [ST. 184). 
The e7tymological connection between this projecting '["entwurf". ) 
-and 
thrownness C'Geworfenheit*l As no accident. Man, ls thrown Into, Being and 
throws himself into his own Being. Does anything IiKe'this, appear in 
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Beckett? 
Perhaps the locus classicus of thrownness in the modern theatre is 
Beckett's Act*Without Words, I which opens 
Desert. Dazzling light. 
The man is flung bacKwards on stage from 
right wing. He falls, gets up immediately, 
dusts himself, turns aside, reflects (E. 57). 
It will be noticed that reflection here follows thrownness. As we 
gaze at the creature flung before us, "there" in the dazzling light, we 
feel the force of Heidegger's query "Has Dasein as itself ever decided 
freely whether it wants to come into "Dassin" or not, and will it ever 
be able to make such a decision? " CBT. 271). All thelymany further stage- 
directions, in Act Without Words I. to "reflect" are examples of 
projection. The man tries to seize his Possibilities, which are given 
to him by his understanding, and quickly learns the factical limitations 
of his situation. This short play can be seen as a perfect Heideggerian 
parable for Geworfenheit and entwurf with the Beckettian rider that 
seizing possibilities is harder than it looks. 
Other examples abound. Both Murphy and Watt are plonked down into 
our hen without a by-your-leave. Watt. especially. is just thrust 
off the tram into the story. But the best examplesappear later. Molloy, 
, for instance, is just thrown Into Position: *1 am in my mother's room. 
It's I who live there now. I don't know how I got there" (T. 7). In 
cascando*"Voics" speaks of "him" as "a ton weight" who is "stuck in the 
sand" (Cascando p. 411 rather liKe Winnie in Happy Days who has been 
thrust Into the sand and is jerked back into _", life" dai"ly by her -alarm- 
r_16j. -X. In The Expelled the "heroo arrives at the beginning of the -story 
,. by 
being flung down some steps. He makes it rlear that 'he 7is -frequently 
Tiung out IiKs this- and usually pursued and beaten. but on this ýoccasionm 
"for once, they had confined themselves to throwing me out and no more 
about it" CNK. 10). At the 
first line of How it Is we are Plunged 
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in medias res, that is, into the -mud alongside the creature who, like 
all Beckett's creatures, is "already" there. Malone is in much the 
same state as Malloy, "One day I found myself here, in the bed" (T. 183). 
The Unnamable is even clearer about this and often refuses to accept 
that he was ever anywhere else, as for instance, "I have been here, ever 
since I began to be" CT-2961 and all he says about how he got there is 
implied in his reference to the "signing" of a "life-warrant". "They PP 
sign the warrant and we are flung into Being. 
So much for thrownness. What of projection? Here BecKett seems 
to be parodying Heidegger - all his moribunds project wildly, aimlessly, 
artificially. Malone is the best example. He draws up a plan of what 
he is going to do before he dies (cf. "Being-towards-Death" below) and 
maKes a determined effort to fulfil his last remaining possibilities, 
that is, his abilities to tell stories, to talK, to list things. To 
some extent he achieves his Project. To some extent the brevity of 
life, the poorness of memory and the interventions of the unexpected 
conspire to thwart him. But he cannot do other than project. Nor 
can BecKett avoid filling his own time by inventing stories. 
We can now construct a preliminary list of the "equiprimordial" 
existentials of Dasein. Dase in is, "there", thrown. into factical 
existence, already in-a-world, already with-others, already concerned 
with the ready-to-hand, already solicitous about others, already with 
understanding and -in a state-of-mind, and,, only thus can Dasein be-Itself. 
None of these constitutive items "precedes" or explains -any, of the others, 
-tbey-are equiprimardial, 
part-and-parcel -of, Dasein's -existence and 
generally to be subsumed., if a. t all, -under -the' heading "Care", which 
is the-. meaning of Dasein's'Being. 
'4 
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Das Man. *They". Uneigentlich Existenz. n1nauthentic Existence". 
We now come to a vexed and much-misunderstood existentialist thesis. 
Heidegger, Sartre and, by implication at least, other existentialists 
employ what is almost a new term in philosophy - nauthentic" - and use 
it to describe human behaviour in a way that is nearly always taken 
ethically. Herein lies the first problem. In Heidegger at least, in 
Spite of all its positive connotations, the term nauthentic" is used entirely 
without ethical content. It may be normal to draw from his discussion of 
authentic and inauthentic existence ethical conclusions, but to do so 
requires the addition of imported factors to the original thesis. Taken 
i it stands, this thesis at no point states or implies that Dasein 
Should try to be authentic* At no point is inauthentic existence 
. described as "wrongo or "evil% 
The second problem we shall leave until we come to talk about 
Sartre in the next chapter. It arises from a query inherent im the 
authentic - inauthentic distinction - namely, is authentic existence 
as defined in existentialism ever possible? As I say, this problem 
appears most forcibly in Sartre on "mauvaise foi, " and can be left until 
we meet that concept. Meanwhile I must outline briefly Heidegger's non- 
ethical concepts, 00as Man' and-"Uneigentlich Existenz". 
*Das Man' roughly means *the theyo = "people". It is 'the crowd, 
the, herd, rather than the individual. In *everyday Being-with-ons- 
anotherw Dasain Ostands in subjection to Others. It itself is notj its 
Being has been taken away by the Others* JBT. 164). Dasein Is Its 
Po: ýzJbJlJtJesj my existence is my understanding projection of myself 
Into my possibilities. but In *average everydayness" 
Z)assin's *possibilities 
Of Beinz ara, far the Dthers to dispose of as they Please" (ST. 164). Heidegger 
gives the exwple of employing public. transpart or reading the newspaper 
that Is also read by so many others. My "own* existence. is subordinated 
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to a public existence that is not mine. In our average everydayness, 
"We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they (man) take pleasure; 
we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge" 
CBT. 164). 
"The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish 
from the authentic Self - that is, from the Self which has been taKen 
hold of in its own way" CBT. 167). Thus existence dominated by "them" 
is inauthentic existence, and i6authentic existence is the Being-in-the- 
world of everyday Dasein. 
Perhaps surprisingly this is another constituent part of Dasein's 
primordial Being-there. "Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen 
away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and 
fallen into the "world" (BT. 220). Here "world" is in -inverted commas 
to indicate that it has the denotation of the ordinary usage rather 
than Heidegger's special meaning. So it means "world" rather as in the 
Christian conception of "the devil, the world and the flesh" - Dasein 
"falls" into the world, that is, into the "they". And Dasein is 
constantly "tempted" by the "world" and by the relative ease of only 
tieing its "they-Self". Once we have fallen into the world we become 
by it, but this implies nothing'static, rather we are 
driven into 'hustle" and hurry that drives us along, `alienating" us 
from ourselves. But this Norldly" wthey-Self"ýwe, fall into is not 
rIe ally "Other". it is still 'myself". so In falling we'become 
nentangled" In ourselves; we can never'become Other however inauthentically 
we-. behave. 00asein plunges Out Of itself 'into itsel-f. intathe ground- 
-lessness and nullity 
of Inauthentic everydayness"" CBT. --ý23). 
I The pri=rdiality of the "they-Self* is'established In'the 
following passage. which ýalso serves as Heidegger"S' 'Summary of 'his 
_, -position up 
to this point: 
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As something factical, Dasein's projection 
of itself understandi ngly is in each case 
already alongside a world that has been 
discovered. From this world it takes its 
possibilities, and it does so first in aocordance 
with the way things have been 
interpreted by the "they". This 
interpretation has already restricted 
the possible options of choice to 
what lies within the range of the 
familiar, the attainable, the 
respectable - that which is fitting 
and proper (BT- 239). 
If Dasein only consults its "they" possibilities it remains blind 
to its own. possibilities or it resorts to mere "wishing" about them and 
wish-states-of-mind. daydreams, are really the opposite of a genuine 
grasping of possibilities. "They" never choose, "they" have always 
already chosen, and to exist inauthentically is to let their choices 
operate for me too (BT. 345). Inauthentic Dasein is "carried along by 
, the nobody" 
CBT. 312). Listening to the voice of "they", Dassin fails 
to hear itself CBT. 315). 
Do we find any of this in Beckett? Do his characters suffer 
under "the dictatorship of the 
"they"? ". The second Act Without Words 
appears to be a comment on the 
"everyday" Being of man, and is a good 
place to start in its clarity. 
In Act Without Words II a-goad, emerging from the wings of the 
stage, prods into life two men 
in sacks. 'They go through the motions 
of a daily routine, dressing, eating, undressing and so on. in 
alternation, and Beckett creates the impression that the goad, like 
Winnie's alarm CIO . ck, will go on goading until-there is nobody left 
to torment. Thus each player in this mime appears to exemplify an endless 
. and, 
deadening routine and to confarm unquestioningly -to ýhabits imposed 
, upon 
them- Significantly IIAO and -wBm. as they are called, go -through 
, their routines quite 
differently, thereby giving -the impression o-F 
choosing their own possibiliti8s and consequently of existing authentically. 
13ut, the overall structure within which they-ýexercise this freedom-makes 
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a mockery of it. Their conformity to what the goad clearly expects 
of them is absolute; to emphasize* the point, they wear the same 
clothes (not merely similar clothes, the very same garments) and eat 
the same carrot. Here we have two people under the tyranny of the "they", 
this last being represented by a goad. And in fact the goad is a 
better illustration of "Das Man" than a crowd of people would be, for 
Heidegger is at pains to emphasize that "they" are no particular group 
of people or individuals, "they" must only be the indefinite, collective 
neuter. Something like an impersonal goad, in fact. 
Act Without_Words II can be seen as an illustration of the situation 
. 
that we feel all through the trilogy and that appears unambiguously 
in How It Is, the situation of being compelled to "go on". It is no 
coincidence that, scattered all through the fiction after Watt, there 
are references to the source of this compulsion as "they". In the 
Texts for Nothing for instance we find the following, 
We seem to be more than one, 
all deaf, not even, gathered together 
for life. Another said, or the same, 
or the first, they all have the same 
voice, the same ideas, All you had to 
do was stay at home.... CNK. 71-2). 
And Molloy has this aside: 
All the things you would do gladly, 
oh, without enthusiasm, but gladly, 
all the things there seems no reason 
for your not doing, and that, you do 
not do! Can It be we are not free? (T. 36). 
It is the "they-Self" that prevents us from doing what is not acceptable 
to -them*, although there "seems no reason" to-refrain. Later Malloy 
týjWs about the spurious relief of getting 'lost -in the' ", they" and 
. 
of 
coming back again: 
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Yes it sometimes happens and will 
sometimes happen again that I 
forget who I am and strut before 
my eyes like a stranger. Then I see 
the sky different from what it is 
and the earth too takes on false 
colours. It looks like rest, it is not, 
I vanish happy in that alien light, 
which must have once been mine, 
I am willing to believe it, then the 
anguish of return, I won't say where, 
I can't, to absence perhaps.... (T. 42). 
Here we have BecKett's old tricK of splitting the Self and having "I" 
talKing about "me", a split that seems to be along the lines of the 
"they-Self" and the authentic Self. They are both me but the 
condition of passage from the latter to the former is that I must 
"forget who I am". And, as we have seen, this will put me in "alien". 
or "alienated" light which looKs liKe "rest" ("tranquillity") but "is not" 
(it is "hustle"J. Getting bacK to me ("myself,, ) is going to feel liKe 
getting bacK to an "absence" after the excitements of the "they-Self". 
The Unnamatile is constantly talKing about "them" and what "they" 
want. "They", for instance, try. "to maKe me believe I have an ego all 
my own, and can speaK of it as they of theirs" (T-348). This underlines 
the irony of Heidegger's position - in being exhorted to "be ourselves" 
we are presented with an impossibility, for if I "am myself" at your 
bidding then I am, again, bowing to the dictatorship of the "they". 
"They" are bound to fail, as the Unnamable implies, by definition, in 
the attempt to "maKe me believe" anything about myself, although "I 
was 'liKe them, before being liKe me" (T. 382). 
Once again we find ourselves back at the, problem of Beckett's 
'-na7qtion. Who is narrating-what to whom? And once again'Heidegger 
-some illumination. Take the following cr 
, provides _Ux 
from the fourth 
Text for Nothing: 
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He has me say things saying 
it's not me. there's profundity for 
you, he has me who say nothing 
say it's not me. All that is 
truly crass. If at least he would 
dignify me with the third person, 
like his other figments, not he, he'll 
be satisfied with nothing less than 
me, for his me CNK. 88). 
Here the tension between "him" and "me" can be seen as that between 
author and character. But there is another level that emerges from our 
Heideggerian considerations, a level on which the "everyday" Self, the 
"they-Self" is talking about the authentic Self. On this level we can 
gloss this passage as follows. The authentic Self ("He") seems to be 
the origin of the "they-Self" and makes it "say things" such as "it's 
not me" (the self-rejection of the alienated "they-Self"). There's 
profundity if you like, 1, who don't say anything because my voice is 
drowned in the voices of the "they" manage here to say something. An 
apparently stupid situation. It would be better if "he" (my authentic 
Self) would talk about me. Cwho is after all only a puppet of the "they") 
in the third person as he does with his other "figments". that is, with 
the other objects of his perception or imagination. But no, he won't 
treat me like Tom, OicK or Harry (he can't, he is me), when he talks 
about me he must talk aboutme as *his me". 
In Lessness we learn that people have been "false" to the 
11. blacKed out fallen open true refuge" for a long time, "time out of mind". 
'It is hard to be conclusive, but might this not, also be an example of 
inauthentic existence? The empty, darK. open "refuge" of the Self is 
what we are *false' -to when we fall under the dominion nf rdas Man". 
In. fremier Amour we find one of -, 15ecKett#., s aphorisms. the sort. of 
thing about which we f eel that ýwe ran only say that it .,, 
has a- beautif ul 
, "shapen. Thus: "Clest penible de ne plus etre ýsoi-meme. encore --plus 
-p8nible qua de lletre. quoi. -4u'lonen 
dise". [Premier -Amour. 
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talK of "shape" in this context, while it may be the truth, is not 
the whole truth. In the end, BecKett's-sentence means something. With 
our Heideggerian reading we can say that talK about Knowing what it is 
liKe to be oneself and not to be oneself reflects Heidegger's two sorts 
of self, the public and the private, and of course it is more painful, 
of the two unsatisfactory possibilities, to be estranged from oneself 
than to be oneself. 
BecKett adds a point to this discussion that is not specifically 
made by Heidegger. It concerns habit. Implicit in the notion of 
inauthentic existence is the idea of dead, unthinking routines, habits 
in fact. Dasein can only project himself into his possibilities by 
understanding what he is doing and grasping his existence, never by 
merely jogging on along the old road. This thought first appears in 
E3ecKett in his essay on Proust, where he describes how habit, in 
ft. 
A la recherche. shuts off possibilities. "The creature of habit turns 
aside from the object that cannot be made to correspond with one or 
other of his intellectual prejudices, that resists the propositions of 
his team of syntheses, organized by Habit on labour-saving principles" 
CPTD. 23). In a sense most of his later characters actually strive to 
achieve this labour-saving state of being deadened by habit. Sometimes 
it seems their next-best alternative to real death. At least from Watt 
onwards repetition, the attempt to build something up into a habit, 
becomes a central motif in BecKett. His narrators do not want to "Known, 
they want to be bacK in the womb with its dark, empty, endless repetition 
, of . heartbeats. 
Rather remarkably, ýwhen we -,, reach The Unnamable we find 
Beckett referring back, in this context to Proust, again., "I invented 
love, music, 'the small of flowering currant. to escape. from mew IT-307). 
'These are only a -few of the many Inventions that have been dragged -in to 
'-"! pass the time". as the tr-amPs would -say-in, 
Godot., in the -course of 
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the trilogy. And the flowering currant has just *a touch of the 
Proustian ! 'Fetish" about it; the whole sentence is liKe a brief 
resume of A la recherche. More important is what follows. 
"Organs, a without, it's easy to imagine, a god, it's unavoidable, you 
imagine them, it's easy, the worst is dulled, you doze away, an instant" 
(T. 307). The function of all our habitual assumptions, all our 
inventions and imaginations is to dull "the worst". When we come to 
How It Is this process is complete. The only meaning that existence in 
that mud has, the only way of even speaKing of what is happening, of 
how it is, is through the pattern, the habitual form of life, the great, 
grotesque, but regular dance of habit-deadened existence. And, 
significantly, it is in How It Is that BecKett abandons his quest for 
the Self "itself" and allows habit, the "they-Self", wonderfully 
projected into the mud, to dominate. 
5 
* * * 
Eigentlich Existenz. "Authentic existence"., Gewissen. "Conscience". 
Authentic existence is, of course. the reverse of the inauthentic 
existence described in the last section. To, exist-authentically is to 
exist as Self and not as "they-Self". Heidegger borrows the term 
"conscience" to describe the power that calls us out of the *they-Self" 
and into the Self. It is Da5ein's own conscience that does this,, so it 
is I who demand my Self -, from my "they-Self*,. Conscience is, an "appeal* 
f r6m one to the other. "and because only -the . -Self i of the they-self gets 
, appealed to and brought, 
to, hear. the 
. 
1hey -,. collapses" CBT. '317). It 
but. it does-not 
ý=Y collapse 
-disappear- *Z)asein,,, has'Being-. in-the-wor2d 
quite as =ch when 1t -exists authentically, as,, when,, 1t-_, i1oes. 'not. - as 
, Heidegger points 
out earlier, ý"Authentic, -Being-nne!,. B-ýSelf does 
not, rest upon an exceptional condition ,, of the .,. s ubj e ct. a condition 
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that has been detached from the "they".. .. "CBT., 168). The call of 
conscience passes over all the. considerations of the "they", of 
introspection, of psychoanalysis, of anything that treats the Self 
as an object. It calls "Solely to that Self which, notwithstanding, 
is in no other way than Being-in-the-world"(BT. 318). So authentic 
existence is not detached from the world and the "they"; Murphy's 
mistaKe is to maKe a bid to shut out "the world" and to "come alivel, 
in his mind, but "the appeal to the Self in the they-self does not 
force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself off from the 
"external world".... "(BT. 318). We are in no way discussing solipsism 
or subjectivism here. 
Conscience, in calling to the Self, strictly says "nothing". but 
it calls Dassin forward into its npotentiality-for-Being-its-Self", 
that is, it calls on Dasein to exist authentically. And it discourses 
"solely and constantly in the made of Keeping silent" (BT. 318). Here 
the "callep". conscience, sounds remarKably liKe a BecKetLan character, 
not simply because it talks by keeping sflent in a manner that echoes 
Beckett's paradoxes on this subject, but in i ts ambiguous anonymity: 
The caller maintains itself in 
conspicuous indefiniteness. If the 
caller-is asked,. about its name, 
status, origin or repute, it not only 
refuses to answer, but does not even 
leave the slightest possibility of one's 
making it into something with which 
one can be familiar when one's 
understanding of Dasein has, a 
wworldly* orientation. On the other 
-hand, it by no means disguises 
itself In the call {BT. 2193- 
Thq". point here, as in Beckett. is that -the:, Self calls to -its Self from 
its Self. And at least one. 'if -not two. of these terms is anonymous and 
-indefinable. 'The "they-Self"'we-can. perha 
. Ps define. but what are we 
'to -say of the Self "itself' or, of the -conscience)'that, calls *to -it? 
-They. are both "me". undisguisedly. but,, we can say nothing of -them. 
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Compare The Unnamable, passim. 
The call of conscience "comes from me and yet from beyond me"(BT. 320). 
Once again we are back at the "First Person - Third Person" problem, 
discussed in the last section. This calling conscience, at once me 
and not me, sounds very like the "I" - "They" tension in, say, 
, 
How It Is or the Texts for Nothing. If we are tempted to call the 
"them", in BecKett, God, we find Heidegger Positing the same possibility. 
The "Scribes", "up there" in How It Is, bending over the, prone forms of 
the mud-creatures, dictating; or the "He" of the fourth Text for Nothing, 
seem to be external powers and yet within the narrator. As Heidegger 
says, one can taKe "the power itself as a person who maKes himself Known - 
namely God" (BT. 320). But he has a better explanation, and one that 
I thinK will fit SecKett better too. "The fact that the call is 
not something which is explicitly performed by me, but-that rather "it" 
does the calling, does not Justify seeKing the caller in some entity. with 
a character other than that of Dasein" (BT-320-1). The caller is an 
"it", but it is also me, a "who". "In its "who", the caller is definable 
in a "worldly" way by nothing at all. The caller is Da5ein in its 
uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the not-at-home - 
the bare *that-it-is" in the "nothing" of the world" (BT-321). 'The 
caller is "alienn because nothing could be more alien to the "they-Self" 
than the Self. And Heidegger repeats: "The call does not report events; 
it calls without uttering anything" (BT-322). There is no. Possibility 
of my being mistaKen as to who 
is calling when I hear this silent call - 
I know it is me. I know myself in MY '"Uncanninessw. ý that is. in my 
Individuality. and Irecagnize myself unmistakably -when I call myself 
out of the 'they-Self * -into my own'Potentiality ý, 
because,: j am *Care",. 
"Conscience manifests itself as the call of -zarz: 'the -Caller-is -Dasein.. . 
The 13ne to whom the appeal Is made -is this vsrY, zame -Dasein" IBT.. 322). 
i 
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I If Dasein interprets the call. of conscience as the voice of God it is 
merely slipping bacK. into . the world, - into the "they-Self 11, hiding in 
the Objective, resting in inauthenticity. If the voice of conscience 
is not my voice it is a public voice, "God's voicen, the voice of 
the "they". Vox POP'Uli. vox dei. But thus it must be my voice for 
it is precisely the voice that calls me away from the "they" CBT. 3233- 
We should now be in a position to understand the following comment 
of Heidegger's that summarizes this basic state of authentic existence. 
"In understanding the call (of conscience), Dasein is in thrall to its 
ownmost possibility of existence. It has chosen itself" CBT. 3343. This 
is how "man maKes himself". 
It will be seen that this question, of authentic existence is bound 
up with the question of selfhood, which in BecKett appears as the quest 
for Self. I have already made some Points about Beckett en passant and 
the bulk of this discussion must be left to our direct approach to the 
self in the section so-entitled, below. For the present I would just 
liKe to give some examples of BecKett's references to the quest for 
the Self that will perhaps read a little more clearly with Heidegger 
in mind - 
Ars8ne. for Instance, describesthe mystery of Watt's arrival 
at Mr Knott's house where "he Knows he is in the right place at last.... 
he will be in his midst at last, after so many tedious years spent 
clinging to the perimeter". he will be able to taste "the long joys 
of being himself* [W-39). We now have a chance of understanding this 
a: Lthout resorting to admiring Its, shape. The "right place" Is the 
. authentic 
Self which is 'in our midst". the '7, perimeter" to which we 
cling is the they-Self. Only In the'fOrmer can we be ourselves. 
Frequently through the 'Texts -for Nothing -we come across similarly 
, arcane statements 
that seem a little clearer . with Heidegger"s help. 
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"I don't Know, I'm. here, that's all 
I Know, and-that it's still not me, 
it's of that the-best has to be made"(NK. 85). 
"I Know, there is no one here, neither 
me nor anyone else, but some things 
are better left unsaid, so I say 
nothing" (N. K. 98). 
"To be judge and party, witness and 
advocate, and he, attentive, indifferent, 
who sits and notes. It's an image, 
in my helpless head... " CNK. 91). 
"One, meaning me, it's not the same 
thing" (NK-91). 
"The ears straining for a voice not 
from without" CNK. 91). 
lw 
"That other who is me... because of 
whom I'm here" CNK. 109). 
In each of these examples there is a "me" and some other who is 
also "me". If these appearýsusceptible of -another interpretation 
(which is possible, though I suspect it would end up being a very 
similar sort of interpretation) what can be made of the following 
from The Unnamable without our Heideggerian view? 
What I say, what I may say, an 
this subject, the subject of me and 
my abode, has already been said 
since, having always been here, I 
am here still... I, greatly fear, 
since my speech can only,, be of 
fne and here, that I am once 
more engaged in putting an, end 
to both. Which would not matter, 
far from it, but for the. abligation, 
once rid of them. to begin again, 
to start again from nowhere, from 
no one and from nothing and win 
to me again, to me here-again.... 
(T. 304). 
y.. 
1* lit 
lUst. "Anxistyn. Nichts. *Nothing". 
oasein wfalls" into inauthenticity. It -flees- from itself into 
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the "they". This f leeing is not . the same as the f leeing of one af raid. 
If I am afraid, it is of a definite entity within-the-world that 
threatens me, but when Dasein "flees" into the "they" it is fleeing 
from itself. Hence we need another term than "fear" to describe the 
state-of-mind that brings about this-fleeing. This is especially so 
as Dasein, when it flees from what it fears, is in fact totally 
orientated towards the "fearsome" thing, (Heidegger gives no examples, 
but this physical one is clear enough: when I run away from a fierce 
dog all I do has reference to the dog, I can thinK of nothing else, my 
whole being is involved with the dog, albeit in the negative mode of 
trying to avoid it). But when Dasein flees from itself into the world, 
into the "they", it is quite unable to say definitely what it is fleeing 
from. So it is even more important to find a term that will differentiate 
this from fear. 
Heidegger adopts KierKegaard's word "Angst" which we will translate 
"anxiety"; it has also been rendered as "dread", whých is perhaps too 
strong. Just as "concern" and "solicitude" are both made possible by 
the fact that "care" is Dasein's fundamental Being, so fLr and its 
related emotions are made possible because anxiety is one of Dasein's 
fundamental existentialia. Fear-is fear, of what"threatens. us from 
within-the-world. Anxiety is anxious about no specific entity but about 
"Being-in. -the-world as suth" CBT. 2303. "In'anxiety one does not 
encounter this thing or that thing, which. as something threatening, must 
have an Involvement.... That in the -Face Df which-one has anxiety 
I. s -characterized by -the fact that what threatens Is nowhere. Anxiety 
mdoes not know" what that In the, face Of which'At is anxious is"CBT. 231). 
We. are anxious in the face of the "nothing, and nowhere" that is 
I, the world. 
If this -seems 'incomprehensible it 
is perhaps worth considering 
-"the world" cannot mean this ý or, that entitY within-the-world nor 
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can it mean the aggregate of all such entitiesi it must be defined 
as the possibilities of -the - ready-to-rhand. - And Possibility is 
precisely "nothing-yet, nowhere-yet". In fact we have now followed 
Heidegger to the point where we can see that his concept of Angst 
coincides with KierKegaard's. _ In discussing original sin in The 
Concept of Dread KierKegaard explains Adam's position by saying that 
Angst is awoKen in him by the prohibition to eat the fruit of the 
forbidden tree. The Angst is aroused precisely because Adam is being 
offered a choice and therefore is confronted by possibility. Kierkegaard 
goes further and specifically defines this possibility as "nothing". 
Adam "dreads" in the face of "nothing" (Kierkegaard, 1,38-40). 
Because Dasein turns away from itself, its Self is "disclosed" as 
being "there* (BT. 229). Thus, paradoxically, the fleeing into 
inauthenticity is the condition for authenticity. I flee because I am 
anxious; I am anxious in the face of my Being-in-the-world, in the. 
face of the "nothing" of my possibility; my possibility, as we have 
V 
seen, my own'Being-in-the-world, is my authentic existence. Thus, Angst 
is a condition of authentic existence, it "discloses" Dasein to itself. 
Anxieýy maKes manifest in Dasein 
its Being-towards its ownmost 
'Potentiality-for-Being - that 'is, -its 
Being-free-for the freedom of 
choosing itself and taKing hold 
of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein 
face td face with-its,, Seing-free 
for... the authenticity of its 
Being..... Anxiety. individualizes 
Dasein and thus discloses it as 
Osolus ipse* (ST. 232-233). 
liaidegger -returns 
to, anxisty -in 'his discussion of "moods" or 
"S .. tates of mind*. Rather -disingenuously, , he offers anxiety. as ý, a siMle 
-, 0 , example 'of 
how -8 -state of, mind 'to 
be, described. But, -we need not 
be misled about this; he. is'talking, as inuch about, anxiety itself as 
,. ý about states af 
mind. In 'the, f ace - of . itself. %and about 1tself , he - says, 
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Dasein feels anxious. To put it another way, Dasein feels, anxious in 
the face of the nnothing" of-. the world. . Heidegger stresses that this 
"nothing" is not to be interpreted as a lacK of something in the present- 
at-hand, rather it is the condition of the world. "The present-at- 
hand must be encountered in just such a way that it does not have any 
involvement whatsoever, but can show itself in an empty mercilessness" 
CBT. 393). "Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world" CBT-393). 
Elsewhere Heidegger asKs whether anyone "has ... ever made a problem 
of the ontological source of notness" (BT-332). And what emerges from 
all this is a picture of anxiety as a fundamental state-of-mind, in 
which authentic existence is possible, and of "nothing". "nullity" or 
the "not" as that which we are anxious about, although- pot in the way 
of "missing" something that is "not there". 
The application of this to BecKett must be obvious. His fiction 
in particular abounds with characters terrified of "nothing". depending 
0 on "nothing", needing 
"nothing" in a way that maKes it quite'plain that 
this nothing is not just a "not something". And the state of mind of 
the BecKettian narrator is rarely specific fear of things within-the- 
world, but it is not comfort and freedomfrom everything liKe fear 
either; it is Angst. 
Watt is a good place to start to. tooK for exam'ples. Heidegger 
asks if anyone has looked into the. ontalogy, of 'notness", and here 
surely is Watt attempting it in his speculations about Mr. "Knott". 
Even before he has come properly face to -face with Mr. Anott, Watt', s 
-naýration for Sam's. or Beckett's), is stiff with . th"Ord not". "Not 
that, Watt was ever to have any direct dealings with - Mr. ýmtt- far he 
was not*, -for example [W. 643.. And ýthe-fjrst -, Major -event, of his,, ztay 
In Mr. Knott's house Cbesides. Arsene', -s speech, _ 
, of which, more hereafter3 
. is the visit 
of the Galls. father and son. 'to -the piano. whirh 
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is described later as "a thing that was nothing" that had "happened" 
0 
(W. 73). This is repeated a few pages later as though Beckett were 
pleased with the paradox, "a nothing had happened" (W. 77). And it is in 
this connexion that'he delivers himself of his oracular reductio: 
"For the only way one can speak of nothing is to speak of it as though 
it were something, just as the only way one can speak of God is to 
speak of him as though he were a man.... "(W. 74). Which, of course, is 
Heidegger's point that nnothing" does not always just mean a "lack" - it 
can have a positive value. This. throws a new light on such dicta of 
Watt's as "Ye. s, nothing changed, in MrjrKnott's establishment, because 
nothing remained, and nothing came or went, because all was a coming and 
a going" (W-130). The "nothings"in this sentence clearly denote something 
more than a "lacK". Which might even suggest a new interpretation of 
apparently simpler statements such as "What did he Know of Mr. Knott? 
Nothing" (W. 147). After all, the sentences that follow this are: "Of his 
anxiety to improve, of. his anxiety to understand, of his anxiety to get 
well, what remained? Nothing. But was not that something? "(W. 147). The 
last question goes unanswered. 
All this consideration of "nothing". we have seen, is intimately 
bound up in Heidegger with anxiety. *Anxiety "does not know" what 
t 
ýthat in the face of which it Is anxious is". So it -is with Watt. "Of 
the nature of Mr. Knott himself Watt remained -in particular ignorance" 
(W. 199) . "For-of Mr. Knott he could not-speaK'(W. '2143. Mr. Knott 
would seem to be -the nothing in 'the, fare of "which Dasein is anxious. 
-the -verses -that- begin-Who may,, tell the -tale/of -,, the In, -the Addenda 
man? " conclude with ýthe parallel 'interrogative', *nothingness/in 'words 
enclose? " -IW. 247). 'The --old man's-tale Is nothingness. 
What is significant -about. this "is not ý, merely 'that -we ., now ý have an 
explanation ofthe negativity, of Jjr,. -. ynott'-' '. We -can, go4-further. A 
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Heidegger's definition of the "nothi. ng" can be thoroughly applied 
to Mr. Knott. We are anxious, it will ba'remembered, iý the face of 
the "nothing and nowhere" that is the world, the world here meaning 
that which is created by my freedom, that is, possibility. Mr. Knott 
is just this possibility. He is, but he. is not any one given entity. 
He is free possibility before it has chosen this or that. This explains 
his notorious systematic irregularity and unpredictability and his 
capacity to run through the whole range of possibilities of a given 
subject. Mr. Knott's meals, appearance and habits are quite indefinable. 
As one of many examples we can consider his clothes. "The clothes that 
Mr. Knott wore ..... were very various, very very various" (W. 199). All 
sorts of random clothing is attributed to him, which he wears in the 
most random manner. Thisýseems to symbolize possibility well enough, 
but what clinches the argument is the deliberately exhaustive list of what 
he wears an his feet. This list (W-pp. 200-201) is too long to quote in 
extenso but it is an example of one of the most striKing features of the 
0 
novel a desperate ratiocination that wants to say every possibility 
in a given context. To explain it away as merely illustrative of an 
insane rationalism is inadequate; we can start to understand it 
properly only by taking it as it is and interpreting-it in its 
obviousness. It : is a list of possibilities. It includes all possibilities, 
it therefore puts us in a position tb stand bacK-from them, it 
symbolizes the pre-choice. situation of Watt, gazing at Mr. Knott., Jt 
symbolizes freedom. Watt's gazing, at the nothing ("Knott") of possibility. 
if our comparison with Heidegger -does,, no more than establish who 
fir Knott is, and, why. BecKett, -.. adopts the technique, of : exhaustive 
-enumeration 
In Watt. -., it has --don e: a_great, deal. ý'Sut, '7=thingness -also 
. figures largely in'the other worK. 
It--is, present in * urPhY whose hem 
finds himself at Lpeace when 
%he -somethings -give way, or. simply add up, 
"to the Nothing, than which in the, guffaw. of , the Abderite naught is. more 
140. 
real". This nothing is "the accidentless One-and-Only" (M-168). 
Then, later, there are. the: Texts for'Nothing with their ambiguous title, 
and a scatter of references to nothingness in most of the work. From 
The Expelled, "I raised my eyes to the sKy .... where nothing obstructs 
your vision" CNK. 131. An ambiguous sentence. From The Calmative, 
"All I say cancels out. I'll have said nothing" (NK. 26), where it is 
interesting to note the future tense; BecKett does not have the audacity 
to claim that he has said nothing. Then again the narrator's mind was 
Italways flung bacK to where there was nothing" (NK. 41). 
These examples can all be read in a Haideggerian context; and 
if they are so read they acquire more meaning. Even more obviously 
Heideggerian is this from Eleuth6ria: Victor, the hero, defends his 
liberty and when asKed what he is defending it for C"pour quoi fairp? ") 
he replies "pour rien faire". Freedom is precisely to do nothing, to 
be able to choose but not to choose yet. 
Malloy has an interesting aside on nothing. He claims that "to 
know nothing is nothing" (T. 64) in a context which indicates that 
the second nothing is idiomatic and the equivalent of "easy". The 
implication is that nothing, previously treated seriously as important, 
is now the easiest thing to grasp, which, -, in Heidegger's case. ýJs 
paradoxically true - before anythingI am faced with the-nothing of 
freedom. Moran, liKe Molloy. %tumbles" in the midst of-"nothingness" 
(T. 1231 at exactly the point when we-expect him, -Surrounded, by his 
house, and his possessions as he is. -to feel, most ý certain -of "something". 
once again, this needs Heidegger. If we take "nothing" as a sort of 
.. Y., 
, equivalent 
opposite of "house", Moran's ., stumbling is Incomprehensible. 
]But if we see ""nothing* as 'Possibility, 'in -ýthe ýf ace of the world, then 
-the house is precisely 'the condition of Moran 'I. s,. "no thing to. And at, this 
point in the tale Moran Is, specifically concerned with choice - the 
illusory choice of whether to obey Youdi and the -real choice of how to 
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set out and when. 
It may be noticed that I am here stressi. ng the "nothing" aspect 
'of my argument rather than the "Angst" aspect. The two are inseparable, 
of course; face to face with the nothing Oasein is anxious. Thus if 
we can demonstrate that Watt or Molloy are face to face-with nothing 
then we can define their state of-mind as anxiety. This is so whether 
or not their state of mind is similar to what is meant by "anxious" in 
its usual meaning. This is the circular result of Heidegger's habit of 
giving words totally specialized meanings. "Lngst", however, does have 
an objective content of a sort in Kierkegaard and we may assume that 
6 
this is implied in Heidegger. Anxiety is "vertigo" for the Danish 
philosopher, la dizzy peering into the "abyss" CKierkegaard, 1,55). 
This is a metaphor for Being-towards the nothingness of freedom, the 
anxious peering Into the "depths". It appears thus in Beckett too. 
Malone, who is as capable as any Beckettian hero of little asides such 
as "the true prayer at last, the one 'that asks for nothing" (T. 130) also 
has, a revealing explanation: "What I sought", he says, "was the rapture 
of vertigo,.... the relapse .... to-nothingness" CT. 26). And the Unnamable, 
in whose babble the word "nothing" is repeated over one hundred times, 
after his endless repositionings. of himself and his "vice-existers', 
finally realizes that he is, in an "enormous prison, like a hundred 
thousand cathedrals" (T. 413). and'in ý*this, 
immensityn, hjs voice 
gets lost in the "vault" in "the abyss" where he, is "already" (T. 413). 
In KierXegaard, Heidegger and, Beckett freedom Is a vertigo in the face 
,.. of . the abyss of nothingness. 
, Heidegger proposes a more conventional 'vi ew'ý of nothingness as well, 
, --, one which 
Is dOUbtlSss also present In ý'BecKett. 'BochensKi, summarizes 
-, it, thus, '"Human, existence 
is related, toý'nothingness as follows: first 
human existence -has no, ground. 'it ]Originates . -in 'the -abyss of nothingness; 
142. 
second, it culminates in death, whichAs another abyss, of nothingness; 
third, the very being of human, existence is an anticipation. of death, 
of nothingness: it is intrinsically vaid"'(Bochenski, 1,171). 
It is time for us to consider death. 
*** 
Sein-zum-Tode. "Being-towards-death". Ganzsein. "Being-a-whole". 
Dasein's Being cannot be a sort of aggregate of the Beings of his 
body, his soul and so on. It must be the Being of Dasein's unity. 
So says Heidegger CBT-74). Being-in-the-world is shown to be unified 
in the section on Care. Care is Dasein's Being and it is defined as 
"ahead-cf-itself-Being-already-in-the-world-as-Being-alongside-entities- 
within-the-world" CBT. 237). This definition is sufficient to establish 
Dasein as a unity if we consider Dasein statically, but once we 
introduce the concept of temporality something more must be added. 
It is significant that the definition of Dasein as Care quoted 
above refers to Dasein's "average everydayness", that is, to Dasein 
in inauthenticity. At the beginning of Part Two of Being and Time, 
, introducing 
temporality. Heidegger. isat pains to point this out. He 
observes that in Part One he was not discussing Dasein's authenticity 
or totality. The two automatically appear together. Our discussion 
of inauthentic existence, above, depends largely an propositionsýfrom 
Part One of the work and our discussion of authentic existence 
dippends an material'-frm Part-Two. Part-Two is'entit-led*-"Dasein 
and Temporality". 
'The point Is that however-well we-get-on ýdefining Dassin as Care 
and so on we cannot discover its unity or'authenticity without time. With 
time we are able'to understand mur existential projections into the 
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future. Also we at once discover. the horizon. of those projections - 
death. Being-towards-death reveals the totality of Dasein's 
possibilities and hence imposes a unity on Dasein's Being. 
At death Dasein ceases to "exist", there is nothing more 
"outstanding" for Dasein to do and it becomes merely "present-at- 
hand". A dead body does not even rise to the status of readiness-to- 
hand, it is just brutally present. 
"existence" and helps to define it. 
This provides a contrast with 
More important than this, however, 
is the direct pressure exerted by Being-towards-death on the Self 
to exist authentically. Not only is death the horizon that creates 
a unity for Dasein, it also forces Dasein to "be itself" by virtue 
of its inescapability. We saw that inauthentic existence involved 
allowing the "they" to replace "me" as the maKer of decisions, the 
projector. of existence. Now the one occasion on which I cannot find a 
replacement for "me" is at my death.. If authentic existence is 
characterized by being "always mine" then Being-towards-death is 
guaranteed authentic CBT. 283-4). 
Then, we are always old enough to die. Death is always impending, 
another possibility among the many, an indefinite but undeniable 
element in the'-factical CE3T-. 2B9). The "they" tranquillizes itssl-f 
about death, but thereby only proves that Dasein's Being is 
Being-tow. ards-deathi -the tranquillizing -is Being-towards-death'in a 
negative, modeIST-295). Death is Dasein's "ownmost possibility"(ST.: 303). 
The authentic state-. of mind-Of'. 5eing-towards-death is, We'have 
seen . that -. -this '-7anxisty" , Is, a vertigo In--the face . of possibility, and 
death Is the -fIna1., possibility,, ý, tbe possibility of ---, no-mo re -possibility. 
In -"the -face'of death Angst ls'the,. only - authentIc -may ýmf,, Being. 
When we, consider .. death, we --are, "by 'implication, considerlng, our 
lives asý, a. whola. 
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Authenticity is related to totality, and we can expect the. authentic 
I 
only in the unified whole. However, unless we commit suicide immediately 
on having this thought, our Being-towards-death, that is our 
potentiality for Being-a-whole, will be characterized by anticipation. 
But then all our existential projects are characterized by anticipation, 
by expecting, by waiting for (BT. 349). This positive waiting is quite 
the opposite of the dreaming, hanKeri6g-after, wishing-for and mere 
-willing of inauthentic existence CBT. 239-40). 
It will at once be apparent that there is a good deal of this in 
BecKett. Malone's entire narrative, for instance, illustrates Being- 
.1 
towards-death. Sometimes he authentically grasps his possibilities, 
firmly aware of the probable limits of his existence and determined 
to shape his remaining time into a whole. This is the state he is in 
when he plans what he is going to do with his remaining time. He 
decides to tejl certain stories in a certain order, make an inventory 
of his possessions, die. A perfect example of authentic Being-towards- 
death within the limits of the'factical. At other-times he is far away, 
plunged deeply into his stories about others. For him, as for the 
Unnamable, they are "vice-existers", in other words they are his "they- 
Self". When he tells their stories he is'letting "them" exist for him. 
This, incidentally, underlines the paradox involved in the concept of 
-free. authentic choice. Once Dasein has chosen X he is'no longer free 
to choose Y, that is, he is no longer free. There is a clear sense. in 
Malone Dies, of Malone'"Putting off* talking about himself; wafeel that 
the'narrative is'awaY"from the-centre. away'from-the, point, -while we 
learn about the'Lamberts, 'Saposcat-and Ma=ann. And Indeed 'it Is, 
these are'-Malone's ways -of -, passing,, the 'time. -When considering his 
projects. Malone Is existing authentically.: but when engaged'on-them 
, he Is inauthentic. -The issue bec=es, clear In 'The Unnamable. 'The 
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narrator in this last part. of the trilogy says that he has invented 
Malone and the others much as they invented Saposcat and the others, 
and he rejects them accordingly: 
All these Murphys, Molloys and 
Malones do not fool me. They have 
made me waste my time, suffer 
for nothing, speaK of them when, 
in order to stop speaKing, I should 
have spoKen of me and of me alone 
(T. 305). 
The Trilogy becomes a striving after authentic existence when seen in 
this light. In Malone Dies this is coupled with a Heideggerian Being- 
towards-death, but by the time we reach The Unnamable. although the 
narrator has learnt that he must try to do without others Cwithout 
"they", without projects) if he is to be able to stop talking (that is, 
stop being, that is, become a whole at last) he is patently unable to 
stop. He "must go on". So here BecKett again develops a Heideggerian 
proposition ýnto a picture of hell. It is all very well, he implies, 
to talk of Being-towards-the-end, but how are we to get to the end in 
a world in which Zeno's "grains of millet" can never add up to a heap, 
"the impossible heap". as Clov discovers. 
This reference to Endgame is not fortuitous. In both the major 
plays, 'Godot and Endgame, the situation of anticipation and'Being-towards- 
death are explored. Indeed a lot of BecKett's'theatre is-terminal; 
Happy Days implies an 'impossible 'third act in which Winnie is totally 
buried, Krapp's tape is his last, and so on. And obviously there is an 
opportunity here to interpret the waiting element in Godat in existentialist 
ter7ns. I shall quote-most of a-paragraph from Being and Time which. can 
be compared with Godot, perhaps especially so -in the extra Knowledge 
that in German it is, entitled Warten auf'Godat. 
Dasein comports itself towards 
something possible in its possibility 
by expecting it tim Erwarten). 
Anyone who is intent on something 
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possible, may encounter-it unimpeded 
and undiminished in its "whether it 
comes or does not, or. whether it comes 
after all" ..... To expect something 
possible is always to understand it 
and to "have" it with regard to 
whether and when and how it will 
be actually present-at-hand. Expecting 
is not just an occasional looKing-away 
from the possible to its possible 
actualization, but is essentially a 
waiting for that actualization (ein 
Warten auf diese) - Even in 
expecting, one leaps away from the 
possible and gets a foothold in the 
actual. It is for its actuality that 
what is expected is expected. By the 
very nature of expecting, the possible 
is drawn into the actual, arising 
out of the actual and returning to it 
(BT-306). 
In Waiting for Godot there is a tendency for the reader or the audience 
to put the emphasis on Godot. Who is this person who does not come? 
But, reasonable though this question is, the play itself is clearly about 
waiting. Now waiting is how we comport ourselves towards possibility, 
according to Heidegger, and for Vladimir and Estragan this is roughly 
the case too. And we have seen that authentic existence consists in 
remaining free to choose, that is, in not choosing. So the tramps are 
authentically keeping their options open while waiting for possibility. 
Meanwhile it. is essential that they do nothing that will preclude their 
genuine availabilitY-for possibility. In other words they must do 
nothing., Which is why nothing happens in the play. Thus, when they 
try to hang themselves they fail and go into pointless dialogue instead, 
a dialogue designed to avoid action: 
VLAD: Well? What do we do? 
EST: Don't let's do anything. 'It's safer. 
VLAD: Let's wait and see what he says. 
EST: Who? 
VLAD: Godot. 
EST: Good Idea CWFG. 18). 
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Later Estragon asks whether they are "tied", and here is the 
existentialist rub - they are tied, tied to inaction if they are 
to remain authentic. In a sense, thus, they are tied to possibility - 
if only they would give up waiting for possibility and plunge into 
possibility, as Pozzo so clearly has done, then, liKe Pozzo, they 
would be free to come and go. It is BecKett's addition to this scheme 
that iTeither freedom (the tramps) nor involvement CPozzo) brings - 
anything more than misery. It is-also Sartre's addition. As we shall 
see, for Sartre man is "condemned to freedom" (the tramps) and is 
always in "bad faith" (inauthentic existence, Pozzo). 
This waiting for possibility, Being -towards -death, waitingto-be- 
a-whole motif permeates BecKett's worK. So far we have mentioned __ 
Malone Dies, The Unnamable and the plays, but more examples can be given. 
In Text for Nothing VIII the narrator states explicitly that he 
"wants to cease" but then Plaintively adds that "being" would be nice 
too. In other words Beckett is elaborating the paradox: only at the 
end can I be me, and then it is too late CNK. 111). 
On a simpler level, there is the constant reference to death 
throughout Beckett's work, and always death is a welcome horizons in 
From An Abandoned Work for-instance, we read, "Oh I Know I too shall 
cease and be as when I was not yet, only all over instead of in store, 
that makes me happy" (NK. 145). Earlier, in Eleutheria. death is seen as 
desirable but with attendant disadvantages; Victor says, "Si J'etais 
mort ja ne saurais pas qua je suis mort. C'est la seule chose qua J'ai 
co. ntre la =rt. Je veux Jouir de ma =rt. Vest I'a la libertd: 
se vcir mart* LTypescript. p. 116). Sc deathis, freedom-except. 
without consciousness to enjoy'that freedom, one is not free. 
molloy equates dying with becoming complete. "Perhaps there is no 
whole, before you're deadw he-says,, thereby giving a precis of several 
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pages of Being and Time (T.. 27). And, he suffers from this dilemma. of 
talKing about his "life" when. -since his life is not yet "whole", he 
cannot Know what his life is. "My life ..... now I speaK of it as 
something over, now as of a JoKe which still goes on, and it is 
neither, for at the same time it is over and it goes on, and is there 
any tense for that? " (T. 36).. This surely is Heidegerrian Being-towards- 
death. Death is our "wholeness" and we must anticipate it to exist 
authentically. but anticipating is already-having, so we talK about 
"My* life properly only when we consider it as already over. An 
unsatisfactory situation, as BecKett implies, but one we must grasp 
if we are to maKe much sense of this, also from Molloy: 
For what possible end to these 
wastes where true light never was ........ ? Yes, a world at an end, in spite of 
appearances, its end brought'it forth, 
ending it began, is it clear enough? 
CT. 40). 
0 
Malloy thinKs that death might be worse than'life, an oýd but common 
fear in Beckett as in Shakespeare, and he doesn't want to commit suicide, 
but deathless life is worse than anything, as he maKes clear by 
describing his progress as a "Verttable calvary, with no limit to its 
stations and no hope of crucifixion" (T. 78). 
Moran is in; the, same ambiguous situatilon. He wants to be wiped 
out, but he dreads death as a "regeneration" (T. 141)., On the other 
hand he Views his disintegration as not merely, a. process of ageing - It 
is also some sort of a "clawing* upwards on the part of a man who is 
'dispossessed-of Self% Moran, ls--firmly embedded in. the "they* and 
we. -ican imagine that 
his destruction wi: 22 be-, good for him in 'that -it 
will at last'teach him authentic existence. 'The-price in BecKett is 
always --exortitant. 
"This E3eing-towards-death *theme, is the property of the characters 
in the plays, the trilogy and all the central worK that emerged from 
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BecKett's great creative period (1946. --1953? ). It is perhaps less 
in evidence in How. It Is and the later shorts. Here there is an, 
abandonment of progressive movement towards some point and the 
static or repetitive situations described do not seem to admit of any 
possible end. In the 
ýarly worK, too, although death is frequently 
present, it is imposed on the characters from without, as it were, and 
not much considered by them from within. Belacqua and Murphy are 
watched shuffling off their mortal coils by detached and ironic eyes. 
Belacqua's maKer, however, does indulge in one revealing aside. Before 
he undergoes the bizarre operation Can necK and toe) under the 
anaesthetic of which he will die, he is ignorant of the significance of 
his impending doom. "He did not pause to consider himself in this 
matter, the light that the coming ordeal would shed on his irrevocable 
. self, because he really was tired of that old bastardo" (MPTK. 1731.. 
Which is interesting in that it assumes that the "ordeal" of death can 
illuminate the "self" - Being-towards-death brings authentic existeince 
with it. 
*a* 
Schuld. '»Guilt"- Entschlus. "Resolution». 
"Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen awayfrom itself as 
an authentic potentiality for, 5eing its Self, and fallen into the 
world" CST. 220). This we now understand as Dasein's inauthentic 
involvement with Odas Man". "they". But if inauthentic Dasein is 
ct6racterized by 'fallings, authentic Dasein is characterized by "guilt". 
Neither of these concepts has anything -to do. with sin, ar lawbreaking CBT. 224). 
Guilt Is-pri=rdial and Precedes any-'indebtedness" CST-329). We have 
dealt with'wfalling". by-imPlication, in'the section on, inauthentic 
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existence, above, and now we. must -examine this apparently ineluctable 
guilt. With it we must looK at another aspect of authentic existence, 
one that accompanies guilt, "resolution". . 
"Dasein as such is guilty" (EIT. 331). Here is yet another of the 
equiprimordial existentialia of Dasein. And Dasein is guilty because 
freedom is freedom to choose only one possibility, so Dasein always 
"lacks"the other fulfilments - the-possibilities it does not choose. 
This Plack", which is obviously inescapable, Heidegger treats as 
similar to the "lack" which is at the basis of all sorts of guilt. He 
interprets guilt as an "indebtedness". Indebtedness means not having 
or not doing; thus Dasein's basic inability to choose everything, which 
means 10not doing" most things, is, an indebtedness, a lack, a guilt. 
x0asein as such is guilty*. 
Conscience, we saw above, is essential to Dassin also, the call 
of Dasein's Self back to its Self. It is this conscience that tells us 
that we are guilty, for conscience is the call of-Care, and Care is 
our Being as Being-in-the-world, and our Being-in-the-world is a matter 
of concernful dealing with the world, and that, is a matter of choices 
and freedom. All this is already there in our situation. 
When Heidegger says that we are guilty because we have *fallen" 
Into the world, into the "they*, this amounts to exactly, the same thing. 
The way in which we fall into the world is to allow our choices to be 
made for us. -to. 
lacK, Possibilities in just the way we lacK them even when 
existing authentically because we cannot choose them all. . So. 
Dasein 
is, -responsible far-what. he does choose and-guilty because of what he 
does-not IBT. 332-! 333). 
"'Tesolution", -is-the ! reticent selfi-projection. upon mne! B, Dwnmost 
Being-guiltY. in which-one'is.. ready for, anxietyn CBT, 343). This Is the 
condition of, authentic existence. Resolution As "authentic Being-one's- 
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Self" CBT. 344). What does. this mean? . Heidegger is not at his clearest 
here, but it would appear that. this is his version of Sartre's "choosing 
to be oneself". Dasein must maKe the "resolve" to want to listen to 
the call of his conscience and Dasein must be "resolute" in adhering 
to himself if he wants to exist authentically. This decision "to be 
myself" does not detach me from the world or let me become a "free- 
floating "I""(BT. 344). On the contrary it permits me to exist in my 
true Being, which. is Being-in-the-world. "They" are irresolute, "they" 
never choose, somehow everything has already been chosen by "them". 
When I submit to "their" choice I am doubly inauthentic -I have not chosen, 
and no identifiable one of "them* has chosen either. 
TWo final points. "Authentic resoluteness", we are told, "resolves 
to keep on repeating itself". Authentic existence is not merely 
achieved once for all, it is a permanent state of effort. Secondly, 
"resoluteness is authentically and wholly what it can be, only as 
anticipatory resoluteness" (BT. 355-5). From what we learnt of anticipation 
and waiting in the last section it will be apparent that resolutedess 
is an essential part of authentic Being-towards-death, itself a condition 
of authentic existence. 
Here we have, an example of two of Heidegger's concepts that apply 
usefully to Beckett because Of the profound level at which the philosopher 
is talking. Beckett's characters, for instance. seem to be endlessly 
self-punishing and never able to say that it is unfair or that they are 
"not guilty*- I would propose that to associate their torments with, 
those of Dante's damned.. Is a genuine exercise in -literary criticism 
but does not go far enough-In, the direction of-explanaticn. After all. 
BecKett, s cosmology, is not Dante's; I)ante Intended his vision to be 
-taken an several levels of meaning.. no doubt. but'first among them-was 
something very like a1iteral meaning. This cannot be true of'BecKett- 
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As we. shall see in the final chapter, BecKett is not devoid of an 
interest in - religion, . but he.. Is . certainly not an orthodox Christian. 
If we want an explanation of the pervading guilt and punishment themes 
we are liKely to do a lot better with Heidegger's ontological versions. 
In a sense this point can stand without examples. After all, 
there is no question but that BecKett's characters are punished for a 
profound guilt and that his entire oeuvre is created in a sort of gray 
light in which bitter suffering is universal and, because never complained 
of as such, curiously assumed to be fair. Howeverthere is a clarity 
to be obtained from some of the specific points at which BecKett's 
characters talK about their guilt. 
Malone, for instance, adopts the metaphor of the "sin of having 
been born" and is specific that there is nothing unmerited about' the 
punishment which follows such a sin. 
And without Knowing exactly what 
his sin was he felt full well that 
living was not a sufficient atonement 
for it or that this atonement was 
in itself a sin, calling for more 
atonement, and so on, as if there- 
could be anything but life, for the 
living. And no doubt he would have 
wondered if it was really necessary 
to be guilty in order to be punished 
but -for the memory. more and more 
galling, of his having'consented, to 
live in his mother, than to leave her 
(T. 240). 
Later, pondering on his stories, Malone wonders if he is talking about 
the right Macmann. But he comforts himself with the reflection 
that "So long as it is what is called a living, being you. can't go 
wrong. you have the guilty one" ET. 260). 
'The intimate relationship between this basic guilt and life 'is 
further-stressed by the Unnamable who not only talks about'*signing" 
Worm's "life-warrant" but even says that "MY crime is my punishmentO (T-372). 
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In other words the "crime" in BecKett. creating the "guilt", is life 
and the "punishment! ' : Ls life. -"The. inestimable gift of life". As 
Heidegger says, "Dassin as such is guilty". 
*** 
Zeit. "Time". 
Early in Being and Time Heidegger promises to "point to" 
temporality as "the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call 
"Dasein""(BT. 38). He points to one or two places where thinKing about 
time has not been very clear. We are accustomed for instance, to maKe 
a distinction between what is "in time" and what is "eternal" (BT. 39) 
and we are baffled, as Kant was, because "the decisive connexion. between 
time and "I think" (is) shrouded in darkness" EBT. 45). But we must 
try to see what is really meant by these distinctions and connexions if 
, we are 
to understand Dasein. 
The second part of Being and Time, as it stands, is entitled 
I'Dasein and Temporality". To some extent it is a recapitulation of-the 
first part with the dimension of time added. It enables Heidegger to 
introduce authentic Being. -thatis, Being-a-whole and Being-towards- 
death. He does this'in the first three sections of this part (2,1-2.3). 
In the remaining three -sections (2.4 - 2, S) temporality and historicality 
are directly considered. 
It may have-been"noticed, that there is'now an apparent rivalry for 
the, status of 'the meaning'. of 10asein's Being".. "'We have just learnt 
, that this ý, is "temporality", but In -discussing '"care% above, - we def ined 
r-are,, In exactly-this. way too. 'This is deliberate. ""Temporality* Is 
-yet another of, ýthe'equiprimordial elements, of Dasein's existence and it 
As -cars. '*Tempo ra lity, -revea 1s Itself as'the meaning of jauthentic 'care" 
EBT. 3743. The unity of the structure of zare lies ýin temporality. Thus, 
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"Existenz" relates to the. future, I project myself existentially into 
my possibilities ahead-of-myself. Facticity, on the other hand is the 
past, the given, the "already" into which I find myself "thrown". 
Resolute Dasein calls itself bacK from the factical "they" and the 
possible "then", from the past and the future, into the "there" of 
Da-sein, Being-there, that is, into the present of choice and freedom. 
Resolute Dasein gives, and listens to, the conscientious call of care, 
brings its Self bacK to the authentic present (BT. 375 ff. ). 
In other words we have now put together all the equiprimordial 
aspects of Dasein's Being. If we select any one of them we find that 
it brings all the others with it, but this is only clear once one has 
added time to the other elements. There is no need here for us to 
rehearse all the categories so far discussed in the light of time, 
as Heidegger does. It must suffice simply to point out that everything 
that we have met so far taKes 'on a new intelligibility in the light of 
time. "Understanding", for instance, relates to the Future, while 
oneys "state of mind" relates to the Past, "Being-in-the-world" is only 
possible because Dasein can "temporalize" - indeed* just as there are 
only "worlds" because of Dasein, so there is only time because Of 
Dasein. And so ion. 
When Heidegger comes to discuss time itself, in isolation from his 
other concepts, he makes the point that time is not., as we so easily 
imagine, a "succession" of discrete Instants. Only Basein is temporal, 
and Oasein isthe "between" of the phrase *between birth and death" 
(BT. 425-61. And only-for. Dasein isýthere history - Dasein. -itself-is 
th e primary stuff, of'history. -the ready-to-hand'is-only secondary 
histaricalitY. as-we ran see-if weýconsider a museum-exhibit-which Is. 
-in nature". no lolder'"'than the,, gless of, the, case'that exhibits it 
but which is "'old" to -us by virtue of the defunct "worldw It connotes. 
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that is, by virtue of past Dasein. 
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We do not. experience time as an ! 'infinite" succession of "nows" 
as per the Aristotelian definition. Time- is always "datable" and always 
has a I'span". That is. "now" always means "now, when ......... for 
instance, "now, when I am eating lunch". And this "date", this 
"reference". is never to a theoretical, infinitesimal "now", it is 
to a "span" of time, however brief; lunch taKes time to eat CBT. 461-2). 
Heidegger develops this at some length, but enough has now been said 
to relate this to BecKett's unusual handli , ng of time. 
First we can see that BecKett is conscious of the paradoxical. 
traditional handling of time. In the second Text for Nothing we read 
"And now here, what now here, one enormous second, as in Paradise 
CNK. 7ai where the equation is madeýbetween the infinite divisibility 
of time and the Eternal Present of God. In the eighth Text the 
narrator exclaims "there will be no more time, till I get out of here" 
CNK. 1081 
. 
which maKes us realize how much of BecKett Is worK is set in 'a 
timeless limbo. Endgame, for instance. -is full-of endings Cthere are 
no more pain-Killers or bicycle wheals, the rat and the flea are Killed, 
Nell dies) but this only underlines the situation of Hamm, whose play it 
is, and who is somehow hanging on, beyond time, after all the other 
I 
deaths, waiting in timelessness for nothing. The exiguous leaves 
sprouted by the tree -in Godot serve the. same function, they arez 
parody of a development, of a moving time that is mocKed by-the stasis 
of the playl. s -action. The only -sort of positive time In,, BecKett 4s just 
that condition of authentic temporality stressed by Heidegger. as we 
ha ve , already -seen, 
Being, 7towards-death. But. -in 13eckett'It --: is'no 
, cause 
forýrejoicing. The, whole, matteris summed UPýln-'P=E3, s 
celebrated outburst towards, the end of Godot. 
156. 
Have you not done-tormenting me 
with your accursed time! It's 
abominable! When!. -When! nne day, is that not enough for you, 
one day liKe any other day, one 
day he went dumb, one day I 
went blind, one day we'll go 
deaf, one day we were born, 
one day we shall die, the 
same day, the same second, 
is that not enough for you? 
(Calmer. ) They give birth astride 
of a grave, the light gleams 
an instant, then it's night once 
more CWFG. 89). 
Here are all the elements. Sub sPecie aeternitatis time is nothing, being 
either infinite or infinitesimal, so Pozzo can say that life adds'up 
to one second, the "enormous second" of the Texts for Nothing. (This is 
the same point as the one BecKett. maKes in Breath where the two cries 
separate one breath, representing minimal life, and the title seems 
to be an amalgam of-"birth" and "death"). On the other hand Pozzo is 
also aware of the Heideggerian thesis that time for Dasein depends on 
finitude, Being-towards-an-end, so his examples of "whens", of "days", 
are all examples of endings - the ending of speech, sight, hearing. This 
is just Beckett's usual addition to Heidegger - the conditions, even 
of authentic existence, are hell. 
It seems true, however, to say that Beckett's most frequent use 
of time-elements is as a parody of the Aristotelian paradox. 'In Mercier 
et Camier. for instance, we learn that there are days when one is being 
barn all the time and will never die (MC. 50). In Malone Dies we have 
to make something of the opinion that a nonthis-not much "compared 
t. a. -a whole second Of childishness*, just "a drop in a bucket" '(T. 233). 
The Unnamable adds his expected twist: "'! -It was ane, -second -they -should 
have-schooled. me to endure,. after. that: I, would have heldýout -for 
all eternity* (T. 325). 
So Beckett -rejects. by. parodyinglit, the traditional, view, af time, 
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just as Heid. egger does. *Further,. we. have seen that he stresses the 
Being-towards-death (Bei. ng-towards-the-end) component in Dasein's 
temporalizing, again, as in Heidegger. But it is perhaps worth 
mentioning in conclusion that there are several non-Heideggerian aspects 
of BecKett's treatment of time. 
There is, for instance the "passing the time" motif which appears 
for instance in Malone Dies ("I divided, by 60. That passed the time" 
T. 202) and frequently in Godot. Then there is the "piling-up-cf-time" 
motif represented in Happy Days, in the "millet grains" of Endgame and 
in The Unnamable: "Time .... piles up all about you... thicKer and thicKer" 
(T. 393). Then there is the whole discussion of Proustian time in the 
essay on A la recherche du temps perdu. 
I mention these to show how, as we leave Heidegger's first 
analysis of Oasein behind, and move into his considerations about 
temporality, we start to find fewer, instructive parallels with BecKett. 
This is therefore where we should stop. Hawever, there are two 
elements in BecKett's worK which, although not expounded systematically 
by Heidegger, are sufficiently present at various points in Being and Time 
to merit attention. Thus the two remaining sections of this comparison, 
besides the Conclusion, do not carry Heideggerian concepts as titles but 
have BecKettian themes instead. 
*** 
.. --Language and Silence. 
When the narrators of the tri: logy'lose the,. thread mf, thestory 
they -are telling, or. 
despair ofý, lt, -, they'find*themselves-left-withýwords. 
'The words, language covering sheets :, of. paper. 
be, ca, mpulsory, 
and they are undeniable, they havez -sort, - -of , certainty-which the,. stories 
do not. Not far behind this comes -a', yearning'. to be, done with, words -and 
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to lapse into silence. 
Similarly, when the reader finds himself adrift an the sea of 
Beckett's prose he tends at least-to anchor himself in the hard fact 
of the words in front of him, -. Beckett may build castles and destroy 
them but the stones are there. on the pages of his works. He wants 
to lapse into silence, it seems, to stop writing, and there is an 
undeniable sense of relief for the reader when silence at last falls 
at the end of The Unnamable. Thus a tension between language and 
silence is an ever-present element in Beckett and in our response to 
BecKett. 
A sufficiently clear example of this appears early in the trilogy 
where Molloy is unable to maKe a definitive choice between language 
and silence. When the man "A" (if-it is "A*) speaks to him he says 
"I believe him, I know it's my only chance to - my only chance, I 
believe all I'm told, I've disbelieved only too much in my long life, 
now I swallow everythigg, greedily. What I need now is stories ...... 
(T. 13). But then "All leaves him and he is "free". if that means anything, 
and his monologue reaches one of its occasional climaxes as he wanders 
what he is "free" for: he is free "to know*, but to know *that you would 
do better, at least no worse, to obliterate texts than to blacken margins, 
to fill In the holes Of words-till all is blank and flat and the whole 
ghastly business looks like what it is, senseless, speechless, issueless 
misery" (T. 13). In a dozen lines he moves from being greedy for stories 
to, proposing-the abolition of words, -from language to silence. To 
reinforce the point he immediately observes that the trouble liesIn other 
people and in thinking about other peoplei as'soon as he-*returns-in 
spirit* to 'A" he finds that 'the murmurs begin again*. -. Which, leads 
tothe further observation that *To restore silence. is the role of 
-objects" [T. 13-14). Much later. Moran refers to 
wthe, silence of which 
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the universe is made". LT. 122). Beckett's world is polarized by, 
0 
the hell of language and the speechless misery of silence. 
Before relating this to*Heidegger it is worth considering an 
essay an Nihilism in J. M. Edie's collection New Essays in Phenomenology 
(Edie, l) by Stanley Rosen. This remarKable essay establishes a most 
interesting relationship between Ontologists and Language Philosophers 
which we can adopt to clarify the relevance of Language Philosophy 
to Beckett's obsession with language. 
Rosen adopts the position that for Language Philosophy language 
is identical with Being, which, however, cannot be taken to mean t Vt 
objects simply are words. Wittgenstein himself stresses that - 
propositions can only say how things are and nct what they are (cf. 
Tractatus, 3.221), which at least implies that propositions are not 
things. On the other hand the limits of my speech are the limits of 
my world, and the Being of my world is revealed in my speech. This 
is an appropriate way into BecKett. The Unnamablesays that he is 
"made of words" (T. 390). There is a sense in which all Beckett's 
worK is self-consciously a word-castle, the only possible way of Being, 
yet a sort of counterfeit Being. It may be hopelessly unsatisfactory, 
but words are as close as Beckett is ever going to get to Being. 
That is the approach suggested by Language Philosophy. Rosen is 
more concerned, however, with the Ontological alternative, and here he 
could be speaking of either Haidegger or Beckett. 
The goal of ontological speech 
-is not discourse about beings. 
-but the revelation of Being. -Since 
speech is itself an smanation, of, 
rather than... identical-with. -'Being 
- i. e. since'speech, as discursive. 
necessarily "runs'through" or is 
bound to the disjunctive-multiplicity 
of things - speech necessarily 
separates. us from Being [Edie. l. 154). 
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This is exactly the opposite of Wittgenstein's point of view (unless 
we assume that there i's siomething. at the top. of his famous ladder). 
but itsums up Molloy's (and BecKett's)dilerrtna exactly - speech, 
language, words are the only way we have of capturing Being, they are 
certainly all that an author or narrator has to use, and at the same 
time they are exactly what separates us from Being - whence the 
simultaneous talking and yearning after silence. "The ontologist 
discerns more or less that it is silence he yearns for. The linguistic 
analyst struggles to Keep talKing" CEdie, 1.154). BecKett and his 
narrators, then, are both these things. 
Rosen's subject is Nihilism and, since BecKett can easily appear 
nihilistic, we can profitably followRosen's move from this discussion 
of language and silence to his treatment of Nihilism. Nihilism, he says, 
contends that there is no significance in the universe, that nothing, 
not even human life, has a final meaning. Nihilism therefore holds that 
maKes no difference what we say, because "difference" is internal to 
speech and speech cannot speaK about its ownýsense or signi-Ficance" 
(Edie, 1,155). However, there is always the possibility that there 
exists a "sense or significance" in the universe that is outside the 
limits of speech. SO trUS Nihilism MUSt maintain that "everything is 
sayable" in order-toidispose of any possible extra-linguistic "meaning". 
BecKettls narrators seem to go an in their effort to "get it all'said" 
as a sort of test of this proposition. Only when all that is sayable has 
been said can we get to the silence beyond and see if there is any 
'Ofu, rtherg meaning. 'This. inr-identally, -Is the burden ofa good-deal of 
di scussion of Wittganstein; the-matter of nmysticism" and of wtotalities" 
about which only silence is, possible Is, brought up,. as an unsolved 
problem-at the, end, iof RussellI. s introduction--tD, the'Tractatus. 
When'Rosen talks of '7Dntalogists" he -cannot help Twaning, or 
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including, Heidegger., It is Heidegger who is concerned that man should 
be open to the call of Being and our job must now be to see what his 
Ontology maKes of language in the light of this concern. 
Heidegger has turned increasingly, since Being and Time, towards 
poetry and the presocratic philosophers in his search for Being. 
He claims that the Presocratics were open to Being and that they fulfilled 
the thinKer"s tasK which is to reveal Being. Since their time 
philosophy has tended to conceal Being. Poets, on the other hand, have 
remained open to it, and Heidegger has apparently devoted a good deal 
of attention to H61derlin's poetry in particular. J. Glenn Gray, 
making this point in his essay "Poets and Thinkers" (in Lee and 
Mandelbaum, 1). quotes Heidegger's adoption of H61derlin's motto that 
language -is the "most dangerous of possessions" (Lee and Mandelbaums 1, 
104) and also Heidegger's development of this in which he says that 
language possesses man and masters him. "When a person is genuinely 
concerned with speaking rather than merely chattering, he does not 
really determine what he says, but his speech is determined for him by 
being, by the innermost essence of things. " This is a paraphrase of a 
passage from Heidegger's Brief uber den Humanismus in which language is 
named *the house of Being". (Lee and Mandelbaum. 1.105) So here we 
have added a new dimension. "Chattering" may conceal Being, but "genuine" 
speaking is Being itsel-f talking. 
Macquarrie associates Heidegger's treatment of language with his 
treatment of-truth. Truth. in Being. and Time, is related back to its 
Gr?. gk root *a-letheia" which Is, translated literally as'Ounhiddenness". 
The true is simply the un-hidden, the discovered nature mf, reality. 
Similarly, language which is. genuine'lights up. discovers Being-in-the- 
World and Being-with-others. Inauthentic talk is "they" - talk which 
sirply passes an received opinion without illuminating the world. 
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(Macquarrie, 1,112-3) So here we have "comedown to earth" a little. 
Language, on the highest level, may either conceal or reveal Being, 
but on this "truth" level it either conceals or reveals the world. 
On this second level we find a comparison with BecKett's habit of 
suddenly revealing the second-hand nature of his characters' speech. 
"I say it as I hear it" repeats the Unnamable endlessly, revealing his 
speech to be "they"-talK and thus inauthentic. Beckett attempts 
constantly to speak authentically but never feels that he succeeds. 
Walter Kaufmann, in a curious essay entitled "Heidegger's Castle" 
in From Shakespeare to Existentialism claims that Heidegger is trapped 
by his own words into meaninglessness. "He thinks that unlike all 
previous thinkers since the early Greeks he is an the traces of Being 
itself, but it is language that has her sport with-him. " (Kaufmann, 1, 
277) This is not adequately substantiated in Kaufmann's essay, but I 
think it iA interesting that it applies rather well to Beckett. He is 
on the traces of the Self, of course, and Knows very well that language 
has her sport with him; he perhaps demonstrates the necessity of trying 
to capture philosophical goals in words, however inadequate wo. rds may be. 
What does Heidegger himself say about language and silence? First7 
he considers that languag6 is founded in 'discourse" which is equiprim- 
ordial with *states of mind" and "understanding" which are themselves 
*the fundamental existentialia which constitute the Being of the *there", 
the disclosedness of Being-in-the-World". CBT. 203) He demonstrates this 
by observing that *hearing* and "keeping silent" are modes of "discourse" 
aho.. the Dasein thatIs in a'state-of-mind" and "understanding* the world 
is naturally arientated towards the world and-Others. inone, of these =des, 
or in language. Here we -f-ind an ontologist attributingthe-same sort of 
position to language-that Language Philosophy does. Language is Dasein's 
"truth", the articulation of Dasein's"disclosedness*.. -'"Discourse -is 
existentially language. because'that entity whose disclDsedness'it 
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articulates according to significations, has, as its kind of 8 
Being, Being-in-the-warld. " (BT. 204) In other words, language is 
Dasein's way of "Being-in-the-world". Dasein is "made of words" as 
the Unnamable says. 
We have seen that "Keeping silent" is another possible mode of 
discourse for Dasein. But this in no way alters the contention that 
language is Oasein's way of Being-in-the-world. On the contrary, 
Oasein can only "keep silent" because his Being is such that he is 
able to speak. We cannot say of a man barn dumb that he is "keeping 
, 
silent". (BT. 2081 Keeping silent, then, is not a haven of innocence 
for Heidegger any more than it is for Beckett. For both, and for 
Wittgenstein, the mystic silence would be a perfect consummation, but 
unless, like Victor in Eleutheria, we can be dead, and see ourselves 
dead, we cannot achieve this. Life is words. But keeping silent may 
0 
achieve more than talking a lot. Babbling. away is most often "Gerede", 
"idle talk" which instead of disclosing things covers them up. "Idle 
talk" is gossip, it "passes along" things it has learnt and it believes 
what it Is told on authorityj thus it is never in contact with the truth 
at all. It is the voice of the "they". CBT. 211-213) On the other hand, 
4wif, anyone is genuinely"on the scent" of anything he does not speak 
about it". IBT-218) 
This connects with what we have learnt of conscience. Conscience, 
the call of Care, the call of the authentic Self to the "they-Self", 
discourses "Solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent". (BT. '318) 
I 
S4%the silenceis the condition of authentic existence. 'Man, will only 
find his Self after the-silence has'set., in, which is surely one of the 
clearest messages of Beckett's-fiction. 
We have already mentionedthe-frequency of the, pronoun'"I", in 
Beckett, especially In The Unnamable. We are -now In a position ', to 
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quote Heidegger's last word on the subject of language and silence; 
it is a summary that could be put at the end of Beckett's trilogyj 
the emphases are Heidegger's. 
Dasein is authentically itself in the primordial 
individualization of the reticent resoluteness 
which exacts anxiety of itself. As something that 
Keeps silent, authentic Eeing-one's-Self is just 
the sort of thing that does not Keep on Saying "I". 
CBT. 369-70) 
*** 
The Self. 
"Once a certain degree of insight has been reached", says Wylie 
to Neary in Murphy, "all men talk, when talk they must, the same tripe. " 
(M. 441 Thus, or perhaps in the less direct tones of Heidegger as quoted 
at the end of the last section, we opt for silence. But Beckett refuses, 
notoriously, to be silent. After Breath came Not Ii Why? Because when 
his silence falls, he has not yet attained his Self. Here lies the 
extra twýst that Beckett gives to a Heideggerian proposition - he agrees 
that silence is the condition of authentic existence, but how can we fall 
silent, especially when silence is still a "mode of discourse"? Beckett, 
or rather his narrator. puts it thus in the eighth. Text for Nothin 
I say no matter what, hoping to wear out a 
voice, to wear out a head, or without hope, 
without reason, no matter what, without 
reason. But it will end, a desinence will 
come, or the breath fail better still, I'll 
be silence, I'll know I'm silence, no, in 
the silence you can't know. I'll never know 
anything. 
CNK. 108) 
The"mystic -silence-that 
is more than just a "Keepirýg. silent* is 
unavailable to our 'knowing" because it -is by-definition a cessation 
of Being, af discourse, -of language. So we are left with words. They 
are the bar to whatever ultimate. reality the silenceý. repressnts, but 
-they are also the only means -towards it. 
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It is quite clear that in BecKett this "ultimate reality" is, 
at least in one aspect, the Self. Throughout his worK, and indeed 
on the very same page of Texts for Nothing from which I have just 
quoted, there is a desperate scrabbling to get to "me", to say "I" 
to be "in my midst" to "win to me" and so on. In Text for Nothing 
number eight we read "Me, here, if they could open, those little words, 
open and swallow me up, perhaps that is what has happened. " CNK. 108) 
The tension here is between the ihcomprehensibility of words (perhaps 
I have already managed to say "me") and their obvious uselessness (if 
only "me" was me). In some mystical way the true silence may be "me". 
Meanwhile there are oply the words, and they are not me. Are they? 
We have seen what. Heidegger has to say about the silence; we can now 
consider what he has to say about the Self, about "me". 
Heidegger starts his enquiry abo, ut Being by interrogating Dasein 
because Dasein already has "a'vague aver9ge understanding of Being". 
(BT. 25) Furthermore, Dasein also has an understanding of itself, it 
"always understands itself in terms of its existence". CBT. 33) This 
looks promising. Heidegger at least may get somewhere in his definition 
of the Selfj we shall see. 
Whatever Dasein's Self is it is not definable-in Dualist, terms. 
Heidegger refers scornfully to "the naive supposition that man is, in 
the first instance, a spiritual thing which subsequently gets misplaced 
"into" a space". CBT. 83) He insists that man is a whole, a unity. 
We feel. a 1ittle Insecure later when he says-that 'Othe-world-and 
DatLain and entities within-the-world are the ontologically constitutive 
states which-are r-losest-to us" (BT. 134) where *us'" perhaps. refers-to 
some Self other than Dasein,. which, would. be to-import, an -inconsistent 
'Dualism again. However, when we come to the, section entitled'"An 
Approach to the, Existential Questionof the "who" 'of Dassin",, CBT. 150ff) 
. our fears are 
dispelled; Heidegger unambiguously equates Dasein with 
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the Self. "Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself 
The question of the "who" answers itself in terms of the "I" itself, 
the "subJect", the "Self". " (BT. 150) 
So, Dasein is always "Self", but Heidegger makes quite sure - 
that, having made this point, we cannot rest comfortably an our 
Cartesian assumptions. He subjects the "Self", the "I" to a rigorous 
examination (E3T. 150-152) the burden of which is as follows. 
"I" cannot be, and must not be treated as, just another present- 
at-hand object within the world. "'I" is Dasein, so its existence precedes 
its essence; we must examine it existentially. This means that "I" 
can only be exhibited by exhibiting one of the definite kinds of 
Being of Oasein, for example Being-with-others or Being-in-the-world. 
I am not "I" in isolation. If we use the word "I" in isolation it is 
merely a "formal indicator" rather than a substantive. 
7 
As a "formal 
indicator" "I" does not disclose Dasein at all. So Dasein is "I", 
but it is useless to examine this "I" with a view to finding out "who" 
Dasein is. What we must examine is Dasein's existentiality - the ways 
of Being of man - to answer this question "who? " 
Dasein's existence is a Being-with. An 71" that has meaning is 
an 'I" already in a situation already with-Others, in-the-world. Is 
this the limit of our discussion? Far from it. We have yet to consider 
the implications of authenticity. We saw that "inauthentic existence" 
is dominated by the "they" and that the "authentic Self" (existence 
and'Se If areinterchangeable bere),, Is "the Self which has been taken 
ýajtj of 'in Its own way'. (BT. 167) Both of these must be-taken 
, existentially - -the *they-, Self* in action is the one whose possibi- 
lities have been taken-over, by-the'*theym.. the authentic Selfls 
the one that projects itself into its own possibilities. Both of'them 
really arew the Self - "the 'not-10is by no means taniamount-to an 
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entity which essentially lacKs "I-hood". " (BT. 152) Knowledge of 
the Self "is not a matter of perceptually tracKing down and inspecting 
a point called the "Self", but rather one of seizing on the full 
disclosedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all the constitutive 
items which are essential to it. " (BT. 187) Heidegger's emphasis maKes 
my point here - the Self is to be sought as much in inauthenticity as 
in authenticity. After all the "they" is defined as belonging "to 
Dasein's positive constitution" (BT. 167) So it is a "constitutive 
item" of Dasein and as such relevant to "knowledge of the Self". 
Even though I am "proximally and for the most part" my "they-Self", 
it is my existence, authentic or inauthentic that defines, creates, 
is my Self. 
For Beckett this suggests that his characters are wthemselvesn, 
or have "found" their Selves, already and in spite of what they say. 
The novels and plays represent the "existence" of their people, so 
they reveal their Selves constantly as they act and talk. The same 
may be said of the narrators who tell their stories and of Beckett 
who invents them all. This is Heidegger's cutting of the Gordian 
knot - "what I do is me". as Hopkins put It. so there is no need to 
search further for my Self. 
This common-sense approach certainly applies to Beckett up to a 
point. We do feel an automatic "superior" knowledge as readers or 
as audience. We can see what Hamm is, we can talk objectively about 
Moran. We can observe their doings and so observe "them". But this 
X4, not, surely. a sufficient Interpretation-of ]Beckett. We tannot 
say that all his work. is simply a ýdemonstration Of a delusion and 
that -the Self is quite obvious -all along. This -can ', be mnly one 
aspect of the 'truth, -and iTideedAt . 1s -not Heidegger's 'last word -., on 
the subject. 
There appearsýto be a r-antradiction"between'this-first stage Of 
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$pall is Self" and the stress laid on the importance of my "own" 
Self, my authenticity. It is as if Heidegger moves from an 
"empirical Ego" position (I am my desires, my body, my BanK account) 
to a "transcendental Ego" position. The purely existential Self is 
very liKe the empirical Ego, it is all my actions and possibilities 
bound together by a "formal" "I". But the "ownness" of my "authentic" 
Self seems to imply something transcendent. Is this so? 
We saw, in discussing Conscience, '; above, that Conscience calls 
Dasein bacK from the "they-Self" to its "own Self". (BT. 317) 
Conscience says "nothing" to the Self and by "Keeping silent" it 
calls us out of "concernful Being-with-Others" into our "potentiality" 
for Being our Selves. And "the call comes from me and yet from beyond 
me". CBT. 318-320) The caller, we learn, is "Dassin in its uncanniness". 
(ST. 321) It sounds like an "alien" voice to everyday Oasein, it even 
sounds like the voice of God, all this in a highly Beckettian manner, 
as we have seen. But it is guaranteed to be the voice of the authentic 
Self because whenever we interpret it, or attribute it to anything 
beyond ourselves we at once find that we have turned away from it and 
back towards the "they". For example, if I interpret the call of 
conscience as "universal conscience" I find. 1 have merely defined, the 
voice of the "they". Only in meeting the ineffable spirit can I 
match up-to it and become myself. 
This new level proposes, thus, some sort of transcendent self. 
It Is even more Beckettian than our earlier, empirical self; it is my 
'6ý. *nmost* potentiality for Being,, about which"I must talk and think, 
but it isexactly that, self-rPelationship that starts where words 
leavemff. 
HeideZger returns, to these points--in, ýtheýsecand'half, ýof, ', Being'and 
Time. He analyzes Kant4s Position-on", the",, Self-andýconcliudes"thatýhis 
010 -is still an object, present-at-hand, within the. world. Kant has 
169. 
not broken the traditional ontological mould. Heidegger does this 
as follows. Dasein is a unity that has some understanding of its 
own Being, and it is a unity that is always "mine". Dasein's unity 
is "held together" by the "I". (BT. 365) This "I" is "harboured" 
by Care - obviously the condition of Care is to be a subject, "Care 
for oneself" is a tautology - Dasein is existentially Care by being 
Self and Self by being Care. When Oasein's "I" expresses Being-in- 
the-world or Being under the dominion of the "they", it "fails to 
see itself in relation to the kind of Being of that entity which'it 
is itself". (BT. 368) By this point it is apparent that Heidegger 
is moving towards a position in which, in spite of earlier statements, 
he must acknowledge that there is a sort of selfhood in the authentic 
Self that is lacking in the everyday Self. And, sure enough, "Selfhood, 
is to be discerned existentially only in one's authentic potentiality- 
for-Being-one's-Self - that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein's 
0 
Being as care. " (BT. 369) Once he has reached this point Heidegger 
finds that clarification follows naturally - the "constancy of the 9 
Self" is now seen to depend an authentic existence and we find a 
satisfaction In realizing that we have, long since, defined 
inauthentic. irresolute"mfalling" into the world. So Heidegger 
at last chooses to unify the Self with authentic existence, which 
leaves us open to our most Beckettian glass to date. We have seen 
that authentic existence depends on the call of conscience from the 
'Self to the "they-Self" and. we have found this to be a call, *that 
)p c '&'rates in the modeýof keeping-silence. I would, propose that'this 
silent call Is the voice of"the "'little world", -that-, calls*Murphy, 
, the silent sum=ns af -Mr, Knott that brings Watt %to -his ý, house and 
the goad or god'that prods the, narrators of the. trilogy and the 
characters of the, plays Into-further "existence". : It is -the voice 
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that prompts the three questions that open'The Unnamable and it is 
the compulsion that dictates that novels' conclusion. It calls to 
the "they-Self", the inauthentic Self that has been "dispersed" 
and "disconnected" (BT. 441) and it prompts BecKett's dreadful 
struggles for unity. In Heidegger this unity is held out as a 
possibility - it can grasp itself as a whole that exists between 
thrownness and death. In BecKett this "loyalty of existence to 
its own Self" (ST. 443) is never achieved. 
*** 
Conclusion 
Heidegger warns us of the dangers of accepting tradition 
instead of confronting Being for ourselves and speaks of the necessity 
of arriving at the "primordial experiences" of Being that we had 
before philosophy. (BT. 44) It is as if, like Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger reaches a position from which he can see that his labours 
to arrive there are a little beside the point. True, he proposes 
that philosophy, like poetry, can reveal Being, but the non-conclusion 
of Beingand Time and the oracular nature of his later work indicate 
an impatience with systematic analysis, however profound, as a tool 
to bring man into contact with Being. 
Arne Naess in his summary of this point concludes that Heidegger 
means man to approach Being but warns that man, to do this, will have 
to learn to "exist in the namelbss*. (Naess. 1,2421 I would propose 
t66t Beckett's work is an attempt". to describe this "nameless" 
existence. -The final results ofthis attempts will be examined in 
the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
*** 
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Notes to Chapter Three 
1. O'Hara, 1,143. Cf. above, Chapter 1. p-4. 
2. Heidegger is an "ontologist". that is, a student of that branch 
of metaphysics that deals with Being. He equates "ontology" 
and "metaphysics" in his lecture What is Metaphysics? of 1929. 
My point here is that Heidegger has not produced the part of 
Being and Time that deals with "beyond man", only the part that 
deals with man, and I am using "metaphysics" in its colloquial 
sense to denote this "beyond". I am fully aware that this 
colloquial usage is based on a mistake as to the meaning of 
Aristotle's title The Metaphysics. 
3. Cf. the chapter on "Philosophy and Poetry" and the chapter on 
"Heidegger's Castle" in Kaufmann's From Shakespeare to 
Existentialism CKaufmann, 2). 
4. Most of the characters in Beckett's fiction are in quest of 
something - Murphy, like Belacqua, is searching for Nirvana, 
so, perhaps, is Wattj Malloy is in quest of his mother, Moran 
in quest of Molloy. All of them are in quest of themselves. 
The concept of Habit in Existentialist though is dealt with in 
Macquarrie's book Existentialism (Macquarrie, 1,145-146). 
6. Heidegger's own notes make it clear that he adopts Kierkegaard's 
usage of Angst more or less in toto. Cf. BT. 235. n. IV and BT. 278. n. VI. 
7. Cf. the section on Being7onels-Self, above. 
.  
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CHAPTER FOUR Sartre's Being and Nothingness and Beckett. 
Introductory. 
Sartre's Being and Nothingness owes something to Hegel, something 
0 
to Husserlp and a great deal to the Heidegger of Being and Time. 
Several of the concepts Sartre deals with are taKen with little or 
no alteration from Heidegger, for example "Angst" as the state-of-mind 
of man in the face of freedom. Or, again, the "human reality" used by 
Sartre is a term equivalent to "Dasein". But more important than 
these points of close resemblance is the general point of structure. 
Sartre worKs within Heidegger's frame-worK. There are differenýes in 
emphasis, and plenty of original developments, but there are almost 
no ideas in the French work that do not correspond in some way with 
similar ideas in the German. Thus both philosophers picture, man as 
. "there", already aware of 
himself, already free, already aware of a 
world, of Others, of facticity and so on. This means thdt some of this 
chapter will overlap with some of the preceding one. As far as 
Beckett'is concerned, some of Sartre's amplifications of Heidegger 
bring him closer to our subject and I shall concentrate on these. 
Where Sartre either repeats Heidegger or develops him away from Beckett 
I shall be briefer. 
It is more difficult to write about Being and Nothingness than 
about its German predecessor. Sartre's argument does not progress 
from point to point as Heidegger's does, his concepts are more closely 
woven together (in his presentation of themi not, of course, as a 
picture of man and the world. ) Thus "nothingness". -for instance, 
appears in his discussions, of Freedom. the Self, Consciousness, Angst 
and somn rather than being dealt with once for all. Because of this 
I shall first give a rapid summary of the argument of the book, putting 
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the salient concepts into their places in Sartre's argument, and then 
deal with each concept in turn showing how it affects Beckett. 
As with Heidegger, "Being" is the question at issue. As with 
Hegel, there is a dialectical necessity of opposing "Nothing" to 
*Being". Sartre grasps this nettle of "Nothing" much more firmly than 
either of the Germans. *Nothingw for him, is human consciousness. 
This does not mean that the human mind is nothing. "Being" is made 
up of two sorts of thing, *real" objects and our mental pictures of 
those objects when we imagine them. To both these sorts of "Being" 
we oppose our consciousness -I am conscious of my neighbour's house 
when I look at it, and then I am conscious of it when I imagine it 
witK'my eyes closed. In each case the're is a clearly definable object 
of consciousness (the house; my mental image of it) but my conscious- 
ness itself is not an object. So what is it that I . 
"oppose" to "Being"? 
Sartre says it is "Nothing% Consciousness is a "hole" in the solidity 
of "Being". it "decompresses" the otherwise total pressure of it. 
0 
*Human reality" is Npour-soi We are "for-ourselves* while 
all objects are "en-soi", "in themselves". (I shall henceforth treat 
pour-soi and en-soi as English:, words. ) This reflects Heidegger's 
thesis that Dasein already has an understanding of its own Being. 
In short, I know that I am me. 
Knowledge is the "presence" of a thing to consciousness. Things 
cannot be "present" ýto the en-soi; we can remember here Heideggerl s 
expression when he says that the table "cannot touch" the wall. What 
1: 1 -. "present" -. to my consciousness Is, precisely. -not me. So. as 
pour-sai, 1, "negats' the an-soi, I am the, "Nothing* to its "E3eing!. 
Only-the known Is a being,, the-, knower-is "not apprehensible", he. -is 
nothing. Thus there is "nothing" to separate the knower from the known. 
The known, being, the en-soi, is solid ("massif") and contingent. 
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"Uncreated. without reason for being, with any connexion with another 
0 
being, being-in-itself is de trop for eternity.. " CBN. xlii) Being 
and Nothingness is Sartre's attempt to do better than either Idealism 
or Realism in holding together the mutually-exclusive regions of the 
en-soi and the pour-soi. That is, it is an attempt to explain man 
in the world. 
Freedom is a fundamental part of this explanation. "I" can 
always choose what I shall do even after account has been taken of 
all "my" motives and desires. "I" am free, even of "me". There is 
nothing to justify my choices but I do choose; the en-soi is brute 
contingency but I choose what values it is to have. Values "spring 
up like partridges" when I act. My value-conferring freedom, as in 
KierKegaard and Heidegger, breeds "Angst". I am inclined to flee 
from the "Angst" and to reduce my freedom, choices and responsibility; 
in short I am tempted into inauthentic existence. This is like 
Heidegger's flight into "das Man" but, in Sartre, stress is laid on 
the fact that I am responsible for becoming inauthentic, it is "I" 
who lies to "me" when I am in "bad faith". Man, however, is always 
in *bad faith". for the opposite, Osincerity", means being what you 
are, and how can I ever be sad or happy? I can act sadly or happily 
but as for being - we have already seen that I am nothing. So all 
human action is in bad faith. 
"Human reality' is thrown into a world and abandoned in a 
ft. a ituationw. It can never reduce itself to en-soi, In which case it 
would be a definable something, but it does aspire to the "impossible 
synthesis" of theýfor-itself with the In-itself where a 'ýreal* self 
would emerge. As things are, the self is the foundation of values. 
My choices confer value. How close all this is to Heidegger is made 
I 
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clear by Sartre's summary of his arguments which he gives at the 
end of the first chapter of the second part of Being and Nothingness 
(p. 105). There he lists-the topics he has treated: man "nRgate5" 
things by "not being" themi his existence is always inauthentic in 
that he can never be himself; Descartes' cogitoAs not enough; man 
is being for-itself not in-itself; man gives rise to values and 
possibilities. Still Heideggerian, he goes on to say that now we 
must study time(the.. cogito, ha5 instantaneity but possibilities need 
time) to settle the main question - that of "the original relation 
of consciousness to being". (BN. 105) 
On the matter of time Sartre repeats Heidegger on the non- 
historical non-temporal quality of the en-soij man gives time to the 
universe. On the other hand he adds the idea that my past is that 
en-soi which I am - an idea he explains by observing that the past 
makes me what I am "from behind". The pour-sai alone is present and 
the present alone is pour-soi. Pour-sai projects into the future. So 
we hav6 here the familiar Heideggerian trio - the past is facticity, 
the present is man, Dasein, pour-soi, -, and 
the future is possibility. 
The world is my world. It is only "an ideal limitation - by 
nothing - of a collection of thises". [BN. 183) Space,, like time, "is 
not". It comes into the world because of pour-soi. 
Where Sartre develops Heidegger most successfully is in his 
treatment of Others. His concrete examples of the existence of others, 
connected with shame and similar emotions., force him to develop a third 
-ca; tAgory,, of existence. Man exists pour-soi in a world, of en-soi, but 
he recognizes-the existence-of other, pour-sai beings and realizes that 
he exists -for them. 'Consequently man, exists *Pour-autrui*,, - for others. 
Sartre discusses'this and its-inplications at7length, as we shall have 
to do with Beckett'in"mind. 
The discussion of Others leads Sartre on to discussions of the 
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body, and love. Then a section is devoted to freedom, although 
this concept has been much in evidence before. Now, of course, it 
takes into consideration the expanded view of Others. Some of 
Sartre'5 M05t inspired writing appears here as he deals with the 
possibilities that confront pour-soi and the relationship of these 
possibilities to the world and to the limitations of facticity. One 
of the essential points of Existentialist freedom and choice is made 
here - that man has freedom of choice that may or may not coincide 
with his freedom of obtaining. The importance of this freedom of 
choice appears again and again - it illuminates spatiality (Japan only 
becomes distant if I choose to go there), temporality (even the past 
can be modified by present choices as for instance in the change in the 
value of the events of 1789 in 1917) and it illuminates Others (when 
choose I always discover that meanings have already been implanted 
into the world by the choibes of Otheýs. ) 
Death is treated differently by Heidegger and Sartre. For the 
latter death, so far from being my ownmost possibility, is not a 
possibility at all. All my genuine choices imply finitude -I will 
do X, not Y, and I will finish doing it within a certain time. But 
death, although it is finitude in one sense, is an'"unrealizable". 
infinite state for which I can have no responsibility. This leads 
into a. discussion of man's responsibility within his lifetime which 
involves an Existentialist psychoanalysis according to which men do 
not have given characters or characteristics but choose-themselves. 
'Sartre 7offers a, short conclusion to Being and_Nothingness in 
which he considers the metaphysicalýand ethir-al'implications, of his 
philosophy. 'The first, of'these will find. its, placadn-the, final 
chapter of this thesis. 
** 
177. 
Consciousness. 
It will be apparent from the above summary of the main theses 
of Being and Nothingness that Sartre, like Descartes, finds he must 
lean heavily on a clarification of what "I" means. His starting 
Point, and the place around which he circles and to which he 
frequently returns, is consciousness. The same may be said of 
Beckett. 
But can 01" and "consciousness" be equated? This is the question 
that Sartre tackled in his first published work, The Transcendence of 
the Ego C1936). This essay is a development of Husserl's theory of 
intentional consciousness. Husserl, according to Sartre, refreshed 
philosophy by claiming that even such apparently purely "mental" 
phenomena as mathematics and chimeras are objects of consciousness 
and thus not really "mental" at all. This enabled philosophy to 
describe all things, from tables to fiallucinations, as objectsAn their 
own right. Sartre concurs with this. But Husserl goes on to describe 
the "other side" of the business of perception in terms that Sartre 
finds unsatisfactory. Husserl adopts a neo-Cartesian Position which 
proposes a split between the subjective and objective worldsi on the 
subjective side of the split we have consciousness and an Ego presiding 
over consciousness. To bring subjective and objective together we 
must 'M bracket out* the question of whether the objective exists or 
not and-rely on the marriage implied In the concept of Intentionality 
consciousness "intends* its objects. 
In Sartre's version this Is simplified. Thereis-no Ego "behind" 
or Oinn consciousness. Intentionality'Is consciousness. The wbracketIng 
cut' of the question of the existence nf objects becomes redundant 
because there Is no real dualism here. It is Impossible to *stop* in 
the Passage, from consciousness to Its object and ask, "does the object 
exist? " because there is no passage, no gap between consciousness and 
-its object. Thus Sartre, like Heidegger, cuts Descartes' Gordian knot 
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consciousness is always consciousness of something, cogito, ergo est. 
To be fair, Sartre does not reject the Ego's existence, only its 
transcendence. Husserl proposed the Ego as a transcendent ! pole"-which 
unified experience. Sartre sees another, less mystical, definition 
of the Ego. For him it is another object-of consciousness, liKe the 
world. When I say "I am undecidedn what I mean is that my Ego appears 
to my consciousness to be in the psychic state of indecision. This Ego, 
therefore, is an object of consciousness, not "behind" consciousness as 
a subject. The Ego is not an abstract something that has the mission 
of unifying mental events, it is all those events put together, the 
"infinite totality of states and actions which never lets itself be 
reduced to one action or to one state" (Sartre, 1,57, my translation 
here and hereafter. ) Sartre compares the Ego to the world - the world 
is not a transcendent unity of things, merely their totality. 
The implications*of this constitute some of Sartre's most 
characteristic doctrines. If the Ego is merely a non-transcendent 
totality of psychic states it follows that there is no "real met', 
no given Ego that is the absolute "me" to which I must or can or 
should conform. Similarly there can be no "unconscious". no hidden 
pool of my "real" desires and wthoughts". Only when I turnýthe light 
of consciousness onto my state of mind (or any other object) and 
grasp itzs mine can it be me or part of me. 
Sartre claims here to have liberated and purified the "transcen- 
dental field". All thatIs left in it is -consciousness. which is the 
oýly absolute in that it is "nothing". merely, being an"'intentian" 
towards objects. Consciousness, alone, is inaccessible. My mental 
states, love -for example, are as objective as chairs. -There is no 
longer anything impenetrable about others except. by definition. their 
consciousnesses. PerhaPs rather dangerously. -considering-that he, is 
engaged in a rejection of Husserlian and Cartesian dualism., Sartre 
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sums up his propositions by describing two spheres, the "transcen- 
dental" sphere of consciousness, and the "Ego-sphere" accessible to 
psychology, the sphere of mental states, actions, qualities. The 
latter is the object of the former. 
Transcendental consciousness is an "impersonal spontaneousness" 
which "determines its existence at every moment without our being able 
to conceive of anything before it,. Thus every instant of our conscious 
life reveals to us a creation ex nihilo". (Sartre, 1,79) This 
consciousness is a monster: if at every moment it creates a new world, 
how can there be any unity or continuity in conscious life? "A 
phenomenological description of the spontaneousness (of consciousness) 
would, indeed, show that it renders impossible all ideas about the 
freedom of the will. " (Sartre, 1,82) Thus an Ego is needed to give 
a coherent object to consciousness. If consciousness suddenly appears 
on. the plane of pure reflexion ("I am I") then we are seized by a fear 
of ourselves and an "absolute anguish". This last is not an intellectual 
process, but a daily event. 
Consciousness as a monster defeated by the Ego, consciousness as 
anguish Can anguish that "we cannot avoid, ") this is the price of our 
humanity and'the agony of Samuel Beckett. 
In spite of the celebrated dualism of Murphy, Beckett's early 
worK 5how5 some concern with these Sartrean problems. Subject and 
object are much canvassed in the essay on Proust and Beckett comes 
to the conclusion that direct contact between them isImpossible 
ýTecause they are automatically separated by the subjectss consciousness 
of perception". (PTD. '74) 'This both states Sartrean negation [I know 
I am not what I am conscious of) -and, paradoxically, Implies the unity 
of perception with. what, is perceived (I a not-separated -from objects 
by perception. Indeed, I am what I perceive, but, 1 am separated by 
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by my con5clousne35 of that perceptionJ 
Even In, Murphy some of the philosophical fireworks bring the 
characters who indulge in them close to Sartre's position in The 
Lr-ansr-endence of the Ego. When Wylie, for instance, proposes that 
the World is a closed system (like "the horse leech's daughtern its 
"quantum of wantum cannot vary*) Neary sees why Berkeley wanted to 
find some escape from this static hell,,. OHe had no alternative... 
Immaterialize or bust. The sleep of shear terror. ' (M. 43) This is 
r8miniscent of Sartre's *absolute angU15h" In the face of his escape 
from the closed system, consciousness. It is also possible to put an 
Existentialist interpretation on the well-known point made in Chapter 
Six Of Murphy that In the third and final zone of his mind'"he was 
not free. but a mate in the dark of ab5olute freedom*. (M. 79) Hare - 
the *absolute' is specifically not him but could be something like 
Consciousness in which his Ego is an object& a mate in the absolute e 
light. 
In Watt Beckett Is struggling with other problems than those of 
consciousness. but even here there are Sartrean elements 
in some 
Passages, The picture on the wall of Erskine's room 
(W. 126-1273 of a 
r-ircle andAts cantre, perhaps in search of one another, can 
be taken 
45 an illustration of the problem of the Ego. If the circle represents 
the limit of everything that is Ome" (my feet, my 
dreams, my bank 
account) then the question, as tackled by Sartre in 
The Transcendence 
to Is, what Is the contra? Is the centre a given, something of the E 
rsýOgni=able that we must put Into position at the heart of our 
lives, 
an identifiable Ego? or is the dot in Erskine's picture not going to 
ber-M., Q the centre of this given circle? In which case 
Is It merelY a 
0 Mote in the dark of absolute freedom'? In this 
latter case we find 
QUt3Glve3 faced with the dangerous 'new" dualism described above 
in 
'he discussion of Sartre's'otwo spheresm, consciousness and 
the r85t. 
'rhQ dot Is consciousness, the circle *the re5t*. The dot does not belong 
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as the centre of the circle because transcendental consciousness is 
"impersonal". 
Some other examples could be given from Watt but it is BecKett's 
later worK that is in more need of elucidation. Before turning to it 
we must see what Being and Nothingness has to say about consciousness. 
Our time spent on The Transcendence of the Ego has not been wasted 
in that Sartre clearly incorporated its ideas into'Being and Nothingness. 
' 
Sartre's development of his views on consciousness in the later work is 
excellently summarized in Heslals The Shape of Chaos, discussed in 
Chapter One above. Hesla reduces Sartre on consciousness to five 
propositions: consciousness is "nothing", "intentionality", "reflex- 
ivity", "freedom" and "nct in-itself". (Hesla, 1,186) All of these we 
can now understand, with. -the possible exception of "reflexivity". This 
is Sartre's term for the fact that consciousness can have itself as an 
object, it "reflects" itself. Indeed, consciousness only, exists as 
both consciousness of an object and consciousness of that consciousness. 
It may be pointed out here that of these two consciousnesses one 
at least must be the Ego. Or. better, when. instead of being conscious 
of being conscious of an object, I am in the state of "absolute anguish" 
of being conscious that, I am conscious Df myself ("Z*am 1") surely one 
of these must be the Ego. But we know that this is precisely what 
Sartre is trying to avoid, and-in Being and Nothingness he points out 
that the Ego fthe "self" here) can have a sort of theoretical existence 
"between* consciousness, and bonsciousness. This is not a contradiction 
bf,. the thesis of The Transcendence of theEZo, for it establishes this 
ýEgoýas, precisely. nothing. ý'*The self.. -. represents an, ideal distance 
within the-immanence of'the,. subject. in, relation'. to. himself. a way-of 
not being'his own coincidence. aýway of. escaping"identity while 
positing It as unity. '" 'IBN. 773 "Thus there 'is : a"'*nothingness" that 
divides me from myself, a'"nothingness", that is necessary to my 
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identity. 
So, consciousness is a "nothing" opposed to "being", and, 
within this nothing, the self is the nothing that divides me from 
myself in reflexive consciousness. 
All this seems to me to be a most satisfactory gloss on the 
passage in The Unnamable where "I" suggests 
perhaps that's what I feel, an outside 
and an inside and me in the middle, perhaps 
that's what I am, the thing that divides 
the world in two, on the one side the 
outside, on the other the inside, that 
can'be as thin as foil, I'm neither one 
side nor the other, I'm in the middle, 
I'm the partition, I've two surfaces and 
no thickness... (T. 386) 
What is so appropriate about this as a parallel for Sartre is the 
fact that not only is this narrator the "ideal distance" between 
consciousnesses (that is, no distance, "nothing") but these conscious- 
nesses are described as "outside", "inside" and "surfaces". Now these 
three concepts, technically, add up to zero. The "outside" of 
something has no depth, it is another "nothing", as is the "inside" 
or the "surface" of something. This "nothing" is just what Sartre 
says that consciousness is. 
Beckett has frequently worked on the Idea of consciousness - 
ponfronting itself. In some of the novels and plays he finds a sort 
of objective correlative for this by confronting characters with their 
own pasts. We cannot understand this fully until we have considered 
the Sartrean conception of time but for the moment It is illuminating 
-tý., think-of Krapp In Krapp's Last Tape. or Henry in'Embers, as people 
face to-face with themselves., r-onsciousness to consciousness. 
Similarly the'two-halves of-Molloy could be considered', in this way. 
M05t Important for'BecKett, however,, is the'Sartrean stress on 
'the different positions of 'consciousness. All through., the trilogy, 
183. 
the Texts for Nothing and How It Is there is a tension between 
the narrator and his "vice-existers". It is immensely complicated. 
Who narrates Molloy? Is it Moran? Who is the Unnamable? Who are 
the scribes in How It Is? These questions seem finally to lead us 
to think of all Beckett's characters and narrators, and Beckett 
himself, as being one and the same person. This is made possible 
and comprehensible by Sartre's view of consciousness. At the first 
level I have a "non-thetic", "non-positional", "pre-reflexive" 
consciousness, to borrow the terms used in The Transcendence of the 
., 
ýeing and Nothingness, passim. Ego and.. Then there is my consciousness 
of that consciousness, and then there is the possibility that the 
objects of these two sorts of consciousness may coincide and I 
become conscious of being conscious of myself.. Sartre avoids "infinite 
regress" here but leaVe5 us with enough of a Chinese puzzle to help 
clarify BecKett. As an example we can consider the first of the 
Texts for Nothing. 
Suddenly, no, at last, long last, I couldn't 
any more, I couldn't go on. Someone said, 
You can't stay here. I couldn't stay there 
andl couldn't go on. I'll describe the place... 
How can I go on, I shouldn't have begun, no, 
I had to begýn. Someone said, perhaps the 
same, What possessed you to come?... It's simple, 
I can do nothing any more, that's what you 
thinK. [NK. 71) 
This opens with a tension immediately established between "I" 
and "someone". It is our Sartrean point that these two are the same. 
After a dozen lines ", someone" Is again quoted and Beckett says that 
. this someone 
Is "perhaps-the, same", as the first. and. indeed it is, 
but time has-elapsed, -casting-doubt'(consciousness"*, determines Its 
existence at every-moment, without cur, being. able'to conceive of 
anything before It., *]. But all the '"someones" are the narrator. "It's 
simple" be. says, '"I can-to nothing any, more" and continues. with, "only 
a comma intervening, "that's what you thinko. CNK. '711 The"010 and 
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the "you" are both him his consciousness bifurcated as we have 
seen. And this consciousness is not a physical or a mental thing, 
but distant from and different from either of these: 
I say to the body, Up with you now, and 
I can feel it struggling... I say to the 
head, Leave it alone, stay quiet... I am 
far from all that wrangle. (NK. 71) 
So the "I" is the pure subject, opposed both to the objective world 
and objective images of that world, as in Sartre. And it is not 
the Ego. "It's not me" says the narrator when asked why he is there. 
(NK. 73) 
But of course "pre-reflexive", immediate consciousness is 
indissolubly linked with the object that it "intends". So, "the 
cold is eating me, the wet too". he says. But he goes on4at'l-eas-c-1- 
presume so, I'm far. 
' He is at once far and near, at once "prEr-reflexive" 
consciousness of the cold and wet and consciousness of that consciousness: 
. -1 
Eye ravening patient in thý haggard, vulture 
face, perhaps its carrion time. I'm up 
there are I'm down here, under my gaze, 
foundered, eyes closed ... we're of one mind, 
all of one mind... CNK. 73) 
Indeed, the two consciousnesses are "of one mind", they are "up 
there* and "down here" and they areboth "I". 
We have thus looKed at three of Hesla's Sartrean categories that 
describe consciousness. The two remaining are "freedom" and the 
fact that consciousness is pour-soi not en-soi. 
Freedom might appear to be the one thing that Beckettian 
consciousness is not. "I can do nothing* says the narrator of our 
first Text forNothing, "I can't go on" says the Unnamable. 'But 
this is to miss the point about Existentialist freedom --it is freedom 
to project. Now the one thing that we are left with, after the 
amputations, the Paralyses. the reductions, -the isolation, "the_darkne5s, 
the silence and the mud of Beckett's mature fiction-is. the babble, of 
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of a freely-projecting consciousness. Even when, in How It Is, 
we have to account for the scribes and for the constant repetition 
of "I say it as I hear it" we find we are merely pushed back one 
stage further - the scribe is Beckett, the voice heard his voice. 
Beckett is free to will, to project; his fictions are entirely his 
own. Beckett expresses Sartre's insight - man is condemned to 
freedom. This will be dealt with at greater length in the two 
sections on freedom, below. 
As for the fact that consciousness is pour-soi and not en-soi 
this is. as clear in BecKett as anywhere else and hardly needs exemp- 
lification. But, to make the point, we can consider the following, 
again from the first of the Texts for*Nothing: 
I need nothing--. neither to go on nor to 
stay where I am, it's truly all one to 
me, I should turn away from it all... 
(NK. 71) 
. 
The word "one" in "it 's truly all one to me" denotes the en-soi, 
"massif", solid, indifferent, away from which consciousness "should" 
turn - feels it can turn. But consciousness, although absolutely 
other than being, other than en-soi, "exists" in its nothingness only 
because being "is". There is no possible gap between consciousness 
and the objects of consciousness. "Let them cease* says our narrator, 
referring to the body and the head, but answers himself, "I can't. it's 
I would have to cease. " (NK. 71) 
Nothingness. 
Consciousness Is nothingness. it is the nothingness that rmn 
sets nver against Being. 'This may puzzle us -if we. remember what 
Hegel 
said about Being - it is an "emptiness". it is what is left when all 
the essences of an object have been subtracted. while for his French 
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successor it is the opposite of "nothing". The point is that Hegel's 
Being is the first (or, if we prefer; last) quality or essence in a 
hierarchy of such concepts whereas in Sartre Being is'everything 
including all qualities. essences. and, as we have seen, even dreams, 
hallucinations and feelings as intangible as boredom. So in Hegel 
two simultaneous announcements start Cor finish) his system - the 
announcement that Being is and the simultaneous announcement that 
nothing is. Being is nothing. This includes everything is a general 
sort of way - there is nothing in heaven or on earth that is not 
included under these first categories. But this means that nothingness 
here acquires an existence, it is one of two equiprimordial existents. 
Meanwhile in Sartre Being and nothingness far from being a 'pair of 
vast brackets that include everything, respectively are everything 
and nothing. Being is the solid mass -of all that is, ' nothingness is 
human consciousness set over against Being. They never become merged 
0 
into one another (in Hegel they join forces in the synthesis of 
"Becoming") but are Opposites - although if Being vanished we would 
not be left with nothing, nothing would vanish too, before Being 
there was not nothing either. This last point is not reversible, 
Being Is not dependent on nothing, in'the way that nothing Is-dependent 
on Being. Being can be completely and satisfactorily described without 
any recourse to the concept "nothing". As Sartre puts it, nothingness 
merely "haunts being". 16N. 16) 
7his anti-Hegelian phase of Sartre's argument has some light'to 
throwýon Beckett. SOmetinms the word *nothing" appears-in, Beckett in 
a-context that-seems"to need,, Sartre's stricture on Hegel that""before 
Being" there could not have been "nothing". For-instance in Watt 
the narrator tells us that in Mr Knott's establishment "nothing 
changed ... because,, nothing remained". (W. 130) With Sartýre on Hegel -in 
mind we can gloss-this as: "We must find a new conception of nothingness 
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if we want to talk about what "remains" when "nothing remains" 
because, surely, when we say that nothing remains we are thinking 
about the remaining which implies some sort of Being for the entity 
which remains. " In other words, one aspect of Mr Knott's negativity 
makes the Hegelian mistake of attributing some sort of Being to 
nothing and Watt feels an inadequacy in the words'and concepts at 
his disposal for the correction of this mistake. 
Similarly in The End the narrator says, first, that he can see 
"nothing except... the grey light of the shed", and comments, "To see 
nothing at all, no, that's too much". (NK. 64) He? e is a perfect. 
example of those entirely Beckettian moments of wordplay that so, 
often cry out for a philosophical'gloss. Because of the "grey light" 
we can take "nothing at all" on a purely physical level. ' But how can 
that explain "no, that's too much"? This forces, us to move from 
questions of vision to the next nearest possible interpretation: 
perhaps it's "too much" to hope that oblivion ("nothing at all") 
will be granted, say after death. But, although "nothing" here may 
have a visual (ie, physical) meaning and a post-mortem meaning, we 
are still troubled by the apparent oxymoron of "to see-nothing at 
all". 'This is where weýfind ourselves plunging into a philosophical 
reading whether we will or no. With Sartre an Hegel once again in 
mind wd''can bring out the full 'irony of "nothing" being "too much". 
for, if we cast aside Being and gaze upon the "nothing at"all" as 
a Hegelian objectwe-will'becDme-aware, with Sartre, that it-is not 
. Yiothingw--that we are'looking-at; *-but*something. '"Nothing" is *too 
much" as an expressian for, what 15-there when nothingls-there, for 
-wreal"-nothing Is-that 'Of which nothing. can-be affirmed, not even 
týhat it 'is* nothing. 
I 
fiavingImpraved a Hegel. 7Sartre-'moves"on-to", improve on Heidegger. 
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He quotes with approval Heidegger's theses about man's Angst in 
the face of nothingness and about the absolute negativity of 
nothingness, "Das Nichts nichtet", nothing "nihilates" itself, it 
is not. But he perceives an inconsistency in Heidegger's develop- 
ment of this. When Dasein "negates" the world it does so by saying 
what it is that it is negating - "I am not the world". Thus for 
Heidegger nothingness "carries being in its heart". (BN. 18) Sartre 
prefers the opposite possibility, that "Nothingness lies coiled in 
the heart of being - like a worm". CBN. 21) Apart from the obvious 
coincidence of the name Worm in The Unnamable we can associate this 
with Beckett by quoting Sartre's own example - that of distance. 
Put simply, Sartre establishes that even. in something with such 
positive being as the statement that "the distance from A to 6 is X" 
there is a core of negativity. For either we must say that this 
statement means that A is not in proximity to B by X amount, or, 
if we see the distance as a positive length CX is a line a yard long), 
we must. say that the line X extends to A in one direction and to B 
in the other direction and that beyond A and 6 there is not any more 
distance. As Spinoza says, omnis determinatio est negatio. 
In general this princ#le iofl. negation, applie5 to Beckett In his 
handling of beginnings and endings. In Endgame, for instance, there 
are numerous ambiguities about what constitutes a start and what a 
finish. "The end is in the beginning". says-Hamm, "and yet you go on. " 
(E. 44) And Hamm's story goes-on and on and, liketheltwo-acts-of 
Gtklot, seems Infinitely-, repeatable. "7here'. Is-a'theme. ýln, 'the.. play of 
-things, piling up. the millet 7grains,: of *, that- old -Greek", and the 
constituent,. parts of, the "little heap, -, the,.. Impossible heapýn 'ý'The 
point of all'this. is that-until the end. isýreachednothing, ''. is,. Known. 
Unless*the line X-has end-Points we cannot conceive--what Aistance. 'X 
-is. 
When will grains of sand, or of millet, get to the, point, that we 
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can say, "now there is a heap of sand"? 
I would associate this paradoxical element in Endgame (which 
is present passim in Beckett as the last words of Molloy and of 
The Unnamable show) with Beckett's desire to reach the end, the 
nothing. Once the end really comes, once all has been said, once 
it has "mounted up to a life" (E. 45) we have found a negation, and 
that means a determination, which is to say knowledge and understanding. 
Here is another recipe for hell in BecKett: only when the end of 
something comes can we understand it. 
After these discussions of Hegelian and Heidýggerian nothingness, 
Sartre poses the question now laid bare, "where does Nothingness come 
from? " (BN. 22) His answer is that man brings nothingness into the 
world, that man, as pour-sai, consciousness, finds that he opposes 
a nothing to the Being of the world. This matter is dealt with in 
the last section, above. But, once he has established consciousness 
as the "origin of negation", Sartre follows Heidegger in discussinj 
the results of this in terms of freedom (. a concept which involves a 
con51deration of Angst), the Self, man's responsibility and the 
creation of values by choice. 
Freedom. Angst. The Self. 
Man brings nothingness into the world by being conscious. Man 
is free, by virtue of his 'consciousness, but, this, freedom'is not a 
quality-he possesses. 'it is., him. OThereIs no difference-between 
-the, being of man and his being-fme. 1 IBN. 25) 'Following KierKegaard 
and Heidegger Sartre says that man, can "fear" beings In the, world 
but feels "anguish'. Angst. In the, face of himself. "Angst is'fear 
plus '"vertigo" (Sartre-uses the same-word, as Kierkegaýrd)-djzziness 
at the prospect of my own freedom to will. This is clarified by 
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Sartre's explanation that there are no motives in consciousness, 
only for consciousness. Thus I am not "in angU15h" on account of 
my motives, which are objective to me, not subjective, but an 
account of the freedom I have, as a conscious being, to disregard 
even my strongest motives. He gives the example of the man on the 
cliff path. In spite of all motives towards safety and caution, 
the man can walk too close to the edge, deliberately throw himself 
off even. The possibility is always open at any rate. 
This is important for Beckett, not directly but as 'it leads into 
Sartre on the Self. If we say that "I" choose between "my" possibi- 
lities, even to the extent that I can choose to disregard all motives 
and act gratuitously, jump off the cliff, then we have a useful way 
of looking at the idea that "I" make "myself". If the motive 
determined the action I would not be free. (We may presume that 
this is the situation for at least some animals the hungry dog 
will always eat the food, in respon5e to his motive of hunger, unless 
a stronger motive supervenes. ) As pour-soi I can choose between my 
motives, I can decide what I am going to be. If I am offered an 
alcoholic drink, I can accept it, or ask for a non-alcoholic drink, 
or have no drink at all. Not only can "I" choose between these 
possibilities, I must choose between them. This example shows what 
Sartre means by pour-soi deciding what it is going to be. When I 
choose between these drinking alternatives I am "making myself" 
in that I am defining myself along* such possible lines as: being 
thbught a sociable fellow, becoming an alcoholic, being prepared 
to make a fuss to get what I want, raking an ostentatious display of 
my teetotalism, and so cn. Now Sartre, -speaking, Df-this,, process of 
choice, says that "Freedom... Is characterized by a constantly 
renewed obligation-to remake the Self which =nstitutes the free 
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being. " CBN. 34-35) The emphasis on "Self" is Sartre's, but is 
just where I want it too. It emphasises the point that, if we 
can use "dualism" of Sartre, the division in his dualism is 
between consciousness on the one hand and the Self on the other. 
We have seen that this Self is not transcendental, it is me and 
yet it is an object for me. It is my "essence" and yet I am always 
separated from it by a "nothing", for, given all my motives, there 
is still an "I" to choose freely between them. My essence, my Self, 
is everything of which 
explains my action but 
Since my consciousness 
"free being" "I" exist 
peering into the abyss 
self inasmuch as it ex 
I can say "that is" about myself. My essence 
the action itself is beyond such explanation. 
is nothing, my Self is what constitutes my 
as other than "me". My Angst, which is my 
of my freedom, "appears as an apprehension of 
ists in the perpetual mode of detachment from 
what is. " (BN. 35) 
I have dealt with this point at some length because I thinK that 
here we are approaching something like Beckett's view of the Self. 
His early work is haunted by an absolute dualism of the older, 
Cartesian, sort. I would suggest that his later work shows evidence 
that his thinking has moved towards a dualism of the Sartrean type. 
For a start, Sartre's thesis depends on the notion that conscious- 
ne5s is absolutely subject. "I" speak out of my absolute subjectivity 
in such a way that I can never turn round and looK at my "I". What 
I would see. were I able to do so, would be consciousness, -that is, 
'. pathing. This explains-the lack of success of Beckett's quest for 
the Self - there Is any amount af stuff In his narrators' worlds, that 
qualifies as *mine" but none of it is "I*j there Is plenty of objective 
Self but it is always *Not In. As the Unnamable reaches the climax 
of his 2ast page his desperation takes a form that bears this out; 
0 perhaps it is I" he says, "perhaps somewhere or other it was I", 
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but then, "it's not I" and then, "it will be I. " (T. 418) However, 
in principle, he can never say "I" and thus wili never be done. 
Which means that we have two points to consider in Beckett, 
the freedom that arises from the radical detachment of "I" from "me", 
and the question of the content of the objective Self. 
In discussing consciousness, above, we came to the conclusion 
that Beckett expresses Sartre*s insight that man is condemned to 
freedom. We can now see more exactly why this is so. Man must 
choosej he can never relinquish responsibility and relax in a 
determinism where all is done for him. This is the almost constant 
condition of Beckettian man. "You must go on" even when you canIt.; 
even choosing not to choose is choosing. Beckettian man wants to 
stop choosing, to stop being free. The narrator of'From an Abandoned 
Work expresses well one reason why this is so: "I have never in my 
life been an my way anywhere, but simply an my way. " (NK. 36-401 
This states both of Sartre's points -I am "on my way" because I 
must "go on", I must go on choosing, but there is no guide, no 
direction to go: L. n. I am free. So what do I choose to do? How do 
I finý out where to go? In The Expelled there is one of many possible 
examples of this. The "hero" is walking in the streets of what seems 
to be Dublin. He enters a cab t"of my own free will") and1s forced 
by the driver into saying where it Is that he wants to go. The sheer 
contingency of the world and the hopeless results of total freedom 
appear in his answer: he must say something, so he says "To the Zoo" 
and adds *It is rare for a capital to be without a Zoo. " CNK. 16-17) 
in other words he zhooses because he Must but chooses completely 
at random, he has no desire to go to the Zoo. But. even If he had a 
desire, his choosing to fulfil It would be free and unconditioned. 
Thus when he. der-ides to eat, -a-little later in this text, it comes 
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as a suprise to us that he expresses a desire, and no details of 
the meal are given, it surprises us less to realize that perhaps 
he ate nothing. Similarly, that night, our "hero" is "seized, then 
k 
abandoned, by the desire to set fire to the stable" in which he is 
sleeping. (NK. 23) We notice in these examples that desires seem to 
come to him from outside, (they "seize" him) and that he, his 
conscious "I", is untouched by them, as in Sartre. On another 
level the same thing is taking place. Beckett the author, or perhaps 
the narrator himself, interjects, "No reason for this to end or go 
on. Then let it end. " (NK. 163 Indeed, there is finally no reason 
for conscious beings to choose one course of action rather than 
another. The greatest possible number of motives and desires do not 
add up to n9cessity. 
Our second point for consideration is the content of the objective 
Self. In SaYtre this chn be summed up as being all that "I" recognizes 
as "me", with the rider that "I" is free to determine what "me" shall 
be liKe, within the limits of the factical. TaKe the following passage 
from The End: 
To know I had a being, however faint 
and false, outside of me, had once had 
the power to stir-my heart... CNK. 64) 
So his consciousness recognizes his "being" as an objective Self. 
He describes himself "5hitting" in the boat he has turned into his 
refuge and, when he has criticized himself for this, he comments, as 
if in answer to an objection. "The excrements were, me too, I know, I 
... know, but- all 'the -same. ' (NK. 65). So his being '", outside of" him 
includes his'excrement. And : It-, Includes his body as we can see from 
-the last clauses of that highly physical text, From An Abandoned Work: 
You could 'lie there f or, weeKs and -no one hear you, I mften-thought of that. up in 
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the mountains, no, that is a foolish 
thing to say, just went on, 'my body doing 
its best without me. (NK. 149. My italics) 
The body and its products are far from the free, absolute realm 
within which consciousness is doomed to babble alone, its babble 
becoming objective even a5 it 15 conceived and thU5 bringing the 
babbler no closer to hiM5elf. But not the body only, even the will 
is something other than the "I". as this from'The'Calmative maKes 
clear: 
I said, Stay where you are till day breaks, 
wait sleeping till the lamps go out and 
the streets come to life. But I stood up 
and moved off. 
This "hero" chooses, as he freely can, to do exactly the opposite of 
what he has just decided to do - as Sartre says, no amount of past 
willing can maKe me act now. "At each instant we are thrust into 
the world and engaged there. ". ýJBN. 37-38) 
I hugged the walls, famis hed for shadow. To 
think that in a moment all will be said, all 
to do again. And the city clacks, what was 
wrong with them, whose great chill clang even 
in my wood fell an me from the air? What else? 
Ah yes, my spoils. I tried to think of Pauline, 
but she eluded me, gleamed an instant and was 
gone, like the young woman in the street. So 
I went In the atrocious brightness, bedded in 
my old flesh, straining, toward5 an issue and 
passing them by to-left and right and my mind 
panting after this and that and always flung 
back to where there was nothing. (NK. 40-41) 
Here again the body is part of the objective Self, "I", the subjective 
Self Is "bedded in my old flesh". The voice of-consciousness, of "I"s 
Anterjectsthe sentence *To think that In a moment all will be said... ", 
and also. the question "What else? " The burden, nf these is . that ýthe 'UO -is 
coming to the end -of his babble (as indeed he Is. - The Calmative 
finishes a page -later) and he is making sure that he has -said all he 
has 
ýgot 
to say. So, he -has ýdealt with 'an _incident,, told a -story. 
accounted for his-body, now what el5e-Is there in his objective'Self 
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to be mentioned? Ah yes, his "spoils". The mention of his "thought" 
of "Pauline" makes it clear that these spoils are memories. Thoughts 
and memories are like lights that gleam an instant as consciousness 
"intends" them and then vanish. My mental life, (for example my 
memory of Pauline) here as in Sartre, is an object of my perception 
just as a "real" young woman whom I see in the street is an object 
of my perception. And the "I" in this text is trying to get out of 
this, to escape from "this hell of stories" back into his impossible 
Self, the subjective absolute. He is "straining towards an issue" in 
which his "mind" (objective) will catch up with his Self (subjective) 
but, as we realize must happen since the "I" is nothingness, he is 
always flung back to "where there is nothing". The ambiguity here 
between objective and subjective exactly reflects Sartre's thesis 
about reflective consciousness. When "I" has looked at world, at 
body and-at mindýand found itself lacking it tries to look at itself. 
But in doing so it reduces itself to an object, so it is no longer 
looking at itself, and even if it were looking at itself it would be 
looking at nothing. 
only with this sort of an interpretation in mind can we make 
any sense of the last page of'The Calmative. 'The *hero" falls down 
but says "I didn't lose consciousness, when I lose consciousness it 
will not be to recover it. " When the crowd leaves him, soon after 
this, the daylight comes back but he states, "I had no need to raise 
my head from the ground to know'Iwas back in the same blinding void 
ýs-before% (NK. 423 Consciousness, in'Sartre and, *Beckett, is the 
inescapable absolute that is nothing. 
** 
Freedom. Choice. Responsibility. 
All that we have said so far about freedom is based an the, first 
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chapter of*Being'and*Nothingness, Before leaving the subject we 
must look at the substantial section of that work (Part Four, 
Chapter One) entitled "Being and Doing: Freedom". Early in this 
chapter Sartre offers a resume" of what he has so far said about 
freedom in his work. This is the point at which his famous dictum 
"I am condemned to be free" appears, but there are two other dicta 
here that are of as much interest to us in our search for light to 
throw on Beckett. 
First, Sartre summarizes a paradox, for BecKett a torment, 
that we have come across before: freedom is the negative, the 
"nihilation", the nothing of consciousness; as such, when I talk 
about it I am not really talking about it. "It is through this. 
(negativity) that the for-it5elf escapes its being as its essence; 
it is through this that the for-itself is always something*other 
than what can be said of it.. " (6.439. Sartre's emphasis. ) This 
explains the difficulty of Beckett's-taski in trying to say his 
"I" he is attempting the impossible. As he says, there is "nothing 
to express", the "nothing" is his consciousness. How is he to 
express this which is in principle inexpressible? 
Second, Sartre defines the pour-soi, the for7itself, as *the 
one which is already beyond the name which is given to it. " CBN. 439) 
He intdnds this is the sense that conscious "human reality" has no 
fixed essence, is foreýer creating itself anew, cannot be pinned 
down, cannot be labelled and given a name. Whence, perhaps, Beckett's 
. ýPi-nal abandoning of names in-the trilogy, culminating'in the "unnamable" 
hero of the third volume. This-is reinforced by: the namelessness of 
the being who writes Texts fnr_'_Nothing and. by the random and emPtY 
nomenclature of How'It'Is. 
Besides this 5uTnarj, most of Part Four. Chapter One deals with 
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choice and responsibility. On the matter of choice Sartre offers 
a solution to the problem that has been with us since we looked 
at Heidegger on this subject, the problem of the limits of choice, 
the problem of whether I have the freedom, for example, to choose 
the impossible. It is amusing that the test-case that Sartre 
chooses to employ in this context concerns bicycles. Rather like 
Molloy or Moran, Sartre proposes to consider the project of arriving 
"on my bicycle as quickly as possible at the next town". CBN. 504) 
This whole discussion reads very like another view of Beckett's I 
world. The projected bicycle ride "involves my personal ends, the 
appreciation of my place and bf the distance from my place to the 
town... But I have a flat tyre, the sun is too hot, the wind is 
blowing against me, etc., all phenomena which I had not -Foreseen: 
these are the environment. " (BN. 504-505)' Later, Sartre defines my 
awareness of the environment as being determined by the-latter's - 
"coefficient of adversity". 
But a puncture does not really reveal the limits of my freedom. 
T 
After a. 11, again like Molloy and the others, my "fundamental project" 
to be myself still holds good, whatever obstacles impede secondary 
projects. (That-Is, I still choose to be the sort of person who 
would make that journey. ) And then, it is up to me freely to 
renounce a-task even when its accomplishment has become impossible - 
I could go blindly an trying to achieve it for ever without any 
hope of success. Then again, "freedom's very project is.: in general 
tp. do In. aresisting world by means of a victory nver the world's 
resistances. * IBN. 507) These cansiderations-are Intended bySartre 
to be quite impartial, neutral descriPtions of some of-the. charac- 
'teristics of choice. and their slightly -, pessimistic, tone must-not 
0 
mislead us. Sartre As describing the worlds It is not -a fault, of 
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the bias of his mind that our world is made up of things that 
we first encounter as resistances or obstacles. In this he 
improves on Heidegger. After all, Heidegger's neutral examples 
of the world as "Zeug", for instance that of the clouds "meaning" 
rain, also relate back to a situation of adversity. The clouds 
"mean" rain. to the farmer because the farmer needs to grow cropsi 
he needs to grow crops because, ultimately, some Oasein somewhere 
feels the uncomfortable sensation of hunger. The world is to be 
battled with. This is implicit in Heidegger, explicit in Sartre, 
and a.. nightmare reality in Beckett. 
With choice comes responsibility. "I am absolutely free and 
absolutely responsible for my situation. " CBN. 509) Sartre's expla- 
nation of-this responsibility reads so like a description of the 
situation of Beckettian man that examples from the latter are 
hardly necessary. Here is Sartre: 
We are taking the word "responsibility" in 
its ordinary sense as "consciousness (of) 
being the incontestable author of an event 
or of an object. " In this sense the 
responsibility of the for-itself is over- 
whelming-since he is the one by whom it 
happens that thers. is a world, -, since he is 
also the one he makes himself to be, then 
whatever may be the situation in which he 
finds himself, the for-itself must wholly 
assume this situation with its peculiar 
coefficient of adversity, even though it be 
insupportable... this absolute responsibility 
is not resignation; it is simply the logical 
requirement of the consequences of our 
freedom. What happens to me happens through 
me, and I can neither affect myself with it 
not r9volt against*it nor resign myself to it 
EBN. 55; 3-554) 
We can -fit this to Beckett-stage by stage. 'There is no doubt. that 
his novels and textsýare, pervaded by "responsibility* in that, there 
is a permanent consciousness of authorship. ýIn both senses of the 
word. We are not allowed to forget for very long that there. is a 
writer wrIting these words that we are reading, butAn Sartre's sense, 
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too, there is a consciousness of authorship. Beckett's characters 
create their worlds. flat in the early novels, perhaps, where the 
ObigO world has its own ways of bursting in upon and tormenting 
people. But from Malloy onwards we are aware that the world that 
rises up under the pencil of the narrator does so at his bidding. 
Thus there are two levels - Malone is in bed and dying because 
Beckett has put him there, and we know it, and Saposcat, for 
instance, ccr. A39 into existence because Malone bids him appear. At 
. times the two 
levels coincide, as when we come across the interjection 
OWhat tedium* which could be the view of both Beckett and Malone. 
This means that sometimes, although we must attribute authorship 
either to novelist or narrator, it is mcontestable* which of the 
two is actually the author. But there is never any question that 
we are seeing a world being created by a consciousness. *There is" 
a world for Saposcat because Malone invents it (or "intends" it), 
for Malone because Beckett does likewise. 
But, Sartre goes on, man, pour-soi, does not simply make the 
world, he makes himself too. Here we find Beckett at his most 
Sartrean. All through the trilogy and the later works the narrators 
are engaged on making themselves. Sartre proposes, in the passage 
quoted, that because of this self-construction man is also responsible 
for his situation: "the for-itself must wholly assume this situation. " 
And so it lit for Beckett. The Unnamable is really doing nothing other 
than making himself and his world. revealing his responsibility for 
it-by continuing to talk about it. *going onw. even when it is 
"insupportable% even when Oyou can't go on*. By talking about 
hims. elf and his world he is making them both in that the literary 
r.: ec:. 4um. is 11 made -of wordsO (thus the Unnamable says, "I'Im made of 
wordso - T. 3SO) and in that, if we follow Wittgenstain; language is 
mants way of existing. 
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It is some slight encouragement to our task of fitting 
this passage from Sartre to Beckett to realize that the "resignation" 
rejected by the former is not present in the 
absolute responsibility is not resignation"? a 
people are never exactly "resigned"i that is 
we ever thinK of applying seriously, even to 
who "do not move" according to the famous st 
attitude shows that they see their situation 
latter either. "This 
Indeed, Beckett's 
not an epithet that 
the tramps in Godot 
age-direction. Their 
to be inescapable and 
they are somehow quite determined to go an waiting, but they, tcould 
W hardly be-called "resigned". 
The last sentence of our quotation from Sartre brings us yet 
closer to BecKett. It provides an explanation for some of the 
more mysterious inabilities that afflict Beckett's characters. Let 
me first stress that Sartre is here talking on an ontological level. 
Thus, when he says that man cannot "revolt" against what happens to 
him he does not mean that I cannot choose to object to what I dislike. 
of course I can. But I cannot choose that X should happen to me 
and that X should not happen to me simultaneously. If we bear this 
in mind we can perhaps answer the following questions that arise in 
Beckett =reiclearly: Why does Hamm. at-a crucial point-in the 
development of. Endgame, exclaim "I was never there... it all happened' 
without, me" (E. 473? Why do the tramps in Godot not succeed in 
hanging themselves? Whence the imperatives that force Malloy on to 
his destination, Moran an in his -pursuit, of Molloy? Why-, does Watt 
jp-to the house of Mr-Knott? -Why, does Malone'keep= writing? ýWhy 
does Clov obey Hamm? 
, All these-can-be taken-on various non-ontological'Ievels; thus: 
the tramps justaren"t efficient and-decisive. enough toido anything. 
Ham, and Clov are Master and Slave, and so-on. - But I viculdpropose 
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that we are. missing an essential element in their meaning if 
we exclude the possibility of an ontological level at which these 
questions are partial or complete parables. 
Thus, Hamm is isolated from even his own most intimate 
experience, from "all" that has "happened", because he is free. 
He cannot "affect" himself with "what happens" because "what happens" 
is what he makes happen, it is him, and yet, as a conscious nothing- 
ness, he knows himself to be radically "other" than the world he 
creates. What I do is me, but "I" am nothing, "I" can never be 
"there" where it is happening, "I" am "here", in the indefinable 
silence of the subjective. Because of thisiincidentally, it is 
really all the same whether I have "real" experiences or whether I 
invent them. Hamm's story is every bit as "real" a part of the play 
as Clov's boots. 
The tramps in Godot cannot hang themselves. This is a parable 
to illustrate man's condemnation to freedom. Vladimir and 
ýstragon 
cannot "revolt against"Ahe world created by their choices. Death 
would presumably represent choiceless oblivion - but that is not for 
man, and these two are "all mankind". as we know. CWFG. 79) We must 
always choose, even, in'the emptiness of the wojýld of Godot, and-we 
can choose anything except not to choose, because that is a choice too. 
Of course, this does not work on a natural, non-ontological level. 
In a "natural" situation, man can, by making the unique choice of 
suicide., choose*to stop choosing, the significance ofýwhich is the 
6, trden-of that most'perfect of Existentialist writings, The Myth_of 
, Sisyphus., but-surely nobody supposesýthat'Godot is concerned with 
literal suiclde.: itis-not. a. play that. can be satisfactorily inter- 
preted -, with, a phrase such as"Lat's kill Durselves"*taken at simple 
face-value. 
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The imperatives that drive on Molloy, Moran, Malone and 
the other narrators are an expression of their inability to 
"revolt against", or to "resign" themselves to, themselves. 
Again, there is the natural,, sociological level on which Youdi 
is "the bass", Gaber his factotum and Moran his employee; and 
there is the psychological level on which Malloy has an Oedipus 
complex that drives him towards his mother's bed. But there is 
also the level of the ontological parable. On this level there 
is a condemnation to responsibility seen in the imperatives, a 
condemnation that becomes clearer and clearer as BecKett 
progressively strips his characters. They are sloughing off the 
world at a fair rate between More Pricks Than Kicks and The 
Unnamable. but we do not feel that they slough off so. much as an 
ounce of responsibility. On the contrary, as the world retreats 
it ýecomes more and more apparent that all that they are and have 
depends upon themselves; they become less and less resigned Can 
the natural leveli ontologically they cannot be in this state on 
principle) and, quite amazingly all things considered, they almost 
never revolt. 
This last point proves a great deal.. If Beckett were the 
"natural" pessimist he is sometimes taken to be, and if we read 
him as a prophet of gloom, his hellish universe would be full of 
flaring revolts against the "human condition".. There are some, 
especially in, Clov's moments of violence, but not many. -., The mud- 
-c; reatures of How It is. for,, al: L theirýhorror and vialence,,, hold 
nothing. against the. scribes, the, *theym, whoeverlt Isthat has 
flung themAnto the depths. This Is because The Unnamable and 
How It-Is cannot be read (cannot, only be read, anyway) at. a 
*natural* level. The absence nf. revolt-makes full, sense. ionly when 
we take their situations as ontological parables and see them as 
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trapped in their own worlds for which, in principle, they can 
only "blame" themselves. Clov obeys Hamm because Clov chooses 
to as much as because Hamm chooses to, a point specifically made 
in the play in the exchange, incomprehensible without our reading, 
in which Hamm thanKs Clov for his services and the latter turns 
on him "sharply" and insists "Ah pardon, it's I am obliged to you. " 
(E. 51) 
Hamm and Clov, by being towards each other, being together, 
choose that each should be a component of the other's "coefficient 
of adversity". As Sartre puts it, "our freedom itself creates 
the obstacles from which we suffer. " (BN. 495) This is brought 
home to us time and again as-the refrain "There are no more... " 
mounts up through the play. The lacK of bicycle wheels only becomes 
an obstacle because Hamm wants two of them. The lacK has no existence 
until this moment. The pain-killers only start to be missing when it 
is time for themi Clov, quite logically, does not even hint at their 
absence until they are part of Hamm's present project, then he says 
that there are no more. "My possible is a certain structure of my 
subjectivity. " (6N. 478) 
*** 
The Self. 
We have said a good deal about the Self, the Ego, consciousness 
and so on in the-course -of the preceding sections, but, it is necessary 
tVinention the highly BecKettian"circuit of selfness" that is Sartre's 
summary of his generai'views _as expressed -in 
The Transcendence of the 
fZo and Being and Nothingness. 
Both in Sartre and in Beckett the pour-soi, man, is chasing its 
Chis) "lack", its Self. Sartre likens this to the ass*which pulls a 
cart forwards because it has a carrot dangled beforeIt. Because the 
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carroteis moved forward by the ass's own motion. it can never be 
. 
caught up with. He explains his simile thus: 
We run towards ourselves and we are - due 
to this very fact - the being which cannot 
be reunited with itself. In one sense 
the running is void of meaning since the 
goal Is never given but invented and projected 
proportionately as we run towards it. In 
another sense we cannot refuse to it that 
meaning which it rejects since in spite of 
everything possibility is the meaning of the 
for-itself. Thus there is and there is not 
meaning in the flight. 
(BN. 202-203) 
This Image, and its gloss, appl directly to Beckett. They 
explain the impossibility of his narrator's attempts to "say" 
themselves, the hopelessness of the quest for Self. At the same 
time they give the world just the meaning that it has in Beckett - 
the meaning that arises from my meaning that there should be meaning. 
'The world appears inside the circuit of selfness. " CBN, 198) is just 
exactly what the Unnamable finds. We are separated from ourselves 
by a world and only Onothing' could be the result of our attempts 
to catch up with ourselves. 
So, of course, we cannot be anything. As we have already seen, 
Beckett reduces this to the dictum that his narrator has never been 
On his way to anywhere, but always on his Way. We are always pursuing, 
never reaching, always travelling towards that from which we are shut 
'Off by consciousness. if we ever arrived, we should become en-soi 
or, In simpler terms, if we were ever able to define ourselves as "this' 
"'P, Would not be free to be other, we would cease to be human, time 
would stop and the hole In Being that Is consciousness would -fill up. 
*What the for,: -itself lacKS IS the self - or itself as in-itself-* 
(SN. 89) 0 
'This strikes me as being an excellent ri3ndering of the Beckattian 
Pursuit of th8 Self- 
T in Sartre explicitly and in Beckett perhaps, gives Ihis pur3Uit, 
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rise to value. We shall consider value as one Sartrean equivalent 
of an absolute In the last chapter of this. 
** 
Bad Faith. 
Sartre adopts Heidegger's thesis about "inauthentic" existence 
and develops it into his famous concept of "bad faith". In BeinZ and 
Time Heidegger discusses man's flight into the "they"; man ceases to 
be what he authentically is and becomes dominated by othersi the 
*they" start to make his choices for him and his existence becomes 
inauthentic. In Sartre there is this same flight from oneself, 
Similarly motivated by a desire to escape from the Angst engendered 
by one's own absolute freedom to be oneself. But Sartre takes the 
Matter further than simply positing these two possibilities (being 
oneself, being one*s *they"-Self) and asks what man must be like if 
he*can both be himself and not himself. "Bad faith' is the perfect 
example of this and is selected primarily as an example. In bad 
faith I am simultaneously one thing. 2nd anothers how is this possible? 
Bad faith is different from lying. The liar goes through a simple 
conscious pracessý-he knows one thing-to be the case. sees the advantage 
of concealing this fact and so states the opposite. He deceives you 
and me, 'but he does not deceive himself. In bad faith I deceive myself. 
It is easy to make the mistake of putting an ethical interpre- 
tation on Sartre's discussion of this point. As in the case of Haidegger 
m- ýA-Inauthentic existance"it, would be wrong to do so. Bad faith Is 
only an examele ln, Sartreo it Is not being held up as a bad thing. It 
Is'a phenamenon-that h8'1nvOst: 1gat8s and, indeed. be finds it to be 
a universal,, Jnescapablephenomencn that occurs not by choice or by 
Chance but as the inherent structure of the pour-soi. 
'This is important 
to us because the bad faith in Beckett is also devoid of ethical content 
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and is also presented in its ontological significance. 
The pour-soi must be in bad faith because it cannot be what it 
is. For r. 43 to be angry I must know that I am angry, I must be 
conscious of it. If I an, conscious of something I am not it.. 
Therefore for me to be angry I cannot be angry. The en-soi is what 
it is, it coincides with itself entirely. Thus if I were to be 
"sincere" I would have to become what I am, I would have to become 
en-soi, and of course I can neveý be en-soi in principle. So I 
can never be "sincere* or "angry"I so I am forever in bad faith. 
Popularly, Sartre's ftnous example of the cafe waiter's bad 
faith M. 59ff) is thought to hold up the waiter as a bad thing because 
he acts his job and is not sincerely himself. This is quite wrong. 
There is no way in which the man can cross from being what he is 
("I am*) to being what he does ("a waitern). If, then, we remember 
that the cafe waiter is an ontological parable. and that bad faith 
is an example& we can turn our attention to the meani*ng of this 
parable and the significance of this example. 
The waiter illustrates bad faith and bad faith illustrates that 
man's being is such that he is not what he is. This is so because 
man is conscious and consciousness is a sort of Inverting mirror in 
which everything Is stood an its head. When consciousness appears, 
the principle of Identity that works for, the en-soi, which is what 
it is. breaks down and everything becomes for consciousness what it 
is not. This, and not anything to do with bad faith itself, it what 
Sar. tre is here claiming and temonstrating. 
Which brings. us to Beckett. rather quickly. Here we have a 
convincing &loss an BQCkGtt93 most constant and most mysterious 
theme. -thS 
inability to be. 
I have already quoted Beckettls view of Proust that applies-here. 
Direct contact between subject and object. he says. Is Impossible 
40 
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"because they are automatically separated by the subject's 
consciousness of perception. ". (PTD. 74) This basic idea, developed 
as necessary, reappears frequently in the later worK with an ever- 
increasingly Sartrean intention. In general, none of the later 
"heroes", not even Watt, can be what they are, certainly they are 
all separated from themselves. We can now see why. 
Watt,: for instance, maKes "the distressing discovery" thatof him- 
self too "he could no longer affirm anything that did not seem as false as if 
he had affirmed it of a stone. " (W. 79) Indeed, an the Sartrean 
principle, anything that we say we are, we are not. Thus the 
"programme" established at the beginning of The Unnamable is to 
"proceed" by "affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered'. '. 
(T-. 2931 In Watt, too, it is Mr Knott, the principle of negativity, 
who is the centre of the circle that is the world of his house and 
garden. He is the nothing of consciousness that, according to Sartre, 
cannot be anything, and indeed he 
is 
nothing at all, he is indefinable, 
ineffable. It is Mr Knott's influence that stands. Watt's mind an 
its head - after contact with that negativity Watt walks and talks 
backwards, at least at times, playing "being" to Knott's "consciousness". 
-Hesla relates thisSartrean, point to Endgame. He-observes fIrst 
the necessity for language: if I were something, say "suffering", I 
would not have to express it. to weep and cry out. It Is because I 
am not "suffering" that I need to express it, need to play at it, to 
act out the experience that-is-mine but, not-me. So here we have an 
bgplanation of the frequency with which we are reminded. that Seckett"s 
actors are acting, theaquivalent of the reminders that his -narrators 
are writing. -Hamm is a ham actor., as, weýallýknow, ar, Hamlet., or 
anything but himself.. -Even, when he veils'his -face at -the ýend of 'the 
play the act goes am"an act... whose purposeis. to keepýmy suffering 
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alive by exhibiting it to others, 'including myself as reflecting 
an myself as suffering. 0 (Hesla, 1,190) And certainly, Hamm is 
0 
incomprehensible unless we see him this way, or at least hopelessly 
ambiguous, for we can see that he "is suffering* in the usual sense 
of those words (there is blood on the *old stancher"; we, too, are 
horrified by the lack of pain-killers) but we are puzzled by his 
need to act, to overact, his sufferings. *can there be misery - 
he yawns -loftier than mine? * I would suggest that this makes sense 
best if we regard it as an ontological parable along Sartrean lines. 
Hann, cannot be what he is, he must act, he must be in bad faithi 
that is the message. 
It is just possible that the concept of bad faith can explain 
the mysterious object that appears at the end of'All That Fall. 
Little Jerry runs after Mr and Mrs Rooney from the station to give 
Mr Rooney something he has dropped. Of it Mr Rooney, in answer to 
questions. says OPerhaps it is not mine at all* and "It is a thing I 
carry about with me. " Mrs Rooney says "It looks like a kind of ball. 
And yet it is not a ball. * (ATF. 40) This object could represent 
all objects. the objective In short. As the objective it is 
Mr Rooney's world, vaguely conceived as a ball, and yet, the objective 
not being what it is, perhaps It is not Iminew and perhaps it is not 
a ball. How would the subject know? And yet the objective is always 
and inevitably there with us wherever we go. It is something, as 
Mr Rooney vinlently repeats. that we carry about with us. Mr Rooney 
Jdaves it behind at the station and enters the fantasy world In which 
he accounts for the train having stopped without reference to the 
objective facts* *This'is reinforced by his rather acidly asking, 
Mrs Rooney if she does not believe his account. 'If-this, throws 
suspicion on him, as having perhaps been responsible for the child's 
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death it only makes it more probable that his account of the train 
stopping is a fantasy. But the objective world is inescapable - 
Jerry brings it back to him both in the shape of the mysterious 
object and in his explanation of the little child's death beneath 
the wheals* 
More important than these individual puzzles, however, is the 
general explanation to be found in Sartre on bad faith for the 
Inability of Eeckett's characters to coincide with themselves. 
None of them ever achieves the goal of silence, the goal of 
rendering then-selves en-soi, finishing, because it is in principle 
impossible. The nearest they can get to this dubious Nirvana is 
expressed in The Calmative where the narrator realizes that he can 
at least objectify himself by talking of the present as though it 
were past: 
Yesterday indeed is recent, but not enough. 
For what I tell this evening is passing this 
evening. at this passing hour... I'll tell 
my story in the past nonetheless, as though 
it were a myth, or an old-fable, for this 
evening I need another age, that age to 
become another age in which I became what 
I was. (NK. 26. My. italics. ) 
000 
Otherse 
One of the m-st important developments that Sartre makes of 
a Heideggerian thesis concerns others. Heidegger principally 
establishes that, insofar as we are, we oars With* otherss Sartre 
devotes considerable space to explaining how we are with others. 
For him, others are of enormous importance in existence, even more 
so than for Haidegger. In Being and Time, we will remember, there 
are really only two ontological categories, besides Being Itself; 
there is Dasain's I. existenza. conditioned by facticity, nzda of 
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possibility* already in a world, already with others; and there is 
the Being possessed by what is not Dasein, the "vorhandenO and the 
Izuhanden*. Sartre roughly adopts Dasein's "existenz' as the pour- 
soi. and calls objective existents, the en-soi, but he adds a third 
category to these, existence "pour-autrui", existence for others. 
(I shall henceforth use pour-autrui as an English word. ) 
The category of pour-autrui arises because pour-soi recognizes 
that some of the objects in his world are not en-soi but are fellow 
men, pour-soi like himself. and as he can perceive and judge them so 
they can perceive and judge him. For Sartre, our bodies "mediate" 
between our consciousnesses. He makes it clear that he has reached 
ýthis position by working through and beyond Husserl, Hegel and 
Heidegger U give these nan-es in the order that Sartre does). 
Husserl, in positing a transcendental Ego, cannot escape 
solipsism but, by his phenomenological approach, opens the way for 
Existentialist thinking. Hegel it was who saw that self-conscious 
being is only real when it recognizes the self-consciousness of 
others, but he falls into the error of talking of self-consciousnesses 
as though they were objects, whereas self-consciousness can only be 
subjective. Heidegger "cuts the Gordian knot' (Sartre's phrase here, 
BN. 244) by simply defining man's being as being-with others. However: 
OHeidaggarls being-with is not the clear and distinct position of an 
, 
individual confronting another individual. "ABN. 246) Sartre maintains 
that even If Obeing-with" could be proved, to be the ontological 
structure of man's being-in-the-world, this would not help us to 
explain individual. OonticO relationships such as my relationship 
with Ofterre'l-or whoever. Being and Time. it appears. does not 
escape from solipsism, idealism or realism and, according-to Sartre. 
leaves Dassin nisolatedO as always. He now makes his bwn attempt 
to establish a satisfactory way of seeing others and offers the 
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following theory. (Ul. 250ff) 
I. have a direct apprehension of others, similar to my direct 
apprehension of myself. When I see another man I see him as an 
object, but not only as an object, I also apprehend that, since he 
is also a subject, he is surrounded by his world as I am by mine. 
My environrmnt, when he enters it. flees away from me as I know 
that it is also in relationship with him. His perceptions and 
projects orientate elements in my world towards himself. For me, 
he is a kind of "drain hole* in the middle of being. CBN. 256) 
He, too, presents a nothingness to the solidity of beings objects 
no longer 'group towards' me as they did, but towards him. He has 
stolen the world from me. Of course, I then re-group my world so 
that it includes him, but that only re-affirms how thoroughly I 
have apprehended the other as other. 
Now, however, the other looks at me. When he does so, I do not 
see his eyes at first, I cannot tell what colour they are, or how 
attractive, that only comes later. Immediately, I am aware of 
myself as his object. 08eyond any knowledge which I can have. I 
an. this self which another knows. And this self which I am - this 
I am in a world which the Other has made alien to me; "'IBN. 261) 
Sartre emphasizes this creation of a Self by the look of the Other. 
Previously we discussed the Self exclusively in terms of reflective 
consciousness# as an object my consciousness creates by reflecting 
on itself& perceiving that it is conscious. Now we see that even on 
*tTle unreflective level of immediate consciousness a Self can be 
created, this time by the consciousness-of another being turned 
on tome. If I am concentrating on'som. thing, peering through a 
keyhole for instance, and I hear footsteps behind me I become 
Naware of myself" not because of reflective consciousnbss but in 
an irmad-late way. 
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As a corollary to this we learn the following. The other is 
unpredictable, (Sartre here refers explicitly to Kafka as the 
novelist who has explored this fact most thoroughly) and the other 
makes us aslaves" when we appear to him. (EN. 267) We are possible 
instruments for the purposes of the other and hence *in danger". 
We cannot know the other because knowledge requires an object and 
the other is always subject. All my acts imply the existence of 
others, Consciousness of them reinforces my selfness, not only 
am I not the en-soi, I am, even more certainly, not the other. When 
I die I shall no longer have the possibility of revealing myself as 
subjects others will thenceforth always regard me, that is, my body 
or their memories of no. as object. 
We can relate these points to Beckett in two stages, the two 
main points first. and then the corollaries. 
First, the other '! stealso the world from me. We. notice at 
once the tons of Sartre's imagery here - the other is a *drain hale* 
an "internal hasmorrhage" in my world. Is there anything comparable 
to this Beckattian imagery in Beckett himself? Certainly some of 
the couples seen. to act as owners or destroyers of one another's 
worlds. Clov's world is stolen by Ham, Lucky's by Pozzo. In the 
fiction, the *11 Is often invaded, attacked, at least endangered, by 
another-pour-soi. In Enough, for instance, we have a sort of poetry 
of masochistic submission to a *he". *I did all he desired. I 
desired It too. For him. Whenever he desired something so did I. " 
týX. 153) Throughout this text 'I"Is world is stolen by 'him'. 
Second, we know from Murnhy. Film and elsewhere that Beckett 
has toyed with Berkeleyan-idealism - pandered the Tmlationship of 
esse to percini. By the tim-e of the Texts For Nothing this Interest 
has taken an a Sartrean flavours the other 'betrays your presence" 
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and even Beckett's narrator feels that he must sometimes have 
been Operceivedo by others: 
I can scarcely have gone unperceived all this 
tire, and yet you wouldn't have thought so, 
that I didn't go unperceived. I don't refer 
to the spoken salutation, I'd have been the 
first to be perturbed by that, almost as much 
as by the bow, kiss or handshake. But the 
other signs, irrepressible, with which the 
fellow-creature unwillingly betrays your 
presence, the shudders and wry faces, nothing 
of that nature either it would seem, except 
possibly on the part of certain hearse-horses, 
in spite of their blinkers and strict funereal 
training, but perhaps I flatter myself. Truly, 
I can't recall a single face, proof positive 
that I was not there, no, proof of nothing. 
(NK. 115) 
This narrator knows that he must have been perceived (for he exists 
and the other is a condition of existence) but his isolation is 
stressed, correctly, to the point where he can doubt his own existence 
(01 was not there*). This doubt is based on his inability to conjure 
up an image of an other recognizing him. The open eyes of, an 
unconscious man are not the other. The "look" that betrays my 
presence at the keyhole has never betrayed this narrator's presence, 
so is he present. is he *there*? 
On the one hand, Beckett's characters have their worlds *stolen* 
by other's, and an the other, their "presence* Is "betrayed" by the 
other's look. On the first of these points we can agree that the 
vice-existers steal the world of the ultimate narrator (the Unnamable? 
Sam, "I*? ) in that we soon-loarn to give equivalence to all that is 
said in Beckettes, fiction - whoever is telling the story, it is the 
same to us. Malone's world is metamorphosed into Ilacmann's and we 
cannot object* We can only be sure that these others have stolen 
Beckett's world fran him. On the second point we find evidence 
in the plays that the other0s look is important - Ham needs Nagg 
to watch hir-, his doZ to look up at him. ClOV to listen to him. 
214. 
0 
Happy Days needs Willie to give Winnie a reality similar to that 
conferred an the mouth in. Not I by the Auditor. But, stepping 
back a stage as we have just done with the fiction, the plays 
all depend an the collective look of the audience. Perhaps 
Beckett is Berkeleyan in all this, but he is also Existentialist. 
Besides these two features of Sartre's theory of the existence 
of others, we listed half a dozen corollaries, subsidiary features 
that apply directly to Beckett. First, the other is unpredictable, 
we are before him as Joseph K. is in the face of his trial or his 
castle, we cannot know what the other will do, he too being a free 
consciousness. Thus, in Beckett, *the expelled" is flung down some 
house steps, into the story, for no given reason, and "for once" 
'they' do not beat him in the street, again with no reason given. 
Similarly, in Godot. "theyO beat Estragon, regularly but for no 
necessary reason, unless we accept Vladimir's reason.. which is that 
Esiragon maý have been "not doing anything" in a particular manner 
that caused the attack. But the matter is as broad as the play 
itself - Godot is unpredictable in that he says he will come, and he 
may come, but he doesn't, and Pozzo and Lucky are unpredictable in 
that if you offer them sympathy you may get a kick an the shins, and 
if you meet them one day they may be all talk, confidence and aggression 
while the next they are helpless, blind and dumb. If-the tramps are 
everyman, then Pazzo, Lucky and Godot (or his boy) are others, and 
what are we able to predict of them except unpredictability? 
Second, the other makes me a "slave" when I appear to him. As 
there are so many obvious parallels to this to be found in Beckett 
I $hall simply say here that we should again remember that Sartre 
is proposing thase Points an an ontological level. however. immediate 
and quotidian his discussion of them may appear. Hisýnslavel here 
is an ontological n. etaphor and, if we apply It to Beckett then we are 
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claiming an ontological significance for the master-slave 
relationship that appears so often in his work. Perhaps, thus, 
the goad in Act Without Words II could be the other. 
Third, I am a Possible instrument for the purposes of others 
and hence *in danger". This fits BecKett in two ways. Some of his 
characters are subordinated to the purposes of others (Moran to 
Gabor, Gabor to Youdi, Moran Junior to his father, at least for a 
while) and all of his characters are subordinates to their superiors 
in the hierarchy of narration (Worm, is there for the Unnamable's 
purposes, the Unnamable for Beckett's. ) 
Fourth, the other, as subject, is in principle unknowable. 
This is a point that Beckett makes frequently but nearly always 
by implication only. Throughout the Texts For Nothing for instance, 
"others" appear: "hew, OtheyQ, and so on. We are never allowed them 
in their full value as others, except for an occasi6nal "little. cantern 
always demolished by a contradictory aside. The boundary between 
the "10 and the others becomes fluid, disintegrates, we do not 
believe or disbelieve the voice that says "hew any more than we 
believe or disbelieve the voice that says *I*. If pressqd to explain 
this we would say that the voice itself seems dubious as to its 
certainty or authority an any subject, whether its "I* or its *hew 
or its "theyo. In other words, the subject can only talk as subject, 
and however much it says "he" it can only either miss its mark 
(the other is unknowable) or engulf its objects in subjectivity. 
ft, 5eckett says, It's the fault of the pronouns, any old pronoun 
will do. This incorporates our fifth-point - all my acts'-im-Ply 
the existence of others - for I cannot avoid saying 'he*-and Othey" 
any m. ra than I can stop saying. Even the slush of -words 'is churned 
for somebody, even the Unnamable has an objective existence in the 
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world of others notwithstanding their unknowability. 
Sixth, the look of the other gives me an immediate awareness 
of me as a Self. This, being of course a partial contradiction 
to our fourth and fifth points, seems to leave Beckett behind, but 
perhaps we could claim that, when the system of pronouns has broken 
down, and we are left with the all-devouring babble of the Unnamable, 
one of the points towards which Beckett tries to move is the point 
at which his narrator can posit an "other" to give him back some 
sort of a self: "it's not me they're calling, not me they're 
talking about, it's not yet my turn, it's someone elsel, s turn, 
that's why I can't stir... " (T. 416) 
Our seventh and Iasi point is that death will finish me as a 
subjecti thenceforth others will treat me only as an object, I will 
be knowable at last, but onlyý. in that I shall be reduced to others' 
memories of me and my physical components - my body. Beckett's 
view of the body, like Sartrels, extends beyond the scope of our 
discussion of others and must be dealt with separately. 
*** 
The Body. 
Man wants the security of reducing the other to an object and 
Keeping*it objective. Sartre extends this to our consideration of 
death and our way of loving. When another pour-soi is dead he has 
no more possibilities, no freedom, no subjectivity. We have "won" 
over the other when*he is dead, -reduced him-to the captivity ofthe 
objective forever. We attempt the same thing in the experience of 
love - each partner In the affairor-the marriage tries toreduce 
the other to the neutralized. safe state of objectivity. In death 
always, and in love sometimes. we reduce the other from pour-soi to 
en-soi. 
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This maKes it sound as though Sartre is resorting to an old- 
fashioned mind-body dualism, but this is not so. Certainly a 
dead body is en-soi, but a living body is pour-soi, at least for 
its possessor. I can treat another0s body as en-soi, if, say, I 
am a cannibal, and I can even treat my own body as en-soi if I 
imitate the man who treasures his pickled appendix after having 
it removed. But for me my own body is all pour-soi; further, I am 
aware of the bodies of others as being pour-soi for them, and I 
am aware of my body as it falls beneath the looK of the other. 
(cf. BN. 303-359-ifor all these considerations about the body. ) 
The most important of these points, and the most Beckettian, 
-is 
the claim that my body is pour-soi not en-soi. Sartre observes 
that "there is nothing behind the body. But the body is wholly 
"psychic". " (BN. 305) The body, '. is not an en-soi within a pour-soi, 
it is pour-soi, the pour-soi cannot be "separated" from the body. 
"The body is lived and not known. " CBN. 324) Heidegger's worldly 
series of instruments and signs stops at the body. Thus an author 
generates the series: "book-to-be-written" - paper - writing- pen - 
hand. The series stops with the hand. Consciousness "exists" its 
I body - Sartre gives this verb a transitive usage here - the body is 
a structure of self-consciousness. Finally, the b"ody exists in 
contingency, it is the consciousness' experience of contingency, 
because of the body contingency can "recapture" consciousness. (BN. 338) 
Furthermore the body itself Is contingent and, an its account, we 
'0 , suffer" hates 
love* acts and qualities. There is no way out of this - 
'when no pain, no satisfaction or dissatisfaction is *existed" by 
consciousness. the for-itself does not cease thereby to project 
-Itself 
beyond a contingency which is pure and... unqualified. 
Consciousness idoes not cease'"to have" a body. 'Coenes-thetic 
affectivity is then a pure, non-positional apprehension of a 
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contingency without colour, a pure apprehension of toe self as a 
factual existence. " (EIN. 338) This apparently neutral state turns 
out not to be neutral at all - instead it is "nausea. " 
We can relate these points to Beckett in turn. First, the 
body is "lived", not "known", is pour-soi, not en-soi. Certainly 
BecKett is a'highly physical novelist and poet, and even in his 
plays there is enough eating, drinking, urinating and pain, --. to 
keep our attention on the body. In the novels and texts this 
physicality operates as a kind of disgusted counterpoint to the 
mental activities of-the narrators, a concrete objection to any 
fanciful notions about the Self. It is as if the body is evilly 
insisting an being taken into consideration in the quest for the 
Self, Knowing that it will be just another spanner in the worKs. 
But for all the babble and mentation. the narrators are solidly, 
hideously there, plunged in flesh, themselves inescapably flesh. 
They talk often enough of their bodies, theirý infirmities, but nq 
real distance is ever established between themselves and their bodies. 
In the Texts For Nothing the narrator tries to "will" himself a body, 
a head, strength and courage and even seems to succeed in this 
apparently dualistic undertaking: 
There youýare nowýon-your feet, I'give you 
my word, I swear they're yours, I swear its 
mine,. get to, work with your hands, palp your 
skull ... then the rest, the lower regions... 
(NK. 82) 
So-far so good. but the project collapses because the narrator is 
unable to maintain any-distanco'between'this physical creation and 
his *I. * *1ý21-_, wait --for , you 
'here" '-he, says to-his creation, and 
--follows -this -with, phrases -that are'most- curious without -something 
. -like z Zartrean,, gloss: *1"22 mait for you here. -no; I im -alone. 'I 
alone, am, this, time It's i, nust, go. "'INK-82. ) The pointAs that 
without a,. body, to "7existo --the -ols, -is -alone. -a, nothing., a point o-f 
subjectivity without-existenca. 'So be-, goes on: 11 know how I'll 
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do it, I'll be a man, there's nothing else for it" (NK-82) which is 
to say that he must be a body in order to exist. 
Second, the worldly series of instruments stops at the body. 
The pen "refers" to my writing and thus to my hand. MY hand when 
writing is me writing. We cannot go "behind" my hand. In Beckett 
there is a strict division between the characters' bodies and their 
instruments - crutches, sticks, stones and bicycles are dispensable, 
objects for fascinated consideration, clearly means to ends. Mean- 
while arms and legs are obsessively, preoccupyingly "me. " Thus 
Molloy's bicycle is highly doubtful in a way his stiff legs are not: 
So I got up ... and went down to the road, 
where I found my bicycle (I didn't Know I 
had one). ... It was a chainless bicycle, 
with a free wheel, if such a*6icycle exists 
(T. 16) 
v 
I shall only add that every hundred yards 
or so I stopped to rest my legs, the good 
one as well as the bad, and not only my 
legs, not only my legs. 
(T. 16-17) 
In all of Beckett's work there is remarkably little doubt thrown on 
the body. The instrumentality of the world, the past, the world 
itself, others at least as other versions of himself, all are 
dismissed by the series of narrators. But the body goes marching, 
crawling, babbling an. Even in How It Is and the latest-short 
texts there are bodies - Pim's body and those of his fellow-creatures 
have a reality greater than that of their mental activities and-the 
*little body" of Lessness is a sort of inescapable minimum, holding 
Beckett back from the final plunge Into the purely abstract. 
Finally we must consider Sartre's point 6bout the, body as 
contingency and nausea. -In Beckett the-body is -frequently addmssed 
by the controlling voice cfýthe narrator-as though: it-were a-random 
possession of-his consclousness. We, know that this, is not true,. and 
that Molloy: is flis legs. -the Unnamable. As'his head and so on. but 
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pour-soi can always see his body as en-soi, and, when he does, its 
openness to the contingent is at once apparent. Thus BecKettian 
"heroes" are subjected to the thousand natural shocKs that flesh is 
heir to, and a few more besides. They never really complain, 
because their sufferings, being contingent, are inexplicable and 
somehow distant from them. And, as in Sartre, the body's own emotions, 
actions and qualities are also contingent, which perhaps explains 
Beckett's strange tone whereby we are given the impression that there 
is nothing much to explain his narrators' desires, no way of explaining 
their actions and a curious indifference to even their own freely- 
chosen ends. Beckett excludes all necessity, and events in his 
world are either governed by the fantasy of the person who narrates 
them or the blind contingency of brute fact. 
And nausea - "contingency sickness" - my apprehension of my 
body even when it is feeling neither pleasure nor pain - surely 
this is the status quo in all BecKett's work. The great symphony 
of suffering that makes up All That Fall can stand as a prime 
example. It is not just that people are blind or ill or murdered, 
worse still is the permanent undercurrent of nausea, directed, in 
Maddy Rooney's case at least, at her own vast, vile body. 
How can I go on, -I cannot, Oh let me just flop 
down flat an the road 'liKe a big fat Jelly. out 
Df a bowl and never moVe again! A great big 
slop thicK with grit and dust and flies, they 
would have to scoop me up with a-shovel. 
CATFA) 
Conclusion 
*** 
7here is a lot more In Being -and Nothingness than 'the 
we have dealt with here. ', Some of'Sartre's-theses are not particularly 
relevant to'Beckett.. others we have-covered in'the, chapter an 
Heidegger. Among these latter, however. are two'paints, that are 
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worth mentioning, temporality and death. 
Sartre echoes Heidegger on temporality more or less point-for- 
point, insisting that time depends on man, that the past is an 
aspect of facticity, the future the emptiness of possibility and so 
on. (SN. 107ff) Objects, the en-soi, have no time, and pour-soi 
becomes en-soi when it has slipped into the past. To this 
Heideggerian point Sartre adds that what distinguishes pour-soi is 
that it "has to be" its own past -I am what I have been. This 
may sound commonplace enough, but it is in fact an almost uniquely 
Existentialist view in that it is meant to imply that I am nothing 
other than my past (and my present free'dom if you like, but that is 
a "nothing". ) I do not have a given essence or nature to which I 
can cling, or-to which I can appeal. If I have behaved-with consistent 
cruelty, for instance, I cannot set against the history of my cruel 
actions some claim that I am "really" tender-hearted. - I am "really" 
what I have been, cruel. And this is where Beckett is Existentialist. 
He claims no fixed nature for any of his major characters; how 
often do we find one of them claiming any character at all? Which 
of them seriously proposes himself as finally kind, say, or intelligent, 
or pertinacious, or boring or even erratic? What could we say, 
laying cur hands an our hearts, about the character of Vladimir or 
Clov or Malone or Worm? Certainly Pozzo could be defined, perhaps 
Nagg, the earlier Moran, Saposcat and other lesser types, but the 
"basic" characters, the reduced people, the remnants whose "story" 
, 
w, e are hearing - Molloy, Hamm, the tramps. the Unnamable himself - 
these defy definition. On the other hand they are clearly made by 
their pasts, wondering about, the connexion between what they were 
and whatthey are. But the cannexion is Sartriel, s, connexion -1they 
are what they were. For Molloy there seems to be'a hiatus between 
his adventures with bicycles and crutches end his position-here and 
now in his mother's room; and so it seems to all of -us. unable zs 
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we are to blend the pour-soi present with the en-soi past; but what 
does Molloy talk about? What are his concerns? How do we learn 
to say anything about him at all? The answer to all these lies in 
his past. What Sartre says of the past applies exactly to the 
characters who narrate the trilogy and How It Is: "If the past does 
not determine our actions, at least it is such that we can not take 
a new decision except in terms of it. " (BN. 496) 
That is Existentialist temporality in Beckett. When Sartre 
proposes how we can consider time separately, in a non-Existentialist 
manner, apart from "human reality", he offers a thesis that is 61so 
to be found in BecKett. (This is often the case - BecKett plays 
with a traditional philosophical problem in a way that reveals it as 
incomprehensible; this puts him into the same position as the 
Existentialists at least to start with. ) Sartre looKs at the 
conventional approach to time thus: 
If Time is considered by itself, it immediately 
dissolves into an absolute multiplicity of 
instants which considered separately lose. all 
temporal nature and are reduced ... to the 
total a-temporality of the this. 
(BN. 215) 
Here we have another statement of the time problem that appears 
. throughout Beckett from the grains of Millet in Endgame to the'light 
which "gleams an instant" in Godot, the "one enormous second" of the 
Unnamable and Breath. Or, as we have it in the first of the Texts 
For Nothing, wAll mingles, time and tenses, at first I only had been 
here. now-I'm still here, soon I won't be here yet. " [NK. 74) 
Connected with temporality is-death. Here Sartre contradicts 
Heidegger roundly. Death-is not my '"ownmost" possibility.. cannot 
be'the only thing that nobody can do for me. After all. -every 
choice I make is uniquely mine. nobody can do anything for me. Of 
course, somebody can *stand in" for me, '"take my place'ý. but that is 
quite different, from giving up my freedom to another which is an 
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impossibility. When somebody does something "for" me he does not 
annihilate me, I remain. So every choice, in Sartre, is my "own- 
most" possibility. What is more, it is very hard to develop any 
"being-towards" death since I cannot know the hour or manner of its 
arrival. 
Thus, for Sartre, death, far from being an end that gives a 
meaning to life, is absurd. We are like the condemned man who is 
preparing to give a meaning to his life, to "close the account" 
satisfactorily, by making "a good showing an the scaffold" and who 
is then carried off by a 'flu epidemic. CBN. 533) What death reveals 
is the absurdity of every expectation, even the expectation of 
death itself. 
We are always expecting, always waiting; our freedom is a 
projection towards an end for which we wait, "our life is only a 
long waiting" (SN. 537) and thus we are waiting to wait, "there we 
have the very structure of selfness: - to be oneself is to come to 
oneself. " (BN-538) This waiting implies a final term, death, in 
which, as in Heidegger and perhaps Christianity, one will "come to 
oneself" and meaning will arise. Alas, this final term cannot bring 
with it the meaningfulness Heidegger supposes unless we posit a God 
who chooses the hour of my death. If there is no such chooser how 
can meaning arise? One minute more or less of life may perhaps 
change everything and who Is to say exactly when I shall die? if 
I try to '"round off* my life by writing some definitive philosophical 
. work and 
then committing suicide, I may have a fatal heart attack as 
71 pick, up my, pen to write'the first sentence. Death is arbitrary, 
-the conclusive proof af contingency. absurd. "Death is never'that 
which gives life its meanings; it is. on'the contrary, that which 
an principle removes all meaning from life. " (SN. 539) Here we can 
already see a possible reason why Beckett's characters can't come 
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to the end: the only hope is to Keep going, Keep trying the possi- 
bilities, because the end will only bring about an automatic collapse 
of all meaning. But to conclude Sartre's exposition. 
"Since the for-itself is the being which always 
lays claim to an "after", there is no place 
for death in the being which is for-itself. " 
CBN. 540) 
Waiting for death. then, is waiting for what I cannot Know or under- 
stand, it is "waiting for an undetermined event which would reduce 
all waiting to the absurd, even including that of death itself. " (BN. 540) 
Death is not just not my "ownmost" possibility, it is not even one 
of my possibilities at all. 
Now this applies so obviously to Godot and Endgame that I can 
be brief. Again we are faced with looking at Beckett's works as 
ontological parables. Death is impossible for pour-soi, ýand that 
in the literal sense that it is not one of my possibilities. Godot 
shows man waiting. waiting for what cannot possibly come to him. 
0 
If Godot himself is some sort of absolute (God) then he won't come 
because, as Sartre days, death is not a confrontation with any 
absolute, it is the opposite, the generator of chaos not of worlds. 
The tramPs fail to kill themselves because death is not one of their 
possibilities (rf. Sartra on'suicide. BN. 540). 'They must be there, 
they must wait, they wait for further waiting, wait to wait, and 
meaning never comes, the self never comes. As everytheatregoer 
must at some time have suspected, if Godot came there would not be 
a joyous revelation Of the'meaning of the waiting Ci. e. of suffering, 
--life). On the contrary. it would only confirm the absurdity of 
existence. 
In Endgame we are-watching-people waiting-for death. it 
r-omes. in random ways to the-flea, the'rat, Nagg. It implants-no 
meaning In the world. The play vpens with'the word "finished*, 
but it isn"t. -and'It concludes-with the word "remain",. 
225. 
Notes to Chapter 4 
1. The theses of The Transcendence of the Ego reappear in Being 
and Nothingness in a limited form that really requires a knowledge 
of the earlier worK. Cf. BN. 102-105. What is particularly 
clarified in the later work is Sartre's conception of "the 
circuit of selfness, " cf* the section entitled "The Self", 
below. 
iw 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Surfaces and Depths 
Towards the Wellhead 
What has been offered so far amoýints to a case for a philosophical 
reading of Beckett; what remains is to undertake that reading. Three 
philosophers have been dealt with at length and in detail with the 
aim of exposing their worlds, their languages and their methods. In 
each casel at each turning point in the philosophical argument, I 
have tried to show how a particular formulation or view fitted into a 
Beckettian pattern. This has demonstrated that'Beckett can1be read 
alongside certain philosophers and that they can throw light 
into his 
darker corners. I have tried to establish this unselectively. That 
is, it has not been simply a question of applying a few individual 
moments of philosophical insight to Beckett but of applying the main 
body of three interrelated philosophies, three world-views more or 
less in toto, to his work. 
i 
I have not pursued Hegel, Heidegger or Sartre to their con- 
clusions, even in the three main works discussed. ThusI did not 
follow Hegel into his historical theses, Heidegger into his time-and- 
histori cality section or Sartre-into all of his, concepts. 'However, 
I have presented the central picture of man's being and existence as 
it is to be found in these three. 'In each case-the edges of the 
canvas may have been left dark but the view of the man himself 
(Hegel's man, Heidegger's, Sartre's) has been clear, and complete. 
wa"have accounted, -in all three-r-ases, for vhat Heidegger,, would, have 
r -lled-the"'equiprimordial existentialia" of man:, consr-iousness,. the -a 
objects of consciousness, the-world, others, ; and,,, so on. 
Beckett can-be best-understood. -and'at times-only understood, 
if we see"his work as aliterary-expression or realization of 
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something that resembles these pictures of man. He shows us what it 
is like (how it is) in the world of these philosophers if their views 
are lived through, carried through into consciousness and not merely 
considered as appropriate only to the study or the library. Beckett's 
work offers us a horrific world, but it is the world as it exists for 
philosophy rather than as it exists in "average everydayness". If 
this is not the case, where does the trouble lie? Beckett seems to 
be in violent revolt against the nature of this world and it is 
clearly not something political or psychological that he is revolting 
against. It is something ontological. In general terms it is 1W 
condition humaine that is wrong, there is something wrong at theý 
root of the human situation, something wron&that'no, amount of love 
or money-for-hospitals will cure, something wrong ontologically. 
In other words I would suggest that Beckett's works areq in 
one central aspect, ontological parables. A demonstration of this 
can be found in the self-destructive nature of his fiction. We 
always know that the narrators' stories are only stories, we have 
the arbitrary act of invention thrust under our noses at every turn. 
This forces us to search for stable ground in the quicksands and to 
give only provisional value to the unstable areas, which is as-much 
as to say that we are thrust back to,. an ontological. level-in the 
end, however much we may have enjoyed the fiction while it was in 
progress. In-principle, once this process of destroying himself or 
giving himself-away has', started, in an. author, all hisý, statements 
become, suspect; -butýthere is an. analogy to'be drawn, nonetheless, 
between. Dur going back into. Beckett's-, fundamental concerns (searching 
for a stable area) and,. the-narrators, emergingfrom-their fictions 
-to. talk, about themselves. '-Thus-we-have one way of, getting-closer 
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to the meaning of Beckett's parables if we extrapolate back in the 
direction: fictions (eg. Macmann) - narrators (eg. Malone) - author 
(Beckett? ). This process leads us towards the concerns of philosophy, 
as can be shown if we follow up the example of Macmann and Malone. 
Although Macmann is so obviously a creation, we can respond to 
him in a variety of serious ways. We must, after all, be able to 
suspend our disbelief or fiction would be altogether impossible, and 
I think that,, for example, we are likely to feel pity for him, but in 
the end Beckett forces us back away from him and we have to realize 
that we are being asked to respond to something other than his 
adventures. These adventures, anyway, are inclined to be trivial 
and inconclusive. Here is an example from the end of Malone Dies. 
So... a little later Macmann, having brought 
back from his walk a hyacinth he had torn 
up bulb and roots in the hope of being able 
to keep it a little longer thus than if he 
had simply plucked it, was fiercely repri- 
manded by Lemuel who wrenched the pretty 
flower from his hands and threatened to 
hand him over to Jack again, no, to Pat 
again, Jack is a different one. 
(T. 277) 
As the conclusion of this passage shows, we are not allowed to forget 
the fictional nature of the episode for-very long. The episode 
itself is trivial, meaningless, absurd, unless, perhaps, we take it 
as an indicator of the general nature of Beckett's world (if the 
surface is like this we cannot expect the depths to be particularly 
pleasant. ) 'The mad Macmann makes a sad figure, picking flowers. for 
cckafort, flowers which do not last long, anyway-and which he para- 
doxically destroys to make them last a little 'longer; his. rather 
, pathetic gesture, earns him a fierce rebuke. This is the surface of 
a world that is perhaps not organized for man's, happiness, a fact, so 
obviousIn every painful, line of, -the trilogy, that we are., forced. to 
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interrogate the narrators about this world. They are, in any case, 
creating a world for their creations to inhabit. 
0 
Malone, the dying narrator of the Macmann episodes, gives-us 
some relief by turning back to himself from time to time and discus- 
sing his fictions. But his world, the next stratum of literary 
creation, is as bad as Macmann's. He dismisses his story-telling 
with "But that is all beside the point, like so many things. " He 
continues: 
All is pretext, Sapo and the birds, Moll, 
the peasants, those who in the towns seek 
one another out and fly from one another, 
my doubts which do not interest me, my 
situation, my possessions, pretext for 
not coming to the point... 
(T. 278) 
This sort of aside tells us not only that we should, read the stories, 
such as Macmann's. as a special sort of rubbish, but also that we 
should question Malone's own babble about himself. His "doubts". 
his "situation", his "possessions" are mere pretexts. Once again 
we are being forced on: just as Macmann is not "the point" Malone 
is not the point either. But his stratum of words, although it too 
is a fiction, is closer to the reality that underlies the novel and 
drives it on. Thus we are being directed towards that whichis 
"'the point", that which is "reality". We are once again given a 
strong indication that it will not be pleasant, that there is some- 
thing amiss in the ontological structure of the world; Malone, after 
all, is dying in stinking confusion, his "horror-worn eyes linger 
-, abject 
on all they. have beseeched so long". (T. 278) 
What next? Macmann'has7-passed us, on-to Malone and, 14alone 
seems, to-be-passing us-on. -to someone-or-somewhereý'else-where, we, can 
-read or discover"'the point". He says-that bisýeyes have "beseeched 
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so long" in a "last prayer, the true prayer at last, the one that 
asks for nothing". (T. 278) We might agree to stop here and abandon 
ourselves to oblivion or to mysticism but someone will not let us 
(it is still Malone, nominally at least): 
And it is then a little breath of fulfilment 
revives the dead longings and a murmur is 
born in the silent world... 
(T. 278) 
With that "murmur" we are off again: 
The last word in the way of viaticum. 
Let us try it another way. The pure plateau. 
Try and go on. The pure plateau air. 
Yes, it was a plateau, Moll had not lied.... 
(T. 278) 
This takes us back in the direction we have come from, back to the 
stories about Moll: and Macmann. In the matter of getting, through 
to reality-we want-to go beyond Malone-rather-than'back, to the sur- 
face-of transparent invention. Malone may hint that the way to 
reality (to the "true prayer-at last") is through further-fictional 
inventton, but there is no sign of it in Macmann's story which, 
anyway, is also explicitly intended as a time-filler. 
I have chosen this example1rom the end of Malone Dies because 
here, more clearly than elsewhere,, -we are actually given another 
stratum "beyond" Malone, the stratum of The Unnamable. In the open- 
ing pages of The Unnamable'the "I" speaks of Malone objectively and 
is clearly further down, further away1rom the surface, than his 
previous narrators. "Is Malone'the culprit? " he can ask. (T. '298) 
'.; hen, in, the ssme-wayýas Malone discussed himself-after talking about 
"What 
, ýhe 4-says abouthimself --takes ý, us; 
deeper-into -the,,, real,. concerns "that 
we,,, feel-. to'be-underlyiugý-the'-trilogy.,,. the concerns", that,, are. apparent 
. jon-its,, very,. 
firstý'linesýwhere'Molloy, ask34how-'he, has, ýgot, to where 
he-'is. The'Unnamable comments: 
23L. 
It would help me, since to me too I must 
attribute a beginning, if I could relate 
it to that of my abode. Did I wait some- 
where for this place to be ready to receive 
me? Or did it wait for me to come and 
people it? By far the better of these 
hypotheses, from the point of view of use- 
fulness, is the former, and I shall often 
have occasion to fall back on it. But both 
are distatesful. I shall say therefore that 
our beginnings coincide, that this place was 
made for me, and I for it, at the same 
instant. 
(T. 298) 
Here, having sloughed off the surface fantasies of Macmann and the 
"vice-existence" of Xalone, an unnamable "I" turns to himself, poses 
a question and suggests an answer, that are rendered intelligible only 
if we take them ontologically. Beckett is a creative artist and as 
such is speaking to our emotions as well as our intellects but surely 
It-is not enough to say of this passage that it offers us-the 
generalized sense of anguish of aýbeing lost in an incomprehensible 
world without going on and specifying what that anguish is, why that 
being feels it and how he can conceive of the world as incomprehen- 
sible? If we are thrust from the surface to the depths, if we feel 
we are being taken closer to the fundamental vision, the basic quest, 
of-the author then our-wits need to beýsharper-not duller, as we 
descend. The surface'level offersýus, pain, farce, and. -doubt andq 
although self-consciously-a mere-. creation, it, is, ipso, facto, a 
vision of-the-world, but-if that-is true ofýthe, random creations 
such as Sapooor Macmann it, is surely-at least astrueýof-the deeper 
Jevels. 
Our idea-of surface and, depth-is,,, of course, metaphorical. -1 
have adopted it here for clarity and because, Beckett, employs it 
both-within the'trilogy and, in*'his, oeuvre 4s a, whole. Our reading 
of this_oeuvre, now needs to take, an overall, view which*will make 
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some sense, in a large scale, of the claim that we need to see, 
Beckett as a creator of ontological parables in order fully to under- 
stand him. 
***** 
Beckett's Development 
I would offer two premisses for the discussion of Beckett's 
development. First, he starts on the surface and moves towards the 
depths, andq second, his work is a whole, a unified and self-consistent 
statement about existence which explores the same vision of the world 
from increasingly profound viewpoints. 
The first of these is intended only as a diagrammatic and 
summary aid to understanding, a metaphor to show where Beckett takes 
us. In general the amount of naturaliýtic description of the quoti- 
than world decreases between More Pricks Than Kicks. and, say, Breath. 
Earlier Beckett characters tend to be individualized, human, treated 
as odd examples of normal people; later Beckett characters tend to 
be namelessp inhuman and extraordinary. You might meet and recognize 
Murphy'in'HydeýPark, you-will not, meet one of the "Lost Ones". What 
is wrong with the earlier characters could conceivably be alleviated 
by sociological or psychological attentions: Belacqua Shua and Murphy 
want-things within the world, attainment of which-brings or could 
bring some satisfaction; what is wrong later in Beckett is incurable. 
He,. moves-from an-agonized playing on the naturalistic surface of 
life to an agonized grasping of. its ontological foundations. He 
himself suggests, the metaphor of depthwhen he,, casts"his, creatures 
-in Mow 'It -Is 
into -the mud and has them remember 'life "'up -there" 
in 
, the-normal daylight-vorld. As -an alternative, he employs, deserts, 
cylinders, darkness-and other forms of isolation--to emphasize the 
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distance that exists, in his later work, between his settings and 
the normal surface of reality. 
Our second premiss, that Beckett's work is a self-consistent 
whole, can hardly be surnmarized in the same way. Beckett's vision 
of the world remains steady but its perceptiveness increases so that 
the world is laid ever more bare under his gaze and we are shown the 
depths, the ontological realities that underpin the surface realities 
with which he was at first concerned. Perhaps we can see Beckett as 
a sort of bird circling his prey; the prey remains the same and is 
the centre of each circle he describes, each circle being equally 
necessary. As the bird comes closer and closer the prey i's more and 
more clearly described. Perhaps the analogy with Dante that springs 
to mind here is not accidental, the descent is certainly into the 
depths of a kind of hell. 
Naturally Beckett-does not fit either of these schemes 
exactly. In the early work there are moments as profound, and as 
-much in need of philosophical explanation, as anything in How It Is 
and the later texts. Furthermore, in-the later work there are 
moments that call'for a psychological re'sponse rather than a philo- 
sophical one - in Not I, for instance, where the mouth seems to 
belong to a paranoiac personality as well as to an ontologically 
representative entity. But the general scheme is'helpful and it 
shows us where to apply our philosophical exegesis at', the same 
fi I iýe as hinting, that, the series of ontological parables we read into 
'Beckett may'in'the end resolve'themselves into one unified statement. 
Beckett's work falls roughly into three periods: the pre-war, 
the post-war and the "residual" (to borrow a word of 'Beckett's -own. ) 
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In terms of our philosophical parallels the first period (the period 
of More Pricks Than Kicks and Murphy is the one best illuminated 
by the conventional critical technique of glossing and discussing 
Beckett's references to philosophers. This is his Cartesian period, 
the period in which he plays with early modern philosophy and is 
inclined-to wear his learning on his sleeve. Here, where conventional 
criticism is most fruitful, the need for ontological interpretation 
is least evident. 
The second period (the period of Godot, Endgame and the 
trilogy)plumbs greater depths. Where Belacqua, for instance, appears 
in the first period (in More Pricks Than Kicks) a gloss on his name 
is more or less an adequate explanation of its adoption. But where 
"Belacqua or Sordello" appear early in the trilogy the same gloss 
seems inadequate - for a start, Beckett can no longer remember which 
of them it is he wishes to refer to and he soon abandons them. I 
have concentrated on this second period in selecting examples in the 
three previous chapterso above. In this chapter I shall deal with 
the later work as well. 
Watt acts as a sort of turning-point between these first two 
periods. It starts in the style of Murphy with the hilarious Mr 
Hackett who lives in the "big" world of policemen and billiard tables 
and friends but, once Watt himself comes on the scene, the novel 
moves rapidly into a world that'is at once, more obscure and more 
-ý-rafound. Dialogue and policemen disappear', from the-novel (although 
watt emerges into the surface-world again at the end) and all 
certainties, including the reader's, crumble in the house of Mr Knott. 
The-turning-point vithin the novel, the'arrival of Watt at Mr Knott's 
house, is marked'by one of'Ber-kett', s most sustained excursions into 
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the profounder reality underlying his work, Arsene's speech at the 
end of Part One. This speech will be discussed in the final section 
of this chapter. 
To illustrate the development in Beckett between his first and 
second periods there are plenty of examples. Here are two. In 
Murphy the Occasionalist philosopher Geulincx appears in order to be 
complimented on his "beautiful Belgo-Latin" -(M. 124) and one or two 
parallels can be drawn between elements in the novel and the solution 
adopted. by Geulincx to the Cartesian mind-body problem; notably this 
solution appears funny to us and is wryly treated by Beckett at least 
in implication. In Molloy, however, from the second period under 
discussion,, we-find Geulincx treated differently. There is still a 
touch of humour but we feel he is being used more seriously, more 
passionately and less cerebrally: 
I who had loved the image of old Geulincx, 
dead young; who left me free, on the black 
boat of Ulysses, to crawl towards the East, 
along the deck. That is a great measure 
of freedom, for him who has not the pione-! 
ering spirit. And from the poop, poring 
upon the wave, a sadly rejoicing slave, I 
follow with my eyes the proud and futile 
wake. 
(T. 51) 
The, reference to Geulincx's theory of freedom, which amounts to the 
theory-that we have'very-little freedom, is closer to Beckett's own 
-range of serious problems than the solution to the mind-body problem 
. referred-toln 
Murphy The narrator of this. passage identifies 
1imself, with t-he slave of, Geulincx's-examplean&rises to poetic- 
heights in. -the process. We-are out, of the-realm of the learned-joke 
. and 
inna-more serious confrontation, vith the-issues of philosophy. 
'It, is, worth, noting here, too,. that Beckett and-his-narrator employ 
-the past tense, "I ý; ho had loved. " He is leaving behind him 'the 
4 
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dubious consolations of academic philosophy. 
Another ex=ple concerns two presocratic philosophers. In 
Murphy we are asked to consider the undignified end of "Hippasos the 
Akousmatic" who drowned in a puddle. Here there is nothing to be 
gained beyond the immediate reference and the response it conjures 
up: laughter perhaps and a certain pleasant puzzlement. In Endgame, 
however, from Beckett's second period, the philosopher Zeno appears 
for the sake of his paradox and here we are asked to take him 
seriously just as Geulincx became serious in Molloy. Hamm, towards 
the end of one of his more terrifying monologues, considers time: 
Moment upon moment, pattering down, like 
the millet grains of... (he hesitates)... 
that old Greek,,. and all fil-fe long you 
wait for that to mount up to a life. 
(Pause. He opens his mouth to continue, 
renounces. ) Ah let's get it over! 
(E. 45) 
The puzzlement engendered by Zeno's paradox is not really a laughing 
matter at all, there is a deadly earnest about Hamm's agonized fight 
with time and about Clov's "nearly finished". 
Conventional interpretation, -then, is still of some use in 
the second period of-Beckett's writing (we still have to know who 
Geulincx and Zeno were) but we feel that we are being taken further 
and that we are-going to be obliged to take, seriously the issues 
raised-and not merely to regard them as anintellectual game. When 
ve, get to. the-. third. period.,, *-t.... seems, to mp-,. that-conventional inter- 
. IOtation breaks down, altogeth ez -And that, unless -one - has , squarely 
faced-the-philosophical issues inherent in the second period andis 
, prepared 
to'look-at-the third period in an ontological light, one 
is in danger of finding it. partially incomprehensible. 0 
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This third period extends fromlHow It Is (1960) to Beckett's 
most recent work. It includes the texts Enough, The Lost Ones, Ping, 
Lessness and Imagination Dead Imagine as well as the plays Come and 
Go, Eh Joe, Breath, Not I and. Footfalls, to mention only these. The 
plays, generally, lag behind the fiction in the history of Beckett's 
development. Thus, Krapp's Last Tape, although composed in 1958 is 
clearly akin to Malone Dies,, composed in French as early as 1948. 
with this as a precedent it seems reasonable to exclude from our 
third period sqme of the plays written after 1960 which belong rather 
obviously to the earlier period, notably Happy Days and Play (1961 
and 1962 respectively). 
1 
Beckett himself has described his work of this period, the 
"shorts" since How It is, ýas "residua" (in the Preface to No's Knife. ) 
He glossed this, in reply to a query by Brian Finney, "they are 
residual... in relation to wholie body of previous 'work". (sic. Finney, 
1,10). This would seem to support the contention that Beckett's 
work is in some way a unified whole - it is as if he has been quar- 
rying-his work from the same rock-face'and these are the chippings. 
Certainly it-is hard to imagine what these "residua" would seem 
like if they had appeared without the, earlier work'behind them. 
Just as Watt acts as a turning-point'between the first period 
and the second, How It Is acts as the connexion between the end of 
the trilogy andlexts for Nothing on the one hand and the exiguous 
'p-r-oductions-of Beckett's'later years on the other. 
How It Is crAm-s, as. something. of a shock after the-trilogy 
one wonders how there can,, be. any-more-to sayýand onels surprised 
'by the-sudden indulgence in such-, experimental. prose. But, the quarry 
-of being -is infinite. Beckett 'in his ., attempts, to ". get it all said", 
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haVing taken one prose style to its limits, is bound to adopt another 
method and press on rather than relapse into the-impossible silence. 
"I'll go on". 
How It Is inaugurates our third period in that it has the 
characteristics of coldness, inhumanity and a certain abstraction, 
that are going to become more pronounced in the later "residua". 
But Beckett's work is a whole, How It Isjs working the same, the 
same inevitable ground, as the trilogy. These sections, for instance, 
rehearse themes familiar to us from Malone Dies and elsewhere: 
then on my elbow I quote I see me prop me 
up thrust in my arm in the sack we're 
talking of the sack thrust it in count the 
tins impossible with one hand keep trying 
one day it will be possible 
(H. 8) 
something wrong -there - 
(H. 9) 
Here we find the usual "I" and "me", the one seeing the other as in 
malone's "All my senses are trained full one me, me". (T. 186) This 
narrator, too, is encumbered by and obsessed with his possessions, 
here his sack, and he makes asides 
-("something 
wrong there") that 
parallel Malone's "This is awful". As Beckett, goes deeper into-the 
"mess" of existence he has 'new methods but-. no new matter: conscious- 
ness and its ambivalent relationship with its world are still the 
core of the, problem, still the monolith he must quarry from? His 
work is an attempt to find an-objective correlative for being a 
, parable 
that will somehow -manage to "sa3e' the ontological nature, 
ihe world. 
. Although-. How "It 12 -develops '(in, my, view, 'inevitably) 'the -same 
concerns as Are manifested -in the '. trilogy, 
'it begins to show the 
sort of dehumanizing. schematism, that is the characterirtic-of 
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Beckett's third period. The creatures crawling about in the mud have 
a few touches of "reality" in the shape of tin-openers and memories, 
but their present existence is in many ways as unrealistic as possible. 
If we apply realist or naturalist criteria we come up with such 
obviously banal questions as "How do these people breathe with their 
faces in the mud? " and*"How-do they know which direction to go in? " 
and "Where are they? " and "What happens when the sardines run out? " 
and "Where do the sardines come from? " Clearly we are in a non- 
naturalistic world here, a world in which such questions do not 
matter. Beckett has excluded the possibility of realistic interpre- 
tation as far as he can by, for instance, employing meaningless, 
dehumanized names, "Bom", "Pim" and so on. 
This can be seen as the next stage in the process that. has 
taken Beckett from names such as Celia and Lady Pedal to such 
brutalized appellations as Saposcat and Worm. What names are pos-, 
sible after The Unnamable? Now, in his third period, Beckett is 
going to dispense with names altogether and with all naturalistic 
conventions as he moves closer to the core of his concerns, the 
heart of the problem which is. seen at last to'be inherent notlin 
the surface mess of everyday life (Ibsen and Dickent faced that 
-problerO but in the basic structure of the world, beyond or behind 
mere names or the suffering of individuals. That this is the case, 
that these are Beckett's "real" concerns and that we are not forcing 
an, interpretation arbitrarily, upon him can, -I think, be established 
rom those pregnant snippets of criticism, the'Three'Dialogues with 
Georges Duthuit which appeared in transition No. S in 19492 , In'a 
W&y -it would, be-appropriate to-quote the whole of the second of 
these dialogues. --the 'dialogue on Hasson. :1 shall,, attempt a simmaryo 
4 
however. Uhat we shall find Is 'Beckett's statement -,, ý, that IMasson, 'for 
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all his talk about the void, is not really attempting to paint some 
sort of ultimate reality and that Beckett is searching for such an 
art, impossible though it may be. The relevance of this to my thesis 
about Beckett himself is obvious: he is in quest of an art that will 
express an ultimate depth - an absolute. "B" speaks first and he 
makes, this gnomic utterance: 
In search of the difficulty rather than in 
its clutch. The disquiet of him'who lacks 
an adversary. 
"D" replies: 
That is perhaps why he speaks so often 
nowadays of painting the void, "in fear 
and trembling". 
Masson has no "adversary", nothing to paint, no problem to solve 
within the realms of normal painting. As "D". says, it is not a 
matter of not being able to paint something, it is a matter of paint- 
ing nothing - "the void". Once, "D" continues, Masson wanted to 
paint a mythology, then he*wanted to paint man in society, now he 
wants to paint "inner emptiness". He suffers from "the need to come 
to rest, i. e. to establish the data of the problem to be solved, 
the Problem at last". The capital letter on the second "Problem! ' 
here is-revealing. Of the earlier "problems" (man in society for 
instance) "B" says that they have "by the mere fact of their 
solubility .... lost for, him, their legitimacy". Now Masson wants to 
"reduce their maladies ... to nothing" but he still wants to paint 
something and, "D" points out, if "B" is going to object to all 
Z, 13, nting in -which "the, object -remains sovereign" -how can Masson 
"'be 
expected to. paint the void? " 
"B" replies that this is a mistake. Wanting'to paint, the'void 
is "on the same plane" as wanting to paint. something, -the void of 
Ma, sson is "perhaps simplyýthe obliteration of an-unbearable presence" 
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and this is not really the void at all. The trouble is that even 
Masson suffers from "possessiveness". Although he tries to avoid the 
sort of painting that is the mere "capture of objects" he is still, 
according to Beckett, doing what others have done in the way of 
painting things. "B" finishes by asking "D" to forgive him for- 
relapsing "into my dream of an art unresentful of its insuperable 
indigence and too proud for the farce of giving and receiving". 
When "D" tries to make an emotional appeal on behalf of painting 
that paints things ("the things and creatures of spring, resplendent 
with desire and affirmation") it is too much for "B", whose thinking 
is moving in so exactly the opposite direction, and the dialogue 
concludes "B - (Exit weeping)". 
think the key point here is that Hasson goes some way towards 
Beckett's ideal, he rejects the surface questions. as ille'gitimate 
because-of their "solubility", but in trying to go further he goes 
wrong because he will not admit the "insuperable indigence". of art 
and goes on trying to approach the depths as if they were on the 
same plane as the surface. 
If we-apply this to Beckett we can easilyýsee-that "the-farce 
of giving and receiving", the surface element in art, -is still 
uncomfortably present in his earlier work where his naturalistic 
method does the literary equivalent of capturing objects. In his 
6 
later work he is too-"proud" for"this, he becomes cold, aloof, inhuman, 
int-hiswriting approaches an equivalence'with, that totally abstract 
art that confessesIts "insuperable indigence". The overall 
impression, gained is that Beckett is asking-here for an art, that 
will confront ultimate reality, an art that will correspond, not to 
-the sociological or "natural" structure of the world, but to its 
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ultimate structurev its ontology. 
0 
This demand is not colourless and unbiassed. Inherent in it 
there is already a statement as to the nature of this ultimate reality. 
"D" offers what might be called a positive, optimistic version-, 
defending Masson's inability to move on. to another plane he asks 
two questions to both of which "B's" implied answer is "Yes". They 
are these: 
But must we really deplore the painting that 
admits "the things and creatures of spring, 
resplendent with desire and affirmation, 
ephemeral no doubt, but immortally reiterant", 
not in order to benefit by them, not i#order 
to enjoy them, but in order that what is toler- 
able and radiant in 
, 
the world may continue? 
Are we really to deplore the painting that is 
a rallying, among the things of time that pass 
and hurry us away, ýtowards a-time that endures- 
and gives increase? 
It is this that drives "B" out, weeping. Here we have an encapsu- 
lation of a misty, sub-religious attitude that affects a confrontation 
with the nature of the world of a sort that "B" finds even more 
appalling than failure to come to terms with "the void". "D" employs 
a Ianguage that is highly revealing. There are biblical echoes in 
"creatures", "the things of time that pass" and "gives increase", 
and.. a general tone of pulpit-like exhortation andýencouragement 
in the two long rhetorical questions with their repetitions ("not 
in order... not in order ... in order") and in the optimistic vocabulary: 
"resplendent"D "immortally reiterant", "radiant", "rallying", 
, endures" and At 
"gives 'increase".. 
ItIs quite clearlhat this is,, not "BS" conception of the 
-vorld; *'It drives him outweeping. More significantly, this cannot 
be his conception of the world. 9"rinciple. Masson,, the dialogue 
-claims, cannot, get off-the-., plane of the "feasible" (to borrow a 
term fromthe third of'these dialogues), and on to a plane where he 
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could face "the Problem at last". Stuck on the plane of mere 
"probiems" the only defence for him, in spite of his promising moves 
towards "inner emptiness" and so on, is along the lines of the 
normal defence of normal art: it is'good for us. All'this, all daily 
religion, al; "possessive" art, all positive views of man's world 
belong to the plane of the feasible and Beckett here will have none 
of it. 
To conclude this discussion it seems appropriate to quote, 
once again, "B's" view as expressed in the third of these dialogues, 
that concerning Bram Van Velde. Here it is quite clear how thorough 
Beckett's rejection of the plane of the normal is: on this plane 
there are mere "predicaments" but Beckett wants an art that will 
face an absolute beyond these, a "Problem" beyond mere "problems": 
But let us, for once, be foolish enough 
not, to turn tail. All have turned 
wisely tail, before the ultimate penury, 
back to the mere misery where destitute 
virtuous mothers may steal bread for their 
starving brats. There is more than a dif- 
ference of degree between being short, 
short of the worldv short-of self, and 
being without these esteemed commodities. 
The one is a predicament, the other not. 
(PTD. 122) 
Thusl in mid-career, Beckett states clearly enough that he is looking 
for an art that will be able to work on the absolfite plane and not 
"turn tail" back to the relative plane of the everyday. In Heidegger's 
terms we can think of an art that, not, content with the merely ontical, 
is. able to work with the ontological. 
, ýifiveýlook, --atýthe, -development-: 
In Beckett's, 4rama, we, find, a 
general_pattern that-is the, same-as, that to befound ln, theý-, prose. 
Le-Kid is an early satirical sketch of, '1931;, thereafter it: seems-that 
Beckett considered a ýPlay -about, Dr. Johnson -and Mrs. Thrale whose 
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interept lay, for him, in Johnson's physical sufferings and'hypo- 
chondrid and in the (unconsummated) sexual aspect of their relation- 
ship. 
3 These are the themes of More Pricks-Than Kicks and are very 
much themes belonging to the surface world, everyday reality and the 
ontical: Corneille, Johnson, historical periods, specific diseasest 
this is the stuff of the normal world of a disease-prone intellectual. 
Eleutheria of 1947, as we have seen, 
4 floats profounder concerns but 
still in a sociological and psychological matrix: Victor is 
recognizably an angry young man, a rebel against parents and their 
values and against certain social norms- as represented, for instance, 
by-his fianceei. With Godot the "surface" reality of Beckett's drama 
is drastically and famously reduced. "A country road. A tree. 
Evening" is all we are given by way of information. Already we find 
ourselves faced-with an art which is finding a way of making onto- 
logical statements without resorting to the lecture. Endgame is 
another step in the same direction: we have come to the end of the 
normal world, the end of the surface realities; there are no more 
peoples no more sugar-plums, no more pain-killers, no more bicycle- 
wheels. All that Fall, also written in 1956, may seem a step back- 
wards. but, it, was-written in English as. a radio, play, two factors 
which quite reasonably encouraged Beckett to attempt a more natural- 
istic surface (whence all the different noises in the play,, from 
cows mooing to-the arrival of a train) and, to write with, rather more 
I'style". than he. does-in French (whence Maddy's rather extraordinary 
jis, e. of-the.. English Language. ) -Krapp's"Last'Tape-, works, 
in. something 
of -the -. same way -, although., here ý-, again, we Iind'-the -. End game ýmoti f of 
-the past, 'the surface,,, andcoming'. to an, end., ivingmp jettisoning g 
it all -that. 
"' 
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HapRy Days, written in 1961, bring us up to the date of How It 
Is and the parallels between the play and the novel are inescapable. 
The "surface", ontical world is reduced to the contents of Winnie's 
bag, and Willie's newspaper, and she is stuck, increasingly stuck, 
in a mound of sand that is equivalent to the mud of How It Is. She 
too exists according to a pattern, the pattern of her days is the 
equivalent of the patterns of movement in the novel. Here is a play 
that may still have a "surface" element in, say, Winnie's psychology, 
but whose main thrust is clearly elsewhere: Winnie's problem can only 
be our problem if we takeit on a philosophical level. Play works in 
something of the same way; people are trapped in a post-mortal limbo 
chewing the dry bones of a mutual memory, unable to communicate 
directly, forced to utter,, unable to be silent. To take Play only 
as concerned with marriage, personal relationships, the eternal 
triangle, is surely to be unable to see the wood for the trees. The 
whole playl with its significant title, is about what all plays and 
fiction tend to be about, a man, a woman, another person. That is 
normal enough, banal enough, but to imagine that this normal level 
is the only level on which the creator of Godot and The Unnamable 
is working must be based on, a mistaken perspective. Thisls,. not to 
deny that Play exists on the level of the everyday - all literature 
does that, there is no alternative, and indeed this is Beckett's 
problem, how to find a way of saying the ontological with such pre- 
eminentlY--ontical tools as: fiction-and-,, drama. Thus,, ý. as we watch 
I P. 1ay-we-are busy working out, the-relationships between -the charac- 
ters, thinkingýabout affairs and., marriages, but we cannot-stay at 
this level. Who.. after-all, is, the "eye", of the_spotlight, ýwhy is 
it "playing" with-them?. Again-we, must-ask"whyýthe-firstývaman-opens 
with,, and frequentlyechoes, the. -lines, 
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Yes,, strangeg darkness best, 
and the darker the worse, 
till all dark, then all well, 
for the time, but it will 
come, the time will come 
the thing is there, you'll see it 
(PL. 9) 
The point here is that Play is a picture of a sort of Limbo-, 
where all is over and consigned to the past and to memory, but the 
darkness has not taken over completely, that darkness in which, para- 
doxically, you will be able to see "the thing" that is "there". We 
tend to try to make this pattern fit on the naturalistic level by 
associating it with the end of the love-affairs of the play: after 
they are over all is suffering, and darkness seems desirable although 
it is not a darkness of total despair; perhaps he will come back, 
perhaps next time the paradise of real love will be. offered. But the 
end of the affair is a parable just as my reference to Limbo is a 
metaphor. The referent of-this parable and this metaphor must await 
our examination until it can be related to the ontological concerns 
of Beckett's work as a whole. 
***. ** 
I have proposed, & tripartite divisionýof Beckett's work and I 
have offered some account of its first two periods. These periods 
terminate in How It Is (written in 1960) in the fiction, which seems 
to -represent a turning point, a plunge further into the depths, or 
in Happy -Days and PlaX , (1961, . 1962) -which --in some ývays -offer -a 
'How -It Is. 
In discussing the third period (whicho borrowing-the-title of 
I 
Finney's book, we might call "Since How It ls")ýthe positionzeached 
so far in this chapter-must be related to the chapters on Hegel on 
Heidegger and on Sartre that, precede, it andaffer a synthesis that 
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will constitue a prelimmary overall reading of Beckett. 
***** 
ontological Parables. I-Sartre 
Altogether, Beckett's work represents. an attempt to escape from 
the toils of mere facticity and to- take possession of the freedom of 
the now. The factical is the given, what is, how we find ourselves 
placed, and it appears in Beckett as the surface world, the given 
situation. It is not only painful and unpleasant, as witness the 
uncomfortable world of More Pricks Than Kicks and Murphy, but it is 
unsatisfactory in principle. Man exists in time and is always pro- 
jecting forward into the empty future and he can never rest content 
in'the factical even if he should wish to do so. The future, however, 
is the Angst-engendering. abyss of freedom - man can choose anything. 
Belacqua Shua is well and truly entramelled in the factical but 
he struggles for ways out, preferring voyeurism to participation in 
sex, attempting suicide and so on. Victor in Eleutheria wants to be 
"nothing". Murphy seeks escape through trances, mind-deadening work, 
and takes other routes towards Nirvana. Watt seeks for Nirvana in the 
negativity of Hr'Knott's house. All of these are trying to escape 
from the commotion and "hugger-mugger" of the worlds into which they 
are thrown and to find release in the bosom of some absolute. 
That Beckett is himself moving in the same direction is demon- 
, 'tated. by his progressive abandonment of 
interest. in the personality t 
of'his heroes and his reduction of their-factical environments. Thus 
we can say that, just as Murphy, goes fromLondon to A'Iunatic asylum 
and'from. -A lunatic asylum, to. the-isolated room in, which he finds 
peace in his rocking-chair, andfrom there'to, the big silence of death, 
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Beckett goes from the bustle of his Dublin stories into the increas- 
ingly isolated and interior world of his later work. This movement, 
as the vocabulary I have chosen indicates, reflects the position of 
Sartrean man and it can be fairly claimed that Beckett's work is a 
parable encapsulating in literary terms Sartre's theory of the 
factical and man's freedom. This has been discussed in some detail 
in Chapter 4 and the task now is to impose some general pattern on 
the relationship between the philosopher and Beckett, especially in 
terms of Beckett's third period. The problem for both of them can 
be stated in the same way: if man is free, if man can be defined as 
an entity that. -is--always projecting into the future from a present 
swamped with the inert data of the past (this. applies as much to the 
narrators of the trilogy as to Sartrean man) why is he so profoundly 
dissatisfied? What, in broad terms, is wrong with man's position? 
For Sartre, as we saw, objects exist "in themselves" (en-soi) 
and man's consciousness exists "for itself" (pour soi); the known, 
the object, is a being and the knower, consciousness, is a nothing. 
At its heart, then, human reality is a nothingness "apprehending 
itself as excluded from being and perpetually beyond being, in 
commerce-with nothing. " (BN. 181) Sartre argues that consciousness 
is a "lack"s it wants the fulfilment of being, of being in the manner 
that factical objects are, but it wants to remain conscious, of course; 
it wants to remain free. Man's project, then, is to become an "en- 
'pour -so. 
i- -soi" whereby, without losing the freedom of consciousness, 
he can 'lay claim to objective being-- "I am this, _and this. 
" His 
project is impossible, freedom-is precisely the freedom to project 
anew, 'to chooseto be otherwise-than one'has'been,, to deny-beinE 
"this and this. " Only God would be- an'"en-soi-pour-soi", and -man's 
"fundamental value" is to become God, it is 
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the ideal of a consciousness which would 
be the foundation of its own being-in- 
itself by the pure consciousness which it 
would have of itself. It is this ideal 
which can be called God. 
(BN. 566) 
Man is a "lack" that yearns for a totality that will be no lack, this 
is why he is inevitably dissatisfied. Man, condemned to be free, 
condemned to bad faith, lives by acting a role for the benefit of his 
own consciousness in an unendable quest for permanence. Man is always 
trying to catch up with being andalways failing. The last sentences 
of the main section of Being and Nothingness run: 
The passion of man is the reverse of 
that of Christ, for man loses himself 
as man in order that God may be born. 
But the idea of God is contradictory 
and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is 
a useless passion. " 
(BN. 615) 
In an addendum entitled "Metaphysical Implications" Sartre stresses 
that the root of all this lies in the absolute disjunction between 
pour-soi and en-soi, between consciousness and its objects, between 
man and his world. Total reality, made up of both pour-soi and en- 
soi, is an "ideal" that is never attained, it is "an abortive effort 
to attain to the dignity of a self-cause. " (BN. 623) Objects are 
brought into being, made a world for man, by man's consciousness. 
Man's consciousness is made possible by the existence of things for 
him to be conscious of. The two sides are mutually dependent but 
radically separated. 
5 Sartre's slumary of this is perfectly applica- 
bl, e to Beckett: 
Everything happens therefore. as if the 
in-itself and the for-itself-were pre- 
sented in,, a, state-of disintegration in 
relation to an ideal synthesis. Not that 
'*the,, integration', has, ever, taken place--but 
on the contrary precisely because it is 
, always. 
indicated and., always, impossible 
, (BN. 623) 
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"Always indicated and always impossible" sounds like a formal version 
of Beckett's constant paradox: "You must go on,, I can't go on. " (T. 418) 
This, then, is one of the versions of reality for which Beckett's 
work is a parable. His narrators and he himself are consciousnesses, 
radically separated from their worlds, hopelessly trying to catch up 
with them so that they can attain some sort of being and "find me... 
say me. " (T. 418) Beckett strives constantly for a reduction in the 
en-soi component in his work, and constantly fails. He gets rid of 
great heaps of factical environment, cutting out surface realities 
as he goess trying to "say" the being of consciousness, which is, by 
definition, not among them. But consciousness is "nothing" and as 
the only way it can be spoken of is in tems of being, the speaking is 
never accurate. The passion is useless and, as-the etymology of 
"passion" indicates, this is, in itself, a process of suffering for 
which disease and pain are Beckettian metaphors. 
This offer of an ontological basis for Beckett as a whole can 
be applied specifically to his third period with illuminating results. 
If my picture of his development is accurate we should find that in 
t 
this period Beckett is least involved with surface reality, most 
clearly looking for objective correlatives for philosophical insights, 
with least regard for naturalist criteria and at his most abstract. 
This indeed seems to be the case. First, by way of an introduction 
to a discussion of some texts, thereIs a metaphor 'that-seems 
.I ropriate. 
Life in More Pricks than Kicks and Murphy ispurgatory, 
, thoroughly unsatisfactory in, every aspect, including the 'Intellectual. 
it generates a, strong desire for escape into some, kind, of heaven, 
and man employs to this end, though we -may doubt their ef f 1cacy, "the 
revolver, the bicycle and the rocking-chair. In the early stages of 
251. 
the trilogy life is still purgatorial and death still seems a possible 
relief. But Malone dies and the voice goes on. The Unnamable finds 
that, having escaped from purgatory, he is in hell. How It Is and 
most of the subsequent work explore this hell. Now Beckett is 
influenced here by Dante, mentioned by name in The Lost Ones (LO. 14) 
and a well-known influence from undergraduate days. 
6 
Dante conceived 
the tortures of the damned with horrific clarity and captured 
marvellously the most significant aspect of hell (and the one which 
separates it most radically from purgatory) namely that there is no 
exit from hell and no end to its tortures. These tortures, further- 
more, are repetitive and, necessarily, futile. 
The purgatory of early Beckett, then, is "mere" suffering. The 
hell of the later work is interminable futile suffering. This cor- 
10 
responds to our view of the later work as being more directly con- 
cerned with the ontological. There is no escape from the radical 
dissatisfaction diagnosed by Sartre as man's condition. Man is 
perpetually "condemned to be free" in the famous phrase, it is in 
I principle that man s approach to being is a Sisyphean task. For 
Murphy, as for the soul in purgatory, there is a way out. Tor the 
u=amable and, a fortiori for the creatures of How It Is and the 
later texts, there is no exit. 
The twin texts Imagination'Dead Imagine (completed-1965) and 
The; 'Lost Ones (completed 1966) gain considerably-if they'are-vieved 
as, experiments in'the depiction of a Sartrean hell. .. Both are-post- 
mortem visions in which we are aware of a narrator looking-in, on,, an 
abstractýworld distantly taken from Dante. 
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The first sentence of Imagination runs: 
No trace anywhere of life 
You say, pah no difficulty 
there, imagination not dead 
yet, yes, dead, good, imagination 
dead imagine. 
(IM. 7) 
Sartrean consciousness is set against being, responsible for the 
creation of its world. Merely by being conscious man inescapably 
C reates his world, there is no alternative. -So it is with the nar- 
rator here. He starts with the hypothesis of emptiness, the blank 
page perhaps, where there is "no trace ... of life. " The narrator 
is consciousness aware equally, as in Sartre, of objective facts 
outside himself ("life") and of objective facts inside himself 
("imagination". ) - With a disgusted eye (11pah") he watches the latter 
at work inventing the former. He has been tempted, perhaps, to think 
that he has coincided with the void already. If there ýs no life and 
no imagination perhaps he is free at last. But the very act of 
becoming conscious generates a world, either outside or inside the 
head. Although imagination is "dead" consciousness, condemned to 
freedom,, -must 
invent more imagination: "imagination dead imagine. " 
. Anything perceived, as we 
have seen in our discussion of bad 
faith, is immediately alienated from us by our consciousness of the 
perception. Hence-the text continues 
'Islands, water, azure, verdure, one 
glimpse and vanished. endlessly, omit. 
'Both -in, the case -of Teal vision -and 'in *the case, of an imagined- scene, 
af ter -the I irs t- glimpse 'what -is perceived vanishes as we - try , to . grasp 
it by grasping ourselves --so that -the object --of consciousness 
is -, no 
longer the-island'but-my-pereeption of it. 'This elusiveness of-the 
object 'is, the -, permanent condition of perception, hence* the "endlessly". 
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btt it compromises the status of objects which must then be "omitted" 
as the conscious mind moves on, as minds always must, to another round 
of perception and disillusion. The narrator recapitulates Beckett's 
entire development here. All through his oeuvre he is attempting to 
"omit"$ to "discard" and to "have done", in the words of Hmm. So 
here, having "omitted" a vision, an imagining, the narrator-makes a 
bid for the void, "Till all white. " Can he stop here? "White" would 
seem as blank a place as any other, but imagination, driven by con- 
sciousnesss cannot stop and it goes on with a movement of thought 
something like "Where is the white? Like all imagined objects it 
is in my head. " So the sentence runs 
Till all white in the whiteness 
the rotunda. 
(IM. 7) 
We may feel that the rotunda is a skull,,. into which we are being 
taken by the narrator as he tries to home in on himself; like Murphy's 
mind it is a hollow sphere. Equally it could be the world. The 
usefulness of a Sartrean interpretation here is that it makes little 
difference whether we choose one of these possibilities, or whether 
ve-insist-that Seckettiis. simplyýtalking about a, rotunda of certain 
colour and dimensions. Here is a way to cut the Gordian knot of 
Beckett's ambiguity. The narrator is certainly at least a conscious- 
ness, a subject; all the other.. elements in the text are objects which 
depend-on this consciousness and it hardly matterswhether they are 
aspects of his empirical self (his imagination for example). physical 
objects or imaginary objects. There is -no, real way of -identifying 
the status of much of-the. material of-a, Beckett text, 'but the onto- 
logical statement -, remains -the . same: 'the hell is the hell of conscious- 
mess P the 
hell of being conscious;. the. -problem is, not In the 
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construction of rotundas or in the literal plight of their inhabitants . 
it lies in the nature of the pour-soi. 
To simmarize this in terms of our discussion of man as useless 
passion trying to catch up with being: whatever the status of the 
rotunda it has being over against the nothingness of the narrator's 
consciousness. It "fills" him with words but never becomes him. 
The main part of Imagination Dead Imagine consists of a 
description of what is inside the rotunda. It is a glimpse of hell 
and it is an analogue of the human condition for, needless to say, 
all this talk of purgatory and hell is mere metaphor, the Sartrean 
sufferer is always, precisely,, in the here and now. 
In the rotunda the rhythms of life are reduced to an almost 
abstract pattern: the temperature rises as the light does and falls 
as darkness sets in. These patterns follow varying but definite 
rhythms paralleling the differing passage of the days and the years. 
In the rotunda the rhythm works in seconds rather than hours or 
months but the parallel holds, I think, if we consider Beckett's 
extraordinary difficulties with the apprehension of time exemplified 
In ! Pozzo's outbur3t, iu, -the second act of Godot-where"'they, give 
birth astride of a grave. " In Imagination Dead_Imagine there are 
two bodies in the whiteness with their eyes sometimes open and 
sometimes closed. Man is almost abstractly portrayed, in a minimal 
version of his world. 
The-text-concludes: 
'Leave-them'there, sweating an&icy, 
-there is better, elsewhere. ', No,, life 
ends and no. there is nothing, elsewhere, 
and no question nowýof, ever finding, again 
that white specklost in vhiteness,, to 
see if, they still'lie, still', lin-the stress 
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of that--storm, or of a worse storm, or 
in the black dark for good, or the great 
whiteness unchanging, and if not what 
they are doing. 
(IM. 14) 
Here we find that the narrator, as consciousness aspiring to being, 
realizes that there is nothing besides being, here represented by the 
rotunda, and no chance ever again of catching up with his creation. 
Besides this, we find that "life ends" and then there is nothing, 
"nothing elsewhere. " Man's aspiration to be God, to be being, would 
be satisfied by heaven, at least in that definition whereby the soul 
(pour-soi) becomes one with God, that is, absorbed into the reality 
of the en-soi, while retaining its identity. But this heaven, the 
en-soi-pour-soi, is the 
impossible ideal, the unattainable. Finally, 
the interest in the last sentence is as much in the "human realities" 
inhabiting the rotunda as in the narrator and his enterprise, _, 
Here it 
is significant that although they seem completely trgpped in their 
horrific facticity they are in fact offered a hint of freedom in-that 
they could now be either in the storm or in the dark or in the light, 
or, possibly, doing something else. Night and day may come and go, 
but mankind is free and, so, unpredictable. 
The Lost Ones is a simpler text to deal with. Most of its 
sixty-three pages are devoted to a description of the existence of 
some two-hundred people existing 'in a "cylinder. " Most of them spend 
most of. their time seeking a way out,, climbing ladders,. exploring the 
it 
.. 
piches" in, the walls of the cylinder, -wondering if-the. wayýout may 
not be above -them, 'injust 
that part of 'the -cylinder -they cannot 
reach. 
That, this text-is metaphorical,, a-, parable, can hardlybe in 
doubt. It certainly attacks the imagination-on a, literial level'in. its 
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claustrophobia and in the horror of its physical detail, but that is 
the way parables work. And this parable works at a number of levels. 
Here is a circle of Dante's hell again, here is man seeking meaning 
and creating futile patterns, here is consciousness imprisoned once 
more in a skull or a world. Dante, as we have seen, is mentioned by 
name: the "non-searchers" in the cylinder, sitting in the Belacqua 
position presumably, are 
in the attitude which wrung from Dante 
one of his rare wan smiles. 
(LO. 14) 
Later we learn of two schools of thought among the searchers, one 
which swears by the niches in the wall of the cylinder as the means 
of escape and another which 
dre=s of a trap-door hidden in-the hub 
of the ceiling giving access to a flue 
at the end of which the sun and other 
stars would itill be shining. 
(LO. 18) 
ýIis 
mention of "the sun and other stars" is again Dantean echoing 
as it does the line at the end of the Paradiso. 
L9amor che =ove il sole e Valtre stelle. 
(Paradiso xxxiii, 14.5) 
There is perhaps also a-hint in this context of the line that ends 
the Inferno where Dante and Virgil emerge'from hell to see the stars 
again. 
Inside this hell, with its "sensation, of yellow... not to say 
of sulphur in view of the associations" (LO. 36), which is-describ. ed 
. 
in terms suitable for a present or past experience, -humanity seeks 
for a-way out-until it gives, up'hope and collapses"' into, immob ility, 
,, vanquished. " This will be the "'last'state" ýof all the dwellers In 
the cylinder and any faint hint of hope is specifically-contradicted 
by, the narrator. 
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And far from being able to imagine their 
last state when every body will be still 
and every eye vacant they will come to 
it unwitting and be so unawares. Then 
light and climate will be changed in a 
way impossible to foretell. But the 
former may be imagined extinguished as 
purposeless and the latter fixed not far 
from freezing point. 
(LO. 15) 
There is a hint of hope here in the word "changed", . with its con- 
notations of the end of the world and the last trumpet, and in the 
rather sonorous words "in a way imposssible to foretell", but Beckett 
does foretell what the "last state" of the cylinder will be both here 
and at the end of the text. The seekers will not find any way out 
and the situation in the cylinder will not change until they are all 
"vacant" and "unwitting"; especially, the light will not stop until 
it is "purposeless. " Here we learn that this world, a world of 
perpetually hopeless ambition and futile search, is dependent on its 
inhabitants. Without them the light and warmth vanish. This "last 
state" is the "unthinkable end" towards which existence in the cylin- 
der proceeds "infinitely. " The whole business started "in some 
unthinkable past. " Altogether the suggestion that this is a parable 
about human existence seems inescapable here; the hint is that The 
Lost Ones are the whole race, trapped in a finite world, overcrowded, 
sufferingg going from an uncomprehended beginning to an incomprehen- 
sible end. But the process is identical for the individual conscious- 
ness too, going from a birth of which he knows nothing, through the 
ontological horror of his impossible quest to a, death that will 
annihilate the world. -Beckett-s, 
hell, 'like Sartre's, is here. and 
, now. 
Beckett's work, I am suggesting, can be-read as a-metaphor for 
a Sartrean universe, not exclusively but with some profitable results. 
258. 
0 In the metaphor the voice goes on talking, projecting, feeling itself 
obliged to fill the void before it and creating worlds that reflect 
the world in which it exists. In the Sartrean reality to which this 
corresponds consciousness is confronted with the freedom of the 
future into which it must project and it creates its world as it goes, 
always dissatisfied with the past and always aspiring to a future in 
which it can catch up with itself and come to rest. Without something 
very like this Sartrean parallel what can we make of a passage such 
as the following from the Texts for Nothing 
W. 
i know it's not me, but it's too late 
now, too late to deny it ... what matter 
how you describe yourself, here or 
elsewhere, fixed or mobile, without 
form or oblong like a man, in the dark 
or the light of heavenst I don't know... 
and if I went back to where all went out 
and on from there, no, that would lead 
nowhere... (M82-83) 
What the narrator has said is him is not him (it cannot be him, it can 
only be an element in his factical past) but 
it seems hopeless to try 
to get to him. He mentions two possibilities, however, which are: 
"describing" himself and going "back to where all went out. " The 
first of these is clearly the kind of project undertaken in texts 
such as Imagination Dead 'Imagine and The Lost Ones where sometimes 
people are "fixed" (Imagination) and sometimes they are "mobile" 
(Lost Ones), vhere there is a tension betveen the formlessness of 
abstraction and the forms of representation ("oblong like a-man") 
And where the light and the dark alternate endlessly. The second 
possibility is to go back "to where all went -Out% which is -the 
-position of return -to the narrator, of Beckett again before the blank 
page, back-to the blank point of the consciousness, the imothing into 
"which-slI vanisheF, Sartre's "drain-hole in the solidity of being". 
***** 
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on_tological Parables - 2. Heidegaer 
For Heidegger, too, Beckettts work acts as a parable. In 
Chapter 3 this was looked at in some detail, here it can be examined 
first in terms of Beckett's overall direction and then in terms of 
the third period of his work. 
Taken as a whole, Beckett's work is making much the same attempt 
as that of his narrators. He moves toward a method for dealing with 
ontological reality in art, looking for an objective correlative for 
the way things are on the most fundamental level. There is a strong 
parallel between this undertaking and Heidegger's own development. 
Being and Time is an assault on Being (the object of any ontological 
effort) that fAils; similarly Beckett's trilogy is an assault on the 
w ay things are. In both cases the writer, having failed in the grand 
attempt, has gone on to offer further pieces from the same quarry, 
more ways of approaching the same fundamental problem. 
Being and Time opens with the statement that man has forgotten 
Being and offers to go on the trail of Being in what follows. Much 
is revealed in the published chapters, -especially about the difficulty 
I 
of confronting Being, but the great work is never finished. 
Subsequently a number of much shorter works by Heidegger'have appeared, 
increas inglY oracular in nature, in which the approach to Being is 
rehearsedg redirected and made, for example, through the poetry of 
Holderlin and, the-fragments of the-presocratic philosophers. 
,, 'Beekettts 
trilogy opens with'the',, problem expressed more mum- 
dane-ly. Howdid Molloy'"get there"'? "How -. did, 'he come -to'be where he 
is? -The question. which-in a. sense generates -. the whole word-mountain, 
is never answered. 'Indeed., -it 
becomes riaf firmed as ýthe central 
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question ing for instance, the opening line of The Unnamable. By the 
end, of the trilogy we are aware of a certain relief, that the art-work 
in'our hands is finished, but the parable it contains states clearly 
enough that the quest is not over: "I'll go on" are the final words. 
Subsequently a number of shorter works by Beckett have appeared, 
increasingly gnomic in nature, in which the fundamental question is 
rehearsed and redirected but never answered. 
This comparison may appear to be largely formal, based on the 
publishing-history of two writers, but I do not think it is mere 
coincidence. The "going on" of Heidegger and Beckett is not chosen 
for superficial or aesthetic reasons, it is inherent in the nature of 
their undertaking. To catch up with Being is going to take until 
death (Heidegger on Sein-zum-Tode) or even further (Beckett's parables 
set in hell. ) The project of each writer is the same and it is 
doomed to the same iailure. & 
In summarizing Heidegger's equiprimordial aspects of man's 
existence towards the end of Chapter 3 we found facticity and 
"existence" defined in terms that were later taken over by Sartre and 
which were discussed at the end of, the last, section. "'Resolute 
Dasein", for Heidegger, calls itself back from the factical "they", 
from inauthentic existence, to the "being-there" of the present. 
This call is the call of "rare" that brings Dasein's self back to the 
0 authentic now. All -this -is -made' possible 'by tirae: only Dasein has 
orality and thus -is, the "betweeUl' of -the, phrase "between birth 
and ideath" '(BT 426) 
This "between" is -strcmgl7 present in 'Beckett, incideAally, 
-in 
hisýtendency to keep in mind beginnings and ends. Týe-trilogy 
moves from Molloy's mother to Malone's death, 'The Lost Ones offers 
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the full life-span of the creatures in the cylinder, Breath offers a 
cry to be taken as a life between the poles offered by the words 
"birth" and "death", conflated into "breath. " In Chapter 31 discussed 
Heidegger's other equiprimordial concepts in some detail and in every 
case found Beckett to have offered some literary equivalent. Now we 
are working on a more basic level. Care, time and so on are the 
equiprimordial existentialia of Dasein, but Heidegger's fundamental 
project, having "interrogated" Dasein much as Beckett has put his 
"vice-existers" through their paces, is to approach Being. We feel 
that "behind" or "beyond" Heidegger's discussion there is an unresolved 
question and I would propose that the same applies to Beckett: what 
will remain when he has got it all said? 
One of Heidegger's-exiguous steps in the direction of Being is 
the essay The Way Back Into*the Ground of Metaphysics of 1949. This 
claims that 'Imetaphysics". is like the roots of a tree. It is-a 
science that deals with beings (Seinden). But what of the ground in 
which those roots are planted? 
That must be Being (Sein). The 
approach to Being is behind or beyond or above all the considerations 
of metaphysics- Not only, this; -Heidegger cuts the ground from under 
his own feet by observing that the approach to Being is beyond 
ontology and theology as well 
(Heidegger, 4,219. ) These "sciences" 
also dea 1 with beings, he says, and not with Being. 
once more the, parallel with Beckett, appears. Therels a self- 
de$gruct3. ve element in both-our writers,, they both, -deny themselves 
the only available tools for the pursuit of their, goals. Yet the 
goals remain and, the-pursuit, must,. Zo on and'here. Heidegger has 
light to shed on Beckett for, he explains. yhy, it must. go on. 'The 
explanation is not the sort that would satisfy a -, court of Iaw, -, 
but 
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at this level of "fundamental ontology"., or whatever we are still 
permitted to call it, the criteria governing the value of statements 
change so that the radical denial of the existence of the problem, 
for instance, can be an acceptable solution. Thus in The Way Back 
Heidegger answers the question as to why Dasein should pursue the 
goal of Being by defining Dasein itself as "the location of the truth 
of Being. " (p. 213) This, of course, is. just the burden of some of the 
opening rema: rks of Being and Time. Discussing the question of "the 
meaning of Being" Heidegger states that Dasein is 
"that entity which already comports 
itself, in its Being, towards what we 
are asking about when we ask this 
question (the question of the meaning 
of Being) . But in that case the 
question of Being is nothing other than 
the radicalization of an essential 
tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein 
itself - the pre-ontological understanding 
of Being. " 
(BT. 35) 7 
This should assist us with Beckett. His project, and that of his 
narrators, 
is not a wilful plunging into difficult terrain in a place 
where mankind has a perfectly good road to go along, it is a confron- 
tation of what is already and inescapably there. Thus the Unnamable 
says 
I'll recognise it, in the end 
I'll recognise it, the story of the 
silence that he never left, that I 
should never have left, that'I may 
never find again, that I'may-find 
again... 
(7.417) 
Tjjs. 'js one among, many examples-of: narrators. in the trilogy-referring 
to some absolute which, while. beyond them, i's their own. 'The 
Unnamable -will "recognize" -the -absolute ("the story of the silence") 
it was once his, otherwise how. could he. talk About leaving-it or 
finding it again? Now It Is not present to 12im, *but its absence Is 
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his agony. Clearly the problem is within him, he is already the 
problem, he already has an understanding of Being that is not enough 
of an understanding to yield Being itself up to him but which will not 
let him rest content without it. 
Heidegger's view of Dasein as being an entity which already 
comports itself towards Being is an excellent way of seeing why Beckett's 
characters, "thrown" on to the page or on to the stage, seem to have 
some understanding of their ontological environment, seem already to be 
orientated towards an inescapable but mysterious basis for existence. 
Thus the tramps in Godot are orientated towards (waiting for) Godot. 
"Waiting" seems an appropriate metaphor for Dasein's comportment 
towards Being. Waiting is a condition which does not necessarily effect 
one's daily projects but which underlies all of them. While performing 
one's job or gardening or even while asleep one could be described as 
"waiting", for instance, waiting to get married or waiting for a pay- 
rise. Waiting can underlie or minglewith all one's consciousnesses 
or conditions. 
Paul Tillich has an exalted view of waiting that may perhaps 
mLa-Llv--e this parallel seem less far-fetched. In a sermon actually 
entitled I'Waiting" he as 'this to say: I 
Both the Old and the'New Testaments 
describe our existence in relation to 
'God as one of waiting... Waiting means 
not having and having at the same time. 
For we have not what we wait for ... The 
-Condition, of man'-s relation to God is 
first of all one of not'having, not see- 
in&, not knowing-and not grasping. 
(Tillich, 1,151) 
The'tramps, explicitly, do not have Godot*-do'not grasp his intentions, 
do not know him. and yet they are conditioned by, him-and orientated 
towards him. The parable seems' obviously to work if Godot is taken as 
God but it can operate with any absolute and it is hardly a great step 
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from this to Heidegger's Being which calls- to man and towards which he 
is already orientated but which he fails finally to apprehend. 
Tillich emphasizes the "nots" in his sermon. Waiting is "not 
having" and so on. This negative aspect of waiting relates to Heidegger's 
further discussion, in The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics, 
concerning Being and Nothing. If Being is not a being, he asks, is it 
then Nothing? This sort -of question is based on a misconception, he 
claims; only a metaphysics (inhis acceptation of the term) which deals 
with mere beings can see non-being as either Being or Nothing indif- 
ferently. A more fundamental ontology must hold these separate. 
In An Introduction to Metaphysics of 1935, reworked in 1953, 
Heidegger takes these questions further. He claims that Western man 
has forgotten Being and that our philosophical language has become 
dexalued. He therefore approaches Being linguistically, analysing the 
etymology and grammar of the word to see what it will yield. (Heidegger, 
3,43-61). The result of this is that we are left with the Aristotelian- 
Hegelian position that Being is merely an emptiness. Butif Being is 
empty and indeterminate we are easily able to distinguish it from non- 
being, so -Being becomes -a -paradoxical entity entitled the "determinate 
indeterminate. " We are thrust back to language once again, for Being 
-is essential to language: if we were to subtract the verb "to bell 
there could be no language at all. 
' 8 
In What Is Philosophy? of 1955 Heidegger "reiterates 'that man, as 
Das"el"no is. always already,. in correspondence with Being, -that, this -is 
man's -very nature, 'but that mum does. not -always Iisten to "the appeal 
of Being. " (Heidegger, 2,75) Philosophy, has -an inherent direction, 
", astonishment" Is the condition -it is always pointed"towards Being, and 
of philosophizing. '! Astonishment Is disposition in ., and for which the 
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Being of being unfolds" (ibid, p. 85). This astonishment is the 
astonishment of the poet; the poet -and the philosopher are linked in 
that both are at the service of language, they work at extracting the 
truth of Being from words, they do not seek words to express the truth. 
Language is the house of Being. 
I have simnarized these central points from Heidegger's later 
essays to give an impression of the general drift of his thought after 
Being and Time. The point of this is that it puts us in a position to 
see the deep similarities between his thinking and Beckett's. 
First of all, Beckett chooses to continue; he responds, through 
his characters and narrators, to the "appeal of Being". It is as if 
he were constantly trying to clear away the debris that separates man 
from Being, and certainly he is using the tools Heidegger recommends - 
,; rords. His yords are a house for Being, an attempt to "get it all 
said" and to confront the silence of Being. 
0 
Then, the relationship between language and Being is taken fur- 
ther by both Heidegger and Beckett, and in the same direction. 
Language is the house of Being but, it'is -not "Being as such. Dasain's 
capacity for 'language 
is identical with'Dasein's orientation towards; 
Being. Olga Bernal has said that, for Beckett "le langage est la 
r-ondition necessaire 
du, Je (Bernal, 1,, 15) and if this "Je" is taken 
as Dasein the parallel is very close: "Jell, or Dasein, only arises 
through language (Beckett's narrators create themselves by narrating) 
and through language it confrontsleing, but Being cannot come to be 
by being said. To quote Bernal -again, Beckett's work is "une oeuvre 
qui -cherche une autre lumähre que -celle du'Verbe, la-liml kre de Vindit" 
(Bernal 9 -1, -'15) 
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This idea of working through words towards the silence of Being, 
manifested appropriately by Heidegger himself who, after the word- 
mountain of Being, and Time contracts towards a silent or poetic 
"astonishment" in the face of the ontological, is clearly applicable 
to Beckett whose early creations, such as More Pricks Than Kicks or 
Proust abound in the extravagantly verbal and whose development is 
towards silence. (Cf. Ihab Hassan's The Literature of Silence. passim) 
At the conclusion of Chapter Three, above, I suggested that the 
Heideggerian call to "exist in the nameless" finds its echo in Beckett, 
that Beckett's world is striving to be the "nameless" world. This is, 
of course, a metaphor just as the notion of silence is a metaphor, and 
here we have, I think, the answer to the facile-suggestion that if 
Beckett wants, silence all he has to do is to,. stop writing. Beckett 
is not seeking silence as such, he is seeking the Being beyond words 
for which silence is a metaphor or of which ft could become an epithet. 
His continued creation of worlds is a continuing attempt to find the 
metaphor, the parable, the objective correlative, for Being. A .. 
"nameless" world would be a silent openness to Being and this is what 
Beckett has been attempting, at least since The Unnamable. 
A world full of "names" -or "beings" is the world of 'ýcLere misery" 
of the Three Dialogues (PTD,, '122) , and in -this "world -there is something 
for the artist (Hassou, Beckett) to express. In the silent astonish- 
, =ant that -is -man is,, disposition towards,, 'Being. therels "nothing to 
e); Press-11 What, zetaphors -and- correlatives -does Beckett employ in his 
self-defeating-project of expressing nothling? 
Beckett's ý parables -for -the Heideggerian, approach "to Being seem 
to -belong to ýtwo -types. One -is thetype "-that abstracts, f rom'beings 
0 
to'Being, -that xeduces towards the', zilence. 'Breath,, repre s ents this 
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development at its last gasp. Somehow this type seems logical and 
comprehensible, an obvious step towards the end proposed. Far more 
difficult, and therefore more in need-of our attention, is the type of 
parable, such as Not I, that recreates another fearful world out of the 
ruins of this one and thus seems to contradict Beckett's fundamental 
project. This type can perhaps be understood more easily in the light 
of a comment of Robbe-Grillet (he is discussing the world of con- 
ventional fiction and suggesting an alternative): 
A la place de cet univers des 
"significations" (psychologiques, 
sociales, fonctionelles)', il faudrait 
donc.. essayer de construire un monde 
plus solide, plus immediat. 
(Robbe-Grillet, 1,20) 
This appeal for a new novel is a call towards'namelessness, towards 
the construction of solid, immediate and "meaningless" worlds. Is this 
not precisely what Beckett has achieved in The Lost Ones? In this 
text we are presented with a world that pulsates before us, solid and 
immediate enough, but from which all meaning has been excluded. 
Nowhere in the cylinder can a way out be found. 
N 
Lessness (1969) creates another little world, another parable for 
the ontological position of, man. Its first sentence makes explicit 
that here we have man come home at last, that this is his "true refuge". 
Ruins true refuge long last'towards 
vhich so many false time out of mind. 
(LEM 
By these ruins stands a recognizab'le'human'being. 
Grey-face two. pale bluelittle body 
heart beating only, upright. 
(LEý7) 
On all sides of the -ruin lies endlessness. -" 
X11 sides endlessness earth, sky, as 
one no -sound-no, stir. 
, (LE. 7) 
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The ruins are "the same grey" as the ash or grey sand that makes uv' the 
environment of the text; the sky and the body that stands by the ruins 
are grey, too. All other colours have "gone from iiind" or are dismissed 
as "figments" (for instance the white light or the blue sky) with the 
exception of the often-repeated "two pale blue" (eyes, presumably. ) 
And then, the "four-square" walls are flattened ("over backwards") 
and the body'is the "only upright. " So, there were colours, things 
were once "four-square" although they have now cellapsed into ruins, the 
bDdy ("he") --. in the ruin dreams of "days and nights made of dreams of 
other nights better days. " (LE. 17) The only thing that stands out from 
the world in the last analysis is human reality. At the final, abstract 
level, metaphorically represented by monochrome surroundings, man exists 
alone, alone coloured blue at leist in his eyes. But this is his "true 
refuge" to which "so many" have been "false time out of mind. " Here 
I would suggest that if we take the "true refuge" as being offered to 
man at the ontological level, it shows him confronted by Being. No 
longer confronted by beings (all of which are perhaps only figments - 
"Never but imagined the blue in a wild imagining the blue celeste of 
poesy. " LE. 13) and far out in the. wastes of silence. and, namelessness, 
man, only residually alive and barely -recognizable, has -an inevitable 
orientation towards Being-and can perhaps take the miraculous "one 
step" into the absolute: 
One step in the ruins. 1n, the. sand on his 
back in the endlessness he will make it. 
(IX. 17) 
. Tý&? -man, the "only -upright"-, for whom things. were "better, happier, for 
whom things can be all right, need take -, only -. vne -step Into the "'ruins". 
the indistinguishable and -endless . _nothingness -ýof -his 
', "true refuge" , 
(the leing towards which he is orientated) and -things, will be real and 
bright and -active as 
In the old days. 'Here 'Beckett , of fers us the 
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clue to the colour blue. The man's eyes are blue but so was (and will 
be) the sky: 
On him will rain again as in the blessed 
days of blue the passing cloud. 
(LE. 15) 
Now he is in the greyness, the "flatness", the "endlessness", timeless- 
ness and all the other lessnesses. But he is Dasein, the vehicle of 
Being, the user of the language that is the house of Being and for him 
(, a fortiori for his imagination as for Beckett's imagination or Malone's) 
there is a world of beings in his past and the possibility of catching 
up with Being in his future. Lessness offers us man in a world reduced 
to zero (as the title of the text implies; the French title is Sans) 
and shows us two perspectives on him: he can only be discussed in terms 
of past beings (the ruins he faces are only ruins because they were 
"four square"s the grey is only possible because of previous colour) 
and his return to them (his return, it seems, to himself) lies beyond 
a step into the absolute (Being) beyond which all will be restored to 
him ("true refuge long last.. ') 
In reading Lessness we are affected by the imagery, the associa- 
tions of Beckett's carefully-selected vocabularyt for this is liter- 
ature and not a scientific report. There is an overall impression of 
desolation, of man lost in the waste but paradoxically close to his 
true home, and of other subtler impressions that can be demonstrated 
by critical analysis. At Beckett's level of abstraction, however, it 
capnot be adequate to stop 'at this point, 
it cannot be enough -to say 
that the reader is given such-and-such an impression. These obviously 
metaphorical objects (and the text is packed with. solid and 'immediate 
things) cry out for interpretation. 'The -text --itself defies *the more 
superficial interpretationsfor instance of psychology, and-demands 
at least the sort of treatment it-receives in"Briau'Pinney's 'Since 
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How it Is (Finney, 1) - Finney at once assumes that a text of this 
sort is microcosmic and parabolic: 
In Lessness, then, the white box (of Ping) 
has fallen open, the consciousness has been 
released from its enclosed state of isola- 
tion to confront on "all sides endlessness 
earth sky as one. " Man is left confronting 
infinity, yet still unable to prevent hiur- 
self from making one more finite gesture. 
(Finney, 1,21) 
This is not uncharacteristic of the criticism of later Beckett, by 
Finney and others, and it shows a metaphysical reading of Beckett that 
seems essential. However, my thesis is that after two minutes at this 
sort of level we start to feel uncomfortable and that our discomfort is 
founded on the absence of a philosophical matrix within which to under- 
stand some of the propositions. jLhX does Beckett see man's conscious- 
ness as being "released from its enclosed state of isolation"? Why is 
m an "unable to prevent himself from making one more finite gesture"? 
Strictly speaking these questions are unanswerable, unless by Beckett 
himself, but we can certainly come closer to finding a convincing 
interpretation for ourselves if we apply ontological pictures to 
Beckett's picture and take them as far as we can. Heidegger's analysis 
of Daseinis one such picture. 
One thing that emerges from the parallel between Heidegger and 
Beckett -2. s a narrowing of the gap between the tendency towards silence 
represented by Breath and the meticulous construction of alternative 
worlds such as those of 
Lessness and'The Lost. -Ones. In-both, cases the 
A . -is to create metaphors. 
-Breath, creates ., a -metaphor .. for an onto- MM - 
jogical Insight by a careful selection of. sights and sounds, It. is -a 
dramatic literary sturcture just as -real. and. substantial as'King -Lear. 
Lessness selects other -materials -which, 'because there can be no sights 
or, sounds on &, printed page, consist of a greater numb6r of words, but 
jt toot is an artificial, metaphorical construct which illustrates an 
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ontological view. In both cases the metaphor is formally self-defeating; 
in Breath it is at once apparent that the fastest blink of an eye (or, 
strictly, an infinitesimal moment of time) would have been formally 
more correct if dramatically less effective. In Lessness it is 
essential to the subject exposed by the metaphor that the enviromp-nt 
of the text is actually invisible, although described, and that in 
spite of the phrase "he will make it", referring to the "one step", 
there is "no hold" in the sand. The point is that, given the 
inadequacy of all metaphors (the impossibility of "expressing") for 
Beckett's subject-matter, all his failures are failures in the same 
medium: the ontological parable. That is, they may be beautiful or 
impressive parables but the ontological reality to which they refer 
defies successful transposition into art. Thus we have the paradox 
of complete and satisfying artistic creations for which there is no 
satisfactory interpretation on principle. To understand this we need 
the aid of philosophers faced with the same impasse. 
***** 
ts 3- Hegel 
Beckett moves-from the surfaces to, the depths. He progressively 
excludes the human, the quotidian and the satiric to produce colder 
and more abstract pieces whose significance is increasingly to be found 
at an ontological level. One of the ways in which this happens is that 
in the ýP-xclusion of -the surface of reality the existence of the nar- 
, x, At6r. the-presence of the -author, are'brought into sharper-relief. 
While'there are kites and cars, pubs and, -pros titutes, to think. about 
--we -think,: zbout 
them,, but-where -thereIs -, nothing ý but, mud. or greyness 
, or'breath to think about ve are rapidly'thrown 
back -to', the conceiving 
-mind, the creator. 
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We have had warning of this, of course, in the constant authorial 
intrusions into the earlier work such as the opening and closing senten- 
ces of Chapter 6 of Murphy where the narrator reveals himself as both 
present and impatient. Then, more forcefully, we have seen the self- 
conscious narrator at work in the trilogy where the process of compo- 
sition is laid bare and the narratives are as much about the narration 
of narrative as they are about any of the stories narrated. "What 
tedium! ', c=ments Mal6ne, or perhaps Beckett, in Malone Dies. This 
tendency is radicalized in How It Is with its constant repetition of 
"I quote" and "I say them as I hear them" where the narrator is 
obtruding his presence even if only to disclaim responsibility for what 
he is narrating. This element remains in spite of everything that is 
thrown away. It appears in different guises; thus in the Texts For 
Nothing there is a con tinuing dialectic between "I" and "He" that sug- 
gests a breakdown in distinctions which at'-once' raises the question of 
the status of the narrator. The assu*mPtion tends to be that the nar- 
rator is "outside" his story, objectifying it just as the reader does, 
q 
but in the first Text this is disarmingly challenged: 
Eye ravening patient in the haggard 
vulture face, perhaps its carrion-time. 
I'm up there and I'm down'here, under 
my gaze, foundered, eyes'closed' ear 
cupped against the sucking peat: we're 
of one, mind, all of one-mind, ýalways 
were, deep down, we're fond of one 
another, but there it is, there's' 
nothing we can do for one another. 
73) (NK. 
,. -Here, as often 
in The Unnamable, 'Beckett .. offers us ýa direct. paradox,, 
I'm down-here. " -an oxywron in fact- 
"I'm up'there and Up there" is 
the author's positiOut the writer is "above" his ýmaterial, controlling 
the "scribe" of HowIt'Is. "Down'. heri'. `, 'is, wher-e the. action of 
_,,, fiction ýtakes -place . 
the arena, and the marrator 
_ý 
isAu, both . -Places he 
is-marrator and uarratedq under*his own gaze. 
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In the texts and shorts that make up the third period of Beckett's 
work, where surface reality is at its least significant, the confusion 
of identities, the mixing of pronouns and the interest we are conse- 
quently forced to take 
in the narrating self amount to a central issue. 
Not I offers an emblem of this. On the stage are an illuminated mouth, 
talking, and a silent auditor, listening. They represent an "I" and a 
"He" but in no simple manner. The mouth talks, babbling on in a stream 
of consciousness, interrupted and stimulated by some unheard questioner, 
but Mouth never utters the word "I". In sharp contrast to so many 
other Beckett texts, Not I in fact never uses the first person and, 
indeed, insists that everything narrated happened to "she" not to "I". 
But the auditor listens, a silent witness, a consciousness too. The 
"I" is both Mouth and Auditor, both the looker on and the performer, 
both "up there" and "down here". The Auditor is sorry for Mouth, his 
gestures being gestures of 
"helpless compassion". As we saw in the 
first Text for Nothing 'we're sorry for one another, but there it is, 
there's nothing we can do for one another. 
" Not I is about itself. 
In a text such as Imagination Dead Imagine the narrator is 
-"inside" the fictional world and explores-it with USI,, proposing ideas 
and rejecting them like an archaeologist.. -ýou a., dig and even including 
in the text the "you" whom he is. addressing. 
No trace anywhere of life,,, you say, 
pah, no difficulty there. *** 
(IM. 7) 
In For To End Yet ASain the first, phrase, which is the same as 
the title, -throws us into consideration of the -narrator -, and of 'the 
author. 'It is Beckett who 'has - ended - so, of ten,, - ended, only - to -recom- 
zence; it is the narrating of stories, I'vingY. - that -seems to -go on 
to an end beyond which, 
in-stead of silence, -there, is -the ýneed-to, eud 
again. 
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In this text we are once more in the endless lost whiteness of 
Lessness or Imagination and once more there is the sense of the narrator$ 
again conceived as an eyeq looking in on his own creation: "Eagle the 
eye that shall discern him now" he says of the reduced figure at the 
centre of this vanishing picture. 
What is being offered here is another level of parable. On this 
level these texts can be read in the light of an approach to the 
Hegelian Absolute. For Hegel, Being is merely a Scholastic universal 
rather than the profound mystery it is in Heidegger. The Hegelian 
system has Being at one extreme and Absolute Idea at the other, and 
there is a different sort of priority to be given to the concept 
Absolute Spirit. Absolute Spirit (or Mind, the German is the ambiguous 
Geist) represents the highest and purest activity of the human spirit, 
but it is beyond any individual human, an absolute and, as such, 
identical with Absolute Idea. This*is not the place to explain in any 
detail the logic behind these largest of Hegel's concepts 
9 but some 
glimpse of their mutual s-tructure may be caught in a sentence of 
Hegel's that orientates us in the right direction for Beckett. It-is 
the*last sentence of the last section of the Encyclopaedia. 
The eternal Idea, 'in full fruition, of 
its essence, eternally sets itself to 
work, engenders and enjoys itself as 
absolute Mind. 
(Hegel, 2,197) 
This describes either God or man. It also describes the process -of * 
, literary creation so self-consciously engaged 
in-. by'. Beckett-. and his 
narrators. Stace's gloss on this part -of , Hegel, is -as follows. 
To use metaphorical, i. e., religious 
language, one-may-say, that absolute 
-spirit is nothing less, than'the-spirit 
of God... and the-assertion that absolute 
spirit is the final phase; of -the human 
spirit means. no more than-that the. human 
spirit is of essentiallyýtheýsame'. kind 
as the spirit of. God, andý'that every--man 
is votentially divine. 
(Stace. -I. 11q% 
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If we do not use religious language we discover that we are talking 
about a picture of man in which, finally, a unity is achieved between 
himself (his consciousness) and some sort of absolute. This unity is 
strikingly akin to the object of man's "useless passion" according to 
Sartre. A unity between self-consciousness and the absolute would be 
the impossible pour-soi/en-soi entity called God. (So we have not been 
able to stay away from religion for very long. ) But this unity is 
displayed artistically in all its ambiguity in later Beckett who, at 
his most obscure and paradoxical, seems to me to be struggling to find 
a parable thatowill fit the Hegelian view. 
Hegel's Phenomenolo&Zv which was the subject of Chapter 2, has 
been described by Richard Kroner as 
A modern, itinerarium mentis ad Deum, 
"the journey of the mind to God. -ff-The 
knowledge of God, or the Absolute, is 
the final goal of this voyage 
(cf. Hegel, 3,44) 
This progress is somewhat parallel to Beckett's own. He, too, moves 
towards the absolutel or rather towards an adequate analogy for 
it, 
-sloughing off surface 
detail and becoming progressively more abstract 
as-he-tries to-find-the absolute simultaneously entirely outside and 
. entirely 
inside himself. The Phenomenology concludes with two sections 
(1,1teligion" and "Absolute Knowledge") which I sai d in Chapter-2 that 
11 
we would have to return 
to now. These sections are concerned with 
Absolute spirit and offer 
a triad of which this Absolute Spirit can. be 
z ai d to be c=posed: religion, art and philosophy. 
What -is most -stri- 
'Beckettian point of -view, 'is -that Hegel here king, from our _., proposes an 
. asingly close 
identit between-individual 
- 
incre -y -consciousness., and 
absolute -spirit., 
The "beautiful soul" isits-own 
knowledge Of it3elf'in its pure 
transparent unity - self-conscicnisness, 
which knows this pure knowledge ofpure 
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inwardness to be spirit, is not merely 
intuition of the divine, but the self- 
intuition of God Himself. 
(Pm. 795) 
This last embodiment of spirit - spirit 
which at once gives its complete and 
true content the form of self, and 
thereby realizes its notion, and in 
doing so remains within its own notion 
- this is Absolute Knowledge. 
(PH. 797) 
This-Absolute knowledge, the goal of art, religion and philosophy, 
depends on a relationship between Self and Spirit, between conscious- 
ness and Substance (in Beckettian terms, between "I" and "He") so 
intimate that even Hegel's dialectical method of showing how anti- 
theses "pass into" one another seems inadequate to describe it. In 
the end he has to invoke the metaphor of religion - man can achieve 
not merely an intuition of the divine but also a partaking in the Self- 
intuition of God himself. This sounds rather too satisfactory, too 
pleasantly closed a system to be a true paxallel with Beckett. More 
explains it in almost mystical terms: 
v 
God creates mantsconsciousness as an 
element in his own (God's) self- 
consciousness and therefore man's con- 
sciousness of God is self-consciousness, 
consciousness of himself as a constituent 
element of self-conscious God. 
(More. A,. 3) 
The important thing to remember, however, is that consciousness is 
radically and in -principle separated from -its objects, including itself. 
Thus the final step of union with God is -precluded, -for all Hegel's 
attempts at bridging the gap, and we are left with choosing'between -the 
-. pýýpOSLtJLOn that God 
(the Absolute) 
I. 
is human selfTOUsciousness, and 
., nothing -more and 
the proposition 'that God is still an object, 'for human 
se'lf-consr-lousnesst 2-n vhich case 
he -is'. Other and ýuot ", me*$' . '-For. Hegel, 
Paradoxically, Man 
is As -MUch God As 
it is Possible tO'be without . '-being 
God. Put another way, hullan consciousness ap proaches the absolute-and 
is made of the same stuff as the absolute but remains one step away from 
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being the absolute. 
Here we have a philosophical version of a central problem which 
Beckett gnaws at in all his work and which appears quite starkly in his 
third period. Progressively he takes his eyes off the world and tries 
to confront the Absolute; in Hegel's own way he finds himself bereft 
of all save himself and having been washed up against that rock (he 
cannot get rid of himself in order himself to meet the Absolute) he is 
dragged back like the sea only to form another wave that will uselessly 
break again against the unforgiving rock. Having "ended" he has never 
ended and he ýust end yet again. 
In his earlier work Beckett objectifies God in the manner of 
daily religion. (Hegel sees religion as a stage in the development of 
spirit, an objective and concrete prototype of the Absolute; at a later 
stage philosopy, like later Beckett, can try to do without this con- 
cretization. ) Most of Beckett's references to religion here are 
satirical, as in the case of Watt and Samý feeling most like God when 
they are feeding rats to other-rats. Sometimes he verges on, the 
mysticalq as in the case of Murphy's version of Nirvana or Watt's view 
of Mr Knott. What is more 
important for our discussion of thts early 
work, however, is the presence of the author because this, above all, 
is what will lead on to our Hegelian view; the satirical references 
to things Christian (and, especially, Catholic) are more to be taken 
as sallies Of wit- 
'In reading Murphy and'Watt we'have', no difficulty in identifying 
the author as-Mr Beckett. 'His are the footnotes, 'the, question-marks, 
the aside s -to the reader. "When we come"to the major, post-war work 
A, change is apparent- Godot and Endgame : retain . -a --vestige, of ýthe old 
,, objectification Of 
the divine', but--it-is only superficialýand it is 
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certainly negative; Godot does not come; "the bastard",. in Hamm's 
phrase, "doesn't exist. " The point is that by this time Beckett has 
started to withdraw from the outside world and there is considerable 
doubt cast on all "off-stage" existence. Similarly, in the trilogy, 
there is a marked tendency to get rid of the level of existence on 
which we come across policemen and bicycles and to move inside. What 
is happening in these plays and novels is happening "in here", that is, 
on stage, in Malone's mind, within a skull, between the reader's 
hands. Under these circumstances the presence of the narrator, or 
Mr Beckett,, takes on new significance. At least he, as its creator, 
is outside the world of the work of art. Of his existence as an 
external entity there can be no doubt even if everything else is 
dubious. Thus Beckett moves towards a style of writing in which what 
he creates is hermetically sealed off from the outside except in 
. so 
far as the narrator/author acts as a kind of safety-valve. -. 
Beckett gradually shuts the exit-doors and by the time, of The 
Unnamable there is only one door left open - the door to himself as 
author without which, 
in a celebrated phrase, nix. This explains why 
the Texts For Nothing never rose to the status of a novel -and were 
I 
published with less alacrity than -the trilogy*' 
" They, do-not'represent 
any advance over the trilogy 
from the point of view of the process I am 
describing. one of the Texts even descends to the specificity of 
"the South-Eastern Railway Terminus" (NK. 104), another'raises its' eyes 
to"'the beauty of the skies" 
(NK. 117). - These 'Impurities represent 
eAirnal elements, other ways out, although'it - must'be', admitted'that 
S2-9ns'90 uP. often en6 in these Texts the-"no exit". 
i Ough * as "f or ins tance: 
There's a vay-out, there, there's, '-a-vay 
out somewhere, to know, exactly, where 
would be a zere matter', of-time, -and 
patience, and, sequency of, thought,. and 
felicity of -expression. But the"body 
to get there-with,, where's-the, body? 
(NK*117) 
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In How It Is, as we have sqen, the references to any external pos- 
sibilities, slender as they are, are undercut by the repetition of "I 
0 
quote. " This is a writer writing the words he hears in his head, what 
he writes of is a sealed world, a hermetic picture of a perfect, if 
perfectly monstrousq reality belonging to and depending on an I, an eye, 
a perceiver. 
In this sealed world we are offered lost ones, people and things 
cut off from the light of the sun and the other stars and 
illuminated 
by the only remaining source of light, the only exit, the author's 
consciousness. This situation 
is a parable for a Hegelian ontology. 
In Hegel absolute reality, an all-encompassing concept outside of which 
there is nothings is connoted by human consciousness ("I") in Absolute 
y, j2owledge. In The Lost -Ones there -is a complete world with no way 
in 
or outs but Beckett 
(or a narrator) is looking in. Consciousness is 
essential to the Absolute 
but radically divorced from it;. Beckett's 
narrative (sometimes 
"I") is essential to the cylinder of the lost ones, 
it is the cylinder, but the cylinder is_not it, 
For To End Yet Azain offers a parable for this Hegelian "last 
state. " (The phrase 
2last. state"' is- frequent in the texts of -Beckett's 
third period and can perhaps 
be taken-as an equivalent., to--the extreme 
point in'Hegel's 
dialectic, the arrival of human spirit at Absolute 
Knowledge. ') The-world of the text'is-a world nearly_'ýfinished_and a 
-world still, just 
dimly perceived by ., an authortnarrator represented by 
lace"), -and Is ull. -At first the skull-issomevhere., L 
. 
bent, over a "board" but the Place-. and the, 'board 
"'fade. " "_The'_skull-, `is 
the writer, 'bowed over his -table, the, place, 
is ', the -, world,: external 
'I 
-This reality -fades leaving -only"! 
'remains". -memc)rje s the, 
internal reality Of thewriter's mind, 
"'remains -of ýthe days, of,, the 'light 
of day" which are made to 
if glimmer" so -that, "all at once or ý'by -degrees 
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there dawns and magic lingers a leaden dawn. " The narrative con- 
sciousness, like all consciousness, cannot rest at the end, in the 
darkness; whatever has been jettisoned or has faded the skull will be 
filled again with images and another text, such as For To End Yet Again, 
will uncoil its world. Here is the opening section of the text which 
I have just surnmarized and inter-preted: 
For to end yet again skull alone in a 
dark place pent bowed on a board to 
begin. Long thus to begin till the 
place fades followed by the board long 
after. For to end yet again skull alone 
in the dark the void no neck no face just 
the box last place of all in the dark the 
void. Place of remains where once used 
to gleam in the dark an and off used to 
glimmer a remain. Remains of the days of 
the light of day never light so faint as 
theirs so pale. Thus then the skull makes 
to glimmer again in lieu of going out. 
There in the end all at once or by degrees 
there dawns and magic lingers a leaden dawn-, 
(FTEYA. 11) 
The skull in the void seems an adequate preliminary sYmbol-, f or, con-,,, 
sciousness confronting the absolute. And then,, from consciousness, 
because of consciousness, a world emerges; faced with thelv, oid man 
must fill it, or, as Hegel 
has it, human spirit, aspiring to Absolute 
Spirit, must connote Absolute Knowledge. 
The sense of aloneness, of a, flickering speck isolated in the 
vast dark, is clearly symbolic of consciousness'in", 
its own radical 
subjective 
isolation. What makes a text such as-this so particularly 
appropriate as a metaphor 
for a metaphysical, -view, is that the position 
JOE, 
'; Ousciousness before'. the Absolute. 
is not only symbolized, by-the 
skull in the, void and the glimmer-in the 
dark,, it"is. also-symbolized 
by the writer (authorl narrator) in the act of creation, ýhe, 'too,, is 
an isolated mocient confronted with the absolute 
demand, of, the blank 
page. 
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The world of For To End Yet Again, the world created by Beckett, 
perceived by the skull, is an "ocean of dust" in which "the expelled" 
stands "stark erect amidst his ruins" (FTEYA, ll, -& 12) Here are remains 
indeed: "the expelled" reminds us of the story of the same name and the 
ýdust and the ruins remind us of Lessness and other texts. Into this 
grey world walk two white dwarfs who carry a litter. They seem to 
collect "the expelled" and 
bear him away, a mark of whiteness to be 
deciphered in all the grey. He falls out of the litter onto his back 
and the dwarfs, too, collapse and lie still. Their "ruins" are now 
"marble". The skull is "sepulchral" there is "no fear of your rising 
again. " (FTEYA, 14) Death seems to have overtaken them, but there is 
still a blue eye open in all the whiteness and greyness, enough 
consciousness left for the narrator to interpolate the word "hell": 
this is the "last state" for the "expelled" and for the "dwarfs" and :- 
they are buried in the skull, which explains why it is 1; sepulchrall'. 
They have been condemned to the hell within. Now the text ends with 
a difficult passage* In it we are given a picture of the skull 
(consciousness) dreaming of a real end (though it is ironic that' it 
is dreaming for that is another form of consciousness and thus no end. ) 
This corresponds to the author/narrator's attempt to 11 , get 
it. all, said, 
to Mr Beckett's desire to be released from his "hell of stories" and 
to mants hopeless desire for an end to mere knowledge and a-union with 
the absolute. 
And dream of a way in a space with neither 
here nor there where all the footsteps ever 
fell can never fareýnearer, to. snywhere_nor 
from anywhere further away. No, for-, -in the 
end for to end 'yet again by- degrees or ., as,. 
though sw: Lcched on dark fallsýthere again 
that certain dark that alone, certain-ashes'. 
cans 
Through it who knows yet another-end beneath 
a cloudless sky same dark -it earth and ýsky 
of a last end if ever - there"had -to be 
another, absolutely had to-be. 
(FTEYA, 15) 
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The "space with neither here nor there" is the absolute space (and time) 
known as infinity. Only when all is absolutely destroyed, in the 
darkness of the ashes of all knowledge, will it be the end. And if 
beyond that there is another, if there "absolutely, had to be" another, 
it too would be made of the "same dark", the dark of the "last end. " 
The aspiration here is not towards literal death. The text is 
laden with the imagery of death and decay but it is not a literal 
horror-story. The text is a parable for the anguish Of an unfulfilled 
consciousness, a parable for the last ontological gasp of the Hegelian 
dialectic. 
***** 
The Wellhead 
If these philosophical analogies work we have perhaps found a 
useful way of reading Beckett, particularly 
in hi's darker-moments and 
particularly in the third period of 
his work. In addition we hav ,e 
tested the common assumption that Beckett is a special sort'of writer 
connected in some way with philosophy, especially Existentialist 
philosophy. Having come so 
far it seems necessary to I go a little' 
_'further 
and to see -if our reading -implies a possible 'religious or 
mystical interpretation of 
Beckett. We have been employing concepts 
such as the Void, Being and the Absolute-in a Fay'thatAs suggestive 
, of another step. 
It is vell established that, 'Beckett is -prof oundly. conscious of 
, the 
detail, flavour and mystery of, the Christian, religion. '-One, of 
-the 
best -recent studies to elaborate . on'. this 
13 Hersh "Ziefman is 
, #Rpligious Imagery in the Plays of, SaTmiel Beckett"' (in' COHN; 3), written 
2. n 1975. This essay extracts all sorts of 
-hidden re'lig: *Lous references 
and undercurrents from several plays. making a-, special tour de 
-1 f orc'e 
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when considering Embers. The religious texture of this play is of tel 
well-hidden, but Ziefman uncovers it suggesting, for instances that 
Bolton's name is necessarily associated with Christ's being nailed (or 
bolted) on to the cross, and that Holloway's name is a reversal of 
Christ's claim to be the positive "way", in an impressive argument. 
Similarly Endgame and Godot are combed for their implicit religious 
content (the explicit content is clear enough) and the results confirm 
Beckett's near-obsession with the story of Christ, particularly of his 
death: the tramps support Lucky (Act One) and Pozzo (Act Two) one on 
each side like the thieves at the crucifixion; Endgame 
is set in a 
skull because the crucifixion took place at Golgotha - the place of the 
skull, and so on. This imagery, Ziefman says, constitutes "a Kyrie- 
eleison of suffering and despair. 
" (Cohn, 3.93) 1 quote-all this from 
this recent critic to suggest that Beckett's work is perhaps even, more 
permeated by, religious motifs than has been commonly thought,, but my,. 
main purpose is negative: Ziefman's essay 
is most interesting but it 
does not get us much further with an overall interpretation of Beckett's 
meaning. For that a different sort of approach seems 
indicated and 
T would offer as a model for this the approach taken'by Richard Coe 
in his essay "God and Samuel Beckett" of 1965 (in OH. ara, J. D. 1). This 
opens: 
The universe of Samuel Beckett is certainly 
as complex &3 that of any. other, living 
writer. Yet it is not a dream universe, 
like that of Jarry of Ionesco. It is a.,., -, 
metaphysical vision of. ultimate "reality'. ', 
constructed out of innumerable threads, of 
logic tightly interwoven, -out of, 
1ragmented 
arguments from Proust &nd, Descartes, _-_from,,. Geulincz, Malebranche and. 'Schopenhauer, 
from Dostaievsky. Wittgenstein, and-Sartre, -, 
each seemingly irrefutable, each'in its 
-right and proper place, and each,. Tushing 
headlong towards an Inescapable impossibility. 
AO'Hara J. D. 19'91) 
my contention, too, that Beckett's, vork': 
is a vision of ultimate 
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"reality" and it is for this very reason that I have tried to connect 
him to certain philosophers. 
The result of this approach is that the monstrous and cruel God 
revealed behind Beckett's works when they are read on Ziefman's level 
of religious imagery now stands a chance of appearing more positive. 
I believe that it is possible to offer some mitigation of Beckettian 
pess2=sm out of Beckett's own mouth and that this depends on a i* 
philosophical reading of his work. 
The conventional reading of Beckett arises from the assumption, 
quite correct as far as it goes, that he provokes bitter laughter 
at the delusory props of religion and then, casting them away as much 
as he is able to, considering his obsession with Christ crucified, 
0 plunges into an ever-darker world. His tone becomes less humorous and 
inore desperatev the mind of his narrator seems to be increasingly near 
the end of its tether. 
This reading is obviouslY valuable. However, if we go more 
deeply into the question and try to probe the meaning of Beckett's 
3=ginative constructs we 
find tentative answers In-parallels 'with 
certain philosophersq and, where Beckett-is at his most obscure 
particularly, where we 
feel the need for explanation most acutely, 
the appropriate philosophical analogues turn out to be surprisingly 
positive - Heidegger on the trail of Being, 
'Regel thinking through to 
thq Absolute. 'It is for this rea3on-that in the last chapter, I have 
dealt with our three philosophers in reverse order, -Btarting with 
sartre's Nothing and moving towards the-more positive ontologies. -' 
-am suggesting, ýa-movemeut that -This alternative 
movement vhich J 
is actually towards a more 'Positive world-view, vorks beyond. the 
0 consolations of conventional religion and 
beyond "the - comforts of .ý the 
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sort of philosophy with which Beckett became acquainted academically. 
Thus 'normal Christianity is derided and Geulincx, Descartes and the' 
others left behind. Like Heidegger, Beckett is trying to go beyond 
all that, beyond a world-view based on belief, beyond mere "Metaphysics" 
and be*yond reasoning of an Aristotelian sort. But, like Heidegger, 
he has not thus left philosophy behind (we can think of Heidegger's 
attempt to achieve a more "fundamental" ontology) and there is always 
left open the possibility of some profounder view of religion. 
The road through and beyond conventional religion and some sorts 
of philosophy is followed by our three philosophers and by, Beckett. 
Sartre limits himself to the road and nothing but the road -, in fact 
it is towards Nothing that he travels. This Nothing looms large'for 
Beckett but does not seem adequate as a description of his ina. 1 'mean- 
ing., As Coe putS it: 
L 
Behind "reality" lies the void, the 
Nothing, "than which naught is more 
real"; and it is from this concept 
of the void that Beckett's people 
start out on their pilgrimage in 
search of a new and more acceptable 
version of God. 
(O'Hara,, J. D.. l,, 100) 
This takes -us beyond Sartre just -as we are 
beyond Christian orthodoxy, - 
and Rationalism. Our next stage 
is Heidegger, who. certainly seemed 
close to Beckett in our discussions of 
him -in this, chapter and in 
chapter 3. Heidegger's view of Being 
has been adopted, as, is well 
known, by some modem theologians, notably Bultmann (Cf. Macquarrie.. 
2,. -PANsim-) Beyond -this perhaps -mystical pos sib 
i'lity-lies 
.: Hegel whos e, 
c=ceptjLon of the Absolute. although. 
'he himself -vould rejectýthe -label 
výmystic", =ust appear mystical to athe'st'c =aterialism-OUthe-sort 
-with which Beckett 
is normally credited. 
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We have left behind the well-known level of Beckett's anti- 
Christianity and we are trying to learn what is beyond this Sartrean 
pessimism and how far we can take Beckett into it. ý What we are trying 
to discover is, finally, what Beckett means on an. ontological, level. 
This is as far as a philosophical reading can take usýand, indeed, as 
far as any reading can take us. In passing I might observe that we 
need some explanation that will satisfy the paradoxical fact that 
Beckett's work is often found to be strangely comforting. It is a 
hideous journey on which he takes us, to the edge of the abyss, and 
when he reaches the edge (the end, of Endgame perhaps) he plunges over. 
If there is something Dantesque about this image that is not accidental, 
but is it merely the dark of Hell beyond the void, or is there light? 
Chapter 6 of Murphy,, the famous disquisition on Murphy's -mind, 
takes us into a cynical impasse which is the direct result of ration- 
alist dualism. A way out is, however, sukgested, and it is a mystical 
exit at least 
in tone, in that the third "zone": of Murphy's mind 
allows Murphy to conceive of himself as 
"a mote -in the dark of absolute 
freedom. " (M. 79) This religious-sounding claim is considerably 
developed and expanded in Watt. In this novel we find traces of'' 
mysticism in the visit of the Gail's to Mr Knott's house, 'in"Mr Knott 
himself, in the picture in Erskine's room of a, centre and a-circle and 
in half a dozen briefer references.,, The earliest trace of, the mystical 
in. Watt, however, and also the longest and most. convincing, is to be 
found in Arsene's "short statement"-vhir-h concludes part-one-of the 
_novel. 
This is not the, place for an extensive, analysis, -Of its twenty- 
five-pages, but the following Considerations zftay, 'help, -toýestablish 
the more positive philosophical and --religious viev, of Beckett .,, that I 
am attempting. 
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Arsene! s speech is packed with implicit Christian references which 
are not intended satirically or ironically. Christ -crucified is'not 
present here as a source of parody or bitter joking but 'in a more -, 
positive guise; in fact there is no escaping the conclusion that Arsene 
is' talking about Watt (or any other newly-arrived servant of Mr Knott's) 
as though he, Watt, were Christ. 
The man arrives! The dark ways all behind, 
all within, the long dark ways, in his 
head, in his side, in his hands and feet... 
(W. 37) 
The juxtaposition of these parts of the body reminds one irresistibly 
of Christ with his crown of thorns, the lance in his side, ý the nails 
in his hands and feet. And Beckett offers a background for his picture 
which suggests some of the details of early 'I tali an - paintings- of'the', 
CrUC2. IXI. On. 
The long blue days for his head, for his 
side, and the little paths for-his feet, 
and all the brightness to touch and 
gather. Through the grass the little 
mosspaths, bony with old roots, "and'the 
trees sticking up, and the flowers 
sticking up, and the fruit hanging down... ' 
(W. 37-38) 
The trees are perhaps the crosses and the f ruit their victims. Arsene 
remembers when be, too, was the man newly arrived: '` 
How I feel it all again, after so long, 
here, and here, and in my hands, and in 
my eyes, like a face raised,, a face 
offered, all trust and innocence and 
candour, all the old soil and fear and 
weakness offered, to be sponged away and 
forgiven. 
(W. 38) 
, Surely 
behind this picture stands an. lMage of'lChrist, innocent-but 
offering himself so that sin, the 
"old sOil'-'* -may', be -forgiven. 
My. present purpose is -to go beyond : this, -, beyond Beckett's playing 
with the detail of 
Christianity, to a more direct confrontation of, the 
sbgolute, but it is worth reflecting for a moment on -the ýsignificance 
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of this passage. Arsene, Watt, and other men, as servants of Mr Knott 
are specifically likened to the suffering Christ. Beckett's motivation 
here seems to be an extreme and radical version of Christianity: what 
is so terrible about the suffering of the Son of Man is that it is 
undergone not by God but by man. Arsene, however, as we have said, goes 
beyond this. 
The_. man has arrived at Mr Knott's house, having found the door 
he has "passed beyond it",, Mr Knott's house is the beyond. In this 
place he is "in his midst at last" and can taste- "the long joys of 
being himself" for here, although he may at first be indignant at 
having to work, he comes to see that work for Mr Knott is also ("and 
, indeed chiefly")-'for himself. "Calm and glad" he goes about his work, 
"calm and glad he witnesses and is witnessed. " (W. 39-40) But Mr Knott's 
servants do not rest here; one day something slips. Once they have 
reached the point where what is "inside" them and what is "Outside" 
them have become indistinguishable, in other words once the Sartrean-- 
Negelian identity of man with God has been established, a profound 
feeling of alienation erupts. 
My personal system was so distended at, the 
period of which I speak that the distinction 
between what was inside it and what was 
outside it was not at all easy to draw, 
Everything that happened happened inside it, 
and at the same time everything that happened 
happened outside it. k 
(W. 41-42) 
gere Beckett offers us a man vho has become the -man- -God, -the pour-soi- 
vho has connoted Absolute*Knowledge. 'But-he goes'beyon&this; 
something changes even 
in the absolute, somthing, slips. Arsene 
observes. that -the old yearning vas 
in f act'happiness, and -that ''to -have 
arrived at last is -not 
happiness. 
The glutton castaway, the drunkard in the 
desert, the lecher in prison, they are-the 
happy ones. 
'(W. 43) 
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This could be taken as a symbol of Beckett's whole endeavour: to f all 
silent in the bosom of God is the goal but no answer, the end but no 
conclusion. 
Arsene feels he has to offer an explanation of the "change" that 
takes place, and we await his explanation with impatience as it will 
offer, perhaps, Beckett's conception of what is beyond the absolute, 
beyond God. Arsene says this: 
In my opinion it was not an illusion, as 
long as it lasted, that presence of what 
did not exist, that presence without, that 
presence within. 
(W. 43) 
This conforms to the theme of negativity in Watt; Mr Knott is not; 
resting in his establishmentis only the first step, the second leads 
man to see that the master for whom he works is absent, but this absence 
is not a simple absence: beyond man's quotidian conception of God lies 
an ineffable mystery, a "presence which does not exist. " The servants 
i. revolve about Mr Knott 
"in tireless love" (W. 61) and they "nest a 
little while in his branches" (W. 56) but there is a problem about him 
in that he must have had a beginning and he must have an end or else 
how is time possible? The answer to this-is the equivalent of the 
ýIlchange_" 
which 
-offers the "presence which did not exist. " Arsene 
vonders: 
Or is there a coming that is not a coming 
to, a going that-is not a going from, a 
shadow that is not the shadow of purpose, 
-or'not? 
(W. 56) 
TAs speculation is at once in keeping, with'. themystery of Arsene's 
"change"ýand'with the sort-of-paradoxical mysticism in which the 
mXsterium, tremendumboth'is and'is-not. "Later -.. in -the novel, -in -the 
, episode of the Galls. father and. son, Watt. himself experiences the 
change and he describes It in these -s=e paradoxical 'terms, -terms 
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expressive of the God beyond God and of the identity between the Void 
and the Absolute: "a thing that was nothing had happened. " (W. 73) 
After the Second World War, Beckett's work developed and matured 
as we have seen. One text stands out from this period as exploring 
further'the-theme of positive assertion of some exit, some beyond, 
- some hope however empty and paradoxical. This is the significantly- 
entitled The Calmative written in French in 1946. (NK. 25-42)- 
This text contains the usual Beckettian miseries, which I shall 
take as read, and the usual uncertainties as to who is writing and 
whether the events narrated can seriously aspire to the status of 
existent entities'or not. But it is also remarkable for its optimistic 
elements. The ancient (or dead) narrator enters a town by the Shepherd's 
Gate (the Good Shepherd's? anyway he sees not "a soul" there, "only 
the first bats like flying crucifixions") on a Sunday. He sits on a 
capstan at the waterside and gazes out to sea, but there is no help 
there (in this "dead haven") and he looks at a flagstone because he 
has always found that help comes from the earth not from the sky. When 
he looks up he sees a young boy in biblical rags holding a goat; the 
boy offers him a sweet but departs'before they can converse.. 'When the 
narrator'himself moves onle 'describes his "getting back" (to where? ) 
as "noti.. quite empty-handed. " He goes into a church, which he prefers 
to call a cathedral, and he climbs a tower at high speed, coming out 
into*, the night. Back-inýthe street he accosts a stranger to ask the 
6ý'me, 'or something, a'ný -he *discovers -to ýhis surprise that"he has ""no 
pain -whatever" -at this point. 'He falls asleep on -a bench and wakes 
up-to'find alman'beside him with, whom'he'talks. "The, man, on discover- 
ing--that the'narrator has-no money, seizes him but startstalking 
kindly, to him'in-a way-that-generates a, moment of optimism: 
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Between the carm 
rowelling my neck 
But gradually the 
devastating hope, 
dare. 
3ing voice and the fingers 
the contrast was striking. 
two things merged in a 
if I dare say so, and I 
(NK. 39) 
After this the man offers him one of his one-and-sixpenny phials in 
exchange for a kiss, which is duly given. Then he departs "with 
radiant smile. " 
My pains were back, but with something 
untoward which prevented my wrapping them 
round me. 
(NK. 40) 
The text ends with the dawn, for all this has taken place at night, 
but the dawn seems as much within him as without. He cannot see the 
stars: 
For the light I steeped in put out the 
stars, assuming they were. there, which I 
doubted, remembering the clouds. 
(NK. 42) 
This can certainly be-read as if the light is now emanating from the 
narrator. A comparison could be made with the dawn that rises on 
Watt, once Arsene has left, bringing in "the day without precedent 
at last. " (W. 63) 
I think-thereis a suggestion inThe Calmative that the-narrator 
meets the young Christ, who behaves with characteristic charity. This 
boy is holding a sinner"in the shape of the goat and is-taking him 
away to look after him. Appropriatelyýtheýnarrator feels,. after the 
'boy has gone away. that'he should have asked him what his father did. 
Orice again we move. from the presence, the, existence, of the-man who 
was Christ to the-absence and-Ineffability of the'nothingithat is"God. 
And for once, man, in ýthe shape of ýthe -man an the bench, is kind and 
good and'Ithis. immediately creates a "devastating, hope. " Interestingly 
this follows on a-visit. to-, a church and an-attempt to-ascend to-God. 
God iszotýthere at the'top, of the-tower. 'ýbuthope seems to'be 
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available at ground level, at the level of man. Yet the Cathedral is 
necessary, the Chriýtian beackground is essentialq humanism is 
certainly not enough, the absent God, God the Void, is paradoxically 
ever-present. 
This more positive element in Beckett (though we have seen some 
reasons to qualify that adjective) is also present in the trilogy. 
Besides a large number of anticlerical and antireligious jokes in the 
Moran section of Molloy and-many other veiled and overt references to 
Christianity, the trilogy contains some remarkably mystical and even 
optimistic moments. I shall limit myself to a discussion of the most 
striking of these. It is to be found in the closing section of the 
first part of Molloy. Here, more perhaps than anywhere in Beckett's 
mature work, the clouds lift for. an-instant and the narrator seems to 
have arrived. 
The last forty-five lines of the first part of Molloy are an 
tmdoubted relief and the traces of light they contain must be looked 
at against the darkness of what precedes them. 
And true enough-the day came when the 
forest ended and I, saw the light ... I 
opened, m yý eyes -and I -saw 'I had arrived. 
, -(TO'90) 
Molloy has fallen into a ditch and this has woken him up, it seems. 
He looks across the vast,. plain onto which he has emerged from the 
forest and on the horizon he, sees the-towirs. -aad-. steeple of a-town. 
He relapses for a1ew lines into the old bitterness, ("How could I drag 
myself over that vast-moor? ") but then-the-light-returns with, an 
optimism quite astonishing in Beckett. 
Tortunately, for, jue at this painful j unc- 
ture.... I hearda voice telling me"not, to 
fret, that help--wasr-oming. --'Literally... 
Don't fret'Molloy,, we're coming. 
ý(T. 9 1) 
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This seems to be somewhat devalued by the ensuing sentence ("Well, I 
suppose you have to try everything once, succour included, to get a 
complete picture of the resources of their planet. ") 
birds ("skylarks perhaps") and then, nearing the end 
paragraph that constitutes his monologue, he says "I 
Thus he obeys the voice. "It must have been spring" 
remains in the ditch, he even longs to be back in th, 
"not a real longing", he has arrived somewhere. 
But Molloy hears 
of the one hu. ge 
did not fret. " 
he says. He 
e forest, but it is 
The tone of this passage is a remarkable lightening of the 
Beckettian gloom, but one aspect of its specific content-seems to 
demand analysis from a philosophical point of view. Whose is the voice? 
In conformity with our earlier discussion in which the external 
voice in Beckett's prose is taken to be the author's I think we can 
I 
see this voice as Beckett himself reassuring Molloy that he is getting 
to the end and that he will soon be relieved by Moran. H; wever, also 
in conformity with that discussion, this relationship between creator 
q 
and created is also that between God and creature. In An Existentialist 
Theology John Ifacquarrie summarizes this development in sentences which 
can easily -apply to Beckett. 
If man-in the ocean of what is, possibility 
entangled in. facticity, were the whole 
picture, the only-logical outcome would seem 
;o be that heroism of despair, the determina- 
tion to be myself within and in spite of-the 
limitations of a miserable existence, which 
we associate with Heidegger and'Sartre... 
But on the other hand, if anxiety discloses 
'the possibility-of a-ground of being, being 
'itself, beyond the contingency of, lboth Vorhandenheit and Existenz, that is, divine 
1e interpreted as 'We-ing, m'a-n-Ts finitudemay b 
-creatureliuess. 
: (Macquarrie, '2, '-80) 
'With the introduction of the external, voite, especially the'voite 
bringing comfort and succDur, _ Beckett is opening, the door-. to "'being 
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itself" and to a view of man not as self-dependent, as has often seemed 
the case in other parts of his work, but as "creaturely. " 
Enrico Garzilli, in Circles Without Center (a pregnantly Becket- 
tian title if we'think of Watt) suggests that we can take this a stage 
further to a synthesis of an atheistic view with the Christian view in 
an overall interpretation of Beckett. This is based on the Prologue to 
St. John's Gospel in which Logos and Theos are seen as created (and, 
especially, created word) and creator. This duality underlies the 
relationship between God and Man, between God the Father and Christ, 
Vetween the narrator and the narrated, between self-consciousness and 
the self. Here we have a development of the Sartrean slogan about man 
making himself: "The person is most himself when he creates ... The 
person ultimately is one who is creating himself as he lives" (Garzilli, 
1,144-149) This brings in Heidegger, Sartre and a Christian view and 
in fact also echoes Hegel. Consciousness, for Garzilli, "looks back" 
at its creator just as human spirit, in Hegel, looks at Absolute Spirit. 
Thus the "voice" of Molloy is God, the Absolute, the author, the 
self, consciousness. Under a certain light all these are identical. - 
This-mystical intuition is perhaps the final depth. in Beckett, the 
mystery towards which his parables aspire but which they never attain 
for the end of all these attempts, if they are unsuccessful, is 
, failure, and, if they are successful, is nothing. As Coe puts it 
Just as the Self is the-inconceivable 
Want of silence behind the words of 
lanFage, so also "God" is the"Total 
Nothing behind the word which is 
'Creation. 
(O'Hara, -J.. D. 1,111) 
Or,. as Charles Glicksberg has-it in 14odern. Literature and the, Death of 
God, 
When literary nihilism... is carried to an 
extreme, it then comes full circle and 
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approaches the condition of "negative 
theology"... The literary nihilist... 
#I is a mystic manque. 
(Glicksberg, 1,99) 
Beckett strenuously attempts the impossible and his task is pro- 
foundly human, whence perhaps the consolation to be derived from his 
work. Nietzsche expresses his position with strange accuracy: 
But that "other world", that inhuman, 
dehumanized world which is a heavenly 
Nothing, is well hidden from men; and 
the belly of being does not speak to 
man, except as man. 
(Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 59) 
It is in the impossible going-on that Beckett, as man, speaks to us as 
man and it is within that discourse that Being is to be found, if 
anywhere. Like all metaphysical entities, Being, God, the Self, the 
. Absolute, "are brought into being by someone's wielding them in 
discourse. 1110 Beckett creates the conditions of-metaphysical pos- 
11 sibility in his discourse, and at times this is quite specific. 'I 
can conclude with two examples. 
The Voice (appropriately enough) in Cascando speaks this over 
the Music: 
moturther ... no-more searching... to 
find him ... in the dark... to see him... 
for whom ... that's it ... no matter... 
never him ... never right ... start again 
... in the dark ... done with that ... this 
time... it's the right one... we're 
there ... nearly ... finish - (p. 44) 
This voice, the voice of philosophical discourse, the foundation of 
'the possibility of metaphysics, is Beckett's own and offers an abstract 
summary of his total, project. "Words", in Words and Music,, offers 
a, more concrete, and therefore more metaphorical, surimary of, the same 
ontological process with its inevitable, but-unattainable, mystical 
, goal: 
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then down a little way 
Through the trash 
Towards where 
All dark no begging 
No giving no words 
No sense no need 
Through the scum 
Down a little way 
To whence one glimpse 
of that wellhead. 
(P. 35) 
vt 
. wv I 
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Notes to Chapter 5 
1. The most thorough chronology of Beckett's work that is readily 
available appears, on unnumbered pages, at the beginning of Ruby Cohn's book Back to Beckett (Cohn, 2. ) 
2.1 give the date both in conformity with academic convention and 
for a purpose. The purpose is to point out that the, Three 
Dialogues, although now printed together with the essay on 
Proust of 1931, are not in fact early, Joycean work like that 
essay (and like Beckett's essay in Our Exa&Mination...., of 
course) but belong to his second, post-war period and are the 
artistic theory of the man then currently engaged upon the 
trilogy and the Texts for Nothing. 
3. For information concerning this lost work cf Deirdre Bair's 
biography, Samuel Beckett, pp. 253-257. 
Cf. for example, the end of the "Existenz" section of Chapter 
3. above. 
Here, as a Beckettian aside, we can remember the Unnamable's 
statement already quoted: "I shall say therefore that our 
beginnings coincide, that this place was made for me, and I 
for it, at the same instant. " (T. 298) 
6. Beckett's essay on Joyce in Our Exagmination of 1929 is entitled 
"Dante ... Bruno. Vico ... Joyce. " The first story in More Pricks 
than Kicks of 1934 is "Dante and the Lobster". etc, etc. 
7. This may need a precis to render it intelligible. I suggest: 
"Man is the being that questions Being; the meaning of Being 
must lie inside man; the answer lies within the question; Being 
only il a question for man because man is by definition the 
questioner of Being. " 
8. -Heidegger is prestunably. speaking metaphorically here. 'There are 
-languages that dolnot possessýthe'verb "'to be",,. Arabic-for 
example, although'the concept "being" can be present'in such 
languages. 
9. For a clear and concise summary of the relationsip between 
Ibsolute'Idea, Absolute Spirit. and their associated. concepts 
cf. Stace, 1, pp. 101 ff. 
10. Elmer Sprague, Met! Rhysical -Thinking, New'York: OUPs 1978 '(P. 4. ) 
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